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Foreword
Traditionally the Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA) each year publishes a
volume in this series reflecting on a particular research topic. This year’s topic is
related to both research and the MSc programme on Compliance and Integrity in
International Military Trade (CIIMT). They both focus on a wide variety of sci-
entific ingredients like economics, export control, ethics, and legal aspects. With
this point of view the volume distinguishes itself from what it is common in the
literature on this subject, namely, a monodisciplinary approach. The same breadth
of expert areas is also offered in the corresponding education programme at the
NLDA.
A substantial number of contributions deal with Export Control, which is a
subject of increasing interest for the Ministry of Defence (MOD). A violation of
trade legislation may result in negative consequences like limited access to
military-strategic items and financial claims. The strictest body of regulations is a
United States regime for controlling and restricting the export of military tech-
nologies called the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which
will of course be considered in this volume.
Although it may seem a relatively new topic, regimes of modern export control
date back to the “Trading with Enemies Act” (USA, 1917) and the “Import, Export
and Customs Power Act” (UK, 1939). ITAR was enacted at a later date during the
Cold War (1976). ITAR’s prominence has increased over the years, leading to the
implementation of export compliance programmes by US exporters. Also for the
MOD this prominence and the possible negative consequences gave rise to the
development of more research and education programmes by the NLDA.
Case studies of non-compliance are presented in this book, including its causes,
consequences and ways of working around the control. I am convinced that besides
the theoretical discussions these kinds of analyses provide a better understanding
of the topic, making it more valuable for everyone dealing with the compliance and
export control.
I am very pleased that the authors also included a chapter on the Dutch history of
arms exports in which a historian elaborates on arms exports and arms export
control in the Dutch Republic, from 1585–1621. By then there was already a strong
v
need for arms export control, far before the US and UK Acts were enacted in the
last century. The interests and benefits yielded by the Republic are analysed in the
last chapter.
Finally I want to congratulate all the authors and editors for this extensive and
thorough overview of this very important topic, which will definitely serve as a very
good background in compliance and integrity in international military trade.
Patrick Oonincx
Dean of Faculty Military Sciences
Netherlands Defence Academy
Breda/Den Helder, The Netherlands
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Abstract This year’s volume of the Netherlands Annual Review ofMilitary Studies
(NL ARMS) offers an interdisciplinary view on the domain of Compliance and
Integrity in International Military Trade (CIIMT), integrating defence economics,
international law, arms export control frameworks and policies, informationmanage-
ment, organizational sciences and ethics. Although in academia, and from an interdis-
ciplinary perspective, CIIMT constitutes a novel research domain, across private and
public defence-related sectors, the subject evokes high levels of attention and interest,
instigating a need for critical thinking, reflection and creativity to address ensuing
multi-faceted issues and problems. From 2017, the Faculty of Military Sciences
(FMS) at the Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA) has offered an in-house MSc
programme on CIIMT, which, by integrating practice-based and scientific-based
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knowledge, aims to contribute to this need. The NLARMS 2021 comprises, amongst
others, contributions from students and lecturers partaking in this programme.
Keywords Compliance · integrity · international military trade · (arms) export
control · strategic trade control · strategic trade control frameworks
1.1 Introduction
Re-imposing United States (US) sanctions against Iran, the US-China trade war,
US threats on account of high-technology exports to China from the European
Union (EU), the termination of theUS-Russian treaty on Intermediate-RangeNuclear
Forces (INF), the political turmoil surrounding the Nordstream-2 pipeline project,
or selling military-strategic items under the flag of humanitarian support constitute
examples of recent events with potential geopolitical consequences.
The examples above hold another thing in common. To some degree, they are
related to the arms trade.As compared tomost other goods, commodities and services,
the international arms trade is extensively controlled. The need to exercise effec-
tive control over international arms transfers is acknowledged, almost globally, and
grounded in specific international regimes, arrangements and treaties, on national
laws and regulations, as well as in standards and principles.
In research, varying concepts are applied to render meaning to control. For
example, military strategists refer to arms control,1 whereas lawyers employ export
control2 and economists arms export control3 to express both similar as well as very
dissimilar control notions, inherent to their domains.Moreover, next to these concepts
of control, in literature, measures such as economic sanctions4 and arms embargoes5
serve as manifest forms of more or less effective controls, and the Financial Action
Task Force, by imposing regulations to counter money laundering and terrorism
financing, also aims to oppose the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.6
To prevent possible quagmires springing from differences in terminology, NL
ARMS2021 onCompliance and Integrity in InternationalMilitary Trade (CIIMT), in
this introductory chapter, applies strategic trade control as an encompassing notion.7
To us, the editors, strategic trade control relates to all efforts undertaken by countries
and international organisations, such as theEuropeanUnion, to design and implement
measures to regulate international movements of military-strategic goods and dual
use items that are able to exacerbate ongoing conflicts, contribute to destabilizing
weapons build-ups, or can be used in violations of human rights. Moreover, the
1 Gray 1992; Smith 2009, p. 87.
2 Aubin and Idiart 2016.
3 Smith and Garcia-Alonso 2006.
4 Afesorgbor 2019.
5 Brzoska and Lopez 2009.
6 Joosten et al. 2019; Stewart et al. 2020.
7 Dill and Stewart 2015; Salisbury 2013.
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concept of strategic trade control frameworks is applied to clarify variations in the
development, design and operational use of strategic trade controls across nations.
Such clarification is considered necessary as national strategic control frameworks
serve as the foundations underpinning multilateral frameworks.
Strategic trade controls imply strategic relationships between defence-related
public and private sectors, comprising industries, firms, governments, universities
and research institutes, and international institutions. Strategic trade control frame-
works shape the business environment and regulatory contexts in which industries
must operate, navigate and remain aligned to, both nationally and internationally,
in order to conduct and sustain business relating to the transfer of controlled items.
Due to its complex nature and evolving policy landscape, compliance with strategic
trade controls can incur high levels of costs, additional resources, and ongoing
commitments, both from industry and end-users.
Two significant trends have become visible over the last two decades. First, regula-
tions to improve international security are regularly abused for economic purposes,
as illustrated by the recent trade war between China and the US.8 Second, dual-
use items, in particular emerging technologies, are gaining importance. Both trends
instigate novel monitoring issues, thereby rendering strategic trade policies subject
to continuous change.9
Violation of strategic trade legislationmay hold severe consequences, for instance,
limited access to military-strategic items, loss of trade privileges, fines, reputational
damage and even prison sentences. In this respect, and compounded by its extraterri-
torial effect, the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) is considered
the strictest body of regulations.10
Compliancewith trade control regulations is not only the responsibility of defence-
related industries, but, instead, stretches to encompass end-users, such as the armed
forces. It has to be noted, however, that, in striving to act compliant with trade
control regulations the relation between compliance and integrity remains essential.11
Integrity is the primary requirement in any compliance process, whereas acting ‘in
compliance with’ is understood as an act associated with integrity. Likewise, when
shaping an ethical culture based on integrity, such acting ‘in compliance with’ as
well as the standards that are part of the object of compliance are to be incorporated.
There is no recipe for constructing the best relation between integrity and compli-
ance, for, as such relations are context-dependent, they are being shaped in actual
organizational practices. In this regard, build-in mechanisms to gain insight and
awareness on integrity-compliance relations will influence organizational decision-
making processes on trading military goods or services to a suspicious country.
Rather than responding reactively, when particular transactions are causing societal
outrage, an ethical culture enables organizations to act pro-actively, by incorporating
8 Heidenkamp et al. 2013, p. 105; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2005, p. 27.
9 Brandt 1994; Kytömäki 2014; Jones 2020.
10 Heidenkamp et al. 2013, p. 113.
11 Achterbergh and Vriens 2009, pp. 376–377.
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reflection on their principles in relation to what legal standards demand as part of
their business processes (see Chap. 6 of this volume).
Strategic trade controls and -frameworks do not only derive their relevance from
a strategic perspective. Rather, they challenge all organizations and their members
that are partaking in the supply-chain of military-relevant or dual-use items. This
constitutes the main focus of the interdisciplinary MSc programme on Compliance
and Integrity in International Military Trade (CIIMT). As both lecturers and students
contribute to NL ARMS 2021, the next section provides an overview of the CIIMT
MSc programme.
1.2 The Compliance and Integrity in International Military
Trade (CIIMT) Master Programme
The MSc programme on CIIMT is concerned with exploring, analysing, under-
standing, explaining, controlling and improving the military dimension in inter-
national military trade. More particularly, CIIMT studies managerial questions
regarding strategic trade control of military and dual-use goods and services. These
questions comprise defence economic, ethical, organizational, legal and strategic
elements (e.g., human rights, international order and security).
1.2.1 Focus of the MSc Programme on CIIMT
The programme is primarily designed to cater to the needs of military and civilian
defence personnel, including EU, NATO, from all services and commands and
defence-relevant industries, agencies and research centres, active in the field. By inte-
grating scientific based- and practice based knowledge, it aims to develop academic
professionals that are able to generate and implement problem solving strategies and
management decisions to further compliance and integrity in strategic trade control
of international trade in military and dual use goods and services.
To this end, the CIIMT MSc ties in with the FMS-NLDA vision on scientific
education, embedded in Schön’s reflective practitioners’ paradigm.12 This paradigm
unites both management and leadership skills needed to decide and operate in high-
tension and high-risk knowledge intensive environments. FMS uses the reflective
practitioners’ paradigm to refer to critical thinking, reflection, and Bildung that char-
acterize its thinking doers, the so-called Thinking Soldiers, either at the academic
Bachelor’s or Master’s level.
In view of the complexity of international trade of military and dual-use goods
and services, the rapid evolvement of strategic trade control and -frameworks, and
12 Schön 1983; 1987.
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their importance to procurement processes, defence organizations require innova-
tive thinking doers, that, based on in-depth understanding, from an interdisciplinary
perspective can be expected to find- and take responsibility for creative solutions.
1.2.2 Learning Styles and Structure of the MSc Programme
on CIIMT
Thepart-timeprogramme is taught over the course of twoyears, totalling 60European
Credit Transfer andAccumulation System (ECTS) credits and consists of 10modules
(see Fig 1.1). With the exception of the thesis, each module is structured in five
independent learning weeks, one contact week and one experiential learning week.
Independent learning takes place in preparation on the contact weeks. By means
of ‘guided’ self-study, students study parts of literature and prepare assignments.
Independent learning, as a workingmethod, does not prevent students to consult their
peers, teaching staff or their colleagues in the organization. As such, independent
learning is related to experiential learning as wll. Key to experiential learning is
Module EC Title Discipline Leids 
Level






2 5 International business in defence 
markets and law





3 5 A legal perspective on strategic 
trade
Law, ethics, defence 
economics
500
4 5 Managing compliance and 
integrity in military organizations
Ethics, system theory, 
organization theory, defence 
economics
500
5 5 Designing internal compliance 
programs
Information systems, internal 
control
500
6 5 Monitoring and auditing internal 
compliance programs
Information systems, internal 
control, auditing
500
7 5 Research methods Research methods 500
8 5 Managing relationships in non-
compliance contexts




9 5 Integration project related to 
aspects of ICP in business 
environments
All previous modules 600
10 15 Master Thesis (including
individual research proposal)
All previous modules 600
Total 60
Fig. 1.1 Curriculum of MSc programme Compliance and Integrity in International Military Trade
Source Beeres et al. 2021
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that students engage in a dialogue within their organization by sharing new insights
and applying these to (e.g., problem identification, -analysis and solution) in their
professional field. As such, experiential learning may not only benefit the student but
the organization aswell.Moreover, experiential learning contributes to the deepening
of understanding and the integration of scientific- and practice based knowledge.
The programmederives its coherence from the following structure. First, by taking
an outside-in perspective, modules 1–4 provide an interdisciplinary context from
which strategic trade control in international trade of military and dual-use goods
and services can be understood.
Next, building on this background, the program proceeds to deepen the students’
understanding of particular control and information aspects within organizations by
studying (the feasibility and boundaries of) re-designing, implementing, monitoring
and auditing internal compliance programs (ICPs) within organizations. Students are
involved in how to construct an ICP. To this end, modules 5 and 6 integrate practice-
based knowledge and skills, stemming from experience in the field, with scientific-
based knowledge on information systems and internal control. By sharing knowledge
and experience, students and teaching staff learn from each other. Building on these
modules and the module on research methods (module 7), it becomes possible to
study and discuss problems, challenges and controversies, such as, managing non-
compliant behaviour or conflicts of interest within and between organizations in
international trade in military and dual use goods and services (module 8). The Inte-
gration Project (module 9), subsequently, draws from all previous modules, enabling
students to conduct their own interdisciplinary research, based on their selection of
ICP key elements in relation to a specific business environment and using appropriate
research methods. The Integration Project can be seen as a stepping stone to writing
the master thesis (module 10).
1.3 Outline of NL ARMS 2021
As elaborated on previously, due to our focus on specific managerial questions
regarding the international arms trade, studying (the management of) strategic trade
control requires an interdisciplinary approach. Although from the literature it appears
that various disciplines contribute studies to either the international arms trade, export
control, arms export control, or compliance and integrity, to date, research connecting
and integrating these concepts, however, remains to be undertaken.
For this reason, as well as to add to this novel interdisciplinary knowledge domain
and to underpin theMSc programme, the editors have chosen to provide the contribu-
tors to NLARMS 2021 with as much leeway as possible to think creatively in adding
their expertise to thismultifaceted field. In fact, we have asked them to become reflec-
tive practitioners themselves! We want to express our gratitude to all the authors for
delivering their contributions to this volume.
Despite our extending a free rein, all contributions could be groupedmeaningfully
into two categories. The first category consists of research we consider basic (i.e.,
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underpinning the first four modules of the MSc programme on CIIMT), while within
the second category, we distinguish chapters that apply knowledge to address specific
managerial issues/questions, thereby integrating both scientific- and practice-based
knowledge on strategic arms trade (frameworks).
Moreover, and to interconnect research and education, students of the CIIMT
MSc programme have been invited to contribute to this volume also. As a result,
NL ARMS 2021 in Chaps. 4, 10 and 14 presents its readers with three case-studies
based on papers written by students (2019/2021). Students were asked to recognize,
analyse and respond to non-compliant and/or unethical behaviour within and by
organizations in the context of arms export control, in accordance with the Problem-
Oriented Policing (POP)-guide template. Although designed for policingwork, POP-
guides offer a method to deal with deviant behaviour in general. Also, the focus on
crime holds similarities to situations of non-compliance or breaches of integrity.
The template consists of four consecutive stages, Scanning (describing the case,
particularly the salient individual, organizational factors motivating the deviant
behaviour and the regulatory and (inter-) organizational context); Analysis (in-depth
analysis of the underlying structural conditions and causes of the deviant behaviour
including the micro-, meso- and macro-level origins and factors, e.g., psychological,
organizational and (inter)national policy and regulation);13 Response (designing a
possible ad-hoc (crises management) and a systemic (internal control) manner of
addressing the case’s challenge); and Assessment (reflecting on the analysis and the
effectiveness of the chosen response in relation to external (regulatory/ legal) and
internal standards, and drawing lessons for future cases).14
In Chap. 2, van Lieshout and Beeres contribute to filling the knowledge gap by
investigating why, how and to what extent economic motives and the international
arms trade are interrelated. More in particular, the authors analyse the development
of explicit sets of relationships between dependent and independent variables in the
international arms trade, from 1995 onwards. Although an economic-based literature
review results in a number of relevant studies on the international arms trade, the
authors argue, as a research domain, CIIMT remains understudied andwill benefit by
connecting with insights from neighbouring economic fields. To this end, the authors
offer a future research agenda.
DeBruin, in Chap. 3, investigates present-day challenges and opportunities within
the system of export control regimes (i.e., the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia
Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar Arrangement).
The systemof export control regimes is considered an important instrument to prevent
both the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons, as
well as to control dual-use products. De Bruin favours a paradigm-based regime over
the current weapon-based regime. In addition, the author recommends to revise the
regimes’ decision-making processes to respond more swiftly to developments in the
field.
13 Hodson and Jensen 2013.
14 Braga 2008, p. 15.
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The first case study, by Klappe and Keunen, in Chap. 4, discusses a case of
non-compliance by Fokker Services. From 2005 to 2010, Fokker Services failed to
complywith the economic sanctions theUSGovernment had established against Iran
and Sudan. Klappe and Keunen analyse how the company operated while evading
export control, breaching sanction regimes and export control laws, thereby, paying
attention to the roles of top and middle management during everyday activities.
In Chap. 5, Voetelinkmaps the field of international export control law. The author
refers to export control as a set of domestic and international laws and regulations,
policy rules and commitments, applicable to and regulating export, re-export, transit,
and transfer, in anymanner, pertaining to goods, technology, and software. Over time,
domestic and international export control law has developed into a challenging and
dynamic legal discipline. Although not being an established legal sub-discipline in
its own right, Voetelink argues the critical importance of considering related parts
of export control law comprehensively to understand their impact on international
military trade.
Timmermans, in Chap. 6, explores the multifaceted relationship between compli-
ance and integrity. The author constructs a framework to analyse how compliance
and integrity concepts invoke each other at different levels. The framework helps to
unearth and understand the often implicit (organisational) design choices, shaping
this relationship in particular real-life situations. Besides offering a more detailed
understanding, the framework aids to pinpoint the aspects in the relationship between
compliance and integrity that currently remain underdeveloped. To this end, Timmer-
mans argues for additional research to shed light on how integrity and compliance
overlap and supplement each other in terms of content and/or process, both in theory
and in organizational practices.
Splinter and Klomp, in Chap. 7, explore whether economic sanctions are able
to trigger sudden economic growth collapses. Their results clearly demonstrate that
economic sanctions hold a significant positive effect on the likelihood of a growth
deceleration in the first three years after the first threat signals or actual imposition.
In particular, trade sanctions, multilateral sanctions, and sanctions aiming at the
business sector cause sudden negative growth accelerations.
In Chap. 8, Saitova and Beeres present the results of their search for data sources
to provide insight in the characteristics, types and qualities of aircraft designed for
combat purposes, the total market volume (entries, movements and exits), as well
as each aircraft’s financial equivalents, over a specific period of time. The authors
conclude that to conduct their empirical investigation into the factors contributing to
the worldwide demand and supply of fixed-wing combat aircraft, sufficient data can
be availed of. However, this data comes at a price.
In Chap. 9, Klomp and Beeres investigate whether the legal origin of a
country influences the likelihood of ratification of multilateral international treaties
concerning arms control. The authors expect civil-law countries to be more likely to
ratify treaties than common-law countries. The empirical results clearly confirm this
expectation. In particular, civil-law countries have ratified about nine percent more
treaties than common-law countries.
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The second case study, by Türkalp and Dekkers, in Chap. 10, looks at a fictitious
case of sharing parts and services among NATO partner nations. Although, NATO’s
goals require close cooperation between partner nations on operational readiness,
interoperability of their systems, material supplies, transfer of technology and joint
R&D projects, a common approach on the application and implementation of arms
export controls appears to be largely absent. This case study, in the context of the
material logistical support and services provided by the NATO Support and Procure-
ment Agency (NSPA), investigates the lack of applying and implementing arms
export controls.
In Chap. 11, Voetelink addresses the issue of extraterritoriality of US export
control and sanctions legislation. The author discusses, inter alia, the notion that
US export controls ‘follow the part’, thereby extending US jurisdiction over any
item that has left US territory, even when this item has been incorporated into a
new foreign-built object. As goods do not possess a nationality, the extraterritorial
reach of these provisions cannot be based on the national principle or on any other
principle of jurisdiction. Also, extraterritorial sanctions provisions have not given
rise to coordinated foreign protests in general. The author concludes that “the need
for the US to enact extraterritorial sanctions legislation will only be taken away when
the US and its allied trading partners are prepared to better coordinate their foreign
policy objective”.
In Chap. 12, De Schryver and Demmink address the F-35 program’s international
defence supply chain. Multiple exports across the supply chain are subject to intri-
cate licensing and export controls. Drawing on insights from governance and contract
theory, the authors apply contract-boundary-spanning governance mechanisms as a
theoretical lens to highlight important trade compliance challenges within the supply
chain network. The authors find that while serious efforts have been made by various
state actors and legislators to reduce the burden regarding trade compliance require-
ments in the F-35 program, the industry still faces a considerable number of compli-
ance challenges. It is argued, that, to overcome these challenges, private parties
in defence supply chain networks need to undertake contract-boundary-spanning
initiatives.
In Chap. 13, Bogers, Beeres and Smetsers, using a four-level dashboard, offer
both a quantitative and qualitative analysis on the effectiveness of the recent arms
embargo against Saudi Arabia. The authors elaborate on the question as to how
political, security and economic motives have impacted the (un)willingness of major
arms selling states to join the arms embargo against Saudi Arabia.
The third case study, conducted byNieboer and vanManen, in Chap. 14, discusses
the fictitious case of an unauthorized transfer of a so-called Dronebuster under the
US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Using the POP-guide as a
framework, the authors investigate underlying causes and conditions. According to
the authors, a mix of hard and soft controls used in a coordinated effort may turn out
the best effects in preventing unauthorized behaviour.
In Chap. 15, Bertrand and van Riet investigate the process of developing an
Internal Compliance Program (ICP) for the Royal Netherlands Airforce (RNLAF).
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By combining a PESTL analysis, the legal framework and the selected ICP Frame-
works, the authors have devised an 11-pillars ICP, which they consider the most
adequate for the RNLAF.
Finally, in Chap. 16, taking a historical perspective, De Jong elaborates on arms
exports and arms export control in the Dutch Republic, from 1585 to 1621. Nothing
new under the sun, it would seem. The author discusses the need for arms export
(controls) at the time, and the interests and benefits yielded by the Republic, in doing
so.
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Abstract Taking an economic perspective, and underpinned by a literature review,
this chapter analyses the development of explicit sets of relationships between depen-
dent and independent variables in the international arms trade from 1995 onwards.
We distinguish five main categories within the markets of military and dual-use
goods and services, comprisingweapons ofmass destruction,majorweapon systems,
small arms and light weapons, dual-use goods, and services. Per category, papers are
ordered by research type and methodology. Based on our findings thus far, the final
section of the chapter offers a research agenda for further studies.
Keywords Arms trade · weapons of mass destruction · major weapon systems ·
small arms and light weapons · dual-use goods and services · arms export control
2.1 Introduction
Over the years, either openly or covertly, weapons have been traded across borders,
despite multiple domestic and international regulations aiming to control, forbid,
prohibit or protect such arms commerce.1 During the Cold War, arms trade and
transfers were mainly considered and commented on from an ideological point of
view.2 After the fall of the BerlinWall economic drivers gained importance in confer-
ring meaning to the motives and consequences underlying arms transfers. From then
on, access to foreign markets has been regarded essential for a thriving domestic
arms industry in the long run.
In 1995, conducting a review on the relations between economicmotives and arms
trade, Anderton stated: “The end of the Cold War has increased the relative impor-
tance of economic causes and consequences of arms transfers. Unfortunately, there is
surprisingly little theoretical and empirical development of arms trade”.3 According
to the author, the main cause for this knowledge gap lies in the “failure, to date,
to develop explicit sets of formal relationships between dependent and independent
variables”, which Anderton primarily attributes to “a lack of trying”.4
Just over a quarter of a century later, this chapter aims to revisit Anderton’s
seminal research. More specifically, the question we ask in the title, ‘What do we
know?’ refers to our interest in theoretical and empirical developments regarding
explicit sets of relationships between dependent and independent variables in the
international arms trade, over the past 25 years. To take stock of research findings
to this effect, primarily, the literature review focuses on conjectures, refutations
and/or confirmations instead of on “descriptive compilations of data, case studies
1 Kempf 2016, pp. 4–29; Stohl and Grillot 2009, pp. 10–40; Voetelink 2017, p. 378.
2 Kempf 2016, p. 30.
3 Anderton 1995, p. 524.
4 Anderton 1995, p. 535.
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and journalistic accounts”.5 However, to achieve an overarching picture on state-of-
the-art economics of arms exports, we have also included more descriptive findings
in our review.
Within the scope of this volume, we will not redo Anderton’s analysis fully.
Instead, this chapter, as mentioned above, offers our initial findings regarding the
progress made to fill the knowledge gap regarding why, how and to what extent
economic motives and the international arms trade are interrelated.
The remaining part of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section
outlines the research methodology, to be followed by the chapter’s main body,
entailing the results of the literature study. Next, these findings will be analysed,
to be followed by some concluding remarks and an agenda for future research.
2.2 Research Methodology
Literature reviews require transparent processes, characterized by clear steps and
considered decisions on the selection of papers.6 In this section, first, we will define
this research’s scope, and the selection methods and criteria we have applied. Last,
this sectionwill offer a synthesizedoverview, basedon additional research (from1995
onwards) on the explicit sets of relationships between dependent and independent
variables in the international arms trade.
Before proceeding with the remaining part of this methodology section, first,
we elaborate shortly on the five categories, generally distinguished in the interna-
tional arms trade, of military and dual-use goods and services.7 These categories
comprise weapons of mass destruction, major weapon systems, small arms and
light weapons, dual-use goods, and services (e.g., training and maintenance).8 Each
category raises specific managerial challenges and controversies, requiring different
market structures and control mechanisms.
Although widespread consensus exists as to the control of proliferation of chem-
ical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, this cannot be said about general
controls regarding the sales of conventional weapons. With respect to conventional
weapons, it is useful to distinguish major weapon systems from small arms and
light weapons. Compared to major weapon systems, the market for light weapons
is more difficult to control, partly because major weapon systems are supplied by
an oligopoly, whereas light weapons are competitively supplied by large number of
producers. Dual-use systems raise unique difficulties, such as the spread of military-
relevant knowledge via civil trade transactions. Services are becoming increasingly
important in the transfer of military-relevant knowledge and technology.
5 Anderton 1995, p. 525.
6 Kalkman 2020.
7 Smith and Udis 2001, p. 82.
8 Levine and Smith 1997, pp. 340–341; Smith and Garcia-Alonso 2006, p. 29; Smith andUdis 2001,
p. 82.
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2.2.1 Scope
Our literature review focuses on the ways in which economic motives and the inter-
national arms trade are (inter)related. The chapter’s scope, therefore, remains limited
to research that contributes to understanding the economic drivers prompting inter-
national trade ofmilitary and dual-use goods and services. Literature on international
lawandother adjacent domains, have not been included in the review.Wedo acknowl-
edge these domains’ important contributions to a broader area of expertise, as well as
their attention to some economic parameters concerning the international arms trade.
However, in general, these adjacent bodies of literature will not directly contribute
to improved understanding of the theoretical and empirical developments regarding
explicit sets of relationships between dependent and independent variables in the
international arms trade over the past 25 years.
2.2.2 Selection
The literature review underpinning this research has been restricted to published
and peer reviewed academic papers, in English. Books and book chapters have been
used as supporting literature. Queries used in Google Scholar are “arms exports”,
“(international) arms trade”, “economics of arms trade” and “economics of arms
exports”. These queries are chosen, based on relevance and coverage, as key words
for papers regarding our actual research interests.
Table 2.1 provides an overview of our classification of the selected papers. For
each category (i.e., weapons of mass destruction (WMD), major weapon systems
(MWS), small arms and light weapons (SALW), dual-use technologies or goods
(DUG), and (5) services (SERV)), papers are ordered by research type (theoretical
or empirical) and methodology (analytical, descriptive, exploratory, testing). We
added a sixth category, general (GEN), for research papers that discuss the market
of military and dual-use goods and services in general -often analytical- terms.
As of yet, our dataset—in progress—consists of 30 papers (see Table 2.1). Two
papers span more than one category (which is why the columns ‘theoretical’ and
‘empirical’ in Table 2.2 add up to 32 instead of 30). Berryman provides an analysis of
bothmajor weapon systems andweapons ofmass destruction.9 Fuhrmann researches
the relationship between both dual-use and weapons of mass destruction.10
Table 2.2 aims to provide insights into the most important contribution the papers
add to literature. Looking at research into the differing categories of weapon systems,
it turns out most studies are conducted into markets for major weapons systems
9 Berryman 2000, p. 85.
10 Fuhrmann 2009b, p. 7.
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Table 2.1 Selected papers on the economics of exporting arms
Paper Market Research type Methodology
Akerman and Larsson Seim (2014) MWS Empirical Exploratory
Berryman (2000) WMD/MWS Empirical Descriptive
Blum (2019) MWS Theoretical Testing
Craft (2000) MWS Theoretical Testing
Dunne and Smith (2016) MWS Empirical Descriptive
Fuhrmann (2008) DUG Theoretical Testing
Fuhrmann (2009a) DUG Theoretical Testing
Fuhrmann (2009b) WMD/DUG Theoretical Testing
Fuhrmann and Tkach (2015) WMD Theoretical Testing
Garcia-Alonso and Levine (2007) GEN Theoretical Analytical
Golde and Tishler (2004) GEN Theoretical Analytical
Holtom and Bromley (2010) GEN Empirical Descriptive
Khanna and Chapman (2010) MWS Empirical Exploratory
Killicoat (2006) SALW Empirical Testing
Klare (1996) MWS Empirical Descriptive
Levine et al. (1998) MWS Empirical Exploratory
Levine and Smith (1995) GEN Theoretical Analytical
Levine and Smith (1997) GEN Theoretical Analytical
Levine and Smith (2000a) GEN Theoretical Analytical
Levine and Smith (2000b) GEN Theoretical Analytical
Martinez-Zarzoso and Johanssen (2019) MWS Theoretical Testing
Moore (2010) MWS Theoretical Testing
Pamp et al. (2018) MWS Theoretical Testing
Pamp and Thurner (2017) MWS Theoretical Testing
Sandler (2000) GEN Theoretical Descriptive
Seyoum (2017) DUG Theoretical Exploratory
Smith and Tasiran (2005) MWS Empirical Exploratory
Smith and Udis (2001) GEN Theoretical Descriptive
Thurner et al. (2019) MWS Theoretical Testing
Thurner et al. (2020) MWS Theoretical Testing
Source van Lieshout and Beeres 2021
(Row MWS; n = 15).11 As to studies on dual-use goods (Row DUG; n = 4);12
11 Akerman and Larsson Seim 2014; Berryman 2000; Blum 2019; Craft 2000; Dunne and Smith
2016; Khanna and Chapman 2010; Klare 1996; Levine et al. 1998;Martinez-Zarzoso and Johanssen
2019; Moore 2010; Pamp et al. 2018; Pamp and Turner 2017; Smith and Tasiran 2005; Thurner
et al. 2019, 2020.
12 Fuhrmann 2008, 2009a, b; Seyoum 2017.
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Table 2.2 Papers on the economics of exporting arms
Categories Theoretical Empirical Analytical Descriptive Exploratory Testing
WMD 2 1 – 1 – 2
MWS 8 7 – 3 4 8
SALW 1 – – – – 1
DUG 4 – – – 1 3
SERV – – – – – –
GEN 8 1 6 3 – –
N 23 9 6 7 5 14
Source van Lieshout and Beeres 2021
weapon of mass destruction equals 4 (RowWMD; n= 3).13 Last, and least popular,
apparently, are studies on small arms and light weapons (Row SALW; n = 1).14
Most theoretical papers test developed theories using empirical data collections.
Two exceptions are to be made. Regarding the dual-use category, Seyoum develops
hypotheses regarding export control that could be tested (for this reason we consider
this study both theoretical and exploratory). Next, although all papers in the ‘general’
category are considered theoretical, they either develop analytical models (n = 6)15
or deliver a general perspective on the most important theoretical issues concerning
arms trade and export control (n = 3).16 Empirical papers are either descriptive or
exploratory.
2.2.3 Research Synthesis
Our analysis of the collected papers reflects a growing academic interest in the
economics of arms trade over the last decades. The earliest papers develop analytical
models. Researchers look for variables and parameters, that according to them, are
important to map the field empirically. Next, they engage in systematic empirical
descriptive research by actually collecting variables and parameters to be followed
by an empirical exploratory phase, during which hypotheses are developed. Last,
hypotheses are tested during the theoretical testing phase, when it is studied whether
the relationships between dependent and independent variables that have been formu-
lated, actually do appear. Researchers focused on finding reasons, motives and expla-
nations for decisions to buy or sell arms, per category (e.g., Killicoat on SALW).17
13 Berryman 2000; Fuhrmann 2009b; Fuhrmann and Tkach 2015.
14 Killicoat 2006.
15 Garcia-Alonso and Levine 2007; Golde and Tishler 2004; Levine and Smith
1995, 1997, 2000a, b.
16 Holtom and Bromley 2010; Sandler 2000; Smith and Udis 2001.
17 Killicoat 2006.
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A majority of papers is built on quantitative analysis of a combination of datasets.
Data on statistics per state and on procurement of arms are used for explanatory
analysis throughout the years of relevant research. Few authors enrich quantitative
projects with qualitative methods.18 Due to legal reporting requirements, data sets on
national defence expenditures became available and turned out to be useful sources
for further research (e.g., Pamp and Thurner).19 The availability of data resulted in a
certain progress in gaining knowledge on arms exports, leading to the development
of theoretical models, starting with a rather traditional supply and demand model,20
ending (for the time being) with network modelling.21
In the next section, we will illustrate both theoretical and empirical developments
regarding explicit sets of relationships between dependent and independent variables
in the international arms trade, over the past 25 years. In doing so, we will focus on
four out of six categories of military and dual-use goods and services identified (i.e.,
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), major weapon systems (MWS), small arms
and light weapons (SALW) and dual purpose goods (DUG)). As we have not been
able to identify any academic papers on the category services (SERV), we have
decided to exclude this category. The same applies to the category ‘general’ (GEN),
as, from literature, it appears no hypotheses testing is being undertaken.
2.3 Weapons of Mass Destruction
This section discusses two papers and offers a brief conclusion.
2.3.1 Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful
Nuclear Cooperation Agreements22
This paper’s main question is: To what extent does civilian nuclear assistance raise
the risk of the proliferation of nuclear weapons? Answers are provided both by
qualitative analysis—showing the effect of nuclear assistance on proliferation—as
well as quantitative analysis—to explain and test this effect. The study’s dependent
variables are ‘the initiation of a nuclear weapons program’ and ‘the acquisition of
nuclear weapons of the state receiving nuclear assistance’. The ‘aggregate number
of nuclear cooperation agreements’ between two states and ‘security threats’ are
the most important explanatory variables. The ‘aggregate number of nuclear coop-
eration agreements’ is operationalized using different data sets, spanning the years
18 Fuhrmann 2009b.
19 Pamp and Thurner 2017.
20 Levine et al. 1994.
21 Thurner et al. 2019, 2020.
22 Fuhrmann 2009b.
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1945–2000. The main results are: (1) states receiving civilian nuclear assistance are
more likely to start a nuclear weapons program than states that do not and (2) states
receiving nuclear assistance are more likely to acquire nuclear weapons. If and when
“countries generally want to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and if nuclear coop-
eration agreements lead to proliferation”, based on these findings another question
pops up: Why (for what reason) should civilian nuclear assistance be extended to
countries, that cannot yet avail of such capacities?23
2.3.2 Almost Nuclear: Introducing the Nuclear Latency
Dataset24
In their paper, Fuhrmann and Tkach investigate the relationship between the capacity
of building nuclear weapons (i.e., nuclear latency) and international conflict, using
a dataset on nuclear latency that is introduced concurrently. The paper’s main ques-
tion is: ‘Does having nuclear latency reduce the likelihood of being targeted in an
armed conflict’? The dependent variable is ‘initiation of militarized conflict between
states’. The authors introduce four independent variables, ‘target country has nuclear
latency’; ‘challenging state has nuclear latency’; ‘target country has an active nuclear
bomb program’ and, last, ‘challenging state has an active bomb program’. Fuhrmann
and Tkach find that possessing nuclear latency as a potential target reduces the risk of
conflict. However, if and when challenging states hold nuclear latency, there will be
no reduction of the risk of conflict. This study’s main finding is that trade in (nuclear)
enrichment and reprocessing facilities should be monitored, as merely being able to
make nuclear bombs appears (at least) as powerful as actually possessing nuclear
weapons. For within this category, trade does not exist.
2.3.3 Research on Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Do
We Know?
The papers discussed above increase our knowledge on the issue of nuclear prolif-
eration. Both the decision to provide civilian nuclear assistance and the decision to
obtain latent nuclear capabilities appear essential steps in the proliferation process.
Further investigation into the motives for countries to provide and to obtain nuclear
capabilities is warranted.
23 Fuhrmann 2009b, p. 41.
24 Fuhrmann and Tkach 2015.
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2.4 Major Weapon Systems
As it turns out from our literature review, from 1995 onwards most studies have been
conducted on the category of military goods and services. The following sections
will discuss seven papers, offering a brief conclusion at the end.
2.4.1 The Gravity of Arms25
The main research question of this paper is: What are the determinants of interna-
tional arms transfers? In answering this question, the authors show the impact of
several economic, political and security factors on (1) the probability of trading arms
and (2) the value of arms transfers. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, containing
information on values of shipments between two parties, is used for quantitative
analysis. Moreover, relevant sources are added to obtain data on economic and polit-
ical factors. The main question is analysed by applying an economics based gravity
model framework, augmented by political and security motives. Determinants of the
‘probability of trading arms’ and ‘volume traded’ aremodelled and analysed. Results
on the probability of arms transfers between two states as well as the value of such
transfers, follow the theory of gravity (i.e., the probability increases whenever coun-
tries are closer to each other, whilst decreasing when there is more distance -both
physically and politically). Economic factors (e.g., wealth) and security factors (e.g.,
the presence or absence of the threat of conflict) affect the value of arms transfers.
However, most effects are quite small. The authors argue that the “end of the Cold
War appears to have changed the impact of several political factors, especially those
measuring the political and security factors”.26 However, the authors also conclude
that upon the fall of the Berlin Wall “it is crucial to consider political factors, such
as the level of democracy or the political orientation, as explanatory factors of the
arms trade”.27
2.4.2 Arming the Embargoed28
Moore asks:Why do states continue to transfer arms to embargoed states? The depen-
dent variables being ‘the occurrence of a violation of an U.N. arms embargo’ and
‘the volume of an occurring violation’. Moore’s analysis takes different explanatory
variables into account, such as ‘arms dependence of embargoed states’, ‘common
policy interests’ and variables such as ‘military expenditure’, ‘total arms imports’
25 Martinez-Zarzoso and Johannsen 2019.
26 Martinez-Zarzoso and Johannsen 2019, p. 3.
27 Martinez-Zarzoso and Johannsen 2019, p. 3.
28 Moore 2010.
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and ‘arms export dependence’. Results show that embargoes on arms transfers are not
that effective as they are meant to be. Selling states violate arms embargoes mainly
because of their own strategic interests. The volumes of arms exports to embargoed
states are increasing whenever importing states sand arms exporting states share
similar political interests. Regarding the dynamics of the international arms trade
and exports, Moore shows that arms embargoes do not negatively influence arms
exports. A weapons ban does not usually stop weapon sales.
2.4.3 Arms Production, National Defence Spending
and Arms Trade29
The paper’s main question is: How do national defence spending and arms transfers
relate to sales of military goods? The dependent variable is ‘total sales of arms
and military services’. ‘Total national spending on defence’ and ‘arms exports and
imports’ are added as explanatory variables. It turns out that defence spending has a
positive effect on arms sales of the same country: a one per cent increase in defence
spending results in a 1.2 per cent increase in arms sales. The export of arms generates
a similar but however more modest effect on sales. Arms imports do not affect
total arms sales of the importing country. Results show that importing weapons
does not replace national arms production, but, rather, complements it. This paper’s
findings show how supply and demand for military goods and services are related.
Confirmation is found in the relations between sales of arms and arms exports on
one side and between sales and defence spending on the other. The finding that arms
imports are complementary to homemade weapon systems, in our view, is the most
important result of this research.
2.4.4 Trading Arms and the Demand for Military
Expenditure30
Pamp and Thurner investigate the influence of the international arms trade on
domestic military spending. Using SIPRI data on major weapon systems from 1949
until 2013, the authors apply regression analysis to establish the effects of the levels
of arms imports and arms exports as independent variables on the dependent variable
military expenditures, controlling for democracy and wealth and size of population.
Results show that military spending increases when arms imports increase. The same
effect is found with control variables measuring military conflict; more conflicts
induce more military spending. In democratic states, increases in arms exports result
29 Blum 2019.
30 Pamp and Thurner 2017.
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in decreased domestic military spending. The paper’s main finding holds that “arms
exports to allied countries could be used strategically to reduce the defence burden”.
2.4.5 Arm Your Friends and Save on Defence?31
Elaborating on their former paper, Pamp, Dendorfer and Thurner proceed to further
investigate the question: How do arms export decisions affect decisions about
domestic military spending? To this end, the authors develop a formal model to
explain suggested interactions or relations between both decisions. SIPRI data on
arms trade and military expenditures are used in an extended model, derived from
Levine, Sen and Smith.32 The dependent variable is ‘military expenditures’ and
the main independent variable is ‘arms exports’. An interaction dummy variable
is included in the form of positive security externality. If and when arms exports
generate such positive security externality and, moreover, two aligned democracies
are involved, countries appear motivated to spend less on their domestic defence
budgets. The paper’s main finding is that arms exports between friends offer the
exporting country an opportunity to decrease domestic defence expenditures, thus,
selling leads to savings.
2.4.6 Network Interdependencies and the Evolution
of the International Arms Trade33
This paper aims to clarify the structure of international networks in the field of
exchangeof defence technology, and, to this effect, the paper takes a network-oriented
approach. The existence of any arms export relationship between two parties (yes/no)
serves as dependent variable. Additional explanatory variables are wealth (GDP),
gravity model variables (distance, trade restrictions), regime similarity, defence
agreement and intra-state conflict and path dependency. Main findings include that,
as opposed to what would randomly be expected, countries actually maintain less
export and import relationships with other countries, in combination with a low
rate of reciprocation (due the fact the number of countries outranks the number of
arms suppliers). Because of dependencies on arms supplying companies or states,
relationships tend to linger, the same applies to relations between states which are
politically similar to each other. Alliance memberships, transactional costs and GDP
of exporting and importing states have strong (positive) influences on the probability
of arms transfers. In the imperfect arms market, international relationships are not
restricted to dyadic relations; two states trading arms with the same third party tend
31 Pamp et al. 2018.
32 Levine et al. 1994.
33 Thurner et al. 2019, 2020.
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to have a similar relationship with one another. Besides the corroborating these find-
ings -in previous studies on network modelling, this paper contributes knowledge
on more complex relations between arms exporting- and importing countries. Two
states selling arms to the same friend, appear highly probable to also trade weapons
with each other. The international arms trade should therefore be understood as a
network, instead of one-to-one relations. This fundamentally adds to knowledge on
the structure of the international arms market.
2.4.7 Research into Major Weapon Systems: What Do We
Know?
We conclude international trade in major weapon systems is influenced by multiple
factors. Based on the papers discussed above, from 1995 onwards the importance of
economic motives underlying major weapon systems transfers has been increasing.
Moreover, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, strategic and political factors in this
segment of the international arms trade have remained influential. Also, in research,
relations between national defence spending and the transfer of major weapon
systems are increasingly gaining attention. Partly this may be due to the fact that
the SIPRI database accommodates researchers with data at a low cost. However,
hypotheses testing on strategic benefits to be gained (e.g., reduction of national
defence burdens) by exporting major weapon systems remain understudied. To
us, studies geared towards “describing, explaining and even predicting the struc-
ture of the international arms trade network” regarding major weapon systems is
an interesting development, that should, in future, include export control laws and
regulations, particularly ITAR.
2.5 Small Arms and Light Weapons
This section discusses one paper.
2.5.1 Weaponomics, the Economics of Small Arms34
The main question put forward in this paper is: What are the key determinants of
assault rifle prices? To this end, over four time periods, the author has collected
prices and related characteristics of the AK-47 assault rifle, and proceeded to test
four factors, potentially determining the rifle’s price, ‘income’; ‘motivation to buy’;
‘regulation’ and ‘supply costs’. Based on this data, Killicoat constructs a weapon-
price determinants model. Out of the four factors mentioned above, regulation and
34 Killicoat 2006.
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supply costs are the two significant factors determining the price of the AK-47. Two
variables on the demand side, showing some evidence in affecting prices of SALW,
are increasing income and government effectiveness. Based on the results Killicoat
provides additional insight into the determinants of the price of the AK-47; the rifle
most bought and used all over the world.
2.5.2 Research into Small Arms and Light Weapons: What
Do We Know?
Besides finding that, as yet, theoretical research and testing on SALWremains scarce,
we conclude that studies in this field provide determinants on prices of assault rifles. It
appears interesting to conduct similar studies, applying additional determinants also,
and, extending these investigations to include other weapon systems -and categories-
as well.
2.6 Dual-Use Goods
In this section we discuss two papers.
2.6.1 Exporting Weapons of Mass Destruction?35
This paper sets out to find the determinants for dual-use trade in the post-Cold War
era. Since data on the trade of dual-use goods itself are not available, the quantitative
analysis is based on a data-set containing export licenses from the US to more than
one hundred countries. The dependent variable is ‘the volume of dual-use exports’,
which is operationalized as (1) the quantity of approved export licenses and (2) the
total value of those licensed exports, in US dollars. Multiple independent variables
(democracy, alliance sharing), indicator variables (military conflict, likelihood of
conflict, states’ pursuit of the acquisition of nuclear weapons) are selected. Effects
of WMD acquisition and -pursuit on the trade of dual-use goods are tested by using
two interaction variables (does a country own WMD and does a country pursue
WMD). Main findings are that democracies received more dual-use exports than
non-democratic states and dual-use goods are sold to countries that do not face
security threats.
35 Fuhrmann 2008.
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2.6.2 Taking a Walk on the Supply Side: The Determinants
of Civil Nuclear Cooperation36
This paper asks: ‘Why and when do states transfer nuclear technology, materials and
knowledge to other states, for peaceful purposes’? To address this question the paper
provides a quantitative analysis using a database on nuclear production capabilities
and a self-compiled data set with agreements on civilian nuclear cooperation, nuclear
suppliers and potential recipients for all agreements, over the period 1950–2000.
The dependent variable in the analysis is ‘the probability of peaceful nuclear assis-
tance’. Independent variables are ‘shared enemies’, ‘superpower enemies’, ‘mili-
tary alliances’, ‘joint democracy’ and ‘militarized conflict’. Control variables are
‘economic variables’ (i.e., GDP, distance), ‘nuclear proliferation’ and ‘contagion’
(i.e., whether or not a neighbouring state receives nuclear aid). From the anal-
ysis it appears that three independent variables hold negative effects on the prob-
ability of peaceful nuclear assistance, i.e., conflict, distance and having signed a
non-proliferation treaty. All other independent variables hold significant positive
effects, except the variable on shared enemy. The paper’s major finding is that the
market for nuclear weapons, as measured by the indicator civilian nuclear assis-
tance, is determined by strategic interests of states, able to supply nuclear goods and
services. Most evident, the paper finds that states offer nuclear assistance to render
their allies, enemies of their enemies, alliances and other democracies stronger.
2.6.3 Research into Dual-Use Goods: What Do We Know?
To date, theoretical research and testing on dual-use goods remains scarce. More
studies into the determinants of prices and volumes of dual-use goods and services
seem required, especially regarding the demands and requirements posed by export
control laws and regulations, to this end. Seyoum’s paper offers an interesting,
explorative theoretical framework to do just that.37
2.7 Analysis
Taking an economic perspective, and underpinned by a literature review, this chapter
investigates theoretical and empirical developments regarding explicit sets of rela-
tionships between dependent and independent variables in the international arms
trade over the past 25 years. All in all, we find that from 1995 onwards, relevant
studies have been conducted on the international arms trade. However, although
36 Fuhrmann 2009a, b.
37 Seyoum 2017.
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having outgrown its cradle, this particular research domain is still in the process
of growing up and is in need of connecting with relevant and proven insights from
neighbouring economicfields. The gravitymodel, for instance, featuring prominently
international economic trade literature, is only recently being applied to studies on
the international arms trade.38
A number of papers put forward rather generic hypotheses, which were statisti-
cally tested using ‘free’ databases, assembled bySIPRI or the researchers themselves.
Although from Chap. 7 it becomes clear that far more databases are available, these
are not generally being used. One reason may be that the use of these databases
involves higher costs.
In addition, we have not found any research offering hard information on both
price and quantity, simultaneously, although Killicoat’s study comes close. Soft data
are more commonly available (e.g., the number of licenses or probability data on
the amount of transfers). As a consequence, our research tools are mainly limited to
indicators or proxies. Compounding this lack of hard data, numbers and prices of
majorweapon systems are considered ‘security information’.Although the categories
small arms and light weapons and dual-use goods and services are subjected to less
strict regulations, in both latter categories far less research is being conducted. More-
over, little attention to developments in the transfer of individual weapon systems is
noticeable, again excepting Killicoat’s study.
Finally, we find export control laws and regulations to be virtually absent in the
economics-based theoretical and empirical development of arms trade, despite its
major influence on the evolution of the structure of international defence technology
frameworks. To us, it appears indicated to include this factor in future economic
research on explicit sets of relationships between dependent and independent
variables in the international arms trade.
2.8 Conclusion: An Agenda for Research
Based on our findings, this final section focuses on four interconnected research gaps
and recommendations in the domain of the economics of the international arms trade.
From our literature review, it appears that from 1995 onwards, the main research
effort has been geared towards the categories general and major weapon systems.
Consequentially, characteristic methods and tools in research on the market of mili-
tary and dual-use goods and services remain limited to modelling in general, often
analytical terms and statistics. No distinctions are being made regarding individual
weapon systems nor the quality thereof. We therefore recommend the conducting of
research on the dynamics and determinants of prices and volumes in relation to the
quality of individual weapon systems in the categories major weapon systems and
small arms and light weapons.
38 Akerman and Larsson Seim 2014; Martinez-Zarzoso and Johanssen 2019.
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Second, it appears onlyminor research attention is paid to the category of dual-use
goods, whilst there appears no academic interest to investigate the category services.
As far as dual-use goods are concerned, this is striking, especially, given the fact
that, from the perspective of (inter)national law and regulatory frameworks, dual-
use goods are meticulously identified and listed. Although the category services is
distinguished in literature, relevant journal papers could not be retrieved. Perhaps
services should not be dealt with as a separate category, but, instead, be integrated
as an element into the remaining categories.
Third, we recommend including the impact of arms export control laws and regu-
latory frameworks in economic based research, as these bodies appear to influence
decision making in the international arms trade. A related question addresses what
these ensuing effects on the international arms trade may be.
Last, we are convinced research on the economics of the international arms trade
will be bolstered by designing a research programme, comparable to the defence
economic programme devised for country studies in the journal Defence and Peace
Economics.
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Abstract The systemof export control regimes is an important instrument to prevent
the proliferation of both weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons.
However, this system faces several structural and recent challenges. The regimes are
informal, and consequently, their measures are non-binding upon states. Second, the
regimes consist of a selective group of countries, excluding some dominant arms
exporters. New technology is rapidly changing the military field, and it is difficult
for the export control regimes to keep up with these developments. Further, most of
the regimes were designed when states were the most important international actors
while currently legitimate and illegitimate non-state actors play an ever-increasing
role for export controls. In addition, it is unclear how the regimes will advance with
the multipolar world order of the twenty-first century. All new developments could
lead to the proliferation of weapons, making efforts to prevent proliferation more
relevant than ever. There are several opportunities to reform and strengthen the export
control regimes. Cooperation could help the regimes to remain relevant. The sharing
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of good practices can help the regimes to find the least disruptive and effective non-
proliferation measures. Setting up a paradigm-based regime instead of a weapon-
based regime may be more suitable for the future. In addition, a revision of the
decision-making process would help the regimes to respond swiftly to developments
in the field.
Keywords Export controls · export control regimes · weapons of mass
destruction · non-proliferation · disarmament · arms trade · dual-use · Nuclear
Suppliers Group · Australia Group ·Missile Technology Control Regime ·
Wassenaar Arrangement
3.1 Introduction
Unrestricted trade of arms and dual-use products may lead to security threats and
human rights violations. For that reason, states have come up with export controls.
In a world with non-restricted trade, all products and services can move freely
between countries. However, this wouldmean that dangerous goods, such asmachine
guns, chemical products, and nuclear weapons may be purchased by anyone. Also,
this would mean that sensitive technology, such as cyber-surveillance technology,
biotechnology, and weapon systems could fall in the wrong hands. Thus, states
balance the benefits of free trade with their security objectives. As a result, the trade
in military products and technology is restricted by treaties, counter-proliferation
measures, and export control regimes.1
The system of export control regimes is an important instrument to prevent the
proliferation of both weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons, and to
control dual-use products. There are four important regimes, the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, the Australia Group, theMissile Technology Control Regime, and theWasse-
naar Arrangement. The regimes are informal arrangements between a selective group
of countries, often consisting of suppliers only. The activities of the regimes build on
an international treaty. For example, the Nuclear Suppliers Group coordinates sensi-
tive international trade in line with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons.2
Several structural drawbacks of these regimes can be identified in existing liter-
ature. First, most countries are unwilling to give up some of their sovereignty by
engaging in binding agreements on this matter. As a result, the regimes are informal,
and their measures are non-legally binding upon states.3 The regimes have no offi-
cial organs or enforcement mechanisms. They have, thus, hardly any power to act
if countries choose to ignore the guidelines set by the regimes. Second, the regimes
consist of a selective group of countries, with this excluding some dominant arm
exporting countries. On the one hand, a lower number of participating countries
1 Achilleas 2017, p. 3.
2 Achilleas 2017, pp. 5–6.
3 Beck and Gahlaut 2003, p. 5.
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eases the consensus-based decision-making. On the other hand, the non-universal
character hampers the effectiveness of the regimes because only a restricted number
of countries act by the principles established by the regimes.4
While the aforementioned challenges of the international export control regimes
remain, this century raises new challenges for arms export control that are scarcely
addressed in the literature. Since the beginning of this millennium, arms transfers
have been increasing.5 New technology is rapidly changing the military field; 3D-
printing makes it possible to produce weapons from a distance; artificial intelligence
is increasingly used in weapon systems; and advancing biotechnology creates possi-
bilities for biological weapons.6 Further, most of the regimes were designed in times
when states were the most important international actors. Many regime measure-
ments are aimed at states instead of individuals.7 Currently, other actors, such as
terrorist organizations, play an ever-growing role in the international field.8 Another
factor that raises a new challenge is the emergence of several densely populated coun-
tries, such as China and India, resulting in a slow shift in the world order.9 The United
States has often taken the lead since the establishment of the regimes.10 It is unclear
how the regimes will advance with the multipolar world order of the twenty-first
century. All new developments could lead to the proliferation of weapons, making
efforts to prevent proliferation more relevant than ever.
In this chapter, the challenges and opportunities that the regimes are currently
facing are analysed. The chapter is structured as follows. First, the different export
control regimes and their goal are explained to give a background on the regimes.
Second, both structural challenges as well as contemporary developments in the field
of arms trade and their implications on export controls are elaborated on. In addition,
the opportunities for the regimes are discussed in the same section. The final section
is used to conclude.
4 Beck and Jones 2019, pp. 56–57.
5 Wezeman et al. 2019, p. 1.
6 Brockmann 2018, p. 8.
7 Beck and Jones 2019, p. 58.
8 Bailes 2013, p. 17.
9 De Graaff and van Apeldoorn 2018, p. 113.
10 Bailes 2013, p. 24.
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3.2 Export Control Regimes
3.2.1 The Coordinating Committee for the Multilateral
Export Controls
The first arms export control regime, theCoordinatingCommittee for theMultilateral
Export Controls (CoCom), was established during the ColdWar.11 The ColdWarwas
characterized by the (nuclear) arms race between the Eastern and the Western Bloc.
Both sideswere building their arms capacity to counter the threat from their opponent.
At some point, theWestern countries wanted to impede the flow of sensitive products
and technology to the Eastern counties, and thus created the informal export control
regime, the CoCom, to pursue this goal.12
In the remainder of the Cold War, it became clear that more cooperation was
needed to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). For
that reason, countries established several other regimes similar to the CoCom.13 The
majority of the multilateral export control regimes, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the
Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime saw the light during
this period. The Wassenaar Arrangement was set up after the Cold War, but is seen
as a direct successor of the CoCom. As a consequence, the Cold War perspective has
influenced the export control regimes, and the literature on them.14
3.2.2 Regimes and Treaties
There are four major arms export regimes that have a different non-proliferation
focus. Although the guidelines created by the regimes are non-binding, the regimes
support legal binding instruments. Most regimes were established because states
experienced a lacuna in the legal framework. However, usually the legal instruments
have more member states than the regimes. As a result, it is possible for the regimes
to have more specific provisions to fill the gap.15
The Nuclear Suppliers Group was one of the first regimes to be established after
the CoCom. The Nuclear Supplier Group was formed by states that supply nuclear
technology. Together, the 48 supplier states create two sets of informal guidelines
to regulate and monitor nuclear trade, as well as to prevent dual-use items and tech-
nology from being used for nuclear proliferation. These guidelines do not stand by
themselves; they are in line with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
11 Gahlaut 2006, p. 8.
12 Beck and Jones 2019, p. 59.
13 Beck and Jones 2019, p. 61.
14 Bailes 2013, p. 16.
15 Gahlaut 2006, p. 10.
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Weapons and similar regional legal instruments.16 Also, the regime supports the
efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Before the Nuclear Suppliers Group came into existence, the Zangger Committee
was active in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. Similarly, it developed guide-
lines to prevent nuclear weapons from spreading. However, contrary to the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee could only act ‘within the mandate’ of the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The work of the Nuclear Suppliers Group goes
beyond that of the Zangger Committee. As of today, the Zangger Committee did not
disappear completely. It is still active in the field, and it is an observer to the Nuclear
Suppliers Group.17
The Australia Group focuses on two different types of WMD: chemical and
biological weapons. Again, the regime is an informal group of 43 countries that
controls the trade in items and technology related to chemical andbiologicalweapons.
Some civil-used chemical or biological materials can also be used to make weapons,
hence the regime encourages responsible trade of these dual-use items. The Australia
Group compliments the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons
Convention.18
The third regime, the Missile Technology Control Regime, is also focused on
the non-proliferation of WMD. With the inclusion of India in 2016, the regime has
35 partner countries.19 The regime is set up to coordinate the ‘unmanned delivery
systems of WMD’.20 Non-binding guidelines, the listing of sensitive items and the
sharing of information are used to control the trade in missiles.21 In 2002, the Hague
Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) entered into force.
The HCOC is intended to complement the regime, but its binding provisions are less
specific.22 Currently, 143 countries have become members of HCOC.23
The fourth and last multilateral export control regime is the Wassenaar Arrange-
ment. In contrast to the other regimes, the Wassenaar Arrangement is not focused on
WMD, but on conventional weapons such as small arms and rockets. As of today, the
regime includes 42 partner countries.24 The main goal of the regime is to advocate
responsible trade in conventional weapons and related dual-use items.25 Another
goal of the Wassenaar Arrangement is to make sure that arms producing businesses
do not move to the country with the most favourable law on the topic.26 For these
16 Achilleas 2017, p.6; Beck and Gahlaut 2003, p. 5.
17 Gahlaut 2006, p. 8.
18 Beck and Gahlaut 2003, p. 5.
19 Missile Technology Control Regime 2016.
20 Beck and Gahlaut 2003, p. 5.
21 Missile Technology Control Regime 2020.
22 Mistry 2003, p. 120.
23 The Hague Code of Conduct 2020.
24 The Wassenaar Arrangement 2020.
25 Gahlaut 2006, p. 9.
26 Herr 2016, p. 1.
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reasons, the exchange of information and transparency between the partner countries
are encouraged.27
3.2.3 Characteristics Regimes
These four export control regimes coordinate the trade in WMD and conventional
weapons. WMD are weapons that are capable of doing grave harm, and kill a large
number of people, such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.28 A chemical
weapon consists of a chemical that could harm or kill people, animals, or plants. The
effect of a biological weapon is comparable, however; biological weapons contain
substances made from living organisms. Viruses and bacteria also fall under biolog-
ical weapons.29 All regimes try to prevent the proliferation of these WMD. Conven-
tional weapons are all other weapons that are, in principle, legal for a country to
produce and purchase.30 Nevertheless, conventional weapons are often used for the
wrong purposes. For example, over the last years, most wars in developing countries
with a high number of casualties were fought with the use of small and light arms.31
For that reason, there are also export controls in place to regulate the trade in conven-
tional weapons. Here, the trade is not impeded per se, but the end-use of an item or
technology plays a big role.
Often, the situation is not as clear as described above; most WMD are developed
with the use of dual-use items.32 For example, chlorine is used to kill bacteria in
drinking water, but it was also used as a chemical weapon during the First World
War,33 and, more recently, in Syria.34 The trade of dual-use products and services
could also lead to human right breaches. For instance, cyber surveillance technology
can be used to prevent terrorism, but can also lead to privacy infringement. The nature
of dual-use products makes it difficult to prohibit all trade because this means that
civil usage would be hindered as well. For that reason, trade is not prohibited, but
the export control regimes are also applicable to the trade in dual-use products and
services.35
The four regimes share three main characteristics. First, they are informal polit-
ical arrangements that make non-binding decisions. Thus, there are no enforcement
mechanisms in place and countries enjoy some freedom in the implementation of
the guidelines. Second, the regimes make decisions based on consensus. As a result,
27 Gahlaut 2006, p. 9.
28 Beck and Gahlaut 2003, p. 1; Tamada and Achilleas 2017, p. 5.
29 Joyner 2009, pp. 79-80.
30 Tamada and Achilleas 2017, p. 7.
31 Greene and Marsh 2011, p. 3.
32 Beck and Gahlaut 2003, p. 2.
33 Joyner 2009, p. 80.
34 United Nations General Assembly 2017.
35 Bohnenberger 2017, p. 82; Joyner 2009, p. 30.
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decisions often take time because they are only made when all countries assent to
a proposal. Third, all regimes consist of a limited number of participants, most of
which are suppliers of the items and technology of concerns.36 Hence, contrary to
the legal instruments they support, the regimes do not have universal support.
The regimes’ norms are set out in guidelines and control lists. The participating
countries have created broad guidelines that set out the purpose of the regimes as
well as the commitments of the participating countries.37 In addition, the guide-
lines inform on export procedures such as how non-proliferation measures should
be applied. Further, it sets out the structure of the more detailed control lists. When
the regimes decide that a product, service or technology should be subject to export
controls in accordance with the guidelines, these items are listed in more detail. The
Nuclear SuppliersGroup, theMissile TechnologyControl Regime and theWassenaar
Arrangement work with two sets of lists. The two different lists give an indication
of the sensitivity of the items and technologies. When there is a higher chance that a
transfer will contribute to proliferation, there are stricter export controls applicable.38
Also, the country of destination plays a role. For example, trade in sensitive prod-
ucts between two regime participants is more likely to take place than trade between
a regime participant and North Korea or Iran.39 However, this is different for the
Wassenaar Arrangement because the regime is explicitly not ‘directed against any
state or group of states’.40 The lists are regularly updated in accordance with the
current developments.
The focus of export controls has shifted slightly over the years. Previously, the
focus was on preventing the proliferation ofWMD and conventional weapons falling
into the hands of enemy states.41 After 9/11, rival countrieswere no longer considered
to be the only possible danger. Export controls started to be targeted at terrorism
prevention.42 Over the past years, the protection of human rights became a more
important goal for export controls.43 For example, the protection of human rights
plays an important role in the Arms Trade Treaty.44 As of 2013, the Wassenaar
Arrangement also focuses more on the prevention of human rights violations when
it comes to the trade in cyber-surveillance technologies.45
36 Beck and Gahlaut 2003, p.6; Gahlaut 2006, pp. 11–15.
37 Achilleas 2017, p. 11.
38 Gahlaut 2006, p. 9.
39 Bailes 2013, p. 22.
40 The Wassenaar Arrangement 2020.
41 Gahlaut 2006, p. 8.
42 Beck and Gahlaut 2003, p. 13.
43 Bromley et al 2012, p. 1042.
44 Coppen 2016, p. 365.
45 Bohnenberger 2017, p. 83.
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3.2.4 National Implementation and United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1540
The regimes act onvoluntary and informal basis, and as a result, its guidelines and lists
do not bind the countries. Hence, for the export controls to have legal effect they need
to be nationally implemented by the participating countries. The interpretation of the
guidelines and lists varies between countries, and also there is some disagreement
aboutwhat should be considered a sensitive destination.46 As a result, different export
controls can be applied in similar situations.
Nevertheless, this so-called ‘national discretion’47 of countries does not stretch
too far: it is set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 that every
country should have national law in place to prevent the proliferation of nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons. The resolution was meant to impede non-state
actors with terroristic purposes to obtain weapons of this kind. Contrary to the
informal regimes, United Nations Security Council resolutions are binding upon
countries.48 Thus, when a participating country incorporates the guidelines from the
regimes into national law, it shows its efforts to comply with the resolution. As a
result, a considerable group of influential countries has implemented comparable
national law on this matter.
3.3 Challenges and Opportunities
3.3.1 Structural Challenges
As previously explained, the export regimes have an informal nature, and often
mainly consist of supplier states. In addition, they make decisions based on
consensus, and states have national discretion. As a result, the regimes are facing
multiple structural challenges.
3.3.1.1 Non-universal Character
Over the last years, the number of regime participants has increased, thereby
putting pressure on the system of consensus-based decisions. Originally, the regimes
consisted of like-minded supplier states.49 As of today, however, numerous non-
supplier states have joined the regimes. For instance, Denmark, Portugal and Luxem-
bourg became MTCR participants while they had no related missile programs in
46 Beck and Gahlaut 2003, pp. 8–13.
47 Beck and Gahlaut 2003, p. 6.
48 Gahlaut 2019, pp. 54–57.
49 Beck and Jones 2019, p. 65.
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place.50 Consequently, the group of participating countries has become more hetero-
geneous with respect to security and trade interests.51 Especially suppliers and
non-suppliers may have divergent interests.52
The regimes balance their aspiration to establish universal norms, with their wish
for uniformity between the participating states.53 On the one hand, if more coun-
tries are part of the regimes, more countries act in accordance with the principles
established by the regimes. At the moment, several countries with the capability
to develop nuclear weapons, such as Israel, are not part of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group.54 Hence, these potential supplier countries have not committed themselves
to adhering to the guidelines. On the other hand, adding these countries of strategic
concern to the number of participating states might lead to a dilution of the norms
and uniformity of the regimes. The increase in participating states has led to more
internal disagreement. One important topic of discussion concerns what countries
and products should be perceived as a threat by the regimes. For example, the United
States and EU countries have controlled the dual-use trade with their fellow regime
participant Russia.55
3.3.1.2 Consensus-Based Decisions
Especially because decisions are made based on consensus, decreasing homogeneity
hinders the process of decision-making. A single country with divergent views is
able to block the decisions of an entire regime. Regularly, a small group of countries
is blocking advancements to the guidelines, or to the effectiveness of the regimes. As
a result, the regimes struggle to make rapid decisions concerning new technologies,
hereby failing to respond to possible proliferation risks.56 Also, if decisions aremade,
they are more likely to be attenuated to conform to the wishes of every participant.
This raises questions about the efficacy of the regimes in their current form. In the
past, the objectives of the participating countries were more aligned. However, this
is no longer the case. The set-up of the regimes, characterized by consensus-based
decisions and informal nature, was designed for a small group of countries with
similar interests.57 At the time of initiation, this indeed increased the efficiency of
the regimes. Nevertheless, currently, the opposite holds.
50 Gahlaut and Zaborsky 2004, p. 76.
51 Beck and Jones 2019, p. 70.
52 Gahlaut and Zaborsky 2004, p. 79.
53 Gahlaut and Zaborsky 2004, p. 83.
54 Joyner 2009, p. 68.
55 Beck and Jones 2019, p. 71.
56 Beck and Jones 2019, p. 67.
57 Beck and Jones 2019, p. 69.
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3.3.1.3 Informal Nature
The enforcement of the guidelines is problematic as well because the guidelines
are non-binding. Most states are unwilling to give up some of their sovereignty by
entering into binding agreements on this matter. This has two reasons; states want to
remain in control of their own foreign security policy as well as to remain flexible
to act in accordance with their economic interest.58 As a result, the regimes have no
official organs or enforcement mechanisms. They have, thus, hardly any power to act
if countries choose to ignore the guidelines set by the regimes. Other participating
countries cannot hold a non-adherent country accountable as there exist no rules on
violations of the regimes.59 Officially, non-adherence to the regime guidelines is not
even named a violation or non-compliance,60 but ‘export behavior inconsistent with
the spirit of the arrangement’.61 The only way to put pressure on a non-adherent
participant is by diplomatic measures.62
3.3.1.4 National Discretion
For this reason, participants enjoy extensive national discretion in applying the regime
guidelines. Some of the guidelines are somewhat indistinct, which means that coun-
tries have freedom for national implementation.63 Consequently, countries can inter-
pret the guidelines the way that they are most favourable to their own businesses.
As a result, it is possible to have divergent interpretations. Gahlaut suggests that the
regimes need to create enforceable common norms to meet this challenge.64
However, given the current international environment, it is unlikely that this will
happen in the foreseeable future. The participating countries becomemore divergent,
and as a result, it is probable that they are unwilling to adhere to binding norms that
remove their room to manoeuvre. In addition, over the past years, there has been
a tendency to move towards more informal approaches to prevent the proliferation
of WMD.65 An example of this development is the Proliferation Security Initiative.
This informal understanding between countries encourages them to actively avert
the overseas transport of WMD with the use of current international law.66
58 Pryor 2018, p. 46.
59 Beck and Gahlaut 2003, p. 7.
60 Beck and Jones 2019, p. 66.
61 Gahlaut and Zaborsky 2004, p. 84.
62 Gahlaut 2006, p. 18.
63 Beck and Jones 2019, p. 66.
64 Gahlaut 2006, p. 17.
65 Daase 2013, p. 69.
66 Black-Branch 2017, p. 204.
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3.3.2 Recent Challenges
Next to the structural challenges, several present-day developments have caused
new challenges for the regimes. Over the last twenty years, five developments that
have an impact on the arms export control systems can be identified. Non-state
threats andproducers have emerged, there are suppliers operating outside the regimes,
technology is rapidly evolving, the world order is slowly changing, and the UK
decided to leave the EU.
3.3.2.1 Non-state Threats
Previously, states were the largest proliferators, currently, however, non-state actors
have emerged as proliferators aswell.When the regimeswere established, stateswere
the major actors in international law. During the Cold War, conflict was between
states, and thus, states were seen as the most important proliferation threat.67 In
addition, the technology to develop WMD on a large scale had been out of reach
for non-state actors. As of today, the international field has changed rapidly. Other
actors such as international organizations, non-state actors, and sub-state actors play a
substantial role. Non-state actors such as terrorist groups are increasingly interested
in WMD.68 Similarly, these groups have proven to be capable of breaching the
principles of the export control regimes.69
The regimes have responded to the changed threat. After 9/11, the prevention of
terrorism became an important goal formany countries.70 States with different values
and polities such as China, Russia and the United States started working together
to pursue this common goal. At the same time, the export control regimes put more
emphasis on non-proliferation measures targeting terrorist groups.71 As of 2004, UN
Security Council Resolution 1540 made these measures more substantial because it
introduced an obligation for all UN members to have appropriate legal instruments
in place to prevent proliferation of this kind.
Nevertheless, the threat from non-state actors demands additional efforts from the
regimes for several reasons. First, the regime control lists are not primarily aimed at
controlling out-dated products or technologies, while hostile non-state groups often
prefer these as a means of attack.Many of such products are widely used by civilians,
whichmakes themeasier to acquire. Instead, the regimes aremore focused onmodern
technologies used by the states. As a result, a substantial part of the control list is not
useful in impeding this type of proliferation.72 Second, countries are often focused on
the detection of military quantities of a controlled item. For example, the Common
67 Bailes 2013, p. 6.
68 Black-Branch 2017, p. 202.
69 Bailes 2013, p. 21.
70 Anthony 2002b, p. 756.
71 Bailes 2013, pp. 22–24.
72 Beck and Jones 2019, p. 56.
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Control List from the Australia Group lists precisely the quantity that is needed for
an item to be controlled.73 However, non-state actors with malicious intent might
settle for smaller numbers.
Next to non-state groups that form a threat, other recent non-state security threats
can be identified.74 Climate change, for example, is one of the most important secu-
rity issues the world is currently facing.75 Also, pandemics pose a significant threat
for states. As a result of these cross-border issues, states have become more inter-
dependent. Therefore, multilateral solutions to security issues have become more
important.76
3.3.2.2 Non-state Producers and Facilitators
Non-state parties play a more prominent role in the export-controlled trade. Beck
and Jones point out that non-state parties are increasingly used to facilitate this type
of trade, thereby increasing the need for timely transparency from regime partic-
ipants.77 In addition, research and development of weapons and dual-use products
and technology is increasingly conducted by non-state actors. Previously, most sensi-
tive discoveries were done by governmental agencies. From there, these inventions
eventually found their way to the private sector. For example, nuclear technology
was developed by states instead of private businesses.78 As of today, however, a
lot of discoveries or new technologies are (further) developed by the private sector.
From there, they are implemented by defence organizations. Artificial intelligence,
for instance, is produced in the private sector, but now has wide military application
ranging from ‘threat evaluation’ to ‘underwater mine warfare’.79 The Wassenaar
Arrangement participants have responded to these developments by, for example,
including malware in control lists.80
While states make the norms by participating in the regimes, businesses have
to comply with these norms. High technology industries perform in economies of
scale, meaning that the businesses often have the incentive to grow beyond national
borders. As a result, the interests of the industries, as well as the economic interests
of a country, diverge from the security interests of a country.81 Sometimes the states
use the export controls to pursue their economic interest and not necessarily their
security interests.
73 The Australia Group 2020.
74 Ikenberry 2011, p. 65.
75 Mobjörk et al. 2020, p. 1.
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3.3.2.3 Emerging Suppliers
Newsupplier countries have emerged that arewilling to operate outside the guidelines
of the export control regimes. Most export control regimes are effective because
they provide suppliers of sensitive items and technology with guidelines to prevent
proliferation. Now there are several countries with the ability to supply such items
that are not part of the export control regimes. As a result, these new suppliers
often conduct an export that was previously rejected by regime participants, hereby
putting pressure on the export control system.82 For example, China and Israel are
the number five and number eight exporters of major arms respectively,83 while both
countries are not part of the Wassenaar Arrangement.84 In addition, the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has conducted several nuclear tests, and there
are worries that the DPRK is willing to export nuclear material.85 Not only is the
DPRK operating outside the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the country also (unofficially)
stepped out of the NPT.86 Hence, there are no international legal obligations that are
preventing the country from trading in nuclear materials. Nevertheless, actions from
the DPRK are impeded because of the numerous sanctions that are enacted against
the country. There are also countries with sensitive (nuclear) military industries, such
as Pakistan and India, that want to join the export control regimes but are not allowed
access as a result of the veto power of current participants.87
3.3.2.4 New Technology
Evolving military and dual-use technology is challenging the export control regimes
in several ways. First, the swiftness of the technology change pressures the regimes
to change their control lists with a corresponding speed. Recent advances include
3D-printing that makes it possible to produce weapons from a distance, artificial
intelligence that is increasingly used inweapon systems and advancingbiotechnology
that creates possibilities for biological weapons.88 In addition, cyber surveillance
can be used to commit human rights violations.89 Most regimes publish control lists
in which sensitive export products and services are enumerated. When technology
changes, the lists have to be adjusted in accordance. The decreasing uniformity
between the participating countries causes countries to hinder rapid decisions.90
82 Beck and Jones 2019, p. 56.
83 SIPRI 2020, p. 13.
84 The Wassenaar Arrangement 2020.
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Thus, when technology evolves rapidly, it is difficult for the regimes to keep up with
the pace.91
However, the informality of the international regimes could also be seen as an
opportunity. Contrary to hard law instruments, the soft law nature of the regimes
enables them to be more resilient to new proliferation threats because new lists are
easier to establish than new international law instruments.92 In addition, to account
for the rigidity of the control lists, countries such as the United States, have a
separate export control classification series that temporary lists emerging technolo-
gies. Nevertheless, when this is done unilaterally this could harm the international
market.93
Second, various new technologies erase the need for physical trade, hereby
changing the idea of trade. Software, such as cyber surveillance software, can be
transferred electronically without the need for trading partners to meet in person. 3D
printing can be used in future to print components of nuclear weapons.94 However, as
stressed byBromley andMaletta, the proliferation risk ismoderate forWMDbecause
merely the transfer of technology is insufficient to develop that type of weapon.95
The authors explain that additional education or training often is necessary to have
appropriate knowledge to develop such weapons. For instance, in order to create a
nuclear device, as well as a biological or chemical weapon, advanced knowledge is
required.
Third, new developments cause separate technologies to become more inter-
twined. At the moment, every regime is focused on a different type of weapon:
the NSG is focused on nuclear weapons, the AG is focused on biological and chem-
ical weapons, the MTCR is focused on delivery systems, and the WA is focused
on conventional weapons. Not only separately developed new technologies are inte-
grated now, but existing technology is also combined with recent developments.96
Artificial intelligence is combined with emerging biotechnology97 as well as existing
nuclear technology.98 As a result, the functions of the various regimes become more
overlapping.
3.3.2.5 Multipolar World Order
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States enjoyed hegemony over world
affairs.99 However, currently other populous countries such as China and India are
91 Brockmann 2018, p. 10.
92 Gahlaut and Zaborsky 2004, p. 84.
93 Brockmann 2018, p. 20.
94 Kroenig and Volpe 2015, p. 8.
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97 Brockmann et al. 2019, p. 12.
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99 Ikenberry 2011, p. 60.
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becomingmore influential inworld politics. This can have several implications for the
export control regimes. First, unlike India, that recently joined the AG, the MTCR,
and the WA, China only participates in the NSG. Meaning that the number five
main exporter of major weapons operates outside the export control regime appli-
cable.100 As explained by Ikenberry, the international system has been ‘open and
rules-based’. He expects the system to becomemore centred around ‘exclusive blocs,
spheres of influence, and mercantilist networks’.101 Although the informal regimes
do not perfectly fit in the rules-based international order, the exclusion of upcoming
countries could result in an alternative market in which different export controls are
applied based on capital and relationships between countries.
Second, the rising powers of mostly non-western states adds to the feeling of
dissimilarity between countries. Western countries used to be in the lead when inter-
national norms were formed and the formation of the export control regimes was
not an exception. This may other when countries become more influential. Countries
such as China and India might perceive certain technologies to be more might see
different countries as a threat than the current regime members. This makes it more
difficult to form a common international export control system.
3.3.2.6 Brexit
On 24 December 2020, the UK and the EU reached an agreement on the cooperation
between the two parties after Brexit.102 Besides the four main export control regimes,
the EU has set up its own EU-wide export control regimes, such as the regime
governing dual-use items that finds its origin in Regulation 428/2009. Although
Brexit has no influence on the participation of the UK in the export control regimes
discussed in this chapter, Brexit could affect the field of export control in several
ways. First, the Brexit may reduce the willingness of EU countries to cooperate
in this field and slow down advancements to the EU export control regimes. As a
result, the EU countries, as well as the UK, becomemore dependent on the four main
export control regimes.103 For the UK itself it has a similar effect because the country
will no longer be basing its national regulations on the EU norms, but directly on
the guidelines established by the export control regimes.104 Thus, it could be said
that Brexit increases the importance of the export control regimes. Second, the EU
loses several means to influence global export control efforts. Not only its access to
the Commonwealth is complicated, in addition, the EU loses one of its permanent
Security Council members, hereby making it more difficult for the EU to influence
international export control norms.105
100 SIPRI 2020, p. 13.
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3.3.3 Opportunities
While the regimes face several challenges, there are also opportunities for the regimes
to improve and keep up with contemporary developments. First, they could improve
by strengthening dialogue and cooperation. Second, the regimes could be reformed so
that a diverge from the regimes’ norms hasmore consequences for states such as intro-
ducing an enforcement mechanism. Third, the regimes can be more paradigm based,
and the catch-all mechanisms may remain. Further, the decision-making process
could be revised.
3.3.3.1 Dialogue and Cooperation
The export control regimes have a common goal: prevent proliferation by estab-
lishing control lists, encourage transparency and gather best practices.106 Now every
regime separately lists sensitive products and technologies.107 Increased dialogue
and cooperation between the export control regimes would help them to respond
adequately to technology changes,108 and changed threats.109 Some authors go one
step further and suggest that the regimes could be combined, or at least could have a
combined assembly to improve efficiency and encourage cooperation. Nevertheless,
a merger is unlikely because the regimes have different participants. Some countries
are excluded from one of the regimes because of political reasons, while other coun-
tries do not feel comfortable in joining one of the regimes. Hence, combining them
would cause difficulties. Instead, Beck and Jones suggest that the regimes can have
their annual meetings during a shared assembly. As a result, the different plenaries
with representatives and experts would be held at a single location to enable cross-
pollination. The authors add that the combined assembly could be a breeding ground
for new regimes to form in accordance with new developments.110 This can help the
international community to keep up with the rapid (technological) developments in
this field.
In addition to increased cooperation between the regimes, increased information
sharing between other parties involved can help the regimes face the aforementioned
challenges.111 Cooperation of regime participants with countries outside the regimes,
exporting businesses, facilitators, as well as academia would help the regimes to
signal threats at an earlier stage and create awareness.112 Also, their input may help
106 Beck and Jones 2019, p. 65.
107 Achilleas 2017, p. 11.
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improve the enforcement mechanism and compliance instruments of the regimes.113
Black-Branch recommends increased cooperation to discourage nuclear terrorism.
Further, cooperation between regime participants themselves is important.114 The
regimes have a ‘no-undercut’ obligation whichmeans that states have to inform other
participants what exports they have denied.115 This decreases the national discretion
of participating states.
3.3.3.2 Binding Instruments or Enforcement Mechanism
The informal nature of the export control regimes causes challenges. However, it
is unlikely that the regimes’ norms will become hard law instead of soft law in the
foreseeable future. The control lists and guidelines are not binding upon participating
countries. The regimes lack an enforcement mechanism, and as a result, a diverge
from regime norms has no consequence for a state except for when a country unilat-
erally decides to enact sanctions.116 There have been some international attempts to
establish binding non-proliferation instruments, such as the International Code of
Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Hence, states recognize the added
value of an international legal system in this case.117 States often do not want to give
up their sovereignty by joining a binding international instrument when it concerns
sensitive matters like security. Hence, one of the most feasible ways to set up an
enforcement mechanism would not be by reforming the export control regimes, but
rather by strengthening the Arms Trade Treaty that is already a binding instrument.
In the case of the ATT states already gave up some sovereignty to reduce the prolif-
eration of conventional weapons, and thus, there is a probability that they are willing
to go one step further.118
Other measures might be more suitable than reforming the regimes to binding
instruments.Although the regimes are not binding, participating statesmostly comply
with the guidelines and control lists. Thus, it could be said that the regimes are effec-
tive without an enforcement mechanism.119 In addition, Byers points out that it is
probable that states contributing to proliferation of WMD are unwilling to join an
international system in which there is enforcement.120 Hence, a binding system with
enforcement likely only includes countries with no purpose of wrong-doing, and the
remaining countries operate outside this system. Thus, a better alternative would be
that the regimes strengthen the sharing of good practices. This encourages states to
113 Bauer 2020.
114 Black-Branch 2017, p. 216.
115 Anthony 2002a, p. 473.
116 Gahlaut 2006, p. 18.
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respond swiftly to technology advances and find effective export control measure-
ments that are least disruptive for the industries involved.121 Another alternative
outside the structure of the regimes would be a UN Security Council Resolution
compelling states to make national export control law beyond UN Security Council
Resolution 1540.122
3.3.3.3 Paradigm-Based Regimes and Catch-All Mechanisms
Bauer suggests that new regimes can be focused on a ‘common paradigm’ instead of
a weapon type. These new regimes can establish guidelines in order to prevent, for
example, human rights violations, or focus on the protection of civilians.123 Another
example of this is the definition of a chemical weapon found in Article II(1) of the
Chemical Weapons Convention that focuses on the intended purpose of a chemical
instead of the chemical itself. Shifting to a systembased on a commonparadigmcould
contribute to the prevention of illegitimate activity of non-state actors. This would
reduce the risk of terrorist groups resorting to outdated, or dual-use substances to
develop a weapon, because their intentions matter instead of their means. In addition,
thiswould help the international community to keep upwith developments in the field
as this would erase the need to revise the lists parallel to technology developments.
Again, establishing a new regime would take a substantial amount of effort, hence
other options might be more feasible. ‘Catch-all mechanisms’ can serve as a solu-
tion.124 These mechanisms allow participating states to control items and technolo-
gies that are not specifically named on the control lists. Instead, they are controlled
based on the suspicion that its end-use will contribute to proliferation. Thus, with the
use of catch-all mechanisms any sensitive trade can be controlled to a destination that
is, for instance, subject to an arms embargo.125 Also, a solution could be to construct
the control lists in such a way that they are prepared for expected (technology) devel-
opments. In this way, states do not have to debate the control lists as often, hereby
risking that a single country can block a decision.126
3.3.3.4 Revise Decision-Making Process
In the current regimes, the regime participants are not as like-minded as before. This
divergence of interests in combination with the consensus-based decision-making
process causes the regimes to respond slowly to changes. When the regimes still
consisted of a small group of like-minded countries, the decision-making process
121 Brockmann 2018, p. 23.
122 Black-Branch 2017, p. 230.
123 Bauer 2020.
124 Bauer 2020.
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was more suitable. Although it is unlikely that states will easily agree to a different
decision-making process because means that they can be bound to a decision that
they did not agree on, the change in composition demands critical thinking about the
current process. For example, it would advance the export control regimes if they
stepped away from consensus-based decisions. Gahlaut and Zaborsky point out that
a ‘contract-like agreement’ is more appropriate for a large group of states that have
various concerns such as is currently the case. This type of agreement would enable
bargaining between different countries. In this way, countries can negotiate on terms
so they can pursue their own security interests.127
3.4 Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter discussed the four main export control regimes: the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the
Wassenaar Arrangement. The regimes face several challenges. First, the regimes
are informal, have a non-universal character and make their decisions based on
consensus. As a result, states have national discretion in implementing national law.
Second, this century raises new challenges for arms export control. New technologies
emerge that are harder to control, non-state actors become increasingly important in
the international field, and the United States has to share its leading position with
countries such as China and India.
There are several opportunities to reform and strengthen the export control
regimes. Cooperation could help the regimes to remain relevant. The regimes have
similar characteristics, and cooperation between the regimes could thus improve the
efficiency of their non-proliferation efforts. Further, a shared enforcement mecha-
nism could give the export control regimes more power to act if countries choose
to ignore the guidelines set by the regimes. However, this is probably difficult to
accomplish because arms export controls became more informal over the last years.
The sharing of good practices helps the regimes to find the least-disruptive, and
effective non-proliferation measures. Setting up a paradigm-based regime instead
of a weapon-based regime may be more suitable for the future. In addition, a revi-
sion of the decision-making process would help the regimes to respond swiftly to
developments in the field.
In this chapter, non-proliferation was seen as the main purpose of the regimes.
However, it is possible that the regimes are decreasingly equipped to prevent prolif-
eration, but increasingly serve a different goal: the protection of domestic markets.
For example, without consultation of the regimes, the United States sometimes
temporarily controls the trade in some new technologies. Although this type of
measures serves a security motive, it also protects companies in the US developing
that new technology.
127 Gahlaut and Zaborsky 2004, p. 83.
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The chapter focused on export control regimes. To develop a full overview of the
contemporary challenges and opportunities of arms export control, further research
into different arms export control instruments such as sanctions is needed. Also,
additional studies on the most recent export control measures such as the Arms Trade
Treaty and the Proliferation Security Initiative would provide a better understanding
of the current field of arms export control.
As discussed, this century raises new challenges and opportunities for non-
proliferation measures. Unrestricted trade of arms and dual-use products could lead
to security threats and human rights violations. From the Cold War until today, the
system of export control regimes has been an important instrument to prevent the
proliferation of both WMD and conventional weapons. Only time will tell whether
the export control regimes are able to keep up with the rapidly changing world or
whether new instruments are needed to prevent proliferation.
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Abstract From late 2005 through to late 2010, Fokker Services BV (FSBV) failed
to comply with the economic sanctions the United States (US) Government had
established against Iran and Sudan. By scanning the case, violations by FSBV came
to light in a structured way, laying bare how FSBV operated to evade export control,
breaching sanctions regimes and export control laws. Next, analysis stipulated that
the cause and conditions of the violation of the export control regulationsweremainly
rooted in the tone at the top, the role of (intermediary) management and the absence
of a Compliance Program. Subsequently, a short-term and a long-term response were
formulated addressing the tone at the top, the development of an Internal Compliance
Program, and the application of soft controls to promote an ethical culture.
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4.1 Introduction
In 2015, Fokker Services BV (FSBV), a Dutch aerospace services company, agreed
to pay 21millionUSD to settleUS claims that it conspired to violate sanctions against
Iran, Burma and Sudan by providing customers in those countries with aircraft parts,
technology and services. From late 2005 through to late 2010, the company made
1,153 shipments of spare, repaired or exchanged parts to customers in the sanctioned
countries. The company hid the transactions by withholding or providing false tail
numbers to US-based repair shops and by avoiding transactions with US companies
on its “blacklist” of companies that were vigilant about export controls.
The services that FSBV offered were subject to US export control regulations.
FSBV failed to comply with the economic sanctions the US Government had estab-
lished against Iran and Sudan. The sanctions prohibited, among other things, the
unlicensed exportation or re-exportation, directly or indirectly, of any goods, tech-
nology, or services from the United States or any US person to Iran or Sudan. FSBV
has violated export control rules by exporting and re-exporting of aircraft parts,
technology, and services to US sanctioned countries, without first obtaining a license
fromOFAC. Research by various agencies such as OFAC, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement’s (ICE)Homeland Security Investigations, the Defense Criminal Inves-
tigative Service, and the USAttorney’s Office for the District of Columbia has shown
that FSBV has systematically tried to conceal the final destination of the parts.1
FSBV engaged in wilful and reckless alleged violations of US law because FSBV
knew that it was shipping US-origin parts, and parts supplied from or repaired in the
United States, to customers in Iran and Sudan. Therefore, FSBV caused significant
harm to the objectives of the OFAC’s Iran and Sudan sanctions programs given the
volume and value of the transactions.
To design and recognize, detect and prevent the specific non-compliant behaviour
in the case of FSBV export control violations, the Problem-Oriented Policing (POP)
guide template will be deployed.2 The first step involves scanning the facts behind
the case, followed by an analysis of the root causes of what went wrong. Next, short-
term and long-term responses necessary to remedy the non-compliant behaviour are
developed. The chapter concludes with a brief assessment reflecting on the process
and content of the case analysis.
1 US Department of Justice 2014.
2 Braga 2008.
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4.2 Scanning
4.2.1 Macro-level: Sanctions and World-Wide Competition
Starting the review at the Macro-level, FSBV was operating in a highly sensitive
part of the air and space industry, with international laws and regulations based
on national security and economic policy. The industry is strongly regulated and
the world-wide competition forces companies, in general, to operate vigilantly at
all times, as national security and reputation are at stake. It is at this level where
ambiguity and potentially conflicting norms and a perceived lack of (international)
enforcement of the US Iranian and Sudan Sanctions regulations may have played a
role, leading to the violations.
4.2.2 Meso-level: Intentional Non-compliant Behaviour
On 1,112 occasions, FSBV indirectly exported or re-exported aircraft spare parts to
Iranian customers, which FSBV either procured or had repaired in the United States
specifically to fill an Iranian customer’s order, or whichwere of US origin and subject
to export license requirements under US law, independent of the Iranian Transactions
and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR), at the time of shipment. On 41 occasions, FSBV
indirectly exported or re-exported aircraft spare parts to Sudanese customers or end-
users, that FSBV either procured or had repaired in the US, specifically to fill a
Sudanese customer’s or end user’s order, or that were U.S-origin and required the
issuance of a license by a Federal agency at the time of shipment, violating the
Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (SSR).
FSBV has exported and re-exported large numbers of shipments to Iran and Sudan
for many years—from 2005 to 2010 without the necessary export licences. It has,
therefore, the appearance that FSBV has made a cost-benefit analysis between the
profits and expenses regarding obtaining the required export licenses or exporting
without licenses. Exporting without the required export licenses can be consid-
ered as non-compliant behaviour and may be explained from a business-economic
perspective because Fokker almost went bankrupt in 1996 and was taken over by
Stork. Furthermore, it appears from public available sources, that the non-compliant
or unethical behaviour of FSBV occurred while various individuals at all levels
throughout the organization knew of various schemes to evade US sanctions.3 Both
senior corporate managers and individuals working for the compliance and legal
department knew about and approved the various schemes to evade US sanctions.
3 Kini et al. 2014.
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4.2.3 Micro-level: Deliberate Evasion of Regulation
Absence a clear and convincing message from the FSBV top management to abide
by export control rules and absence of a Compliance Plan, middle management
complemented with specialists in theMaintenance and Export department developed
and used several schemes to evade US sanctions and export laws, including the
withholding of aircraft tail numbers, providing false tail numbers, deleting references
to Iran in materials sent to the US and hiding activities and documents from the US
FederalAviationAdministration during audits of FSBV’sDutchwarehouse.4 The use
of the aforementioned combined actions, witness a well-thought-out and deliberate
plan to evade export control rules. US export laws were perceived as inconveniences
to be ‘worked around’ through deceit and trickery.5 This behaviour also illustrates
awareness and low conscientiousness at the individual employee level.
4.2.4 Aftermath
The illegal exports and their concealment are also evidenced by investigations by
various authorities, such as BIS, OFAC and the FBI. In response to export control
violations a settlement between FSBV and BIS and OFAC has been agreed, such
as paying a fine of $21 million,6 implement its new compliance program and poli-
cies, changing some of the workforce duties, training staff in US export control and
economic sanctions laws,7 and the dismissal of a board member.8
4.3 Analysis
To understand the nature of the problem and to develop various courses of reme-
dial action, it is necessary to perform an in-depth analysis of the non-compliant and
unethical behaviour of FSBV. For that reason, it is important to understand the under-
lying conditions and causes of the illegal exports to Iran and Sudan. In addition to the
above-mentioned areas, we will provide a short overview of the sanction’s regime.
4 Kini et al. 2014.
5 Kini et al. 2014.
6 EuropaWire 2014.
7 DiBianco et al. 2016.
8 Broek 2015.
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4.3.1 Tone at the Top
From the publicly available sources, it appears that the non-compliant or unethical
behaviour of FSBV occurred while various individuals at all levels throughout the
organization knew of various schemes to evade US sanctions.9 Both senior corporate
managers and individuals working for the compliance- and legal department knew
about and approved the various schemes to evade US sanctions. This, combined with
the overall number of 1,153 violations during the five-year period (end 2005 to end
2010) points to a culture where compliance with export control rules was deemed
irrelevant. As the Department of State Undersecretary for Political Affairs (DPPA)
included the demand for firing the president, it can be concluded that even top-
level executives were aware of the ongoing violations during a long period, without
taking action to stop the evasion of export control rules. Furthermore, it is relevant
to include in the analysis the possibility of whether FSBV had made a cost-benefit
analysis between exporting to Iran without a license and a possible fine or complying
with the rules. For instance, data show that FSBV had generated in 2012 a revenue of
769 million euros and in 2014 a revenue of 758 million euros.10 Given the amount of
the fine and the annual revenues, it could be cautiously concluded that FSBV was in
favour of complying with contracts and continuing exports to prohibited countries,
instead of respecting the imposed sanctions by the US.
Leaders contribute to an ethical culture by influencing the organization’s vision,
mission, and strategy. Tone at the top is the atmosphere created by management
to encourage employees to embrace a climate of high ethics when the behaviour
is modelled by the top management.11 As role models, company leaders have
an impact on the moral behaviour of subordinates. When faced with an ethical
dilemma, employees reduce the uncertainty of the dilemmaby imitating their leaders’
behaviour, which they observe daily. Felo and Solieri, experimentingwith accounting
professionals to test the theory that an employee will focus on the “tune in the
middle” rather than the “tone at the top”, indicated that signals from top-level execu-
tives appear to have more influence on accounting professionals than do signals from
midlevel managers. For senior-level executives, the message should be clear: “Watch
what you say and do, as people throughout the organization are paying attention”.12
4.3.2 Absence of a Compliance Programme
FSBV had no formal OFAC compliance program in place during most of the five
years when the alleged violations occurred.13 The absence of such a program is an
9 Kini et al. 2014.
10 Aerospace Manufacturing and Design 2015.
11 Tukamuhabwa 2012.
12 Felo and Solieri 2020.
13 Kini et al. 2014.
60 B. Klappe and M. Keunen
indication that leadership was not intrinsically motivated to follow or implement
export control rules and regulations. In addition, an internal- and external control
mechanism failed to discover the violations during a long period, while also soft-
controls (see hereafter) seemed non-existent.
4.3.3 Role of Middle Management and the Maintenance
and Export Department
Absence a clear and convincing message from the FSBV top to abide by export
control rules and absence of a Compliance Plan, middle management complemented
with specialists in the Maintenance and Export department developed and used a
number of schemes to evade US sanctions and export laws, including the with-
holding of aircraft tail numbers, providing false tail numbers, deleting references to
Iran in materials sent to the US and hiding activities and documents from the US
Federal Aviation Administration during audits of FSBV’s Dutch warehouse.14 On
one occasion, FSBVprovided aUS aerospace companywith awork order that falsely
represented that the aircraft part belonged to an aeroplane owned by a Portuguese
airline when, in reality, the part actually belonged to an Iran Air aircraft. The US
aerospace companyfixed thepart and returned it toFokkerServices,who then shipped
the part to Iran.
Furthermore, FSBV constructed and constantly updated a chart called “the black-
list” that tracked which US companies were more vigilant about export controls,
and directed their business to those US companies that were not on “the blacklist”.
FSBV also deleted references to Iran in materials sent to its US subsidiaries and US
repair shops. FSBV changed an internal database that tracked parts to delete fields
related to ultimate end-user information, and directed employees to hide activities
and documents related to Iranian transactions when inspectors from the US Federal
Aviation Administration audited Fokker Services’ Dutch warehouse. The use of the
aforementioned combined actions, witness a well-thought-out and deliberate plan to
evade export control rules. US export laws were perceived as inconveniences to be
‘worked around’ through deceit and trickery.15
4.3.4 Conclusion
The findings of the in-depth analysis show that FSBV has systematically violated
export control regulations by trying to conceal the final destination of the parts. The
cause and conditions of the violation of the export control regulations are mainly
rooted in the tone at the top, the role of (intermediary)management and the absence of
14 Kini et al. 2014.
15 Kini et al. 2014.
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a Compliance Program. After all, corporate managers and individuals throughout the
organization knew about the illegal exports. TheMaintenance and Export department
developed and used even several schemes to conceal the illegal exports. The number
of exports and the length of the period seem to rule out errors in company procedures
and policies and points more in the direction of a non-compliance culture.
4.4 Response
From the analysis, several shortcomings and weaknesses emerge that require an
effective response to stop the non-compliant and unethical behaviour within FSBV.
In order to stop non-compliant behaviour, it is necessary to considerwhich systematic
responses can be applied in the short and long-term. It is important to note that a short-
term response (i.e., crisis management) can also mean anticipating future events and
thus having a preventive effect in the long run. After all, it is of great importance
for the continuity of business processes and the continuity of the entire organization
to respond effectively in the event of an (acute) threat in the event of a crisis, for
example, utilizing institutionalized crisis management capacity.
4.4.1 Short-Term Response
4.4.1.1 Tone at the Top
As soon as possible a statement should be delivered by senior FSBV leadership,
preferably the CEO announcing the urgent need to comply with EC, pointing to
existing shortcomings and spelling out a time-phased plan to achieve a full-fledged
implementation of an EC Internal Compliance Program. An obvious start for the
top management level is to urge all staff to follow applicable laws, regulations, and
company policies and to hold those violating laws and policies accountable. Without
consequences, violations are likely to increase.
In addition, the executive level is to allocate appropriate funding for an EC compli-
ance program. If FSBV allocates insufficient funds for initiatives to encourage ethical
behaviour such as training programs, those initiatives are unlikely to promote a
strong ethical culture. Those at other levels of leadership can also exert their influ-
ence by ensuring that their staff understand the importance of company training
concerning conflicts of interest and other ethical issues. If a manager sends a signal
that employees should view training as a distraction from their regular work and
should be completed as quickly as possible, employees are not likely to internalize
the material. Yet if top management sends a signal that the training is an integral part
of their work, employees are more likely to take the training seriously.
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4.4.1.2 Development of an Internal Compliance Program
FSBV should develop an Internal Compliance Programme (ICP) and implement all
elements as soon as possible. To comply with EC and to stop deviant and criminal
behaviour, FSBVmay include the followingmeasures16 in its company policy or ICP:
(1) increase regulations developing limited authority (e.g., implement rules regarding
approval of export, such as a multiple signature requirement); (2) increase the effort
that must be made to conduct the deviant or criminal behaviour (e.g., implement a
data system targeting anomalies, such as exports to prohibited countries); (3) increase
the chance of discovery (e.g., implement and increase guardianship by providing
more or more effective surveillance controls by compliance officers); (4) reduce
the rewards of criminal behaviour (e.g., implement a company policy that blocks
promotions for a fixed period which will lead to a strong reduction in the incentives
to conduct illegal exports); (5) decrease themotivation of the offenders (e.g., increase
the public awareness about export violations, for example by shaming and blaming,
implement a pyramid with informal and formal controls);17 and (6) remove excuses
(i.e., appealing to higher loyalties can be of significant importance for the potential
excuse that contracts with prohibited countries must be respected. By including
responsibility in the ICP and the code of conduct, and specifying who is responsible
for which business process, the organization becomes more transparent and prevents
officers fromusing other neutralization techniques, such as denying responsibility).18
4.4.1.3 Applying Soft Controls
In addition to these measures, it is strongly recommended to include soft controls in
the management control system. Soft controls consist of informal, intangible prac-
tices to enhance and sustain proper and employee behaviour.19 Practices may impact
the ethical culture and climate of FSBV (meso-level), emphasizing business integrity.
Trainers and managers may use workshops, video clips and flyers, thus generating
self-regulating capacity (clarity and congruency, and congruency), self-providing
capacity (feasibility and supportability) and self-correcting capacity (transparency,
discussability and sanctionability).20
On the latter, the revised crime triangle21 can be used. This is an extension from
the crime problem triangle which derives from the routine activity theory and is used
by the police to diagnose crimes.22 By distinguishing between handler (offender),
guardian (target) and manager (place), the triangle allows for a deeper understanding
16 Goldstein 1990, pp. 102–147.
17 Smith et al. 2007.
18 Sykes and Matza 1957.
19 Kaptein 2008.
20 Bogers 2018.
21 Clarke and Eck 2005, pp. 28–29.
22 Sampson et al. 2010.
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of the incentives and context of a violation. This way it enables preventing managers
and employees of FSBV from reoffending and to assess what changes can be made
available throughout the organization, especially in the departments where deviant
and criminal behaviour occurred.23 Besides, situational crime prevention can be
added to reduce the chances of displaying criminal and deviant behaviour locally,24
i.e., export departments.
4.4.1.4 Operational Resilience
To respond immediately to the illegal exports to prohibited countries, it is important to
pay attention to various operational challenges. Potential challenges: (i) preparation
for unpredictable situations, (ii) coping with crisis and (iii) back to normal.25 FSBV
can prepare for unpredictable situations, coping with crisis and go back to normal
through implementing detailed company procedures andmaintaining andmonitoring
an effective ICP.Acontribution to this is to ensure that FSBV is resilient,whichmeans
“the capacity to cope with unanticipated dangers after they have become manifest,
learning to bounce back”.26
In a crisis situation, it could be useful to leave decision-making to managers at
the lower-levels.27 The latter can be particularly relevant, because they may have the
expertise and knowledge to solve the problem locally. For that reason, it is relevant
to give the local managers of export departments responsibility and the authority to
make decisions, for example, approve an export using a multiple signature system
within the export department.
4.4.2 Long-Term Response
4.4.2.1 Tone at the Top
It is necessary to remain involved and continue to pay attention at Board Level
for EC compliance issues. Leadership should be willing to discuss the topic and
status of remedial action during management board meetings and should press for
sufficient resources (budget, manpower and IT-support means) leading to a full-
fledged compliance programme.
23 Braga 2008, pp. 25–29.
24 Braga 2008, p. 12.
25 Boin 2004.
26 Wildavsky 1988, p. 12.
27 Boin 2004.
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4.4.2.2 The Role of Middle Management
Following guidelines from top management, middle management should be tasked
to develop and roll out EC awareness and training programmes. This should include
workshops, flyers, e-learning materials etc. ensuring all relevant staff and personnel
attend such programmes. Middle managers should also stand ready to discuss with
staff the ongoing potentially sensitive EC cases using CRM techniques as discussed
earlier.
4.4.2.3 Developing an Internal Compliance Program
An ICP should be evaluated and updated frequently, based on new international and
national rules and regulations and should be brought in line with the compliance
policy of FSBV. To aim for a systemic structural long-term response, it is necessary
to focus on the barrel not only at the apple, respectively FSBV as awhole and not only
the individual member who performs duties related to export control or compliance.
Compliance is amatter for the entire organization and all itsmembers. A longer-term,
systemic response involves adjusting the organizational structure and procedures to
accommodate the non-compliant/unethical behaviour structurally.
A suitable means to be compliant in the long-term is an ICP that focuses on EC,
among other things. By designing and implementing an effective and efficient ICP
throughout FSBV the organisation is enabled to recognize, prevent and/or detect
specific types of non-compliant/unethical (counterproductive) behaviour.
Furthermore, to commit to the ICP, the code of conduct and company policies and
to respond effectively in the long-term, it is necessary to change the deviant, unethical
and criminal behaviour of thememberswithin FSBV into compliant behaviour.When
changing behaviour, it is relevant to note that the macro-level, i.e., the (international)
economic and legal context, cannot be influenced by the organization itself. It is
therefore important to assess how FSBV reacts to the environment and how this
translates into the behaviour of individuals (trickle-down): in contrast to the macro-
level, the interaction between individuals and the organization can be influenced.
The following protocol can contribute to changing behaviour: (1) specify the
behaviour into a certain context so that it is clear to members what FSBV means
with compliance; (2) measure the occasions that members within FSBV behave in a
compliant way; (3) analyse the behaviour of the moments in which non-compliant
and/or compliant behaviour is displayed; (4) feedback the data from the analysis
to the members within FSBV, because seeing positive numbers in which complaint
behaviour has occurred stimulates desirable behaviour; (5) set (sub)goals regarding
compliance with EC within FSBV; and (6) reinforce when members within FSBV
have succeeded in reaching (sub)goals, which ultimately leads to a change regarding
the corporate culture within FSBV.28
28 Bleker-van Eyk and Houben 2017.
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4.5 Assessment
Adeliberate violation of export control regulations of themagnitude aswaswitnessed
in the case of Fokker Services during an extended period, caused a renowned firm
to suffer a deep blow. A situation like that is worth a thorough analysis to learn
valuable lessons and share these lessons with other companies that are faced with
export control challenges and customer demands. Using the incremental process of
scanning, analysis, response and assessment (i.e., the SARA framework) proved to
be very valuable.29
During the first step of scanning, violations by FSBV came to light in a structured
way, laying bare how FSBV operated to evade export control, breaching sanction
regimes and export control laws concerning Iran, Sudan and Burma. At the time
FSBV came forward, no government agency had initiated any investigation focused
on the company. The next section, analysis, stipulated what role various actors (top
and middle management) and instruments have played and what their role or impact
was on the day-to-day activities leading to violations. More in particular, it was
found that the cause and conditions of the violation of the export control regulations
were mainly rooted in the tone at the top, the role of (intermediary) management
and the absence of a Compliance Program. Analysing the response over the course
of the next four years, FSBV instituted remedial measures to improve its sanctions
compliance program, adopting a set of procedures to track export-controlled parts.
Furthermore, FSBV bolstered its employee training requirements, fired its president
and demoted or reassigned other employees who had been involved in the violations.
The company’s compliance efforts have been described by US government officials
as “amodel to be followed by other corporations”.30 Subsequently, a short-term and a
long-term response were formulated addressing the tone at the top, the development
of an Internal Compliance Program, and the application of soft controls to promote
an ethical culture. By following the logic of the SARA framework, the root-causes
of violations and misbehaviour within Fokker Services BV became clear.
Without structurally analysing root causes, it is impossible to adequately prevent
and respond to violations.
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Throughout history, states and other territorial entities have restricted the export of
arms and related military equipment, including maritime supplies and equipment,
for reasons of national security. For example, in ancient times the Roman Empire
prohibited the delivery of weapons to other nations1 and during the Dutch Revolt2
the Dutch Republic subjected the trade in arms and maritime equipment to a strict
licensing system (see Chap. 16).3 Such restrictions in international military trade
have been developed in domestic policies and laid down in national rules and regula-
tions. Today, states continue to regulate the export of military equipment. The scope
of contemporary legislation, however, has broadened significantly over time and now
also encompasses goods, technology, and software (in this chapter together referred to
as items) that are civilian by design but may serve a military purpose as well (dual-
use). Moreover, security concerns are not the sole basis for these particular trade
restrictions anymore, as other considerations, such as foreign policy, human rights,
and economy, increasingly influence decision-making. Another striking element of
domestic export control legislation is the increasing importance of public interna-
tional law. All domestic and international laws and regulations as well as policy rules
and commitments that are applicable to and regulate the export, re-export, transit, and
transfer in anymanner of goods, technology, and software can be referred to as export
control law. Although a term like this suggests that a new branch of law has emerged,
export control law is not an established field of law in its own right. Each state still
has the power to enact its own set of domestic laws, regulations, and policy rules,
whereas the international component of export control law draws heavily on various
subdisciplines of public international law. However, as a consistent and comprehen-
sive set of rules is rapidly developing with a growing impact on international trade,
discussion of international export control law as a distinct subdiscipline of law is
warranted.
Export control law is a rather broad field of law potentially encompassing a wide
array of topics. In this chapter it is narrowly interpreted to include only two core
areas of export control, namely the rules with respect to the control of the export of
military and dual-use items, and economic sanctions. Consequently, related topics
such as bribery of foreign officials, securities law, foreign direct investments, and
trust law will not be part of the discussion.
The chapter’s aim is to analyse international export control law by exploring the
various areas of international law relevant to export control law. The chapter starts
by introducing export control and analysing some key terms before exploring the
subdisciplines of international law that are most relevant to export control law in
general. These subdisciplines include the laws of armed conflict (also referred to
as international humanitarian law), sanctions law as part of international security
1 Krause and MacDonald 1993, p. 708.
2 Revolt of the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands against the rule of the King of Spain; also
known as the Eighty Years’ War (1568–1648).
3 De Jong 2005, p. 153.
5 International Export Control Law—Mapping the Field 71
law, the law of arms control, and human rights law. Finally, this chapter offers a
brief synthesis and conclusion. Domestic and regional (i.e., European Union) export
control law will not be discussed in detail but may be referred to where appropriate.4
Asmay be apparent from the table of contents of this volume, export control law is
inextricably linked to other research and policy areas such as ethics, economics and
trade, and politics and international relations, all of which influence the legislator’s
choices. Export control laws and regulations are, therefore, the result of trade-offs
made in all these interconnected areas. Since the aim of this chapter is limited to
mapping the legal terrain, it will not probe the non-legal aspects of export control.
The audience should, however, keep in mind the relevance and impact of other
research and policy areas.
5.2 Export Control Law in General and Terminology
Under modern public international law, states are prohibited from threatening to or
using force against other states. This is a rule of customary law, as well as one of
the founding principles of the United Nations (UN) as laid down in Article 2(4) of
the UN Charter, “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”.5
The Charter states two exceptions to this rule. First, states are allowed to use force
based on their inherent right of individual and collective self-defence against an
armed attack (Article 51 of the UN Charter). Second, states can use armed force
to maintain or restore international peace and security when mandated by the UN
Security Council under Articles 39 and 42 of the UN Charter (peace-enforcement
and peace-operations).
The right to resort to armed force in self-defence, implies that States can maintain
the means to act on that right. Consequently, absent specific treaty limitation States
are entitled to possess arms and other military equipment,6 without restrictions on
the levels or types of armaments,7 and, as a corollary thereof, can produce and trade
them unless prohibited under international law. The right to possess arms has been
confirmed by the International Court of Justice in its landmark Nicaragua Judgment,
“in international law there are no rules other than such rules as may be accepted
by the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise whereby the level of armaments of
4 For an excellent overview of domestic and EU export control law, see Aubin and Idiart 2016.
5 Charter of the United Nations; San Francisco, 26 June 1945; entered into force 24 October
1945. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/No%20Volume/Part/un_charter.pdf Accessed
16 February 2021.
6 For example, a Netherlands policy evaluation regarding non-proliferation, disarmament, and
export control of strategic goods notes that conventional arms serve the legitimate right to self-
defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Parliamentary Paper 2018/19, 33694, No.
38, p. 34.
7 Coppen 2016, p. 22.
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a sovereign State can be limited, and this principle is valid for all States without
exception”.8 The international trade in arms as a legitimate exercise of the right to
self-defence is reflected in the Preamble of theArmsTrade Treaty by its reference to a
number of international principles, including the right to self-defence as recognized
in Article 51 of the UN Charter and “(t)he respect for the legitimate interests of
States to acquire conventional arms to exercise their right to self-defence and for
peacekeeping operations; and to produce, export, import and transfer conventional
arms”.9
As states can legitimately trade in arms, it is reasonable to keep checks on these
goods and related items leaving the territory destined for another state. The reasons
therefor may vary but will include the protection of national security and economic
interests. Also, export control can be a key foreign policy tool as well as a State’s
contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. In general,
national checks on the export of military and dual-use items will focus on items that
can be useful for purposes that are contrary to a State’s interests. Often, these items
are included in elaborate lists and subject to a system of prohibitions, exemptions,
licenses, or other forms of authorization. Yet, unlisted items can become subject to
export control authorization as well through the use of ‘catch-all’ clauses. Clauses
of this type provide that the export of unlisted items still require a national autho-
rization when the end-use or the end-user of an item are of concern as specified in
that clause; e.g. use related to weapons of mass destruction.10 Whether or not an
authorization for the export of an item is required will, in general, be determined by
answering the ‘what’, ‘where’, ‘who’, and ‘how’ questions.11 What are the product
specifications of an item and do they correspond with a listed item (classification)?
Where is an item heading (destination); is that State subject to a sanctions regime?
Who is ultimately the user of the item (end-user)? And finally, how will the item
ultimately be used (end-use)?
Today, international commerce is characterized by the economic principle of free
trade.12 Export controls and sanctions do not seem to fit this principle. Neverthe-
less, they can be justified under international economic law instruments.13 Article
XXI of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT)14 contains ‘secu-
rity exemptions’ allowing States to take “any action it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests”. The exception applies, inter alia, with
8 ICJ 27 June 1987, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgement, Merits, [1986] ICJ Rep 1, para 269.
Hereinafter: the Nicaragua Case.
9 Arms Trade Treaty; New York, 2 April 2013; entered into force 24 December 2014 (Vol. 3013
UNTS, No. 52373).
10 Haellmigk 2017.
11 Cfm. Aubin and Idiart 2016, pp. 5–6.
12 Trebilcock and Trachtman 2020, pp. 1–6.
13 Aubin and Idiart 2016, p. 1.
14 Annex 1A, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of theMarrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization; Marrakesh, 15 April 1994 entered into force 1 January 1995
(Vol. 1867 UNTS 1995, No. 31874).
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respect to “the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic
in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of
the supplying a military establishment” (Article XXI(b)(ii)).15 Article 346(1)(b) of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)16 includes a similar
exception authorizingMemberStates to take “suchmeasures as it considers necessary
for the production of the essential interests of its security which are connected with
the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall
not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the internal market regarding
products which are not intended for specifically military purposes”.17
As has been mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, export control law is
not a self-contained or specialized18 legal regime. Consequently, it lacks a single
set of legal definitions of key export control terminology. So, the meaning of terms
such as ‘export’ and ‘military goods’ may differ, depending on the applicable legal
system and even, within that jurisdiction, on the specific statutory basis. For instance,
under US law ‘export’ not only refers to the transfer of an item or a defense article
out of the US but also to the release or transfer of technology or technical data to
a foreign person even when that person is present in the US19 The latter form of
export is referred to as ‘deemed export’ in US export control law, but this expression
is not used in EU export control law. Further, in the US legal system the terms ‘item’
and ‘technology’ are typical for the control of dual-use and less-sensitive military
items (not including services) pursuant to the Export Control Act of 201820 and its
implementing regulations: the Export Administration Regulations.21 These terms are
not used, however, in relation tomilitary itemswhich are regulated in theArmsExport
15 A similar clause provision can be found in Article XIV bis, Annex 1B, General Agreement on
Trade in Service (GATS) of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization;
Marrakesh, 15 April 1994 (Vol. 1867 UNTS 1995, No. 31874). Malloy 2003, pp. 379–380 points
out that member States can invoke the security exception as a self-judging justification for the
imposition of sanctions leaving States a wide margin of appreciation. In doing so, States must,
however, observe the general principle of good; Para 7.132, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic
in Transit, WTO Panel report, Action by the Dispute Settlement Body, WTO Doc WT/DS512/7 of
29 April 2019.
16 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; Rome 25 March 1957; entered into force
1 January 1958. Consolidated version, OJ C 326, 26/10/2012, pp. 1–390.
17 This provision is not applicable to dual-use items;VRandazzo (2014)Article 346 and the qualified
application of EU law to defence. European Union Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.
europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_22_Article_346.pdf Accessed 16 February 2021.
18 Term as used in UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 of 14 April 2006, Report of the Study Group of the
International Law Commission on ‘Fragmentation of international law: Difficulties arising from
the diversification and expansion of international law, p. 81. Cf. Coppen 2016, pp. 25–26.
19 15 C.F.R. Sections 734.13 and 22 C.F.R. Section 120.17.
20 Export Controls Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115–232, div. A, title XVII, subtitle B, part I (Sections 1751–
1768), 132 Stat. 2209 (50 U.S.C. 4811 et seq.). Part of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, Pub.
L. 115–232, div. A, title XVII, subtitle B (Sections 1741–1781), Aug. 13, 2018, 132 Stat. 2208 (50
U.S.C. 4801 et seq.).
21 15 C.F.R. Sections 730 et seq.
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Control Act of 197622 and its implementing regulations: the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations.23 Here, the preferred terms are ‘defense article’ and ‘technical
data’. For the purpose of this chapter, I will use goods, services, and technology in a
generic way.Where appropriate, I will refer to the terms common to that jurisdiction.
5.3 International Law
As discussed above, the right of states to use force in self-defence and for peace-
enforcement and peace-operations entails the right to possess and sell arms or other-
wise transfer them abroad. The freedom of states to exercise the latter rights has been
considerably limited as public international law developed over the past century.
Currently, multiple subdisciplines of public international law increasingly impact
the discretion of national legislators to control the export of military and dual-use
items. The law of armed conflict prohibits and regulates the use of specific cate-
gories of weapons in armed conflict. Further limitations apply in peace-time where
the law of arms control sets out rules on the production, testing, stockpiling, transfer,
or deployment of certain types of weapons. In addition, sanctions law restricts the
export of military and dual-use items to embargoed States and entities. Furthermore,
human rights concerns increasingly are to be taken into account on every level of
decision-making with respect to export control.
Most of the international rules on export control are laid down in international
agreements (treaties) concluded between states or are part of international customary
law. Additional non-legal commitments flow from informal arrangements, such as
the export control regimes like the Wassenaar Arrangement (see Chap. 3). States
are obliged to implement and enforce the rules as provided in the various instru-
ments to which they are a party. Also, when a state does not comply with the provi-
sions in the instruments, it may become subject to international sanctions, and it
may cause other states to deny or restrict the transfer of military or dual-use items
to the non-compliant state. For instance, the EU requires member states to take a
number of criteria into consideration before granting an export license for military
items.24 The criteria include compliance with arms embargoes, obligations under
non-proliferation treaties, commitments under the export control regimes, and respect
for human rights and the law of armed conflict. This section provides an overview
of these subdisciplines of public international law.
22 Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. 90–629, 82 Stat. 1320 (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).
23 22 C.F.R. Sections 120–130.
24 Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining rules governing control
of exports of military technology and equipment (OJ L 335, 13.12.2008, pp. 99–103).
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5.3.1 The Law of Armed Conflict
Perhaps the oldest subdiscipline of public international law relevant to export control
is the law of armed conflict (or: international humanitarian law). This field of law
is based on the idea that the horrors of armed conflict should be limited as much
as is feasible by protecting the victims of armed conflict and restricting the means
and methods of warfare. This body of law has expanded in its scope and application
sinceWorldWar II. Consequently, the scope of armed conflict is broad encompassing
international armed conflicts between two or more states as well as internal (or: non-
international) armed conflicts that take place between a state and organized armed
groups or between such groups within its territory.25 Warfighting has been subject to
customary rules and religious norms for centuries (e.g., the prohibition of the use of
slings and (cross)bows against Christians as stated inCanon 29 of the SecondCouncil
of the Lateran in 1139).26 The codification of this field of law started in the second
half of the 19th century and continues today. Two topics that are in particular relevant
for international military trade are discussed below: neutrality law and weapons law.
5.3.1.1 Neutrality Law
States that do not participate in an international armed conflict are neutral and have the
right not to be adversely affected by the hostilities.27 This entails the right to continue
international trade and maintain existing commercial relations with the parties to the
conflict.28 The principle of non-participation prohibits, however, neutral states to
make available war materials to one or more of the parties to the conflict. The issue
was addressed in the 1856 Paris Declaration, the very first treaty on the law of
armed conflict. The Paris Declaration protects neutral maritime trade by prohibiting
parties to a conflict from seizing enemy goods on neutral vessels or neutral goods
on enemy vessels except for “contraband of war”.29 The 1906 Hague Convention
XIII specifically prohibits neutral States to supply directly or indirectly “war-ships,
ammunition, or war material of any kind whatever”.30
25 “Armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups within a State.” 2 October 1995, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction.
26 Referred to by Boothby 2016, p. 9.
27 Bothe 2013, p. 549. Neutrality rules are necessary to prevent escalation of a conflict.
28 Subsequent changes in trade activities favouring one of the parties would be incompatible with
the neutral status, however. Bothe 2013, p. 550.
29 Point 2 and 3 of the Declaration Respecting Maritime Law; Paris, 16 April 1856. British State
Papers 1856, Vol. LXI, pp. 155–158.
30 Article 6 of the Hague Convention (XIII) Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in




Closely related to neutrality law is the law of blockade. This part of the law of
armed conflict deals with amethod of economicwarfare at sea aimed at preventing all
vessels from entering or exiting enemy coastal areas or ports.31 A historical example
is the blockade by the Dutch Republic of Flemish port under the control of the
Kingdom of Spain in 1584.32 Initially, the Dutch activities were widely criticized as
a violation of neutrality law because of their impact on the trade of neutral States
with the Spanish held cities. However, as other naval powers were quick to follow
suit the right to declare a blockade developed as a customary rule and was included
in the Paris Declaration (point 4) in 1856.33 Blockades are still relevant today34 and
are also mentioned as one of the actions the UN Security Council can take under
Article 42 UN Charter to maintain or restore international peace and security (see
Sect. 5.3.3).35
5.3.1.2 Weapons Law
Weapons law is the part of the law of armed conflict that essentially prohibits the use
of certain weapons in armed conflict and restricts the circumstances in which other
weapons may lawfully be used.36 Moreover, States Parties to the Additional Protocol
I to the Geneva Conventions37 have to make sure that in the study, development,
acquisition, or adoption of a new weapon international law does not prohibit its
deployment (Article 36). Consequently, states considering importing new weapons
must respect this obligation and incorporate it into their acquisition procedures.
Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in
Case of War on Land; The Hague, 17 October 1907. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.
nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=71929FBD2655E558C12563CD002D67AE&action=openDocument
Accessed 16 February 2021.
31 Heintschel von Heinegg 2013, p. 532. Today, the law of blockade includes activities of aircraft.
32 Drew 2017.
33 Heintschel von Heinegg 2013, p. 533. In order for a blockade to be binding, it had to be effective,
that is: maintained by a force sufficient to prevent access to the enemy coast.
34 For example, the ongoing blockades of the Gaza Strip by Israel and Egypt and Yemen by Saudi
Arabia and its allies.
35 The lawof blockade is also part of the non-legally bindingSanRemoManual on International Law
Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea of 12 June 1994. An important improvement are provisions
on proportionality and the protecting of the civil population; para 96ff.
36 Boothby 2016, p. 3; referring to the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual of June
2015.
37 Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection
of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I); Geneva 1977, entered into force 7 December
1978 (Vol. 1125 UNTS 1986, No. 17512).
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Weapons law is based on the rationale that the means to conduct hostilities in
armed conflict find their limits in humanitarian considerations.38 The first interna-
tional instrument in this field is the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration39 prohibiting the
use of certain explosive projectiles. Other instruments soon followed often concen-
trating on the codification of the customary prohibition of poisoned weapons (e.g.,
the Declaration concerning Asphyxiating Gases of 29 July 1899 and the Treaty of
Versailles of 28 June 1919).40 The use of various types of gases in World War I led
to the adoption of the Gas Protocol in 1925,41 prohibiting the use in armed conflict
of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids materials or
devices” as well “the use of bacteriological methods of warfare”.
Building on this Protocol, that is still in force today, new agreements were
concluded over the past few decades. In 1972, the Convention on the Prohibition of
Biological Weapons42 negotiated by the Conference on Disarmament43 was opened
for signature. The agreement prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and
otherwise acquiring or retaining of biological and toxin weapons,44 making it the
first multilateral treaty banning an entire category of weapons of mass destruction.
By no longer focusing on the use of the weapons, an overlap has been created with
the law of arms control, which will be further addressed in the next section.
The prohibition of chemical weapons was further developed in the Chemical
Weapons Convention of 1993.45 The agreement prohibits the development, produc-
tion, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons. In addition, States are required to
38 See the preamble of the St Petersburg Declaration of 1868, “that Commission having by common
agreement fixed the technical limits at which the necessities ofwar ought to yield to the requirements
of humanity”.
39 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive projectiles under 400 Grammes
Weight; Saint Petersburg, 29 November/11 December 1868. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/
ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=3C02BAF088A50F61C12563CD002D663B&action=openDo
cument Accessed 16 February 2021.
40 Boothby 2016, p. 12 and p. 104.
41 Protocol for the Prohibition of theUse ofAsphyxiating, Poisonous orOtherGases, and of Bacteri-
ological Methods of Warfare; Geneva, 17 June 1925. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/280?
OpenDocument Accessed 16 February 2021. The document was adopted as a separate document
together with the Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms, Munitions and
Implements of War; Geneva 17 June 1925, which did not enter into force.
42 Convention on the Prohibition of theDevelopment, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction; London, Moscow and Washington, 10
April 1972; entered into force 26 March 1976 (Vol. 1015 UNTS 1994, No. 14860).
43 The “single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community”, https://
www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9?Ope
nDocument Accessed 16 February 2021. The Conference also negotiated a number of other
agreements discussed in this chapter.
44 The Agreement does not prohibit the use of these weapons but the Member States have expressly
accepted the prohibition on the use of biological weapons at a number of Review Conferences;
Lentzos 2019, p. 3.
45 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on their Destruction; Paris, 13 January 1993; entered into force 29 April 1997 (Vol.
1974/1975 UNTS 2001, No. 33757).
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destroy production facilities for chemical weapons as well as the weapons them-
selves (Article I). The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, estab-
lished pursuant to Article VII, monitors compliance with the Chemical Weapons
Convention.
Whereas the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has already been addressed in
various international instruments, as will be discussed in the next section, the threat
or use of these weapons was not prohibited under international law.46 This situation
has changed with the entry into force of the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty on 22
January 2021, which prohibits the threat and use of nuclear weapons as well as other
actions. Although none of the States currently in possession of this type of weapons
is a party to the treaty, it signifies a further step towards nuclear disarmament.
In 1980, the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention47 became the basis for
restrictions to the use of certain conventional weapons as set out in protocols to the
Convention. These Protocols coverweapons such asmines and booby-traps (Protocol
II),48 incendiary weapons (Protocol III),49 and blinding laser weapons (Protocol
IV).50 The latter Protocol prohibits the use as well as the transfer of such weapons
further strengthening the link between the law of armed conflict and the law of arms
control. Outside the framework of the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention,
States adopted several other agreements on conventional weapons, such as the Anti-
PersonnelMineBanConvention51 and theConvention onClusterMunition.52 Parties
to these treaties have agreed to neither use these weapons nor “to develop, produce,
otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly” them.
In the future, new and emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and nano-
technology, or items based thereon53 may become subject of international agreements
restricting their further development or use.
46 ICJ 8 July 1996; Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, para 105.
47 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which
May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects; Geneva, 10 October
1980; entered into force 2 December 1983 (Vol. 1342 UNTS 1992, No. 22495).
48 Protocol (II) on Prohibitions orRestrictions on theUse ofMines, Booby-Traps andOtherDevices.
Geneva, 10 October 1980; entered into force 2 December 1983 (Vol. 1342 UNTS 1992, No. 22495).
49 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on theUse of IncendiaryWeapons (Protocol III). Geneva,
10 October 1980; entered into force 2 December 1983 (Vol. 1342 UNTS 1992, No. 22495).
50 Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV to the 1980 Convention); Vienna, 13 October
1995; entered into force 30 July 1998 (Vol. 2024 UNTS 2001, No. 22495).
51 Ottawa Treaty: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction; Oslo, 18 September 1997; entered into force 1
March 1999 (Vol. 2056 UNTS 2002, No. 35597).
52 Convention on Cluster Munitions; Dublin, 30 May 2008; entered into force 1 Augustus 2010
(Vol. 2688 UNTS 2010, No. 47713).
53 E.g., emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems.
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5.3.2 The Law of Arms Control
The ultimate goal of arms control is to preserve international peace and security
by easing international tensions and reducing the likelihood of large scale armed
conflicts. Therefore, the law of arms control not only prohibits the use of certain types
of weapons, as the law of conflict does, but also covers the peacetime production,
testing, stockpiling, or transfer thereof.54 This field of law can be defined as “that
part of public international law that deals both with the restraints internationally
exercised upon the use of military force (in general) and on the use, transfer and/or
the possession of armaments (in particular), including their component parts and
related technologies, whether in respect of the level of armaments, their character
or deployment and with the applicable supervisory mechanisms”.55 The definition
casts the net quite wide, encompassing concepts such as disarmament and non-
proliferation law.56 As it is hard to keep these associated areas separated from one
another, they will be discussed together under the umbrella term of arms control.
5.3.2.1 Development
As with export control law, the law of arms control has a long history. One of the
early agreements includes the 1890 Brussels Conference Act,57 the main purpose of
which was to fight the slave trade. Part of the agreed measures was the restriction of
the transfer of modern firearms to parts of the African continent. The agreement was
not very effective and was supplemented and revised in the aftermath of World War
I by the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye.58 The purpose of this treaty was to
submit all members of the newly established League of Nations to the control of the
trade in arms and ammunition pursuant to Article 23(d) of the League of Nations
54 Boothby 2020, p. 372, quoting Roberts A, Guelff R (2000) Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd
ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 37.
55 Myjer and Herbach 2018, p. 209.
56 In general, arms control is considered the broader concept whereas disarmament is aimed
at reducing the number of arms or the eliminations of whole categories of weapons and non-
proliferation deals with the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction and conven-
tional arms, such as missiles; North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2020, Arms control, disarmament
and non-proliferation in NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48895.htm Accessed
16 February 2021.
57 General Act of the Brussels Conference relative to the Africa Slave Trade (also known as the
Convention Relative to the Slave Trade and Importation into Africa of Firearms, Ammunition, and
Spiritous Liquors); Brussels, 2 July 1890; entered into force 31 August 1891. https://www.loc.gov/
law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000001-0134.pdf Accessed 16 February 2021.
58 Convention for the control of the trade in arms and ammunition; St. Germain-en-Laye, 10
September 1919 (8 LNTS 26; The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, No. 4, Supple-
ment: Official Documents (Oct, 1921), 297–313)). https://archive.org/stream/jstor-2213279/221
3279_djvu.txt Accessed 16 February 2021.
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Covenant.59 The agreement did not enter into force, however. Efforts to revive the
Convention of Saint-Germain-en-Laye at a conference in Genève a couple of years
later were unsuccessful.60 Nonetheless, the conference was no total failure as it also
adopted the Gas Protocol, discussed above.
The development of the law of arms control really took off in the post-World War
II period. Key in its development were the rise and further development of nuclear
weapons andmissile technology.61 It was, however, not until the end of the ColdWar,
when international relations became more balanced, that arms control matured and
the law of arms control became a separate branch of public international law.62 This
field of law covers conventional weapons as well as weapons of mass destruction.
Examples of treaties dealing with conventional arms and forces are the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe63 and the Treaty on Open Skies. Also, at this
point, the Arms Trade Treaty may be mentioned which purpose is not to prohibit the
international trade in arms, but to regulate the legitimate conventional arms trade.64
5.3.2.2 Nuclear Weapons
Today, attention is focused on the weapons of mass destruction. The previous section
already discussed biological and chemical weapons. This section further focuses
on nuclear weapons. The rules regarding nuclear weapons and technology are laid
down in multiple multilateral treaties as well as bilateral treaties between the two
leading nuclear powers of the past decades: the US and Russia. The cornerstone
of international efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the Non-
Proliferation Treaty of 1968.65 The five states in possession of nuclear weapons at
the time of signing of the treaty (the nuclear-weapon states66) committed themselves
to not transferring nuclear weapons or technology to any other State (Article I).
The non-nuclear-weapon states, for their part, agreed not to manufacture or acquire
59 The Covenant of the League of Nations; Versailles, 28 June 1919. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
20th_century/leagcov.asp Accessed 16 February 2021. Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute 1971, p. 91.
60 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 1971, p. 95.
61 Myjer 2020, p. 352.
62 Myjer 2020, p. 354.
63 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe; Paris 19 November 1990; entered into force 9
November 1992 (Vol. 2442 UNTS 2007, No. 44001) limiting NATO and Warsaw Pact non-nuclear
for forces in Europe. On 26 April 2007 Russia suspended its participation in the treaty, but did not
withdraw; Woolf et al. 2020, p. 40.
64 Conventional arms include: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery system,
combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers and small arms and
light weapons; Article 2(2) Arms Trade Treaty. Under the Treaty, States are not to authorize arms
transfer that would violate a UN arms embargo or when they have knowledge that the arms would
be used to commit war crimes.
65 Grotto 2009. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; London, Moscow and
Washington, 1 July 1968; entered into force 5 March 1970 (Vol. 729 UNTS 1974, No. 10485).
66 The US, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China.
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nuclear weapons (Article II) and to accept monitoring of their civil nuclear programs
by the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA (Article III).
Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty calls upon states to end the nuclear
arms race and complete nuclear disarmament. As the nuclear-weapons states failed
to make progress on nuclear disarmament, humanitarian initiatives led to the adop-
tion of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty in 2017. This instrument includes a set of
prohibitions on participating in any nuclear weapon activities, such as developing,
testing, producing, acquiring, possessing, stockpiling, using or threatening to use
nuclear weapons (Article 1). Ultimately, it must lead towards their total elimination
(Article 4).
Earlier treaties on nuclear non-proliferation, some preceding the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, cover areas such as the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests
and the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. The Limited (or: Partial) Test
Ban Treaty67 restricts the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, underwater,
and in outer space. It does, however, not prohibit nuclear test explosions underground.
The latter issue is partly covered by the Threshold Test Ban Treaty between the US
and Russia,68 which prohibits nuclear tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons.
Nuclear testing should definitely come to an end with the entry into force of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which is to ban all nuclear tests world-wide.69
The prohibition on nuclear testing is also part of regional agreements on Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zones.70 Their scope is much broader, though, and generally include
bans on the development, manufacturing, control, possession, stationing or trans-
portingof nuclearweapons in a given area.Thefirst of such agreementswas theTreaty
of Tlatelolco signed by Latin American and the Caribbean States in 1967.71 Other
regional nuclear-weapon-free zones agreements cover areas in the South Pacific,72
67 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water;
Moscow, 5 August 1963; entered into force 10 October 1963 (Vol. 480 UNTS 1965, No. 6964).
Nuclear-Weapon States France and China are not party to the treaty.
68 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (with protocol dated at Wash-
ington on 1 June 1990); Moscow 3 July 1994; entered into force 5 March 1970 (Vol. 1714 UNTS
1999, No. 29637).
69 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, New York, 10 September 1996; not entered into force.
https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/treaty-text/ Accessed 16 February 2021.
70 Such a regional approach to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is allowed under Article
VII of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty.
71 Treaty of Tlatelolco: Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America; Mexico
City, 14 February 1967; entered into force 22 April 1968 (Vol. 634 UNTS 1970, No. 9068).
72 Treaty of Rarotonga: South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty; Rarotonga, 6 August 1985; entered
into force 11 December 1986 (Vol. 1445 UNTS 1996, No. 24592).
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Southeast Asia,73 Central Asia,74 and Africa.75 Also, treaties for Antarctica,76 Outer
Space,77 the Seabed,78 and the Moon,79 include provisions on denuclearization of
areas that do not belong to a particular State.
As early as the Cold War era, the two major nuclear powers, the US and
Russia (formerly the Soviet Union) entered into a number of agreements signif-
icantly reducing the number of nuclear weapons. Under the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,80 both States agreed to eliminate their intermediate-
range and shorter-range ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range
between 500 and 1500 kilometres. The number of strategic nuclear weapons of both
States was reduced under the START 1 (1991),81 the SORT,82 and the New START
(2010) agreements. In the latter agreement the US and Russia limit the number
73 The Bangkok Treaty: Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone; Bangkok, 15
December 1995; entered into force 27 March 1997 (Vol. 1981 UNTS 2001, No. 33873).
74 The Semipalatinsk Treaty: Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia; Semi-
palatinsk, 8 September 2006; entered into force 21 March 2009 (Vol. 2970 UNTS, No. 51633). The
UN General Assembly has recognized the self-declared nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia in
Resolution 55/33S, “Mongolia’s international security and nuclear weapon free status”.
75 Pelindaba Treaty: African Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty; Cairo 11 April 1996; entered into
force 15 July 2009. https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/treaties/african-nuclear-weapon-
free-zone-treaty-pelindaba-treaty Accessed 16 February 2021.
76 The Antarctic Treaty; Washington, 1 December 1959; entered into force 23 June 1961 (Vol. 402
UNTS 1962, No. 5778).
77 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; London, Moscow and Washington, 27
January 1967; entered into force 10 October 1967 (Vol. 610 UNTS 1970, No. 8843).
78 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass
Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; London, Moscow
and Washington: 11 February 1971; entered into force: 18 May 1972 (Vol. 955 UNTS 1983, No.
13678).
79 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; New
York: 18 December 1979; entered into force 11 July 1984 (Vol. 1363 UNTS 1992, No. 23002).
80 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles; Washington, 8 December
1987; entered into force 1 June 1988, ceased to be in force on 2 August 2019, after the U.S.
withdrawal (Vol. 1657 UNTS 2001, No. 28521).
81 START I: Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of
America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; Moscow, 31 July 1991;
entered into force 5 December 1994. Start II, banning the use of multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) never entered into force
(Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on
the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; Moscow, 3 January 1993; expired 5
December 2009 with the entry into force of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty.
82 Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Strategic Offensive
Reductions; Moscow 25 May 2002; entered into force 1 June 2003 (Vol. 2350 UNTS 2008, No.
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of nuclear warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-
launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers to 1,550 shored up by a robust
verification mechanism.83
5.3.2.3 Multi-layered System
The law of arms control is conventional in nature. It is based on a series of bilateral
and multilateral treaties rather than customary law. It is further strengthened and
supplemented by binding decisions of international organizations, in particular UN
Security Council Resolution 1540,84 and several soft law instruments called the
export control regimes (see Chap. 3).85 The final layer of the law of arms control
can be found in the national legal systems as States are obliged to implement and
enforce the internationally agreed rules in their domestic legal system. Of course,
states parties to an international agreement are obliged to implement and enforce
the agreement in accordance with its terms. Moreover, Resolution 1540 creates a
universal obligation for all states to “take and enforce effective measures to establish
domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls
over related materials”.86
Consequently, an expanding multi-layered system of interconnected legal norms
has been created covering weapons of mass destruction, as well as conventional
weapons and forces that have to be incorporated in domestic export control law.
Despite the high level of regulation, the system faces multiple challenges. Some
states still have weapons of mass destruction, and some even do not shy away
from using them, as, for example, the chemical weapons attacks in Syria show.
The US has withdrawn from the INF-treaty and the Treaty on Open Skies.87 Other
treaties have not entered into force yet, such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
and the Adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. Furthermore, the
42195). The treaty was superseded by the New START on 5 February 2011: Treaty between the
United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; Prague 8 April 2010, entered into force on 5 February 2011
(TIAS 11-205).
83 The U.S. and Russia have agreed to extend the treaty through 4 February 2026: Agreement
between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Amending the Treaty of 8 April
2010; Moscow 26 January 2021 (TIAS 21-203).
84 UN Doc S/RES/1540 (2004), 28 April 2004.
85 The politically binding coordinating arrangements within the framework of the current export
control regimes include: the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms
and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee
(nuclear material and technology); the Australia Group (chemical and biological weapons), and the
Missile Technology Control Regime.
86 As the UNSC acted under Chapter VII of the UN Convention, this obligation is binding on all
member States in accordance with Article 25 UN Charter.
87 In May 2020 the U.S. announced its intention to withdraw from the treaty. The withdrawal took
effect on 22 November 2010. Woolf 2020.
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question arises whether the existing rules are sufficiently capable of dealing with
emerging technologies, such as additive manufacturing, artificial intelligence, big
data analytics, bio-technology, and nanotechnology.
5.3.3 Sanctions Law
Throughout history, states have used sanctions as a powerful political tool to exert
influence on other states or even to coerce them into changing their behavior.88 Typi-
cally, sanctions were imposed in the context of armed conflicts or disputes falling
short of war.89 Building on that practice, sanctions became part of the collective secu-
rity system of the League of Nations as an alternative to the use of armed force.90
One of the fiercest supporters of the sanctions paragraph in the League of Nations
Covenant was US PresidentWilson. Addressing a House of Representative Subcom-
mittee he stated, “Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will
be no need for force. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings
a pressure upon the nation which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist”.91
The League invoked its authority to impose sanctions on several occasions with
varying degrees of success, for example, after Italy had invaded Ethiopia in October
1935.92
5.3.3.1 UN Collective Security
The prohibition on the use of force as mentioned in Sect. 5.2 is the central element of
the present system of collective security in which the international community has
tasked theUN tomaintain international peace and security (Article 1(1) UNCharter).
Within the system, the UN Security Council plays a critical role. After determining
88 Today, the reasons for sanctions range widely and include support for terrorism, narcotics
trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and human rights abuses.
89 Nevill 2016, p. 234.
90 See Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, “Should any Member of the League
resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed
to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake
immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of
all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the
prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-
breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not”.
91 Quoted in Elliott KA (1997) Evidence on the costs and benefits of economic
sanctions. https://www.piie.com/commentary/testimonies/evidence-costs-and-benefits-economic-
sanctions Accessed 16 February 2021. Padover 1942, p. 108.
92 Fleming 1935 p. 22. Further League of Nations Sanctions: 1921 Yugoslavia, 1925 Greece, 1932–
5 Paraguay and Bolivia, and 1935–36 Italy; Summary of economic sanctions episodes, 1914–2006,
Peterson Institute for International Economics. https://www.piie.com/summary-economic-sancti
ons-episodes-1914-2006 Accessed 16 February 2021.
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the existence of a threat to international peace and security (Article 39 of the UN
Charter), the Council can take action and even authorize the use of armed force to
restore peace and security. The use of force is, however, an ultimum remedium and
the Council can refrain frommilitary action and opt for less intrusive measures under
Article 41 of the UN Charter, such as sanctions.
Modern sanctions can be described as “non-forcible (i.e., non-military) foreign
policy measures adopted by states or international organisations and designed,
possibly among other things, to influence other states or non-state entities or individ-
uals to change their behaviour or take a particular course of action”.93 They generally
take the form of financial sanctions, such as asset freezes and bans on the provision
of financial services; trade and arms embargoes;94 and travel bans.95
During the Cold War, the UN Security Council only managed to create two sanc-
tions regimes.96 The first was established in 1968, targeting Southern Rhodesia,97 the
second a decade later, targeting South Africa.98 Right after the Cold War had come
to an end, the Council became increasingly active. In 1990, it hit Iraq with a full trade
embargo after the invasion of Kuwait,99 followed in 1993 with sanctions on Haiti
after the military coup in the country.100 These comprehensive sanctions imposed by
the UN turned out to be a ‘blunt instrument’101 and sometimes, as President Wilson
had foreseen, a ‘deadly remedy’. The sanctions had a disproportionate humanitarian
impact of the civilian population contributing to increasing rates of infant mortality,
disease, andmalnutrition.102 Consequently, theUN turned tomore focused sanctions,
now referred to as targeted or smart sanctions, aimed at specific groups and entities
within the sanctioned State. Also, non-State actors, such as terrorist groups, have
become subject to sanction regimes as the sanctions on Al-Qaida show.103 Recently,
sanctions programs have been established not so much targeting a particular state or
actor, but rather a specific economy sector or topic, such as human rights104 or cyber
93 Gordon et al. 2019, p. 2.
94 Usually preventing the sale, supply, or transfer of weapons to the sanctioned State; Gordon et al.
2019, p. 17.
95 Gordon et al. 2019, pp. 2–3.
96 A UN sanctions regime “is a particular package of sanctions measures adopted in relation to a
particular state or situation”; Gordon et al. 2019, p. 6.
97 UN Doc S/RES/253 (1968) of 29 May 1968.
98 UN Doc S/RES/418 (197) of 4 November 1977.
99 UN Doc S/RES/661 (1990) of 6 August 1990.
100 UN Doc S/RES/841 (1993) of 16 June 1993.
101 UNDoc A/50/60; S/1995/1 of January 1995, Supplement to an agenda for peace: position paper
of the secretary-general on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the united nations, para 70.
102 Gordon et al. 2019, p. 29.
103 UN Doc S/RES/1267 (1999); UN Security Council Resolution 1267 of 15 October 1999 estab-
lishing a sanctions regime to cover individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaida, Osama bin
Laden and/or the Taliban.
104 The UK Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020 of 6 July 2020 made under the
Sanctions and Money Laundering Act 2018.
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activities,105 allowing for the sanctioning of persons and other entities regardless of
their relationship with a particular State (horizontal sanctions).106
From a legal perspective, UN sanctions are a powerful instrument. As many of
the sanctions regimes are established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the
UN Security Council Resolutions imposing the sanctions are binding on all UN
member states pursuant to Article 25 of the UN Charter. In addition, Article 48(1)
of the UN Charter instructs the member states to take the necessary action to carry
out the decisions of the Security Council. Last, but not least, Council decisions
take precedence over other obligations of a member state under any international
agreement (Article 103 UN Charter). Therefore, states will have to implement and
enforce theUNsanctions in accordancewith the terms of the relevantResolutions and
regardless of possible other arrangements the States have previously agreed upon.
5.3.3.2 Legality of Autonomous Sanctions
As the definition of sanctions mentioned above makes clear, the UN does not have
the exclusive right to impose sanctions. Today, states, as well as international organi-
zations, in particular the EU, have become very active in this field and have imposed
sanctions in addition to or even absent a UN sanction as an alternative means of
achieving their foreign and security policy goals. This type of sanctions is referred to
as autonomous (or sometimes: unilateral) sanctions. Whereas the UN sanctions are
part of the global collective security system and consequently firmly based on the
provisions of the UN Charter, the legality of autonomous sanctions is less evident.
The starting point is that under international law, a sovereign state is not obliged to
maintain economic relations with other states and, therefore, has the legal discretion
to choose with which other states it will conduct business.107 Consequently, it may
unilaterally restrict or even terminate its international trade relations in the absence
of a treaty commitment limiting that freedom. In international law, such a unilateral
action can be qualified as retorsion. A retorsion does not violate any obligation owed
to any particular state or the international community as a whole. Although it is often
described as an unfriendly act of a state vis-à-vis another state, it is a lawful reaction
to an unfriendly or unlawful act by that other state and therefore admissible.
As sanctions are coercive by nature they can be illegitimate on other grounds.
Although typically they cannot be classified as use of force,108 they may breach the
principle of non-intervention109 that denies states the right to intervene in the internal
105 Council Regulation (EU) 2019/796 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against
cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States (OJ L 129I, 17.5.2019, pp. 1–12).
106 Portela (2019) The spread of horizontal sanctions. CEPS Commentary, 7 March 2019. https://
www.ceps.eu/the-spread-of-horizontal-sanctions/ Accessed 16 February 2021.
107 Ohler 2012, para 14; Joyner 2016, p. 193.
108 The use of force or the threat thereof is prohibited under international law, as was discussed
in Sect. 5.2. Use of force normally entails some measure of military force. Obviously, economic
sanctions do not meet that requirement.
109 Study European Parliament 2020, p. 54.
5 International Export Control Law—Mapping the Field 87
or external affairs of any state.110 Regarding the principle, the UN Declaration on
Friendly Relations holds, “No State may use or encourage the use of economic,
political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain
from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it
advantages of any kind.”111 Whether or not sanctions meet this fairly high threshold
has to be decidedon a case by case basis. In theNicaragua-case, for instance, theCourt
held that it was unable to regard US economic actions with respect to Nicaragua,
including a full trade embargo,112 “as a breach of the customary-law principle of
non-intervention”.113
Sanctions may also be unlawful when issued in breach of a treaty obligation.
Examples are trade provisions in bilateral ‘treaties of friendship, commerce, and
navigation’ and ‘bilateral investment treaties’.114 With respect to the former, the
International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua-case found that the US trade embargo
of Nicaragua had violated Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation between the two States.115 Also, after the US had reimposed its sanctions
against Iran following its withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal116 in 2018, Iran
instituted proceedings against the US before the International Court of Justice.117 In
its application Iran claims that the re-imposition of the sanctions violates the Treaty
of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between both states.118
110 Recently, China called US sanctions on Chinese officials over their alleged role in suppressing
dissent in Hong Kong an interference with China’s internal affairs and a violation of inter-
national law; Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Regular Press Conference on
30 November 2020. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1836732.
shtml Accessed 16 February 2021.
111 UN Doc A/RES/2625(XXV) of 24 October 1970, Declaration on Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations. The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the
domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter.
112 Adopted by the U.S. President by Executive Order on 1May 1985; ICJ 27 June 1987; Nicaragua
Case, para 279.
113 Nicaragua Case, para 245.
Ohler 2012, para 21.
114 Treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation were typically concluded in the post-World
War II era whereas bilateral investment agreements, focusing on the terms and conditions for private
investments, have become more common today; Ohler 2012, para 20.
115 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation; Manugua, 21 January 1956 (Vol 367 UNTS
1960, No. 5224). Article XIX provides that “Between the territories of the two Parties there shall
be freedom of commerce and navigation”. Nicaragua Case, para 279.
116 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; Vienna, 18 October 2015; came into effect 16 January
2016; Annexed to UNDoc S/RES/2231 (2015). Signatories: Iran, China, France, Russia, UK, U.S.,
Germany and the EU.
117 Application Instituting Proceedings Filed in the Registry of the Court on 16 July 2018, Alleged
Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, andConsular Rights (Islamic Republic
of Iran v United States of America).
118 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights; Tehran, 15 August 1955 (Vol. 284
UNTS 1959–1959, No. 4132).
88 J. Voetelink
The most important limitations on a state’s discretion to limit international trade
relations can be found in the GATT and the GATS,119 in particular the provi-
sions such as the most-favored nation clause;120 tariff concessions;121 the prin-
ciple of national treatment;122 the prohibition of quantitative restrictions;123 and
market access rules.124 However, exceptions are allowed under the general exceptions
clauses125 and the security exceptions clauses (the latter are discussed in Sect. 5.2).
Sanctions that are unlawful in principle can, however, be justified when imposed
in response to a previous violation by the targeted state of its international obligations
towards the sanctioning state (an internationally wrongful act). Pursuant to the Draft
Articles on state responsibility126 these countermeasures must be aimed at the target
state’s compliance with its international obligations (Article 49(1)) and must be
proportionate (Article 51). The other side of the coin is that secondary sanctions
(discussed hereinafter) or sanctions legislation promulgated to further other policy
goals, cannot be based on the rules of State responsibility.127
Finally, one particular type of sanctions, the so-called secondary or extraterritorial
sanctions, has raised broad concerns as they can violate international law. Typically,
a national sanctions law or regulation targets the sanctioned state and regulates the
behavior of the sanctioning state’s nationals, foreign persons present on its territory,
and companies incorporated in the state. There is, in other words, a nexus between the
regulating state and the person subject to the regulation. Secondary sanctions cast the
net much wider and can also subject foreign persons and corporations abroad to the
sanction regulations, without any real nexus between the state and these persons. The
US in particular has regularly imposed such secondary sanctions128 causing fierce
critique from their trade partners. Several states and theEuropeanUnion have enacted
legislation to block the effects of these secondary sanctions (see Chap. 11).129
119 Ohler 2012, para 21; Malloy 2003, pp. 378–379. For a detailed analysis see Ruys and Ryngaert
2020.
120 Article I GATT and Article II GATS.
121 Article II GATT.
122 Article III GATT and Article XVII GATS.
123 Article XI and XIII GATT.
124 Article XVII GATS.
125 Article XX GATT and Article XIV GATS.
126 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc
A/RES/56/83 (2002) of 28 January 2002.
127 European Parliament 2020, p. 55.
128 The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996,
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (renamed: the Iran Sanctions Act), the Iran Freedom and
Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012,
the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, the
Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017, the Protecting Europe’s Energy
Security Act of 2019, Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Clarification Act of 2020, and the Hong
Kong Autonomy Act of 2020.
129 EU Blocking Statute: Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting
against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and
actions based thereon or resulting therefrom (OJ L 309, 29.22.1996, pp. 1–6), as amended.
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5.3.4 Human Rights Law
The final subdiscipline of international law impacting national export control law
is human rights law. Human rights refer to the basic rights and freedoms to which
all humans are entitled, such as the right to life, freedom of expression, the right to
work, and the right to education. Although human rights did not become an inter-
national law topic until the second half of the 20th century, the fundamental rights
of individuals have been part and parcel of the constitutions of many democracies
since the Enlightenment. Historic examples include the US Bill of Rights, passed by
the US Congress in 1789 and the French Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du
citoyen adopted by the National Constituent Assembly in the same year.
Traditionally, individuals were not a primary concern of public international law.
However, some international agreements did attempt to protect the rights of groups
of individuals, such as the 1890 Brussels Conference Act pursuing to end slavery.
That attitude changed in the wake of World War II, although initially somewhat
hesitantly. Article 1(3) of the UNCharter identifies “respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for allwithout distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”
as one of the purposes of the new organization, without defining or clarifying the
scope of the concept.130 The UN Human Rights Commission took on the task to
draft a document delineating the fundamental rights of all people, which the General
Assembly adopted in 1948 as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.131 The
Declaration covers two types of human rights. The first are the civil and political
rights requiring the state to refrain from taking specific actions in order to respect the
individual rights that include such matters as the right to life, the freedom of religion,
the freedom of speech, the right to due process and a fair trial, and the prohibition
of torture. The second type of rights are economic, social and cultural rights, which
states are strongly encouraged to realize. These rights include the right to work, the
right to education, and the right to health.
The Declaration is regarded as the foundation of international human rights law.
Yet, as a resolution of the General Assembly, it lacks legal authority and does not
create any legally binding obligations for theMember States.132 Therefore, theDecla-
ration was supplemented with two universal treaties: the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.133 Together, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and both
Covenants are referred to as the International Bill of Human Rights. Soon, additional
130 Further references to human rights are to be found in the Preamble and Articles 13, 55, and 56.
131 UN Doc A/RES/217 (1948) of 10 December 1948.
132 Today, the rights contained in theDeclaration are considered to be part of international customary
law.
133 UN Doc A/RES/2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR); New York, 16 December 1966; entered into force 23 March 1976 (Vol.
999 UNTS 1983, No. 14668) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights; New York, 16 December 1966; entered into force 3 January 1976 (Vol. 993 UNTS 1983,
No. 14531).
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international agreements followed, establishing a comprehensive network of inter-
locking human rights instruments. These include treaties covering specific human
rights matters134 as well as regional treaties.135
Human rights law has an increasing impact on export control law. The human
rights situation in a state can be a ground to deny or restrict the transfer of specific
military or dual-use items to that state. For instance, EU member states are obliged
to assess an application for the export of military technology and equipment against
several criteria, including the respect for human rights in the country of final desti-
nation.136 Also, they may prohibit or impose an authorization requirement on the
export of a dual-use item not listed in the EU Dual-Use Regulation.137
Also, human rights law affects other fields of international law relevant to export
control law. In particular sanctions law is increasingly affected by human rights
concerns. As mentioned above, human rights considerations caused the shift from
comprehensive to targeted sanctions in the early 1990s. In turn, the new sanctions
raised questions about the individual rights of the individuals who were designated
under the sanctions regulations. Most targeted sanctions include measures such as
assets freezes and travel bans which may affect the designated person’s right to
property,138 right to family life, and the freedom of movement. Also, it is sometimes
hard for an individual to legally challenge his designation and listing, which violates
his right to effective judicial protection.139
134 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; Paris, 9 December
1948; entered into force 12 January 1951 (Vol. 79 UNTS 1951, No. 1021); the United Nations
Convention Against Torture; New York, 10 December 1984, entered into force: 26 June 1987 (Vol.
1465 UNTS 1996, No. 24841); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child; New York 20
November 1989; entered into force 2 September 1990 (Vol. 1577 UNTS 1999, No. 27531) just to
mention a few.
135 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Rome 4 November 1950; entered into force 3 September 1953 (Vol. 213 UNTS 1955, No. 2889);
the American Convention on Human Rights; San José, 22 November 1969; entered into force 18
July 1978 (Vol. 1144 UNTS 1987, No. 17955); and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights; Nairobi, 27 June 1981; entered into force 21 October 1986 (Vol. 1520 UNTS 1997, No.
26363).
136 Article 2(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining rules
governing control of exports of military technology and equipment (OJ L 335, 13.12.2008, pp. 99–
103).
137 Article 8 of Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community
regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (OJ L 134,
29.5.2009, pp. 1–296).
138 Property rights are no universally recognized rights; it is however included in Article 1 of
the Additional Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.
139 The UN has established an Ombudsperson (the sanctions regime under Resolution 1276 (1999))
and focal points (other sanctions regimes) to challenge a specific listing/designation. Under EU law
sanctioned persons can challenge their listing before the EU General Court.
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Moreover, states and international organizations can issue sanctions in response
to human rights violations. In 2012, the US enacted the Magnitsky Act,140 targeting
Russian officials who were held responsible for the death of Sergei Magnitsky, a
Russian tax lawyer who was imprisoned while investigating a multimillion fraud
involving Russian officials. In prison, he was severely maltreated leading to his death
in 2009.141 In 2016 theGlobalMagnitskyAct142 was signed into law, allowing theUS
to target individuals anywhere in the world responsible for committing human rights
violations or acts of significant corruption. The EU143 and several states followed
suit and have similarly enacted ‘Magnitsky laws’.144
5.4 Synthesis and Conclusion
Export control law can be described as the set of domestic and international laws
and regulations as well as policy rules and commitments that are applicable to and
regulate the export, re-export, transit, and transfer in any manner of goods, tech-
nology, and software. It forms a nascent, still developing field of law consisting
of a domestic part, which is the traditional basis of this field of law, as well as an
international part. The latter is the focus of this chapter, which explores the various
established subdisciplines of public international law contributing to domestic export
control law. The relevant international norms and rules are laid down in international
agreements (treaties), are part of international customary law, set out in decisions of
international governmental organization, and non-legal commitments flowing from
the membership of export control regimes.
The various fields of public international law that export control law draws on,
together form a set of related rules and norms that complement and reinforce one
another. The law of armed conflict protects the victims of armed conflict and restricts
the means and methods of warfare. Parts of this field of law relevant for export
control law include neutrality law, which protects the rights of neutral states to
continue international trade in armed conflict, and weapons law, that set limits to the
use of certain weapons. The latter subset of rules is connected with the law of arms
control, another subdiscipline of public international law, that covers the deployment
140 Russia and Moldova Jackson–Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability
Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112–208, 126 Stat. 1496 (19 U.S.C. 2101).
141 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2020, p. 38.
142 Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act of 2016, Pub. L. 114–328, div. A, title XII,
subtitle F (Sections 1261 et seq.), 130 Stat. 2533 (22 U.S.C. 2656).
143 The EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime is laid down in Council Decision (CFSP)
2020/1999 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights viola-
tions and abuses (OJ L 410 I, 7.12.2020, pp. 13–19) and Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7
December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses
(OJ L 410 I, 7.12.2020, pp. 1–12). The regime cannot be invoked with respect to corruption.
144 Canada, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Kosovo: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia
2020, p. 41.
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of certain types of weapons, as well the production, testing, stockpiling or transfer
thereof.
The use of armed force by states, in general, is limited under the system of collec-
tive security in which the UN is the leading authority to maintain international peace
and security. Upon determination of a threat to the international peace and security,
the UN Security Council can decide to take far-reaching measures, including the
imposition of arms embargoes or economic sanctions, which States have to imple-
ment and enforce when the Council has acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
The law of sanctions covers this type of coercive measures, also allowing States and
other international organizations to impose sanctions in addition to or even absent
an UN-imposed sanction. As international practice is growing steadily, new types
of sophisticated sanctions, tailored to specific situations are developed,145 raising
questions about the legality of this practice. Also, sanctions may give rise to various
human rights concerns and already have led to changes in the scope and application
of sanctions and the development of human rights-focused sanctions.
(Member) States are obliged to incorporate the international rules in their national
legal systems and subsequently implement and enforce them in accordance with the
relevant terms of the international instruments. Over time, domestic and international
export control law has developed into a challenging and dynamic legal discipline.
Although it is not an established subdiscipline of law in its own right, it is critical
to consider all mutual related parts of export control law together to understand its
impact on international military trade.
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Abstract Over the years, compliance has come to be closely associated with
integrity. Originally, compliance foremost had been understood as abiding by (finan-
cial) law and regulation as a prerequisite to pursuing an organization’s operational
goals. In response to societal developments and corruption scandals this perspective
gradually has shifted. Despite the increased importance and consecutive academic
attentionof the seemingly self-evident relationshipbetween compliance and integrity,
a dedicated analysis of this relationship is still lacking. Such an analysis not only
will increase our theoretical understanding of the underlying concepts and how they
evoke each other, but practically its insights may also help to increase the effective-
ness of managing compliance and integrity within organizations. This contribution,
therefore, conducts a conceptual analysis into the relationship between compliance
and integrity. First, the meaning of compliance and integrity as individual concepts
is discussed, followed by a comparison of the two concepts. The commonalities
and differences that come to the fore then act as a stepping stone to unpack the
various ways the concepts of compliance and integrity invoke each other. Based on
this discussion a basic analytic framework is drawn up that summarizes the different
valuations of the relationship between compliance and integrity. To illustrate their
J. Timmermans (B)
Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy, PO Box 90002, 4800 PA Breda, The
Netherlands
e-mail: jfc.timmermans@mindef.nl
© The Author(s) 2022
R. Beeres et al. (eds.), NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review




practical relevance, the different valuations depicted by the framework are illus-
trated with an example drawn from the defence industry. It concludes by discussing
the implications of the analysis and suggesting some possible routes for further
research.
Keywords Compliance · integrity · management · defence industry · ethics ·
business ethics · conceptual analysis
6.1 Introduction
Over the years, compliance has come to be closely associated with integrity (or its
synonym in this context ‘ethics’). For example, on the websites of (large) companies
such as Daimler and Boeing as well as on other formal outlets such as code of
conducts, these two terms are discussed as a fixed combination. Also in academic
discourse, the relationship between compliance and integrity has received ample
attention. Starting with a seminal article by Paine in 1994, there have been several
publications addressing these two terms.1
Notwithstanding the current obviousness of their association, the relationship
between compliance and integrity has not always been self-evident. Originally,
compliance foremost had been understood as abiding by (financial) law and regula-
tion as a prerequisite to pursuing an organization’s operational goals (i.e., business
targets).2 At that time, broader moral connotations identifiedwith ethics and integrity
thus still were largely absent.
In response to societal developments and corruption scandals this perspective
gradually has shifted. Societal developments such as a raised awareness of environ-
mental and sustainability and citizen empowerment have broadened the responsibil-
ities of organizations to consider their societal impact.3 Moreover, major corpo-
rate corruption cases such as the Enron scandal and more recently Dieselgate
have made clear that legal compliance by itself is insufficient to prevent unac-
ceptable/undesirable behaviours.4 In response, governments and the organizations
themselves have broadened their understanding of compliance to include rules and
legislation that deal with societal and ethical issues. So, whereas compliance tradi-
tionally focused on financial accounting and auditing, nowadays it includes topics
such as environment and sustainability, privacy and data security, and not in the least
(organizational) integrity.
The defence industry has been no exception to these developments. Apart from
being affected by the general societal developments just mentioned, the defence
industry has had its own share of scandals and (resulting) societal and political
1 Chun 2019; Kaptein 2015; Treviño et al. 1999; Weaver and Trevino 1999; Weber and Wasieleski
2013.
2 Paine 1994; Pellizzoni 2004.
3 Painter-Morland 2015; Schwartz and Carroll 2003.
4 Bovens 2016; Windsor 2017.
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pressure to (self-)regulate its behaviour. For instance, In the US, for decades, defence
contractors defrauded the military and the Pentagon.5 This led to an investigation
and recommendations by the Packard Commission in 1986, which in turn led to
the establishment of the Defense Industry Initiative (DII) on Business Ethics and
Conduct to improve compliance.6 In a similar vein, in the UK, a corruption scandal
involving BAE Systems, Europe’s largest armaments company, led to tightening
up corresponding legislation.7 Apart from particular cases, leading developments in
trade export regulation also greatly affected the defence industry, such as the emerge
of the International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR) in 19768 and in 2000 the
European Commission’s Dual-use Regulation.9
Despite the increased importance and consecutive academic attention of the seem-
ingly self-evident relationship between compliance and integrity, a dedicated analysis
of this relationship is still lacking. Such an analysis not only will increase our theo-
retical understanding of the underlying concepts and how they evoke each other but
practically, its insights may help to increase the effectiveness of managing compli-
ance and integrity within organizations. In this contribution, we therefore conduct a
conceptual analysis of the relationship between compliance and integrity.
We start by discussing the meaning of compliance and integrity as individual
concepts, followed by a comparison of the two concepts. The commonalities and
differences that come to the fore then act as a stepping stone to unpack the various
ways the concepts of compliance and integrity invoke each other. Based on this
discussion a basic analytic framework is drawn up that summarizes the different
valuations of the relationship between compliance and integrity. To illustrate their
practical relevance, the different valuations depicted by the framework are illustrated
with an example drawn from the defence industry. We conclude by discussing the
implications of our analysis and suggesting some possible routes for further research.
6.2 The Concepts of Compliance and Integrity
In this section, the terms compliance and integrity are introduced and compared
with each other. The similarities and differences that are brought forward will act
as a stepping stone to further explore the relationship between the two terms in the
following section.
5 Biegelman and Biegelman 2008; Roberts 2009.
6 Kurland 1993.





In the business and management literature, the term compliance is widely used.10
Still, apart from some specialist discussions among legal researchers,11 there is a
consensus about the meaning of the term. The basic meaning of compliance is a
conformity of behaviour with legal rules.12 Both an individual or a group of indi-
viduals such as the organization the individuals belong to may act as the subject
of compliance. The regulation applying to a company, ultimately demand that the
individuals working for that company conform to those rules. Although in its basic
meaning compliance refers to legal rules, the object or content of compliance may be
much broader, ranging from the adherence to laws, rules and regulations to standards
and codes of conducts.13 In the defence industry companies not only have to adhere
to formal trade regulation but typically have a code of conduct in place to guide
their conduct. As such the imperative standard that is being complied with, can be a
regulatory requirement (law, or legal standard), or a normative requirement, that is,
based on contractual, social, or cultural standards.14
Compliance is understood as referring to a state of being or status, as well as to
an act or process. Compliance as a status refers to the state of being in accordance
with rules, legislation or guidelines.15 This state requires there to be a reasonable
correspondence between legal rules or guidelines (i.e., the object of compliance)
and the behaviour of those to whom they are addressed (i.e., the subjects of compli-
ance).16 The actuality of this state can be determined either internally (first-party)
via self-assessment or externally by a second party audit on a customer or contracted
organization, or third party audit, for example, by a certification body.17
Compliance as an act or process refers to what the subject of compliance does to
attain or retain the state of compliance. In the first instance, compliance entails the
subject’s observance of relevant laws, regulations and corporate policies18 bymeeting
their demands and procedures.19 Subjects failing to obey legal and moral rules, then,
are deviating from compliance.20 Seen from a wider perspective, compliance also
can be understood to entail detecting non-compliant behaviour and reducing the
opportunity to display such conduct.21
10 Heissner 2015; Manning 2020.




15 Biegelman and Biegelman 2008, p. 2.
16 Kingsbury 1998.
17 Manning 2020.
18 Biegelman and Biegelman 2008.
19 Manning 2020; Rasche and Esser 2006.
20 Windsor 2017.
21 Verhezen 2010.
6 Exploring the Multifaceted Relationship of Compliance and Integrity … 99
In sum, compliance refers to both the act and the resulting state of an individual or
a collective such as an organization (the subject of compliance), behaving conform
set regulatory or normative requirements (the object of compliance).
6.2.2 Integrity
Similar to compliance, integrity is a widely-used term both in business practice and
literature.22 However, unlike compliance, integrity is a more ambiguous term and
there is far less consensus about its meaning.23 Over the past decades, several authors
have sought to address this and bring some clarity to the meaning of the concept.
The first to take on this matter in a systemic manner are Audi and Murphy. Based
on a review of the literature, they construct a framework to support making ‘appeals
to integrity clearer and more effective’.24 Their paper concludes by suggesting that
any discussion of integrity should start with a clarification of what one means by
it. Following up on their suggestion, Palanski and Yammarino conducted a compre-
hensive review of the various meanings of integrity in management literature.25 This
resulted in a classification of integrity into five general categories. The most recent
contributionwas givenbyOrlitzky andMonga,26 who elaborate on thefive categories,
among others by referring to seven conditions for integrity suggested byMaak.27 For
our current purpose of exploring the relationship between compliance and integrity,
it is not necessary to rehearse the intricacies of the discourse on integrity. Instead,
a summary of the main distinctions made by the authors suffices to get a general
understanding of the different meanings that are being attributed to integrity in the
literature.
Most discussions of integrity in the literature begin by reflecting on the Latin
root of the term, integritas.28 This term translates into wholeness or completeness,
which corresponds with the common meaning of integrity as the quality or state of
being complete.29 Like compliance, the subject of integrity does not have to be an
individual person but may also be an organization. This is referred to by the literature
as organizational integrity.30 Apart from having a different context, the meaning of
integrity at a personal or an organizational level are considered to be very similar.31
22 Audi and Murphy 2006; Orlitzky and Monga 2017.
23 Audi and Murphy 2006; Bauman 2013; Palanski and Yammarino 2007; Vandekerckhove 2010.
24 Audi and Murphy 2006, p. 3.
25 Palanski and Yammarino 2007.
26 Orlitzky and Monga 2017.
27 Maak 2008.
28 Audi and Murphy 2006; Orlitzky and Monga 2017; Petrick and Quinn 2000; Verhezen 2010.
29 http://www.merriam-webster.com/, accessed 23November 2013; http://www.oed.com/, accessed
23 November 2013.
30 Manning 2020; Paine 1994; Verhezen 2010.
31 Verhezen 2010.
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The wholeness-perspective on integrity ties in with the first of two constitutive
understandings of integrity distinguished by Audi and Murphy in their framework.32
They define integrity in the integrational sense as a certain kind of unity of character. It
calls for disciplined adherence to moral standards andmotivates and facilitates moral
reasoning and ethical conduct. Although integrity in this wide, integrational sense is
important in maintaining good character and conduct, it is by itself not sufficient as it
lacks moral content. Content is provided by their second understanding of integrity,
integrity in the artaic or virtuous sense. In this understanding, integrity is identified
either with specific moral virtues such as trustworthiness or loyalty or to virtue in
general, for example, when integrity is referred to as an overarching super-virtue.
Together these twomeaning of integrity offer a framework that supports both scholars
and managers in making their appeals to integrity more clearly and effectively.
Building on this framework, Orlitzky and Monga construct a classification of
integrity made up of five general categories.33 The first category, integrity as whole-
ness, coincides with the common meaning of integrity and with the first meaning
of the Audi and Murphy framework. This notion of integrity refers to the overall
person, requiring overall consistency of behaviour, thoughts, and emotions across
time and contexts. The next three categories offer a further refinement of what consis-
tency should entail. The second category, consistency of words and actions, also
known as behavioural consistency, calls for consistency across time and situations
between espoused and enacted values. The third category, consistency in adversity,
suggests that persons of integrity should stand for something and remain steadfast
when confronted with adversity, (moral) challenge or temptation. It requires one to
resist unethical temptations or choices even at a high personal cost. The fourth cate-
gory, authenticity, adds further nuance to the former two categories, by requiring one
to be true to oneself, which means understanding, owning one’s deeply held values
and acting accordingly. It thus adds to the second category that one’s words must be
consistent with one’s deeply held values.
Again, these first three categories of integrity can be criticized for lacking moral
substance. A Nazi, for instance, may always be acting in accordance with his words,
which in turn may be in alignment with his inner convictions. This is remedied by
the fifth category, integrity as moral or ethical behaviour, which is a precondition for
the other four categories and ties in with the second meaning of integrity by Audi
and Murphy, integrity in the artaic sense. This category requires one’s actions to be
in accordance with socially or morally acceptable behaviour. In line with Audi and
Murphy, such behaviour may refer to particular virtues one must poses or the related
values on which such behaviour needs to be based, such as justice, respect, fairness,
trust and empathy, or virtue and moral standards or principles in general.34
An important addition to these five categories, referred to by Palanski and
Yammarino, is offered by Maak.35 In his discussion of integrity, he discusses seven
32 Audi and Murphy 2006.
33 Orlitzky and Monga 2017.
34 Audi and Murphy 2006.
35 Maak 2008.
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conditions that need to bemet to attain a state of being undivided or an integral whole:
commitment, conduct, content, context, consistency, coherence, and continuity
(‘7 Cs’). Most of these conditions closely match the five categories discussed so
far. Two conditions, however, shed further light on the concept of integrity. In his
discussion of coherence, Maak distinguished between internal and external coher-
ence.Whereas internal coherence coincideswith the category of authenticity, external
coherence refers to what others demand from a person in terms of getting one’s prin-
ciples and actions right. This way, Maak highlights the fact that integrity is not just a
personal notion, but a social or relational notion as well.36 This social dimension of
integrity is reaffirmed by the condition of context. The integrity-condition of context
draws attention to having consideration for all relevant others including stakeholders
and relationships.
All in all, similar to compliance, integrity can be understood to represent a state,
namely the state of being ‘integer’ or whole or being a person of integrity. Apart from
an individual, also an organization can be the subject of integrity. Rather than being a
state, integritymore commonly is referred to as an act or process. To act with integrity
then denotes acting in accordance with high moral standards consistently even when
confronted with adversity, or temptation, and at high personal cost. The five cate-
gories—integrity as wholeness, consistency of words and actions, consistency in
adversity, being true to oneself, and moral/ethical behaviour—further clarify what
acting with integrity may entail. Integrity not only is an individual notion referring
to the state of the subject itself, but also a social notion that refers to what relevant
others are demanding of the subject.
6.3 Comparing Compliance with Integrity
To understand how the concepts are related, we first need to look into what unites
and what separates the two concepts. To this end, we turn to the literature on ethics
management. In this literature compliance and integrity are discussed as two separate
strategies tomanage the behaviour of organizationalmembers towards stable, accept-
able and/or desirable behaviour.37 In ethics management compliance and integrity
thus find their common point of departure, namely a shared purpose in managing or
governing organizational conduct.
Traditionally, the dominant way of managing ethics in organizations equates with
the compliance or rule-based strategy. Dissatisfaction by legislators and scholars
with this strategy gave rise to an alternative strategy, called the integrity strategy38 or
36 Kaptein 1999.
37 Maesschalck 2004; Paine 1994; Roberts 2009; Treviño et al. 1999; Weaver and Trevino 1999.
38 Confusingly, by some authors (e.g., Silverman 2008; Stucke 2014) and in organizational practice
the term ‘ethics’ sometimes is used instead of ‘integrity’ to denote the principle-based strategy.
Conform what is prevalent in the business ethics literature, in this chapter we employ the term
‘integrity strategy’.
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principle-based ethics management.39 Amyriad of reasons has been brought forward
to underpin the suggested transition.
On the negative side, the compliance strategy has been accused of involving
window dressing (i.e., being more directed at public relations and complying with
regulations than at maintaining high standards).40 Furthermore, it is associated with
undermining an organizations’ ethical culture. For instance, as an incentive-based
approach, the compliance strategy also promotes incentives to violate the law when
the costs of mitigating illegal behaviour outweigh promoting an ethical culture41 and
by its reliance on fear it may result in moral silence.42
Additionally, it engenders a minimalist approach to ethics management that does
not encourage considering the full range of issues that individuals are confrontedwith
nor the broader, longer-term implications of their actions.43 Rather, organizations
are focussed on meeting narrow legalistic requirements of effective compliance,44
leaving little room for the individual conscience,45 taking moral responsibility or
creating passion and moral excellence.46
On the positive side, the integrity strategy is lauded for promoting ethical culture
within organizations.47 It motivates individuals to be aware of legal or ethical issues,
increases their willingness to report ethical or legal problems or violations and raises
their commitment to the organization.48 What is more, it was found that under an
integrity-based strategy individuals are more likely to refrain from unethical/illegal
behaviour.49 On the organizational level, the integrity strategy is associated with
aligning the organization with societal expectations of relevant stakeholders, engen-
dering the quality of lifewithin organizations, and ultimately, providing newopportu-
nities and increased organizational value.50 Besides, integrity-based ethics programs
are believed to improve decision making in organizations.51 They stress the impor-
tance of thinking long-term and are better equipped to support dealing with complex
problems or a new context where the rules are different.52
To be able to meet its aspirations and remedy the apparent flaws of the compliance
strategy, the integrity strategy distinguishes itself from the compliance strategy on
several accounts. In the first instance, the difference between the two strategies is best
39 Calderón et al. 2018; Paine 1994; Roberts 2009; Stucke 2014; Verhezen 2010.
40 Geddes 2017; Roberts 2009.
41 Stucke 2014.
42 Verhezen 2010.





48 Geddes 2017; Treviño et al. 1999; Verhezen 2010.
49 Treviño et al. 1999.
50 Verhezen 2010.
51 Treviño et al. 1999.
52 Verhezen 2010.
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understood by comparing their underlying behavioural assumptions. The compliance
strategy is part of the (neo)classic economic paradigm of the ‘homo economicus’, in
whichman is viewed as an autonomous, rational optimizermotivated solely by (mate-
rial) self-interest.53 This coincides with a cost-benefit approach to decision making
on the individual as well as the organisational level in which the autonomous rational
agent pursues its self-interest within the legal boundaries set by the state (or other
types of standards of regulations within an organization). Hence, the emphasis in this
strategy on monitoring, detection, and punishment.54 The integrity strategy is part of
the alternative economic paradigm, sometimes termed the extended approach,55 that
regards individuals as social beings who, next to self-interest are guided by peers,
and values and ideals such as altruism, courtesy, civic virtue, conscientiousness, and
sportsmanship.56 Moving beyond the deterrence model prevalent under the classic
paradigm, individual or collective behaviour is understood here to be driven by both
extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. In addition to conventional cost-benefit thinking,
behaviour then is guided by moral obligation and social influence.57
Under its basic assumptions, the compliance strategy’s ethos entails conforming
with externally imposed standards to govern organizational and individual behaviour
such as laws, rules, regulations, standards, and codes of conduct.58 It, therefore, has
a coercive orientation towards control aimed at bringing individual behaviour into
conformity with set (legal) standards by placing emphasis on adhering to rules,
monitoring behaviour and disciplining transgressions.59
By contrast, and in line with its basic assumptions, the integrity strategy’s ethos
involves self-governance according to chosen, hence internal, standards, values or
principles.60 Control, in this case, therefore is internal or self-control resting on the
individual and/or collective agent’s moral character and judgment capacity.61 Rather
than on coercion, it is based on a commitment to and identification with shared
(organizational) values and moral standards.62
Finally, the assumptions and ethos are reflected in the respective objectives of
the two strategies. Whereas the compliance strategy only is aimed at preventing
unwanted/criminal behaviour, the integrity strategy’s aim ismuch broader by seeking
to enable (socially) responsible conduct.63
53 Manning 2020; Paine 1994; Stucke 2014.
54 Stucke 2014.
55 Sutinen and Kuperan 1999.
56 Manning 2020; Paine 1994; Roberts 2009.
57 Sutinen and Kuperan 1999.
58 Paine 1994; Silverman 2008.
59 Maesschalck 2004; Weaver and Trevino 1999; Treviño et al. 1999.
60 Geddes 2017; Paine 1994; Weaver and Trevino 1999.
61 Maesschalck 2004.
62 Silverman 2008; Weaver and Trevino 1999.
63 Paine 1994; Roberts 2009; Stucke 2014.
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The perceived necessity and subsequent development of an alternative strategy,
does not mean that the compliance strategy is to be abandoned altogether.64 Despite
the stated advantages of an integrity over a compliance strategy, it is generally
acknowledged that elements of compliance are still needed for effective ethics
management. It is recognized that ethical talk needs to be supported with action.65
By holding organizational members accountable for their behaviour through moni-
toring and disciplinary systems, an organization reinforces its standards, upholds
a sense of conformity to shared norms, and maintains the perception of the orga-
nization as a just place.66 Furthermore, even where an integrity strategy is effec-
tively implemented, coercive enforcement measures remain essential to deal with
chronic, flagrant violators that foremost are motivated by tangible consequences of
their actions.67 In a similar vein, the greater flexibility of a principled approach in
comparison with a rule-based approachmay tend to weaken themoral compass.68 As
a consequence, subsequent transgressive behaviour by some can affect others. This
gradual erosion can only be reversed or prevented through effective enforcement of
(moral) standards.69 Conversely, it is also argued that an integrity strategy supports a
compliance strategy. Compliance goals such as reporting misconduct, for example,
benefit from the message of trust and support by a value orientation.70 Besides,
integrity may enhance the understanding of the purpose of compliance activities71
and increase the perceived legitimacy of the authorities responsible for implementing
the regulations.72
The compliance and integrity strategies, thus, are not regarded as mutually exclu-
sive.73 Instead of constituting a simple dichotomy, they are viewed as the opposite
ends of a continuum. Within that continuum, a balance needs to be struck such that
the strategies mutually reinforce each other and compensate for each-others weak-
nesses.74 So, rather than moving away from a compliance strategy, organizations
need to transcend and move beyond it. In this way, the (potential) tension between
integrity and compliance can force deliberate thinking and better decision-making,
for example, about the constraints set by compliance.75
64 Cf. Stucke 2014.
65 Weaver et al. 1999.
66 Treviño et al. 1999.
67 Sutinen and Kuperan 1999.
68 Windsor 2017.
69 Sutinen and Kuperan 1999.
70 Weaver and Trevino 1999.
71 Ibid.
72 Sutinen and Kuperan 1999.
73 Paine 1994; Weaver et al. 1999.
74 Calderón et al. 2018; Geddes 2017; Maesschalck 2004; Weaver and Trevino 1999.
75 Verhezen 2010.
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Table 6.1 Conceptual
framework of the relationship
between compliance and
integrity





6.4 The Relationship Between Compliance and Integrity
Based on the preceding sections, a three-fold characterization of the relationship
between integrity and compliance can be deduced. In part, integrity emerges from the
discussion as coinciding with compliance (Sect. 6.4.1). They have a shared overall
purpose, and up to a point, have overlapping methods and content. In this sense,
compliance can be understood as residing within or being part of compliance (and
vice versa). At the same time, partly integrity can also be understood to be positioned
outside of compliance. In a negative sense integrity then is in tension with, or even
goes against, compliance (Sect. 6.4.2). In this sense, integrity involves acts and
produces outcomes that are at odds with compliance. Conversely, in a positive sense
integrity can be viewed as being complementary to compliance (Sect. 6.4.3). By
going beyond compliance, integrity in this sense broadens the spectrum of ethics
management, for example, by offering an ethos and methods that supplement those
of compliance.
In addition, from the discussion thus far, two characteristics emerge that capture
the variety of similarities and differences between integrity and compliance, namely:
(1) process (or act) and (2) content (or object). The different activities and methods
of compliance and integrity, for example, are covered by process, while the implied
(moral, social or legal) standards fall under content. In this way, ethos can be inter-
preted to consist of both process, (i.e., mode of governance), and content (i.e., the
‘imposed’ or ‘chosen’ standards). In a similar vein, the aims of compliance and
integrity discuss the type of conduct aimed for (content) and, in a broad sense, the
manner that aim is to be attained (process). Also, the discussion of who needs to
be involved in compliance and/or integrity activities can be framed in this way:
the process and content of integrity and compliance denote particular skills and
knowledge required by the individuals involved such as staff, leadership and educa-
tion.76 Together these three ways of relating compliance and integrity and process
and content set up a framework that enables us to further explore the relationship
between compliance and integrity systemically (see Table 6.1).
The remainder of the framework is explained more fully by describing the dimen-
sions of process and content for each relationship-type. Building on the theoretic
considerations brought forward by the literature each cell is briefly discussed and
illustrated by a practical example relevant to the defence industry.
76 Paine 1994.
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6.4.1 Compliance as a Part of Integrity (and Vice Versa)
As shown in Table 6.1, the first way to characterize the relationship between compli-
ance and integrity is in terms of two overlapping concepts. This characterization
of the relationship can be discussed in two distinct manners, namely by regarding
compliance be part of integrity, or vice versa, as integrity to be part of compliance.
This and the subsequent subsection each discuss one of these two manners starting
with compliance as a part of integrity. This way of understanding the relationship ties
in closely with the views by Paine, which first sparked the literature on this subject.77
Rather than as the ends of a continuum, in her discussion, compliance is depicted as
a subset of integrity (i.e., to a large extent the process and content of compliance are
also a part of integrity’s process and content). Integrity in this view is an extension
of the classical economic outlook of compliance.
At a minimum, in line with the (neo)classical perspective, the compliance’s
object/content sets the threshold (legal) standards an agent needs to comply with
to be ethical, beyond that, agents are free to act as they see fit. Under the adage
‘If it’s legal, it’s ethical.’, integrity then may go beyond compliance, but not in a
way that necessarily restricts the behaviour of an organisation or its members. In
the field of military trade, this position can be illustrated by a case of the export of
alleged military goods to Libya by the Dutch company Damen Shipyards Group. In
the media, it was argued that this trade violated ethical standards (encoded in an EU
commissioned code of conduct on arms trade) because the goods were intended and
subsequently indeed used for military purposes.78 The company responded to this
allegation by pointing out that it did not do anything wrong as the trade had been
submitted to and then permitted by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs because it
did not violate any (trade) laws.
This raises the question ofwhether this trade, apart frombeing legally permissible,
also counted as acting with integrity. An argument supporting the view of the Dutch
ministry is provided by regarding integrity’s content (or object) being a part of that
of compliance. In this view, legislation (or formal standards) are regarded as solidi-
fied or codified ethics. Over time, social and moral values and norms have become
engrained in the legislative body. For example, moral considerations about national
and homeland security of countries,79 have contributed to national and international
law-making, for instance, national laws on dual-use goods and the small arms treaty
by the UN.80 What is more, over the last decades there has been a trend in which
integrity has become part of formal standards or even legally required. Paradoxically,
precisely because integrity is considered to be a way to strengthen compliance and
remedy its flaws, integrity has become a part of compliance.
77 Paine 1994.
78 Rengers M, Houtekamer C (2018) Gaddafi verdween, maar Damen bleef geliefd in Libië. NRC
Handelsblad.
79 Cornish 1995.
80 Stohl and Grillot 2009.
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The minimalist, (neo)classical view of economy also transfers to the overlap
between compliance and integrity in terms of process. According to the classic
view, the act of complying would suffice to behave ethically, because legal stan-
dards represent what is socially and morally required. Beyond that, an agent is free
to act autonomously. Again, this can be illustrated with the Damen case. According
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the company, complying with applicable rules
suffices to justify the trade of the boats.81 Regarding the act of complying as part of
integrity is in alignment with the understanding of integrity as wholeness or coher-
ence,which requires an agent to hold on to its principles or norms persistently. The act
of complying not only is a part of the process of acting with integrity, but compliance
also strengthens it by supplementing integritywith accountability throughmonitoring
and disciplining. According to the extended view, however, compliance by itself
would not be enough for behaving ethically or may even be at odds with behaving
with integrity. So, while the act of complying with a body of (legal, social or moral)
standards is considered a part of the process of acting with integrity, it represents
only one aspect of acting with integrity. In the Damen case, the media accused the
other parties of a lack of consideration and reflection on the moral consequences of
the trade beyond ‘just’ complying with the applicable law.
Conversely, the process of acting with integrity also has a place in the act of
complying. Being compliant is not always straightforward. It may involve dealing
with ambiguity and contradictions within or between different (legal) standards. For
instance, the classification of trade under the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR) commissioned by the US Commerce Department offers a different definition
of a US person in different sections. Also, a set of rules such as the EAR or EU dual-
use rules may be interpreted differently, for instance, in France and the Netherlands,
offering difficulties when a dual-use transaction involves both countries. In addi-
tion, standards and legislation between different countries (or organizations) may
be contradictory. A country such as Iran may be blacklisted by one country, while
another country allows trading certain military or dual-use goods with Iran. Lastly,
legislation and standards tend to evolve over time, for example, due to geopolitical
development or technological innovation. The ITAR is known to shift its domain by
either including items that before were considered dual-use or non-military (the so-
called ITAR–creep) or vice versa, for example, a heat camera that was first considered
amilitary item and became to be classified as a dual-use item. In these cases, integrity
as standing for something and offering moral content such as values and principles
offers a bedrock from which such challenges can be met. Also, by offering reflection
and moral deliberation, integrity is well-suited to support the legal interpretation and
decision-making that negotiating ambiguity within and between standards requires.
Furthermore, integrity supports and enhances the effectiveness of compliance more
in general, for example, by increasing the motivation and commitment to comply
and by establishing an ethical culture.
81 Rengers M, Houtekamer C (2018) Gaddafi verdween, maar Damen bleef geliefd in Libië. NRC
Handelsblad.
108 J. Timmermans
6.4.2 Integrity Versus Compliance
Besides overlapping, integrity and compliance also can be in tension or at odds with
each other, both in terms of their content and process. Although the content that is
associated with the concepts in part is overlapping, the content of integrity also is
considered to be broader and more encompassing. For example, integrity covers the
ground where there is no legal or formal demand to act in a certain way yet there
is also legal or formal restriction disallowing certain ways to act. Put in positive
terms, the contents of the concepts can be understood to be complementary. This
is addressed in the subsequent subsection. Put in negative terms, the content of the
two concepts could also be pointing in opposite directions. Behaviour or actions
may conform to formal or legal standards yet be at odds with morality or personal
convictions. Conversely, what one considers to be moral or socially desirable may
go against what is demanded by law or another formal standard.
This opposition corresponds with the idea that the content of integrity is held
intrinsically, whereas that of compliance is imposed externally. The content that an
agent identifies with and stands for, then, demands the agent to go against what
is legally or formally required. Continuing the example about the trading arms to
a suspicious country: Despite it being legally permitted by the national authorities
and possibly resisting economic pressure, acting with integrity demands that those
involved act according to their moral or social convictions and refuse to condone the
transaction.
Dealing with this type of dilemmas is considered to be part of integrity, by some
authors it is even regarded as a vital characteristic of integrity.82 The act of complying
or the decision of whether to comply or not becomes a matter of integrity. This
decision is framed as an internal struggle dealing with the dilemma of conflicting
norms or virtues which jeopardizes one’s integrity (as a wholeness), for example, in
terms of loyalty towards one’s employer versus social justice or care for others. In the
literature on integrity, this dilemma is analysed by way of conflicting demands set
by different kinds of integrity, for instance, moral integrity versus personal integrity
or personal integrity versus organizational integrity.83 To resolve this dilemma, the
agent has to go beyond the content of compliance itself and has to draw on morality
and social standards.
At the same time, the process of complying involves activities associated with the
process of integrity (i.e., deliberating and standing for something aswell).Actingwith
integrity, for example, may either entail the decision to comply with the externally
imposed standards or going against them. In the arms trade example, this would
mean that those involved in the trade, be it on the government side or the company
side, should reflect on the case at hand and explore internally whether carrying on
with the trade equates with means acting on their conscience or not.
Nevertheless, the literature discussed above shows that strictly pursuing a compli-
ance strategy makes it more likely that individuals make immoral decisions that
82 McFall 1987.
83 Orlitzky and Monga 2017; Vandekerckhove 2010.
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go against their personal or organisational integrity. So, not only is the process of
integrity at times a necessary part of the act of compliance, without having integrity
in the mix, compliance is prone to motivate undesirable and unethical behaviour.
In terms of the military trade example: without integrity being engrained into the
organization’s ethics strategy, it becomes easier for personnel to just justify their
actions based on the minimal legal standards (‘if it’s legal it’s ethical’) without
further reflection or deliberation.
6.4.3 Integrity Beyond Compliance
Following Paine, the relationship between integrity and compliance also can be
conceived as complementary whereby integrity encompasses compliance and goes
well beyond it.
As is discussed above, this is certainly the case for content or object of compliance
such as legal or formal standards. By some, the content of compliance is regarded
as setting a minimalist standard that is supplemented by integrity’s moral and social
content. Although legal and formal standardsmay be considered as a residue ofmoral
deliberation (codified ethics), this residue is practically and principally limited. On
the one hand, society and organizations are constantly evolving, for example, through
(technological) innovation or (global) political developments. Legislation cannot
anticipate these dynamics and therefore necessarily is lagging behind. The vacuum
left is filled by integrity that through its aspirational nature is better suited to deal
with new situations and cases. On the other hand, in practice, it is not desirable
nor attainable to include all acceptable or desirable situations into standards. For
example, in liberal democracies, what is considered to be the good life is left to
individuals’ judgment rather than imposed by (legal) standards. Likewise, themission
and vision of a company are stated in broad, abstract terms rather than detailed
norms or guidelines included in corporate standards. So, the ground not covered by
compliance, i.e. behaviour that is not legally or formally obliged yet not forbidden,
falls into the domain of integrity. Continuing our example, trading military goods
with suspicious regimes falls in this category. By not engaging in such a trade, albeit
it is legally permitted, one could argue the company goes beyond compliance to act
with integrity.
Not only in terms of content integrity and compliance are complementary but
also in terms of their processes. In general, the processes associated with integrity are
understood to strengthen the commitment andmotivation to complybyorganizational
members and to improve decision making. In our example, integrity as wholeness or
standing your ground offers an extra line of defence against pressure by the market or
management to make a trade with a suspicious regime. Integrity helps to consider the
long-term moral and social consequences beyond the shorter-term financial gains.
The complementary nature of the two concepts relationship in terms of process can
be traced back to the difference in terms of the content of integrity and compliance.
As discussed above, the standards that have to be complied with may be ambiguous
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or contradicting. As a consequence, the act of complying may require interpretation,
reflection and deliberation, activities associated with integrity. The (moral) content
of integrity such as principles, virtues and values by its nature is more universal and
hence abstract and requires reflection anddeliberationwhen they come into playwhen
confronted with a particular decision or dilemma. This way integrity covers ground
that is not (yet) covered by compliance. Whereas compliance is acting according to
pre-conceived, fixed standards (backwards-looking) integrity’s process of reflection
and deliberation allows to pro-actively encounter new situations and contexts that go
beyond these standards (forward-looking). A weapons manufacturer, for example,
may foreclose trading with suspicious regimes, even before national or international
rulings formally forbid such transactions.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter started by introducing the question of how to better understand themulti-
faceted relationship between compliance and integrity. Although this relationship is
often invoked, it is taken to be self-evident and lacks systemic attention. To this end,
a literature review was conducted into integrity and compliance and the relationship
between these two concepts. This learned that the variety of similarities and differ-
ences between these concepts is captured by two characteristics: their process or act
associated with the concepts and their content or object. Next, from the analysis of
the literature on the relationship between compliance and integrity, three archetyp-
ical valuations of this relationship emerged: (1) compliance as residing within or
being part of compliance and vice versa; (2) compliance at odds/against integrity;
and (3) integrity beyond compliance. Using these two typologies as its dimensions
(i.e., characteristics and archetypical valuations), a preliminary conceptual frame-
work was developed that re-constructs the relationship between the concepts in a
systematic manner. The theoretical and practical relevance of the framework was
then discussed, in particular to the domain of the defence industry.
The framework depicts how compliance and integrity concepts invoke each other
at different levels. For instance, integrity is required as part of the process of compli-
ance, while the act of complying can be understood as belonging to the activities
associated with integrity. Due to this intricate relationship, in designing a compli-
ance strategy, both the process and content of integrity need to be considered. And,
likewise, when shaping an ethical culture based on integrity, the act of complying as
well as the standards that are part of the object of compliance should be incorporated.
Understanding integrity and compliance, either as the two ends of a continuum84 or
as one-sidedly depicting integrity as residing beyond compliance85 as is common in
the literature, does not do justice to the intricacies and multi-layered character of the
relationship.
84 Geddes 2017; Maesschalck 2004; Verhezen 2010.
85 Paine 1994.
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How this relationship pans out in actual organizational practice is context-
dependent. The framework may help to unearth and understand the often implicit
(organisational) design choices that underpin the shape the relationship takes in
particular real-life situations. Furthermore, considering the dimensions outlined by
the framework supports the conscious redesign of the relationship within organiza-
tions. For example, understanding how integrity and compliance interactmay support
the decision-making process of a company about trading military goods or services
to a suspicious country. Rather than responding after the fact, when a particular trans-
action already has caused a public outcry, organizations may pre-empt such affairs
by incorporating reflection on what they stand for in relation to what legal standards
demand as part of their business processes.
Besides offering amore detailed understanding, the framework aids in pinpointing
the aspects of the relationship between compliance and integrity that currently
remain underdeveloped. Further research, for example, may shed further light on
how integrity and compliance overlap and supplement each other in terms of content
and/or process both in theory and in organizational practices. New insights thus
gathered, would help to further populate, corroborate and fine-tune the conceptual
framework.
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Abstract This chapter explores whether economic sanctions are able to trigger
sudden economic growth collapses. The primarily aim of economic sanctions is to
cause a political or behavioural change by imposing serious restrictions on important
economic activities undertaken by the target country. In particular, the basic idea is
that sanctions cause a large adverse and sudden shock to the target’s economy. It
assumes that when this shock is severe enough, the target country is more willing to
cooperate. The findings reported in this chapter clearly demonstrate that economic
sanctions have a significant positive effect on the likelihood of a growth deceleration
in the first three years after the first threat signals or actual imposition. It turns out
that not all sanctions are equally successful in creating a sudden economic shock. In
particular, trade sanctions, multilateral sanctions, and sanctions aimed at the business
sector are the most harmful for the economy of the target country.
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7.1 Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War era, economic diplomacy started to play an increasing
role in international affairs.Many great powers in theworld, such as theUS orRussia,
appear to be less inclined to use armed force to resolve external disputes. Instead,
they often adopt more smart alternatives, like the application of economic sanctions,
to influence a state’s political agenda.1 In this way, they express their concerns or
protect their interests without incurring the large adverse humanitarian costs of a
major military intervention. Examples of such coercive policy measures are trade
bans, suspension of economic protocols, seizure of assets, or the ending of diplo-
matic relations. The attractiveness of economic sanctions is extensively documented
in the literature.2 Despite their increased popularity in the last three decades, the
debate on their success rate remains rather inconclusive.3 One explanation for this
disappointing result is that states are often reluctant to end or at least suspend an
economic relationship as this can be both economically and politically costly. This
conclusion induced a shift in the academic sanction literature from the question of
“Do they work?” to “What they actually do.”4
The adjective ‘economic’ in the term economic sanctions refers to the economic
sphere. The basic idea behind economic sanctions is that it is expected that they
create a major and sudden adverse economic shock. It assumes that when this shock
is large enough, and the target country cannot anticipate or mitigate the costs, the
target government is more willing the accept the demands of the sending country.
Based on the existing literature, economic sanctions hurt the economic performance
of the target economy through various channels including hampering international
trade,5 real exchange rate appreciations,6 foreign capital flight,7 or the limited access
to certain technologies.8 However, the complete economic impact of sanctions goes
beyond these direct effects related to the future domestic production. For instance,
sanctions also increase political uncertainty in a target country which, in turn, will
be again reflected in the economic performance by influencing domestic investment
and consumption.
1 Drezner 2011.
2 Van Bergeijk 1994; 2009; Van Bergeijk et al. 2011; Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2007; Hufbauer
et al.1990; 2007.
3 Hufbauer et al. 1990; Pape 1997; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Elliott 1998.
4 Hufbauer et al. 1990; 2007; Allen 2005, 2008; Allen and Lektzian 2013; Cortright and Lopez
2002; Weiss 1999; Gibbons and Garfield 1999; Alnasrawi 2001; Wood 2008.
5 Afesorgbor 2019; Kohl and Reesink 2019.
6 Wang et al. 2019.
7 Hatipoglu and Peksen 2018; Besedeš et al. 2017; Mirkina 2018.
8 Hufbauer et al. 1990; 2007.
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Although there exists a voluminous literature exploring the impact of economic
sanctions on drivers of economic growth, it is quite surprising that there is a lack of
empirical evidence on the direct impact of economic sanctions on economic growth.
One exception is the paper by Neuenkirch and Neumeier,9 who empirically estimate
the effect of US and UN sanctions directly on economic growth. They find that the
imposition of UN sanctions decrease the target state’s annual real per capita GDP
growth rate by more than two percentage points for the next ten years, while the
effect of US sanctions is much smaller and less distinct as they decrease the target
state’s GDP growth by less than one-percentage-point.
Based on the existing empirical evidence, one can still question whether the
economic shock created by economic sanctions is large enough to force a target
state to comply with the sender’s demands. Nevertheless, growth rates over time have
becomemore unstable due to political events, especially in developing countries, and
these breaks in growth rates lead to distinct patterns. Ignoring these structural breaks
gives a distorted picture of the factors that play a role in a country’s economic perfor-
mance.10 Using this insight, existing studies claim that the variability in exports,
wars, sudden stops in capital flows, and political transitions are strongly associated
with growth decelerations.11 Economic sanctions, therefore, seem a good candidate
in the list of factors that cause the observed patchiness in growth, but the economic
growth literature has yet primarily ignored them.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, to explore the effect of economic
sanctions on the probability of a sudden economic growth collapse. Second, to reveal
the mechanisms underlying the main results of this chapter and relate them to differ-
ences among sanctions including policy instrument used, interests threatened, and
sender type and commitment. By modifying the methodological approach suggested
in the previous literature, we are able to identify periods of major economic contrac-
tions.12 Meanwhile, using the comprehensive Threat and Imposition of Economic
Sanctions (TIES) dataset allows us to differentiate between different broad types
of sanctions.13 Based on the findings reported in this chapter, we can draw several
conclusions. First, economic sanctions increase the likelihood of an economic growth
deceleration by about nine percent in the three years following the first signals of
a sanction. Second, it turns out that in particular, trade sanctions, multilateral sanc-
tions, and sanctions aiming at the business sector are successful in creating a major
economic shock.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Sect. 7.2, the theoretical founda-
tion is described explaining the impact of economic sanctions on economic growth.
Section 7.3 describes the methodology used. Section 7.4 proceeds with the estima-
tion results. Finally, Sect. 7.5 follows with a conclusion and discussion on the most
important findings.
9 Neuenkirch and Neumeier 2015.
10 Pritchett 2000.
11 Hausmann et al. 2006.
12 Hausmann et al. 2005; Jong-A-Pin and De Haan 2008; 2011.
13 Morgan et al. 2014.
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7.2 The Economic Impact of Sanctions
7.2.1 Sanction Process
The definition of economic sanctions which will be adopted in this chapter reads,
“coercive measures imposed by one country, an international organization or a coali-
tion of countries against another country—the government or any group within the
country—with the aimof bringing about a change in a specific policy or behaviour.”14
Thus, an economic sanction involves at least one sender state trying to make
one target state comply with some political objective(s) by using economic pres-
sure. Economic sanctions are utilized for different reasons, including cases of war,
support of terrorism, nuclear weapons development, or only as an instrument of
economic warfare.15 Economic sanctions are intended to impose a serious restrain
on the economic welfare of the target country—especially on the ruling elite and its
supporters—and thereby make its leadership change its policy in order to avoid any
further damage.16 The target government will act according to a “straightforward
cost-benefit calculus” and will want to comply with the sender’s demands to avoid
more costs.17 Besides, it is assumed that the hardship endured due to the sanctions
by the citizens in the target state will make them pressure their government to agree
with the requirements and conditions of the sending states or organization.18
Sanction episodes may start with a threat by the sender(s), which, if not effective,
maybe followed by implementation. Perhaps the sender and target come to a settle-
ment without the need for the actual imposition of sanctions. If sanctions are actually
imposed, a bargaining process will start. In particular, the outcome of this bargaining
process can go in two opposite directions. First, the bargaining is successful, and a
target country starts to cooperate. Consequently, ‘carrots and sticks’ may be provided
by the sender state, like the partial lifting of sanctions or providing financial support.
Second, the bargaining process is a failure, and the target nation does not cooperate at
all. The theory of adaptation acknowledges that targets will not stand on the sideline
when facing sanctions.19 The target may find assistance in allies and seek ways to
avoid the effect of the sanctions or even impose sanctions itself.20 For example, target
states can find alternative trading partners or alter consumption patterns.21 Addition-
ally, the costs incurred on the sender state might reduce its ability to bargain in a
14 Escribà-Folch 2010, p. 2.
15 Van Bergeijk et al. 2011.
16 Galtung 1967; Porter 1979; Kirshner 1997; Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; 1999; 2007;
Hoffmann 1967.
17 Kirshner 1997; Farmer 2000.
18 Galtung 1967; Renwick 1981; Lindsay 1986; Nossal 1989; Mack and Khan 2000; Marinov 2005.
19 Galtung 1967.
20 Drezner 2000; Hufbauer et al. 2007; Early 2009; 2012.
21 Doxey 1972; Knorr 1975.
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tough manner, and third parties may not provide cooperation to the sender, dimin-
ishing the effectiveness of the sanctions.22 Thus, pending the bargaining process,
other players may come along that change the political relations or complicate the
bargaining. For instance, the previous literature concludes that a regime change was
often not achieved because the target received moral and material support from a
major superpower (the US or Russia). Therefore, it is possible sanctions may have
no effect or even an enhancing effect on the welfare of the target country when other
countries come to its assistance, and economic structures adjust.23 Finally, a sanc-
tion episode comes to an end when either the target complies with all or some of the
demands of the sender and sender and target come to a settlement, or the (threats of)
sanctions are gradually lifted even though the target did not meet the demands.
7.2.2 Economic Impact of Sanctions
To be able to tell precisely how sanctions would influence economic growth, we
must understand the channels through which these coercive policy measures affect
the economic performance of a country. In the literature, there is a classical distinction
between trade, diplomatic, and financial sanctions.24 Trade sanctions are forms of
import or export restrictions imposed on one or more specific goods, often including
strategic items, by the sender that reduce the gains of trade of the target.25 Using a
global panel Kohl and Reesink demonstrate that sanction threats, while often much
discussed in media and causing uncertainty to economic agents, do not have a signif-
icant impact on international trade.26 Sanctions, once imposed, do have a detrimental
effect on international trade. In particular, the imposition of a sanction decreases the
international trade of the target country by about fifteen percent.
Trade sanctions influence the economic performance of a target country mainly
in three ways. First, according to the export-led growth hypothesis, there exists a
positive relationship between the volume of export and the growth of the economy.
This implies that export restrictionswill harm the economic performance of the target
economy.27 For instance, Elliot andHufbauer conclude thatmoderate or limited trade
sanctions could reduce bilateral exports by a quarter and a third, while they find
extensive sanctions reduce bilateral flows by approximately 90 percent.28
Second, an import ban limits access to intermediate products, physical capital, and
technology. Though, the economic consequences of an import ban are less straight-
forward compared to export restrictions. On the one hand, as import restrictions are
22 Wagner 1988.
23 Hufbauer et al. 2007; Dizaji and Van Bergeijk 2013.
24 Kirshner 1997; Hufbauer et al. 2007; Morgan et al. 2009; 2014.
25 Van Bergeijk 1989.
26 Kohl and Reesink 2019.
27 Evenett 2002; Dizaji and Van Bergeijk 2013.
28 Elliot and Hufbauer 1999.
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likely to hamper domestic productiondue to a shortageof inputs, itwill also reduce the
export performance of the target state. On the other hand, domestic import-competing
firms may reap the benefits of an import ban due to higher production.29 However,
when imports are being replaced by less competitive domestic production, it will
lead to higher domestic prices and, therefore, cause inflation. Consequently, the real
exchange rate will appreciate due to a rise in the inflation rate of the target country
and make goods more expensive to purchase by foreigners. This will reinforce the
negative sanctions’ effects on exports some further.
Third, in the past decades many sanctions, such as the ones against Iran and North
Korea, have been aimed to decrease technology transfer. These technology sanctions
often aim to hurt the target’s military capacity or hinder it from developing nuclear
weapons.On the grounds of theNuclearNon-ProliferationTreaty, senders can initiate
sanctions to hinder the exchange and development of arms-related technology by the
target. In this light, a technology import ban may lower growth because the target
country misses the benefits of foreign technology, including learning. A subsequent
effect is that the target country will fall behind in technical efficiency compared to
rival countries.30 These rivals now exhibit a comparative advantage in the export
product. The target cannot compete internationally and misses out on export returns.
The second broad group of economic sanctions are financial sanctions. Financial
sanctions are primarily aimed to interrupt the in and outflow of capital to the target.31
Financial sanctions compromise a wide set of coercive financial measures, including
lending restrictions, restrictions on international money transfers, capital controls,
or the withdrawal of foreign aid or foreign direct investments. The economic shocks
caused by financial sanctions can be rather diverse. First, financial sanctions could
also interrupt trade flows without explicit trade sanctions involved and thus have
similar economic effects.32 Second, the target’s assets can be either frozen or vested,
the latter meaning that ownership of the assets is transferred from the target to the
sender.33 Already the threat of sanctionsmaydiscourage new foreign investors as they
create an uncertain business climate. Third, the removal of loans or aid hinders access
to hard currency and can even increase the debt burden of the target government.
Fourth, the prospect of sanctions may also shake consumer confidence and adversely
affect stock market returns.34
The third broad category of sanctions is diplomatic sanctions. These policy
measures are primarily aimed at decision-makers, the legislator or the political elite
and its supporters. Diplomatic sanctions may take the form of seizure of assets, like
physical property, securities, and bank accounts of diplomatic personnel or politi-
cians,35 travel bans on government diplomats, ordering diplomats of the target to
29 Selden 1999.
30 Ben-David and Loewy 1998.
31 Dizaji and Van Bergeijk 2013; Torbat 2005.
32 Hufbauer et al. 2007.
33 Kirshner 1997.
34 Biglaiser and Lektzian 2020.
35 Kirshner 1997.
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leave the territory of the sender government, recalling the sender’s own diplomats to
return from the target country, temporary closing of embassies, ending diplomatic
contact, and the suspension of an economic agreement or protocol.36 Since diplo-
matic sanctions precisely aim to hurt the ruling regime and its elite supporters, it
has been frequently argued that they are more effective in reaching the end goal
than other sanctions.37 They have been imposed in preference to trade and financial
sanctions, whose effects are regarded as more indiscriminate.38
Finally, the complete economic effect of sanctions goes beyond the direct effect
on drivers of economic growth. The main end goal of a sanction is to enforce a
change in political behaviour that often is preceded by political instability.39 Political
instability is especially apparent when sanctions are used as a tool to destabilize the
target government. Political instability, in turn, affects international trade and foreign
capital flows. For example, import flows are reduced because of low expected returns
to investment40 or because of increased import costs due to inefficient or suboptimal
trade policies.41 Additionally, an unstable macro-economic environment reduces
production by firms and thereby their exports.42 Moreover, economic deterioration
caused by sanctions can also fuel a revolution of the public, adding to political
chaos.43
Based on the literature review above, it is still not clear whether economic sanc-
tions imposed by the sending state creates an economic shock in the target country
that is large enough to force the target country to comply with de senders’ demand.
When the impact on the target economy is only modest, the target country will not
be willing to cooperate. So, the main question dealt with in our empirical section,
is whether economic sanctions are able to trigger an economic growth decelera-
tion by creating a structural break. In particular, Pritchett broke new ground in the
domain of economic growth empirics when he published his influential paper on
‘Hills’, ‘Plateaus’, ‘Mountains’ and ‘Plains’ and concluded that there is no single
trend growth rate to be seen, especially in developing countries.44 In fact, countries
shift considerably in growth rates, which are mostly discernible in episodes. One
thing that is particularly striking about these episodes is the appearance of enormous
accelerations and deceleration of growth.
Using this insight, by looking at what happens before or at the start of a growth
transition, one can gain insight into the determinants of successful transitions. In
particular, they find that growth accelerations are significantly correlated to political
regime changes, external shocks, and economic reforms. However, the authors also
36 Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2007; Morgan et al. 2014.
37 Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2007.
38 Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1999; 2003; Drezner 2011; Wallensteen and Grusell 2012.
39 Morgan et al. 2009.
40 Aisen and Veiga 2013.
41 Edwards and Tabellini 1991; Cukierman et al. 1993.
42 Musibah et al. 2015.
43 Rowe 1999.
44 Pritchett 2000.
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conclude that growth accelerations are for the largest part unpredictable and on
the whole unrelated to standard determinants suggested in the economic growth
literature.45
In the same trend, Hausmann and co-authors study episodes of deceleration using
a representative sample of developed and developing countries.46 Their objective is
to gain a deeper understanding of growth collapses instead of accelerations. After
identifying more than 500 episodes of output contraction, they study factors that
determine the onset of crises and the duration of crises. In particular, variables found
to be significantly related to the start of a crisis are the incidence of wars, export
collapses, sudden stops in capital flows, high inflation, and political transitions, with
some strong evidence for the change in exports, especially in developing countries,
and somewhat less strong evidence for high levels of inflation predicting the onset
of a collapse.47
7.3 Data and Methodology
7.3.1 Growth Collapses and Sanction Data
As our dependent variable, we use a binary choice indicator that takes the value
one in the country-years when a growth collapse is identified and zero otherwise. In
particular, a growth collapse or deceleration is defined as “an interval that starts with a
contraction of output per worker and ends when the value immediately preceding the
decline is attained again”.48 To operationalize this concept and identify the onset of a
suddengrowth collapse, a filter is applied.Afilter is a set of constraintswhich together
define a growth period. Such a filter should distinguish normal ups and downs in the
growth rate from actual growth periods of contraction or acceleration.49 In particular,
a start of growth deceleration in the country i at time t recorded when the growth rate
of real GDP per capita (g) fulfils the following criteria. First, the economic growth in
year t should be lower than the growth rate in the previous year: (gt+1 < gt). Second,
the drop in the real GDP per-capita growth is at least 1.5 percent and lasting for
at least four years (gt,t−n ≥ −1.5 ppa, n = 3). Third, the difference between the
average post-deceleration growth rate and the average pre-episode growth rate (both
including year t) must be at least 2.0 percent per year (gt,t+n ≥ −2.0 ppa, n = 3).
This threshold value seems low enough to exclude normal fluctuations in the growth
rate due to business cycles, but not too low to miss out on the start of a deceleration.
Fourth, the level of GDP has to be lower at the end of the deceleration than in all years
45 Jong-A-Pin and De Haan 2008; 2011; Hausmann et al. 2005.
46 Hausmann et al. 2006.
47 Hausmann et al. 2006; Reddy and Minoiu 2009; Berg et al. 2012.
48 Hausmann et al. 2006, p. 5.
49 Hausmannet al. 2005; 2006;Reddy andMinoiu 2009;Gupta et al. 2005;Dovern andNunnenkamp
2007; Jong-A-Pin and De Haan 2008; 2011; Berg et al. 2012.
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before the deceleration, including year t (yt+n < min{yi}, i ≤ t, n = 3). This ensures
the post-growth rate is lower than the pre-episode peak and hence the economy is
not in a recovery period yet. To calculate the growth rate of the economy, we use the
growth rate of the GDP per capita in constant 2015 US dollars reported in the World
Development Indicators published by the World Bank.
Our dataset consists of 187 countries spanning the years 1960 to 2010, of which
61 countries experienced one or more growth decelerations. Detailed results of the
applied filter are displayed in Fig. 7.1, wherein countries are divided according
to region. It is immediately apparent that decelerations are most common in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Latin-America and the Caribbean and the Middle-East and North
Africa (MENA),while nearly absent from theEUandmost other developed countries.
The information needed to construct our economic sanction indicator is taken
from the Threats and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) dataset. This dataset
contains detailed information on both threats and impositions for a broad spectrum
of sanctions for targeting more than 200 countries and send by about 150 countries
and institutions between 1950 and 2005. In particular, the dataset includes data about
starting and ending date, underlying issue, the type of sanction, aim of the sanction,
target interest threatened, commitment by the sender and the estimated economic
costs. In this chapter, we focus only on the four main senders of economic sanctions
the last decades: the US, UN, EU, and Russia. In particular, we create a dummy
variable taking the value one in the full yearswhen a country is subject to an economic
sanction by one of the primary senders in a particular year, and zero otherwise. In
total, we consider more than 600 sanctions. As explained in the previous section, the
entire sanction period consists of different stages. Of the considered sanctions, about
three-quarters of the impositions of economic sanctions are preceded by a threat.
Fig. 7.1 Distribution of Growth Decelerations. Source Splinter and Klomp 2021
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7.3.2 Empirical Model
In this section, we present the empirical model applied to examine whether sanctions
are able to trigger growth decelerations. In particular, we estimate the following
Linear ProbabilityModel (LPM). Onemajor advantage of thismodel is that countries
do not drop out when there is no growth deceleration is identified in the period of our
analysis. This is of particular importance since less than one-third of the countries
in our sample have experienced a growth deceleration. As a result, this approach
reduces the sample selection concerns that are related to, for instance, a conditional
logit model. However, one drawback of this model is that the estimated coefficients
can imply probabilities outside the unit interval.
Pr[decelit = 1] = αi + βmxi t−1 + γ sancit + δt + uit
Where decelit is our binary dependent variable taking the value one when there
is a growth deceleration identified in country i at time t based on the filter explained
above, and zero otherwise. The vector x includes our set of control variables based
on the previous literature.50 In particular, we include real GDP per capita (in natural
logarithm), degree of resource abundance, inflation rate, level of democracy, level of
economic freedom.We include the control variables with a one-year lag to overcome
the simultaneity bias with our sanction variable sancit that is explained above. We
hypothesize that the likelihood of a growth collapse increases after the threat or
imposition of an economic sanction (γ > 0). The final variable uit is the error term.
The parameter αi is a country-specific intercept controlling for unobserved and time-
invariant country characteristics, while δt is a time-fixed effect represented by a series
of year dummies. In particular, we test for the appropriate panel data model using
the Hausmann test. The null-hypothesis of no country-specific effects is rejected at
conventional levels of significance for all model specifications.
Before we proceed, we must deal with the potential endogeneity of economic
sanctions as sending states do not randomly target other countries. Various factors
potentially drive both the likelihood of an economic sanction and the economic
growth of the target country. When we fail to control explicitly for these factors,
our results might be spurious. To capture this endogeneity issue, we apply the two-
stage least squares (2SLS) estimation technique.51 In particular, we consider two
instruments. First, one of the most important decisive reasons why sanctions are
imposed against a particular country is the violation of human rights. To proxy the
level of human rights protection, we make use of the Freedom House dataset, where
countries receive a score based on their political rights and civil liberties. A higher
value indicates fewer political rights or civil liberties. Second, the international status
ranking, as reported in the Banks International dataset, is used as an instrument. The
international status ranking is a composite score based on the diplomatic reputation
of a country. For senders, it might be more costly to impose and enforce sanctions
50 Hausmann et al. 2006; Jong-A-Pin and De Haan 2008; 2011.
51 Newey 1987.































Note **/* Indicating significance levels of respectively 5 and 10
percent; bootstrapped standard errors are shown between brackets
Source Splinter and Klomp 2021
that target countries that are politically and economically important.52 Clearly, these
instrumental variables do not directly affect the likelihood of a growth deceleration
as the correlation with our dependent variable is close to zero.
7.4 Results
7.4.1 Imposition and Threats
Table 7.1 reports the results of our Linear Probability Model. The validity of the
instrumental variables is formally checked by using the Sargan test under the null
hypothesis that the used set of instruments is valid, i.e., they are uncorrelated with
the error term in the structural equation. The Sargan test indicates that we cannot
reject the null hypothesis, so our instruments are valid (p > 0.05). Alternatively, we
apply the Wald test of exogeneity under the null hypothesis that the instrumented
variables are exogenous (p < 0.05). TheWald test indicates that the sanction variable
is potentially endogenous and that instruments should be used. To obtain robust
standard errors, we use the bootstrap procedure with 1,000 replicators.
The results reported in column (1) of Table 7.1 indicate that economic sanctions
have no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of a sudden growth collapse.
52 Wezeman 2014.
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However, a critical remark one canmake about these first results is that they indicate it
assumes that the impact of a sanction on the probability of causing a growth collapse
is constant over the entire duration of the coercive measure. The average duration
of a sanction in our period of analysis is about ten years. The question is whether
the impact of sanctions is equal in these years? In particular, sanctions are believed
to work as a major and sudden economic shock that cannot be anticipated. This
implies that sanctions should in the first place have an effect in the first year of their
imposition or when the first signals are observed, for instance, through a credible
threat. To capture this issue,we adjust our sanctionmeasure by only recording the first
three years of a sanction. The results in column (2) point to a weak, but significant,
positive effect of economic sanctions on the likelihood of a growth deceleration. In
particular, economic sanctions raise the probability of a sudden growth collapse by
about nine percent.
The sanction variable used so far combines both sanction threats and imposition
periods. The previous literature suggests that if targets expect to comply, they will do
so already at the threat stage, avoiding the additional economic costs of the imposed
measures.53 That is, a threat is effective when the outcome of the threat case is equal
to the desired outcome. This debate implies that a sanction threat might be even more
effective than the imposition itself. In particular, when there is a threat preceding an
imposition, a target country might try to anticipate before the actual imposition. In
column (3) of Table 7.1, we split the sanction variable into three stages: (1) threat
stage; (2) imposition stage after a threat, and (3) imposition stage with no threats
preceding. The findings indicate that although all three stages enter significantly
the econometric model, the first and third situation have the most statistical and
economic impact. This suggests that there is likely to be some kind of first-signs
effect. In particular, expectations about the future imposition of sanctions can lead
to a change in the behaviour of economic agents already long before the sanction
is really implemented or even agreed on. Thus, foreign investors, in advance of the
expected sanctions will try to withdraw their capital, and traders will search for
alternative trading partners based on their own assessments of the likelihood of these
coercive measures.
7.4.2 Different Types of Sanctions
To explore whether the impact of sanctions differs among the various types of sanc-
tions considered, we have split up our economic sanction variable in three more
homogenous groups: trade sanctions, financial sanctions, and diplomatic sanctions.
The results in column (1) of Table 7.2 indicate that especially financial and trade
sanctions are likely to create a severe economic shock. In contrast, we find no signif-
icant effect of diplomatic sanctions at common confidence intervals. One explanation
might be that diplomatic sanctions are more tailor-made and usually aimed at the
53 Drezner 2003.
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Table 7.2 Sanction differences
Instrument Aim Senders Commitment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trade sanctions 0.142** (0.042)
Financial sanctions 0.123* (0.071)
Diplomatic sanctions 0.084 (0.139)
Political and military interests 0.060 (0.044)
Economic interests 0.148** (0.053)
General interests 0.139* (0.074)
Unilateral sanctions 0.091* (0.048)




Number of observations 3401 3401 3401 3401
Sargan test (p-value) 0.361 0.421 0.452 0.380
Pseudo R-squared 0.048 0.049 0.051 0.052
Note **/* Indicating significance levels of respectively 5 and 10 percent; bootstrapped standard
errors are shown between brackets
Source Splinter and Klomp 2021
ruling elite without hurting the general population. One alternative explanation is
that diplomatic sanctions are usually accompanied by other economic bans within
one package. This makes it difficult to perfectly distinguish between the effect of
each specific type of sanction.
Usually, the aim of an economic sanction is to achieve a policy or political change
by targeting important economic sectors. Thus, disturbing the economy is only an
intermediate goal. To explore whether the target of a sanction (business sector, polit-
ical system or general)matters for the economic consequences, we split the economic
sanctions in accordance with their target audience. The results indicate that general
economic sanctions or sanctions aiming specifically at the interests of the business
sector raise the likelihood of a sudden growth collapse. In turn, sanctions aiming at
the political and military interests have no statistically significant effect at common
confidence levels. One possible explanation is that, although these sanctions might
create political uncertainty, the coercive measures are mostly targeted at the ruling
elite and do not directly have an economic-wide effect. In turn, trade and financial
restrictions are more likely to affect the macroeconomic performance of a country.
A key element in this debate on the sanction effectiveness is whether sanctions
are imposed multilateral or unilateral. On the one hand, broader participation in
economic sanctions is generally hypothesized to lead to better and more effective
implementation. However, on the other hand, because of the dominant and bureau-
cratic process of sanction initiation, a powerful state, may be able to make a formally
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unilateral sanction effective. Due to these concerns, we split the total number of
sanctions in multilateral (EU and UN) and unilateral (US and Russia) sanctions. One
concern is that there is a significant overlap of some sanctions by their senders. For
instance, the United States implemented most sanctions imposed by the UN. Simul-
taneous inclusion of different types of senders allows for isolation of the true effect
of individual or multiple senders. The results in column (3) of Table 7.2 indicate
that multilateral sanctions have the strongest significant effect on the likelihood of
a growth deceleration. This finding supports the view that the multilateralization of
sanctions strengthens the signal of dissociation sent to a target.54
Finally, we investigate the relationship between the sender states’ commitment
level and the likelihood of a growth collapse. Three different levels of commitment
are employed: weak, moderate, and strong. The degree of commitment is based on
the statementsmade by the sending government. Themain objective is to test whether
greater determination on behalf of the sender results in greater hardships to the target
economy. The estimated results in column (4) of Table 7.2 indicate that in order for
sanctions to exert a negative influence on the receiving economy, the sender state(s)
need(s) to be at least moderately committed.
7.5 Conclusions
The aim of economic sanctions is to achieve a political change by imposing serious
limitations on important economic activities in the target country. In particular, the
basic idea behind economic sanctions is that they work like a major adverse and
sudden shock to the target’s economy. In this respect, one important question is
whether economic sanctions cause a sudden growth collapse by creating a structural
break in economic growth. Based on the findings reported in this chapter, we can
draw several conclusions. First, an economic sanction increases the likelihood of an
economic growth deceleration by about nine percent in the three years preceding the
first sanction signs. Second, it turns out that, in particular, trade sanctions,multilateral
sanctions, and sanctions aiming at the business sector cause sudden negative growth
accelerations.
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Abstract As part of an empirical investigation into factors contributing to theworld-
wide demand and supply of fixed-wing combat aircraft, the authors have conducted
a search for data sources providing insight in the characteristics, types and qualities
of aircraft designed for combat purposes, the total volume on the market (entries,
movements and exits), as well as the financial equivalents of each in a specific period
of time. This chapter discusses both the various pathways embarked on to this end,
as well as the research results.
Keywords Combat aircraft · datasets · data providers · type of data collected ·
language · formats · price · weapon system detail · financial information
8.1 Introduction
As part of a research project into the factors contributing to the world-wide demand
and supply of fixed-wing combat aircraft, we were looking for empirical data sources
providing an insight into the characteristics, types and qualities of aircraft designed
for combat purposes, the total volume on the market (entries, movements and
exits), and the financial equivalent for each within a specific period of time. This
chapter presents the results of this research. The questions the chapter addresses are:
which empirical data sources on combat aircraft are available; what are the general
characteristics of these data sources; andwhich data are provided by the data sources?
Empirical research regarding specific weapon systems has developed only rela-
tively recently. Earlier studies applied separate ‘weapon system counts’ as a measure
to assess a country’s military strength. At the time, Lambelet construed indices to
assess the strategic power of the global power blocks using data on conventional and
nuclearweapon stocks.1 His ideas have gainedmany followers, especially concerning
the arms race literature.2 Ward shifted the methodology from ‘counting nuclear
weapon stocks’ to ‘counting conventional weaponry’ only.3 Diehl and Crescenzi,
in their methodology overview on future arms races literature, express a strong
preference for Ward’s method.4
1 Lambelet 1973.
2 Bolks and Stoll 2000; Desai and Blake 1981; Luterbacher et al. 1979; Kugler et al. 1980; McGuire
1977; 1981; Stoll 1992; Taagepera 1979–80, p. 67.
3 Ward 1984.
4 Diehl and Crescenzi 1998, p. 116.
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Just now, in literature on segmentation between different weapons systems,
the focus seems shifting from effect research to process research. For example,
Caverley and Kapstein have supported their market analysis by regional trade data
(amounts and cost price reflection) and a qualitative analysis of traded weapons
systems (including combat aircraft).5 Johnson has been the first to disaggregatemajor
weapon systems into categories reflecting their strategic capabilities. His consecutive
studies demonstrated that arms categories constitute a factor influencing interstate
policy, both regarding procurement decision, as well regarding the political effects
depending on the end to which arms are used.6 To forecast future developments
regarding Russia as an exporting country, Chizhov has studied the trends on the
global market for fighter aircraft during the period 1950–2007. He concludes that
the geopolitical situation, the level of military threat, scientific and technical progress
and the level of regional economic development are factors influencing the fighter
market.7 From 2000 to 2009, Tsalikov has investigated the role and perspectives
for Russia with regard to the multi-role fighters market. Based on this study, the
Russian Federation has been advised on how to maintain its role as a leading state
on the market. Tsalikov advises on future geopolitical cooperation and investment
in Research and Development (R&D).8 Saunders and Souva chose an altogether
different theme; by redesigning the earlier notion of weapon systems counts as a
proxy for military strength, and introducing a new dataset combining both quanti-
tative and qualitative data on fighter, attack and trainer combat aircraft possession.9
Rounds III, in the similar timeframe, studiedfighter transfers, for better understanding
of state-to-state relationships in the demand and supply of combat fighter aircraft.10
Two sources in English literature allow for a connection between data and a
specific weapon system—in our case combat aircraft (i.e., the IISS Military Balance
and SIPRI Arms trade database) as well as one source in Russian literature (i.e., the
Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade (CAWAT) World Arms Trade Statistics).
When scrutinizing their data sources, we find Lambelet, Ward, Johnson, Saunders
and Souva use the IISSMilitary Balance as their main dataset, whereas Caverley and
Kapstein, Chizhov and Rounds III base their inquiries on SIPRI Arms Trade data.
Tsalikov uses CAWAT statistics.
We proceeded then to find out whether it might be possible to answer our initial
research question based on the above-mentioned three datasets. Unfortunately this
proved not to be the case. IISS is useful for an indication of market size, market
entries and exits, but lacks financial information. The SIPRI Arms Trade dataset
provides an overview on market transfers and a cost indication of goods on the
market. However, it lacks information on total volume on the market and transfer
prices. CAWAT includes financial data, but lacks data before the year 2000. Although
5 Caverley and Kapstein 2016.
6 Johnson 2017; 2019; Johnson and Willardson 2018.
7 Chizhov [Qiov] 2010.
8 Tsalikov [Calikov] 2011.
9 Saunders and Souva 2019.
10 Rounds III 2019.
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we have considered a combination of these three sources, this has been rejected due
to the differences in definitions and methodologies and the probable requirement for
additional data on market diversity and market prices.11
To theoretically underpin our research questions, we have, therefore, embarked on
another inquiry for new data sources, containing: (1) information about the hetero-
geneity of combat aircraft, (2) the presence and numbers of aircraft available during
a specific time frame, (3) aircraft entries to, movements on and exits from the market,
as well as (4) any supporting financial data. This inquiry has resulted in an overview
containing 16 data sources concerning combat aircraft supply and demand (including
SIPRI, IISS and CAWAT).
The remaining part of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 8.2 discusses
the researchmethodology. Section 8.3 provides an overviewof the results. Section 8.4
contains an in-depth analysis of our findings. The chapter ends by putting forward
concluding remarks and our suggestions for future research within this realm in
Sect. 8.5.
8.2 Methodology
While searching for data sources, three pathways have been followed. First, data orig-
inators’ (i.e., states and their defense industries) reports on arms production, weapon
stocks, arms transfers or abolishment of weapon systems have been investigated.
Second, peace research and literature on arms control agencies has been reviewed.
To this, academic databases (Scopus and Google Scholar), the library and internet
have been searched using the terms: ‘military alliances’; ‘security through trans-
parency’; ‘annual defense assessments;’ and ‘combat aircraft’. Last, we have turned
to commercial sources specialized in collecting, validating and spreading data as
their main source of business. All specialized periodic publications in the aerospace
industry have been searched for original database owners and commercial offerings.
Internet has been explored for market reports on combat aircraft, and offering parties
have been included in the analysis. Upon identification, each data sourcewas checked
based on open source information, to be followed by a request for any missing infor-
mation or fact checking. Sources were then asked to deliver their data in a computer
analysis friendly format. Most sources were willing to answer to our requests.
Each data source has been analyzed on the following aspects: (1) data provider
(i.e., state- or non-state based agency); (2) type of data collected (i.e., production,
transfer, abolishment, combat aircraft inventory, combat aircraft characteristics);
(3) accessibility of data (i.e., language, format, price); (4) time frame (i.e., period
covered, specificity of data and periodicity of updates); (5) actors (e.g., states, indus-
tries, armed forces, armed groups); (6) combat aircraft detail level (i.e., individual
11 Colgan 2011.
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configuration, weapon system family, weapon system category); (7) financial infor-
mation included in the data set (i.e., availability, levels of detail, e.g., currencies and
exchange year).
8.3 Results
This section first summarizes each of the 16 datasets general characteristics (Table
8.1). Second, each of the datasets is briefly characterized.
8.3.1 United Nations: UN Register of Conventional Arms
(UNROCA)
UN General Assembly resolution 43/75 of 1988 initiated a study on the ways and
means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms
on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, resulting in the creation of UNROCA
starting January 1992. The UNROCA database is maintained by the UN Office for
Disarmament Affairs, with the aim of creating transparency, building confidence
and preventing conflict among governments, encouraging restraint in the transfer or
production of arms, and ultimately contributing to preventive diplomacy. UNROCA’s
standardized format allows for information aboutmilitary inventory, national produc-
tion, arms exports and imports. Occasionally states tend to provide information on
arms abolishment (in comments) as well. Collection of data takes place by a yearly
request for self-reporting of countries; no additional pressure methods are used. Data
is public and free—the institution is financed as part of the state’s contribution to the
UN. The dataset is available online.12 Though visually very impressive, the format
does not allow for easy (machine) analysis. Contacting the UN does not lead to
receiving the data in a more conventional format.
8.3.2 United Nations: Arms Trade Treaty Annual Reports
In 2013, the UNGeneral Assembly adopted the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) to regulate
the international trade in conventional arms by establishing the highest international
standards, in order to prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in and the diversion of
conventional arms. The ATT entered into force on 24 December 2014 and seems
to have taken over the role of UNROCA regarding information on arms exports
and imports: the coordinating agency, intended audience and reporting categories
are identical. There are some major differences as well. Firstly, the ATT imposes a
12 https://www.unroca.org.
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legally binding obligation to report, with the exception of commercially sensitive or
national security information. Secondly, the reporting format has changed as well,
putting more emphasis on small arms and light weapons, distinguishing between
authorization and the actual transfer of arms, requesting an indication of the value of
transfer, and allowing for a better insight into the logistical chain of arms transfers
(the producing state, the reporting state, and—optionally—the importing state). Data
available to the public is free, financed as part of the state’s contribution to the UN.
The reports are available online.13 The format does not allow for easy (machine)
analysis. Contacting the UN/ATT secretariat does not result in receiving the data in
a more conventional format.
8.3.3 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE): Arms Reports Following the Vienna Document
and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe
The OSCE’s founding document, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, sets out the need
to contribute to reducing the dangers of misunderstanding or miscalculation of mili-
tary activities, particularly in a situation where the participating states lack clear
and timely information about the nature of such activities. Since 1998, participants
exchange information about arms inventory, national production, import and exports
among each other. In September 2016, OSCE members decided to share the infor-
mation exchanged—concerning imports and exports—by the participating States
through posting on the OSCE’s public website. Initial analysis shows that 45 of the
57 member states provide consequent (but not always timely) reports. Interestingly,
states that do not report to UNROCA or ATT (e.g., the Russian Federation or the
Holy See) do provide information to the OSCE made public.
Data available to the public is free, financed as part of the state’s contribution to
the OSCE.
The reports are available online.14 The OSCE secretariat is not able to provide the
data collected in a more conventional format. Scholars interested in the full dataset,
including the non-published reports for the period 1998–2015, should consider
enrolling in the OSCE Researcher-in-Residence Programme.15
8.3.4 European Union (EU): Arms Exports Reports
The EU has adopted a Code of Conduct on Arms Exports in 1998 as a politically
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tomake arms export decisions and to increase transparency among EU states on arms
exports. The code has been replaced in 2008 by the Council Common Position and
implemented in the domestic legislation of member states.16 Amongst each other, the
28 members exchange detailed information, compiled (but not crosschecked) by the
European External Action Service. This full information is not publicly available.17
Reports are available from 1998 to the present. Dissimilation in arms categories
following the EU Common Military List has become common practice from the
2003 report.18 Data available to the public is free, financed as part of the state’s
contribution to the EU. Per state and arms category data is shared over export licenses
issued and refused (both numbers and value), and value of actual arms exported in
euros. In 2019 the EU Council expressed the intention to develop a searchable online
database on to allow all stakeholders to consult and to analyze the data on Member
States’ arms exports in a user-friendly manner. At moment of writing, this database
is not yet available. An alternative presentation of the same data is published by the
European Network against Arms Trade.19 Unfortunately, it is still not possible to
conveniently retrieve the information presented.
8.3.5 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI): Arms Transfers Database
SIPRI is an independent international institute aiming to contribute to an under-
standing of the conditions for peaceful solutions of interstate conflicts and for stable
peace, through scientific research. SIPRI maintains multiple databases, though only
one (Arms Transfers) provides an insight into the level of individual weapon plat-
forms. The database contains information on all transfers of major conventional
weapons from1950 to themost recent full calendar year.Data on nearly every country
and armed group in the world is included. Information is arranged in arms’ categories
based on capabilities. SIPRI provides additional details on each transfer, next to a
statement whether the reported year is an estimate. Transfer value is covered through
a reflection of the known (competitive) production costs, using their own compiled
Trend Indicator Value (TIV). Weapon systems with similar physical characteristics
(limited comparison) are expected to have similar prices. This means that the actual
deal value is not shown. Data originates from the national reports (including the UN
Register), arms producing company’s reports, and (independent) news sources (both
on internet and on mass information channels). SIPRI data is available freely to all
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users. The Arms trade dataset is available online.20 Upon request, a link is provided
for easily retrievable data.21
8.3.6 Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade (CAWAT)
Centr Analiza Mirovo Torgovli
Oruiem (CAMTO)]: World Arms Trade Statistics
CAWAT is a non-governmental independent research, information and publishing
enterprise established in Russia in February 2010. CAWAT’s main areas of interest
include defense spending, the capacity of the defense industry, and the trade in arms
and defense technologies. CAWAT produces both customizable projects (do mind
that as a private person you receive no access—CAWAT deals with institutions only)
and periodical editions for subscribers, including a Yearbook (in an electronic .pdf
format) positioned as a full body catalogue and including several datasets on inter-
national arms transfers, covering 173 states and including transfer prices. The price
of the yearbook is not published online, but it is estimated to range betweene20.000
and e30.000. Universities and commercial sources are able to purchase information
as part of an academic package. CAWAT publications are based on verifiable open
source information, including national reports (including the UN Register), arms
producing companies’ reports, (independent) news sources and reports by inter-
national think tanks (e.g., SIPRI and IISS). Though acting as the main source for
arms trade information within Russian media and academia, the organizational prod-
ucts are not generally known outside Russia, probably due to the orientation and
language boundaries. The main information page is in Russian.22 All periodic publi-
cations (weekly, monthly and yearly) are in Russian as well. An English webpage is
available, but limited. Information about the yearbooks in English can be retrieved.23
8.3.7 International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS):
Military Balance
The Institute of Strategic Studies was founded in November 1958 in the United
Kingdom to promote an informed debate on nuclear deterrence and arms control in
the wake of the Second World War. Today the aim remains to conduct analyses on
the issues of war and power for governments, the private sector and expert users.
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weapon stocks within their force structures. Currently, the Military Balance reports
on more than 171 states. The IISS addresses defense policy and defense spending
and includes detailed information on the organization and number of military forces.
Datasets are available as part of the annual yearbook, in an electronic format and in
print. Prices for a single copy start at £495. Recently, the IISS has started offering an
additional online database: the Military Balance+, with data going back to 2014.24
Full range and functionality are accessible with an Academic or a Corporate license
(prices are not published, but are expected to range between e10.000 and e50.000).
The Military Balance publications can be found online.25
8.3.8 IHS Markit: Jane’s Publications
IHS Markit is a company providing information on a wide range of fields. With the
purchase of Jane’s retail group in 2006 (the brand name Jane’s dates back to 1898 as
a publisher of encyclopedia), IHS Markit has strengthened its grip on the aerospace,
defense and security market. IHS Markit uses both first-hand and secondary infor-
mation sources, including government and industry announcements, traditional and
social media releases, extensive use of networks, freedom of information requests,
(satellite) imagery andvideo analysis. The companymaintains a specializeddatabase,
with digitalized data going back to 1988, available online and on alternative carriers.
The price of full access is part of a commercial agreement between parties and is not
disclosed; competitors estimate numbers reaching six digits. A request for access
can be posted through the contact page.26 Next to specialized data products, the
company produces a wide range of periodicals (e.g., Jane’s Defense Weekly, and
the Defense Industry Newsletter). Within academia, IHS Markit is known for its
yearbooks, which are often used as reference material. Three of those—concerning
combat aircraft—are Jane’s World Air Forces, which provides a yearly assessment
of the airborne capabilities of global Air Forces. Arranged in a standardized way, the
data covers fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, UAVs and—to some extent—missiles,
focusing particularly on upgrade information. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft: In
Service covers all aircraft from ultralights to multirole fighters, arranged by produc-
tion company. Information on production and international trade is limited, prices of
aircraft are occasionally provided, though generally for civilian aircraft only. Jane’s
All the World’s Aircraft: Development & Production covers the production of 49
states with an aircraft industry, enlisting all (sub)contracting companies and their
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8.3.9 Informa: Aviation Week Network
Informa is a multinationally operating company in the field of information services,
scholarly publishing, and international events, with a focus on business-to-business
services. In the aviation field, Informa is known for its brandAviationWeek, covering
developments worldwide and offering a portfolio of products across publications,
data,market intelligence and events. The namedates back to 1916,when thefirst issue
of Aviation Week magazine was published. After multiple name changes it is now
known as Aviation Week and Space Technology. Aviation Week maintains a large
amount of data including a constantly updated dataset on combat aircraft military
inventory data. Extensive information on the various weapon systems is presented,
including family groupings of aircraft types, specifications on weaponry, engines
and contracts. Aviation Weekly has a strong focus on costs, including Maintenance,
Repair and Overhaul cost data and unit cost information per aircraft. The Aviation
Week data originates from the industry, specifically the original equipment manu-
facturer (OEM) government publications, specialized periodicals and think tanks.
Moreover, the company maintains direct communications with military and govern-
ment officials, as well as via freedom of information act requests and even occa-
sionally open source satellite imagery. All information received is cross-referenced.
The company serves both governmental and industrial clients. Individual informa-
tion requests are possible. Depending on the request, customary commercial prices
are agreed on.28
8.3.10 RELX: Cirium
RELX is a UK information and analytics company involved in intelligence and
publishing, operating in 40 countries serving customers over the whole world. In
its Risk & Business Analytics market segment, RELX provides its customers with
data and analytics to improve operations and to manage risk. Since 2019, it has been
brought under the umbrella of a new brand called Cirium (historically referred to
as Milicas and Helicas, and before that it was known as Fleetsanalyser and ACAS
Fleet database), focusing to serve the air travel industry. Through its focus on the
commercial market, RELX serves clients in the field (e.g., OEM and aftermarket,
airliners, airports, aircraft lessors, travel tech), financial specialists (e.g., banks and
insurers), and governments.
The database combines both commercial and defense data, originating from
industry relationships to producing and coordinating companies in the field. Over
2000 sources are combined with a sophisticated big data technology stack. No
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8.3.11 Rheinische Post: Flight Global World Air Forces
Reports
Rheinische Post Mediengruppe is a German medium-sized media and services
company. In 2019, it purchased the historical weekly magazine Flight International,
and its related information website Flight Global from RELX. Flight International—
founded in 1909—is the world’s oldest continuously published aviation news maga-
zine. Flight Global, established in February 2006, maintains the heritage of Flight
International and used to be the home base for initial databases on the aerospace
industry. Since 2007, Flight Global annually offers a free insight into its databanks
by publishing a global overview on military aircraft inventory and providing a short
analysis of recent and expected developments. In 2007, datawas published inmultiple
articles on the Flight Global webpage. Since 2008, each overview is compiled as a
separate .pdf report in a standardized format. Despite a change of ownership, the
company continues to publish the reports in the December edition of Flight Interna-
tional. The price of a single copy at a local shop or online is £4.99 per issue. Data
includes information on ordered, but not yet received aircraft. And although the name
suggests that only Air Force inventory is included, data on aircraft (both fixed and
rotary wing) within the Navy and Army inventory is included as well.30
8.3.12 Forecast International: Military Information Library
Founded in 1973 by a former USAF officer, Forecast International is a provider of
market intelligence, forecasting, proprietary research and consulting services for the
worldwideAerospace,Defense, Electronics and Power Systems industries; gathering
and providing knowledge on Military Aircraft, Defense & Aerospace Companies
(including subcontractors), international (military) markets and World’s force struc-
tures. Forecast International specializes in long-range (15 years) forecasting in the
most cost-effective way. The company collects and analyzes open, publicly avail-
able sources including government publications, industry, private companies, general
and specialized press (following over 200 magazines, next to other paper- and online
subscriptions), trade shows, seminars and conventions. The main customers include
governments and industries at the supplier and subcontractor level. At full range,
an annual access to the online library (dating back to 1989) including both histor-
ical and forecasted data on worldwide production, arms transfers, prices, military
budgets, market (segment) analyses and reports containing information on weapons
systems and geographical developments is offered starting fromUS$65.000. Amore
specific request can be covered separately (starting at approximately US$2.000).
30 https://www.flightglobal.com/reports.
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Next to its analytic products, Forecast International maintainsmajor editorial support
agreements with many key publishers and publications.31
8.3.13 TEAL GROUP: Military Information Library
TEALGROUP (on the market since 1988) is a specialist provider of market analysis
and forecasting services in the areas of international aerospace, with special interest
in the field of defense electronics, engines, missiles and munitions. TEAL GROUP
provides detailed information on military inventory of 123 states (accompanied with
political and economic analysis and future forecast). A special section onUSDefense
Agencies provides an extensive insight into the budgets, capabilities and programs of
theUSArmed (and civilian) Forces. TheDefense&AerospaceCompaniesOverview
gives an insight into the capabilities of the (Western) industry.Weapon system reports
cover production numbers, support chains and financial insights. Data is provided on
the world’s military aircraft systems, including aircraft, engines, military electronics,
missiles and smart munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles, and space systems and
-ports. TEAL GROUP analysts also contribute to a range of specialist publications.
TEAL GROUP information reports draw on a wide range of sources: OEM infor-
mation releases are intensively crosschecked using multiple (publicly available) data
sources. The main customers are industry subcontractors, the financial community,
prime contractors, and governments. Depending on the request, customary commer-
cial prices are agreed on (no indication available). A(n) (online) demo of the data is
free to use.32
8.3.14 Simplify Compliance: Military Periscope Datasets
Simplify Compliance is a provider of regulatory and business information, anal-
ysis, and tools. The company holds a general focus on US-based businesses in
multiple industries, including healthcare, human capital management, and telecom-
munications. Military Periscope as a product is positioned in the latter one. Mili-
tary Periscope, initially developed by the United States Naval Institute in 1986, is
presented as a knowledge base for accurate open-source global defense information.
Theproduct is comprised of a daily newsportal and three (online) databases providing
information on weapon systems, nations’ armed forces (air-, ground-, naval-, special
warfare, paramilitary and strategic forces for 165 nations, including some informa-
tion on deployment plans, programs and budgets), and terrorist organizations (per
region known data are compiled on every international terrorist group including their
31 https://www.forecastinternational.com/fistore/category.cfm.
32 https://www.tealgroup.com/index.php/online-access-demo.
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history and an annual chronology of terrorist activities). All information withinMili-
tary Periscope is open source data. Multiple referenced sources are used to collect
the weapons data. The data in Military Periscope is updated continuously and cumu-
latively. It is not possible to retrieve historical datasets, nor receive access to the raw
data. Military Periscope serves a range of customers, ranging from individuals to
governments, industries, and educational institutions. With an annual price starting
at US$7.800 for a single-station single user access, Military Periscope is presented
as an affordable library. Moreover, as a Federal Library and Information Network
member, Military Periscope offers discounted prices for US users. A free 7-day trial
is possible.33
8.3.15 GlobalData: ADS Solution/Strategic Defense
Intelligence Database
GlobalData is a UK-based data analytics and consulting company with a heritage
of over 50 years, covering multiple industries including Aerospace, Defense and
Security. GlobalData provides intelligence on the world’s largest industries helping
clients to increase business value through growth. The company offers an extensive
dataset known as ADS Solution, or sometimes referred to as the Strategic Defense
Intelligence database. Data includes information on military inventory, production
and transfer (including even the curated tracking of procurement portals for one
third of the globe). Moreover, GlobalData includes tendencies analysis, by providing
a real-time insight into the sentiment of the Top-100 global “influencers” in the
Aerospace, Defense and Security industries, and unlimited access to its analysts.34
A demo can be requested.35 Prices are not published, but agreed between commercial
partners. Next to data, the company offers a range of specialized forecasting reports,
and a public website providing general analyses free to the public.36
8.3.16 Frost & Sullivan: Aerospace and Defense Content
Frost & Sullivan is a globally oriented, multi-industry business-consulting firm that
helps companies to identify business opportunities and supports them in their growth
strategies. Frost & Sullivan was the first company to offer its services on electronic
tapemedia, delivering worldmilitary equipment market data in 1962, just a year after
their establishment. Frost & Sullivan is often consulted by strategic departments, not
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provides a large number of in-depth standardized reports on various subjects fore-
casting future developments. To this end, Frost & Sullivan maintains a large database
including information on the production, inventory, and trade in weapon systems,
next to general information on aircraft characteristics. Data is retrieved from indus-
trial and governmental partners. At themoment Frost & Sullivan offers access to their
research reports (a single report starts at approximately US$4,000, licensed access to
the full library is possible through a commercial agreement).37 The report is accom-
panied by raw data used in the analysis. The company is also working on developing
an interactive database in the Aerospace and Defense environment. This so-called
iFrost platform is not available at the time of writing, but is expected shortly.38 Frost
& Sullivan analysts are known to contribute to IISS Military Balance.
8.4 Analysis
This section provides an analysis following the aspects collected in Table 8.1.
8.4.1 Data Providers
The basic presumption that there are two main origins for data (i.e., industry
producing companies and governments producing or procuring weapon systems)
seems correct. However, not all governments and industries are transparent on their
actions on the combat aircraft market. A lot of data is retrieved through independent
research. This is a difficult and time-consuming process that generally comes at a
price. Table 8.1 (columns 1 and 2) present the organizations and the reports which
disclose the results of this process.
We find that the peace research and arms control agencies (e.g., SIPRI, CAWAT,
IISS) and the commercial parties sources (e.g., RELX, the TEAL Group, Global-
Data) have one thing in common. Both aim to make the world a better place through
data. The difference is in the focus and the customers. Commercial parties link data
to opportunities and growth for their customers, usually other businesses; their focus
is mainly on forecasting the future. Research agencies generally address govern-
ments and civil society, and provide a more explanatory focus on the geopolitical
perspective.
Both research agencies and commercial sources also seem to follow a common
data gatheringmethodology: starting at industrial or governmental publications, they
add other sources such as (in)formal contacts within the industry or the government,
usage of freedomof information requests, (social)media publications, and sometimes
own intelligence as in image of video analysis, including owned satellite coverage
37 https://store.frost.com/industries/aerospace-defence-and-security.html.
38 https://store.frost.com/ifrost-databases.html.
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(the latter is only available to the financially most solvable companies, such as IHS
Markit and Informa). Data is crosschecked and enriched.
This means that although there exist substantial differences between databases
(main focus, speed of incorporation, depth of details, and presentation of data),
generally all sources are interconnected. Developments and findings are published—
sometimes through specialized media (paid subscription, on- and off-line) or freely
on internet (as a means of promotion and customer loyalty), meaning information
will be picked up by other data collecting parties and reused.
Looking at the main customers for whom the data is collected, we see most often
governments, research agencies, industrial partners in the field, sub-contractors, and
(financial) investors. Commercial organizations most often collect data for other
commercial parties, while research agencies’ and governments’ data is redistributed
among other research agencies and governments. There are exceptions—Simplify
Compliance’s Military periscope is a commercial source, but its customers are
individuals, governments and educational institutions.
8.4.2 Type of Data Collected
Table 8.1, column 3 shows that the “T” (transfer of combat aircraft) is best docu-
mented; both by direct states reports, peace research and arms control agencies
and commercial parties. Reporting on “I” (combat aircraft inventory) is a close
second, mostly covered by commercial data providers. However, ‘inventory data’
can mean the most up-to-date data only, thus lacking historic overview. This is the
case with Informa’s AviationWeekly, and Simplify Compliance’ Military Periscope.
Within research agencies, IISS Military Balance is specialized in longitudinal data
on conventional weapon inventory. UN’s UNROCA also includes inventory data
(60 states out of 196 are covered). OSCE-members, finally, do exchange inventory
numbers amongst each other, but this data is not published. “P” (production data)
is provided by commercial sources and UNROCA. The latter covers but a few of
all aircraft producing states (e.g., Russian Federation and China are missing) and is
not always detailed (US generally just puts a number, without distinction in combat
aircraft type). OSCE-members do exchange production numbers against each other,
but this data is not published. “A” (abolishment of weapon systems) receives no
attention, except in some voluntary side notes within UNROCA reports. Multiple
explanations are possible. First, abolishment of weapon systems may be of less
interest to the industry—this is a reflection of a supply driven market. Second, data is
difficult to master, since no standardized definition of abolishment is given (e.g., can
‘stored’ or ‘cannibalized’ aircraft be considered ‘disposed’?). Finally, “C” (weapon
system characteristics) is a specialization of commercial parties. Data on combat
aircraft capabilities (e.g., speed, reach, ordnance) is not offered by research agencies
or through direct reporting.
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8.4.3 Accessibility: Language
Most datasets are in English (Table 8.1, column 4). The UN translates all docu-
ments into Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish. The OSCE
uses English, French, German, Italian, Spanish and Russian translations. The EU
uses 23 official languages (i.e., Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Esto-
nian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian,
Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovakian, Slovenian, Slovene, Spanish and
Swedish). CAWAT’s World Arms Trade Statistics operates in a niche, appealing to
a Russian-speaking public only.
8.4.4 Accessibility: Formats
Recent data is to be found in a digitalized format. Older data (approximately before
1990s) is best found on a bookshelf. There is much variety in the digitalized formats
and its usability for machine-aided analyses. States reports are usually nothing more
than .pdf scans of the original report—if you are lucky, in a standardized format—
however, that is only the case with ATT reports. The UN, for example, produces
beautiful presentations allowing multi-state comparison for arms transfers reports,
but allows no easy data retrieval. The EU is the only organization supporting the
initiative to make its data easier to access. The IISS’ Military Balance and CAWAT’s
World Arms Trade Statistics are in a .pdf format as well, and very difficult to convert
to a database. Flight Global also offers its World Air Forces inventory data in .pdf
format, but is much easier to convert due to standardized size. SIPRI online data
(including details of the transfers made) is not transferrable either. It is however
possible, upon request, to receive a link to almost the same data (lacking transfer
details, but including deal-value in TIVs) which allows the retrieval of data in a
.txt format, making it easily analyzable. Databases are the easiest for machine-
aided analysis. These are offered by IHSMarkit (Jane’s), Informa (AviationWeekly),
RELX (Cirium), Forecast International (Military Information Library), and Global-
Data (ADS Solution). Databases seem to have become general around the beginning
of the 1990s: a 30-year historical dataset seems to be standard for a commercial party,
looking at IHS Markit, Forecast International and the TEAL GROUP. This relative
peak can be explained by the increased availability of digitalized data storage capa-
bility, the relaxation of the superpower tensions, or to show the correlation between
the age of organization and the length of its data trail. Detailed analysis falls beyond
the scope of this chapter. Recently, the IISS also started to offer its data in a database
format, as Military Balance+, with a history going back to 2014.
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8.4.5 Accessibility: Price
All direct states’ reports are free to all users (Table 8.1, column 5). Two other
free sources are SIPRI (which is supported by Swedish government) and historic
Rheinische Post Mediengruppe’s Flight Global World Air Forces reports (provided
as part of the Flight International December publication). All other data sources
require (significant) payment. Priced sources, generally provide easily retrievable
and up-to-date data. The price setting seems to be related to reproducibility and
user-friendliness of data. Access to data is part of a package deal offered by the
provider, including analysis added (usually in a form of standardized reports and
analyst support) and a form of customization of data. There seems a relationship
between the format and the price. Documents in print are most liberally priced.
These are perfectly suitable for reference purposes but cannot be shared simultane-
ously, are less usable for analysis purposes, and exclude customized analyst support.
Digitalized documents in a flat format (such as .txt or .pdf) – often placed in the
same price range—make it easier to share with multiple persons, but remain less
suitable for analysis. Databases (independent of platform) are the easiest to use, but
usually the most expensive. Cheap solutions are limited in the amount of entrances,
comparability, or the capacity to retrieve data. Data on arms transfers is commonly
free. The exception is CAWAT, which charges for data on arms transfers. The expla-
nation could be that CAWAT is the only data source providing deal values. Military
inventory data is usually priced; exceptions are UN’s UNROCA and historic Flight
GlobalWorld Air Forces reports. All arms production data must be paid for. Possibly,
this is due to the sensitive nature of the data: production and holding data provides
a direct assessment of military and industrial capability. Another suggestion could
be the expensive nature of data: coverage of information on 193 states is much more
difficult to perform, than just looking at the transfers. The third explanation is that
the market is commercialized and customers are willing to pay for this data. It is
interesting to see that UN and OSCE initiatives to share this data are much less
successful at collecting data on arms transfers.
8.4.6 Time Frame Addressed
Table 8.1 column 6 shows that most longitudinal data history can be provided by
IHS Markit (weapon system data since 1909, military holding since 1913), SIPRI
(trade since 1950), and IISS (military holding since 1959). IHS Markit Jane’s data
and IISS Military Balance cover most of the period in plain text (digitalized or on
paper), while SIPRI provides a database for the whole period. As mentioned before,
data organized in databases seems to have become mainstream since the beginning
of the 1990s in the commercial branches. State transparency on the (changes in)
conventional weapon systems inventories appears to have become more common
after the 1991 UNROCA initiative, are by and large available online, but not easily
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analyzable. Looking at the timeliness of reporting, there seem to be only two main
speeds: either a yearly or continuous updates. Direct states’ reports and research
agencies SIPRI, IISS and CAWAT follow a yearly routine, updating and publishing
their information once a year. Commercial parties update their datasets constantly.
Timely information is apparently important to their customers. Most commercial
parties also provide periodic reports (often on a yearly basis) covering the general
trends and providing a forecast for the future.
8.4.7 Actors
Table 8.1 column 7 provides an overview of the number of actors in each dataset.
Direct states’ reporting to support transparency among members has been launched
with the UN initiative (UNROCA) in 1991. This initiative has been followed by
internal information sharing between multiple political and military alliances in the
Westernworld.Despite some strong alliances inSouthAmerica,Africa and inEastern
Europe, no internal reporting initiatives on weapon transparency have been found.
This could be explained by fewer strong military threats perceived, or by the suffi-
ciency of UNROCA (and later ATT as well) reporting initiatives. A true global reach
is difficult to attain. Due to the nature of the subject, it is as a rule clear that small,
geographically distant, non-conflicting states are excluded from the datasets, due
to the lack of military equipment. Specific state alliances (OSCE and EU) cover
just the data of their member states, or treaty ratifications (UN ATT). Other data
providers generally aim for the global reach. State-level remains the reporting stan-
dard both between states and by third parties. Research agencies and commercial
companies though are able and often willing to provide data on the level below state:
armed grouping, armed force branch, or company name. Sometimes the informa-
tion is intermingled within a database (e.g. SIPRI includes arms transfers to armed
groups next to arms transfers between states, andmost commercial sources remark on
combat aircraft in the possession of companies next to state-owned combat aircraft)
or is separated (e.g., Military Periscope separates information on non-state groups
in a specialized database, and IISS excludes non-state-owned combat aircraft from
their overviews).
8.4.8 Weapon System Detail
Commercial sources excel on this part, most probably due to the customer require-
ments, which call for a high detail level and technical data. Still, research agencies
SIPRI, CAWAT and IISS do provide configuration data on combat aircraft (i.e. not
only the family/platform data). There are though remarks to be made on the consis-
tency of naming conventions, e.g. the same aircraft—even without substantial modi-
fications over the years—can be named differently in consequential publications of
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the same source: for example JSF, F35, F-35, F-35A, F-35A/B/C, F-35 Lightning II,
F-35 Lightning II type A. This makes it difficult to apply a computerized time-series
analysis. States reports are generallymuch less detailed andmention only theweapon
system category or—if you are lucky—a platform family. It would be interesting to
match the findings in the latter analyses, outside the scope of this chapter.
8.4.9 Financial Information Provided
Finally, Table 8.1 column 8 presents evidence that financial information is seldom
included in the data provided and normally comes at a price. The stated (cost or
market) price of combat aircraft– as a reflection of the production price—is by and
large known. SIPRI uses its own method through calculated TIVs. The traded price
is in the main not disclosed; both the exact size of the package traded and the price
agreed are not shown. CAWAT seems to be an exception, because it includes financial
information on every transfer. ATT reporting has the potential to disclose the traded
price as well. Unfortunately, up till now (in the four-year reporting period) only five
states have been willing to reveal the value of their weapon transfers.
8.5 Conclusion
In the slipstream of the different pathwayswe took to search for relevant data sources,
we gained additional insights into the multi-layered market of weapon system data
and its broad range of customers with varying requirements. There are two main
origins for data (i.e., industry and governments). While industry seems to be much
less transparent, governments have increased reporting over the last decades. Govern-
ments share data, but the data is not crosschecked internally, neither is it made user
friendly. Accessible, timely and complete information on combat aircraft market
transactions seems not to be possible without independent investigation by peace
research and arms control agencies, and commercial sources. Independent data gath-
ering takes place through (in)formal contacts at the industry or the government, usage
of freedom of information requests, (social) media publications, and sometimes own
intelligence as in image of video analysis, including satellite coverage. This is a diffi-
cult and time-consuming process that generally comes at a price. The price setting
seems to be related to the format of data. A positive relation is found between the
price and user-friendliness, and a negative relation between the price and the repro-
ducibility. We observe a relation between the price and type of data collected as well.
Trade data is generally free, but production and inventory data is priced. All financial
information is priced as well. The market for weapon system data is multi-layered.
There is a broad range of customerswith varying requirements. Businesses and finan-
cial institutions look for best investment options; industrial subcontractors are looking
for growth possibilities; and civilian institutions and governments are looking at the
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geopolitical developments. Some require just data (more or less timely provided),
others require specialist analysis, and yet others look for the cheapest market solution
and seek to compare reports. This market deserves further analysis. For our empirical
investigation into the factors contributing to the worldwide demand and supply of
fixed-wing combat aircraft, we have found that there is a sufficient amount of data
available. However, this data comes at a price.
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Abstract This chapter examines whether the legal origin of a country influences
the likelihood of ratification of multilateral international treaties concerning arms
control. We theorize that ratification of an arms control treaty signals a country’s
intention to avoid arms races and wars. We know only little about the variation in the
ratification of such agreements. One possible element that may explain this variation
is the legal origin or tradition of a country. Since treaties are legally binding agree-
ments between two or more states and/or international governmental organizations,
they cannot be adapted to local needs and circumstances. Treaties are therefore gener-
ally an uneasy fit with the gradual, organic evolution of law that is essential in the
common-law system.Bycontrast, the civil-law tradition neatly distinguishes between
legally binding obligations and non-binding guidelines or directives. Consequently,
civil-law countries are expected to be more likely to ratify treaties than common-
law countries. The empirical results clearly confirm this expectation. In particular,
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civil-law countries have ratified about nine percent more treaties than common-law
countries.
Keywords Legal tradition · common law · civil law · arms control · soft law ·
international agreements · treaties
9.1 Introduction
In April 2013, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was opened for signature after the adap-
tation by the United Nations General Assembly and entered into force in December
2014. Currently 110 countries have signed and ratified theATT. Its roots can be traced
back to the late 1980s and was a response to the growing concern on the unregulated
nature of the global trade in conventional weapons in the preceding decades. Espe-
cially the rapid spread of arms in less democratic countries created a serious risk for
human security in these countries. The aim of the ATT was to regulate the global
arms transfers by establishing a minimal legal basis and improving transparency
and cooperation among countries. It is not the first and will for sure not be the last
international treaty to manage the international transfer of strategic goods. Currently,
there are more than twenty international arms control and non-proliferation treaties
in place that are open to all states to become amember. Some are used as ways to stop
the spread of certain military technologies such as nuclear weaponry or missile tech-
nology (i.e., Non-Proliferation Treaty). Other arms control agreements are entered to
limit the trade of conventional arms to state and non-state violent actors (i.e., Arms
Trade Treaty).
One important broad question that still is largely unanswered is why some states
join certain international treaties, but other states do not? This question is not only
relevant from an academic but even more so from a political point of view when
drafting new treaties. The typical answer to this question provided in the existing
literature is that states join international agreements which are in accordance with
their economic interests.1 However, not all treaties provide obvious economic bene-
fits to states.When there are no direct monetary gains from international cooperation,
as it is the case in arms control treaties, there have to be other benefits of treaty ratifica-
tion. An alternative motive to ratify arms control treaties builds on the argument that
non-proliferation of conventional arms and WMD would bring substantial benefits
in ending expensive arms races and redirect resources to more productive purposes.2
Broadly speaking, these benefits can roughly be divided into two categories. First,
signing an arms control treaty might provide some strategic benefits as state leaders
benefit from peaceful international relations, increased gains from trade and from the
ability to enforce their own policy goals in the international arena. Voters are likely to
1 Congleton 2006; DeLeat and Scott 2006; Fredriksson et al. 2007; Fredriksson and Ujhelyi 2006;
Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011; Mansfield et al. 2002; Miller 1984; Milner and Rosendorff 1997;
Neumayer 2002; Rosendorff 2005; Vreeland 2008.
2 Levine and Smith 2000.
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reward this strategic policy. This will, in turn, increase the likelihood that incumbent
officials will be re-elected during the next elections.3 Second, state leaders face costs
of arms races and escalation of international conflicts. The ratification of arms control
treaties reduces the risk of war for certain countries and therefore reduces the costs of
war and arms races. Thus, the conclusion of arms control treaties increases interna-
tional security and stability, because these agreements have an important signalling
function. They provide information about peaceful intentions and the willingness to
employ offensive capabilities because they require all treaty partners to reduce their
offensive weapons arsenal or to limit the range of weapons used.4 With such a signal,
states can escape or slow down arms races and prevent conflicts from escalation to
war.
Additionally,many studies examine the institutionalizationof treaties through rati-
fication.5 A possible key element that affects the decision of whether or not to ratify
a particular treaty is the legal tradition of a country. This issue is mainly neglected
in the current literature. The world’s legal systems can roughly be divided between
two major traditions: English common law and French civil law. Since treaties are
legally binding agreements between two or more states, they cannot be adapted to
local needs and circumstances. Treaties are therefore generally inconsistent with the
gradual, organic evolution of law that is essential in the common-law system. As
a result, common-law countries hold a distaste for treaties. In turn, treaties are a
more comfortable fit with the civil-law tradition that neatly distinguishes between
law and non-law. Consequently, civil-law countries are expected to ratify binding
international obligations.
The aim of this chapter is to provide an insight into the relationship between
the legal tradition of a country and the ratification of arms control treaties. For
this purpose, an ordered logit model is estimated including 171 countries. The main
findings of our study are in accordancewith our expectations. Common-law countries
ratify fewer arms control treaties compared to civil-law countries.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 9.2 reviews the liter-
ature relevant for explaining the relationship between arms control treaties ratification
and legal origin. Section 9.3 describes the data andmethodology used, while Sect. 9.4
shows our empirical results. Last, Sect. 9.5 offers a conclusions and discussion.
9.2 Legal Origin and Arms Control Treaties
The international transfer of sensitive andmilitary-strategic goods, including nuclear
weapons, conventional arms and dual-use goods, are subject to specific international
treaties. This framework is designed to prevent weapons systems, technologies,
3 Brender 2018.
4 Kydd 2000; Müller 2000.
5 Bernauer et al. 2010; Haftel and Thompson 2013; Hathaway 2007; Neumayer 2008; Schneider
and Urpelainen 2013; Simmons and Danner 2010; Von Stein 2008.
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knowledge and services, posing threats to international safety and security, from
falling in the hands of violent state and non-state actors. International treaties are
widely used as a common tool of global governance the last decades. A treaty is
a legally binding agreement between two or more nations and or organization that
is recognized and given effect under international law. One of the most important
principles of treaty law is pacta sunt servanda (i.e., the pact must be respected),
meaning that treaties are binding on the parties by consent and must be performed
by them in good faith.6
The existing literature shows that the ratification of a particular treaty is mainly
determined by political and economic interests. One important issue in this debate
that has not been explored so far is whether the decision to ratify international treaties
is affected by the legal tradition of a country, as this will shape the incentives of poli-
cymakers. Juridical scholars typically classify the legal tradition according to: (i)
historical background and development of the legal system; (ii) theories and hierar-
chies of sources of laws; (iii) the workingmethodology of jurists; (iv) the characteris-
tics of the legal concepts; (v) the legal institutions of the system; and (vi) the divisions
of law employed.7 Using this framework, legal origin theory formalizes the different
perspectives about law and its purpose and classify the legal origin of a country
into two secular principal traditions: common law and civil law, and several sub-
traditions—French, German, socialist, and Scandinavian—within the civil-law tradi-
tion. Generally, the two principal types of legal origins emerged from the different
views of law developed in England and France centuries ago. These contrasting views
yielded diverging ideas and strategies that are not only incorporated into specific legal
rules and codes, but also into the organization of the legal system. Civil law encour-
ages a centralized system where the government directly addresses market failures,
whereas the more decentralized common-law approach favours contract and private
litigation. The two principal legal traditions have been transplanted through colo-
nization and conquests to the vast majority of the jurisdictions in the world by a
group of European countries.8
The common-law legal tradition was developed in England first and later spread
across the colonies of the British empire, including the United States, Canada,
Australia, India, South Africa. English common law developed because landed aris-
tocrats and merchants wanted a system of law that would provide strong protections
for property and contract rights, and limit the crown’s ability to interfere in markets.9
The judge has a central role in the common-law system. The law is formed by appel-
late judges who establish binding precedents by resolving case-specific disputes.
Dispute resolution tends to be adversarial rather than inquisitorial. Judicial indepen-
dence from both the executive and legislature are central. The civil-law tradition is
the oldest, the most influential, and the most widely distributed around the world,
especially after so many transition economies after the end of the Cold War have
6 Abbott and Snidal 2000; Guzman and Meyer 2010; Lipson 1991; Raustiala 2005.
7 Glendon et al. 1982.
8 David and Brierley 1985; McNeill and McNeill 2003.
9 Mahoney 2001.
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returned to it. It originates from Roman law and uses statutes and comprehensive
codes as a primary means of ordering legal material. Dispute resolution tends to be
inquisitorial rather than adversarial. In the civil-law system statutes and comprehen-
sive codes serve as the primary means of ordering legal material, with a key role for
legal scholars who ascertain and formulate rules.
It has been widely documented in the political science and economics litera-
ture that legal origin significantly influences the political decisions on implementing
and enforcing various kinds of laws and regulations. For instance, empirical anal-
yses demonstrate that common-law states are more market-oriented by having more
economic freedom, stronger investor protection, more private ownership, more flex-
ible labour markets, less burden of firm entry regulations and more developed capital
markets than states with civil law, Islamic law, or mixed legal traditions. In contrast,
civil law is associatedwith a heavier hand of government ownership and state-desired
allocations. In other words, civil law is “policy implementing”, while common law
is “dispute resolving”.10 These economic outcomes are not only explained by the
content or application of law, but also by the organization of the law system in coun-
tries. Subsequent studies have found that common law is associated with a lower
formalism of judicial procedures and a greater judicial independence than civil law.
These results are associated with better contract enforcement and greater security of
property rights.11
The influence of legal traditions reaches beyond national boundaries into the realm
of international commitments. A series of studies identify differences between civil-
law and common-law countries in terms of their willingness to join treaties or accept
the jurisdiction of international courts.12 The main conclusion shared among these
studies suggest that common-law countries are less likely to show such willingness
compared to civil-law countries.
One essential element of common-law systems is their bottom-up evolution. Law
is made by judges as a means to solve specific social problems. Legal rules evolve
gradually and are sensitive to the social environment in which they operate and
correspond with its values.13 International treaties, however, are inconsistent with
the notion of local, organic, and socially adaptive law. Foreign documents produced
by international political deals are imposed top-down on the legal system and do not
necessarily reflect its values. As a result, international treatiesmay not fit comfortably
with its existing legal culture of rules and practices. These concerns lead common-
law countries to greatly value the flexibility of nonbinding international rules and
the liberty to modify or disregard provisions that are incompatible with domestic
laws and policies. Additionally, given the power and independence of judges in
common-law systems, governments feel uncertain about the consequences of treaty
10 Botero et al. 2004; Djankov et al. 2002; 2003a; La Porta et al. 1997; 1998; 1999; 2002.
11 La Porta et al. 2004; Djankov et al. 2003b.
12 Chapman and Chaudoin 2013; Efrat 2016; Elkins et al. 2006; Goodliffe and Hawkins 2006;
Mitchell and Powel 2011; Simmons 2009.
13 Gennaioli and Shleifer 2007; Hutchinson 2005.
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ratification and may find it difficult to escape treaty obligations.14 To influence state
behaviour, international agreements typically require incorporation into the domestic
legal system and integration into domestic institutions. Implementation—the intro-
duction of international rules and norms into formal legal and policy mechanisms
within a state—is a key process in the translation of these rules and norms into
changes in actual behaviour.15 When incorporating a treaty into the domestic legal
system, local law has to be brought into line with the treaty’s legal obligations. In
a common-law system, assessing the conformity of local law with the treaty—and
making necessary changes—presents a challenge since the common law is not found
in a single major code. Rather, law exists as an amalgam of statutes and legal prece-
dents. Combing through the numerous legal sources and adjusting them to the treaty
could be time-consuming and difficult.
Whereas common-law systems are less comfortable with legally binding agree-
ments, the reversemight be true for civil-law systems as the flexibility of the legal rule
comes at the expense of its certainty—and it is the latter that civil law values more. In
contrast, nonbinding agreements do not easily fit civil law’s emphasis on certainty,
clarity, and formal legal sources, and its neat distinction between law and non-law.
Civil law sees formal international rules as the preeminent means for governing
interstate relations.16
To summarize the discussion above, common-law systems are more comfortable
with nonbinding agreements than with treaties as they are less flexible and are an
uneasy fit with the common-law legal tradition. By contrast, civil law’s emphasis
on certainty, the preference for formal, established sources and the separation of
law and non-law will result in an inclination toward treaties and a distaste toward
nonbinding commitments. Treaties fall neatly in the legal domain and are the interna-
tional equivalent of the civil code that is amain pillar of the civil-law system.17 Hence,
civil-law systems feel more comfortable with treaties than with nonbinding agree-
ments. Nonbinding international instruments are relegated to the non-law sphere
and are not seen as an established source of international law. Overall, given civil-
law’s affinity for binding agreements and common law’s aversion to them, we would
expect a higher ratification rate of international arms control treaties among civil-law
countries.
14 McLean 2012.
15 Betts and Orchard 2014.
16 Jouannet 2006.
17 Koch 2003.
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9.3 Data and Methodology
9.3.1 Treaties and Legal Origin Data
We have developed a database on the membership status of states in international
treaties concerningweapons based on the information provided by theUnitedNations
Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). The analysis here focuses on those
treaties including the additional protocols that are open for all states to become
member of the treaty. Including all treaties would inflate ratification for some coun-
tries, compared to others which have not the option to become a member of those
treaties. Following Brender protocols of the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons which require individual ratification of members will be dealt with as if
they are a treaty of their own. These protocols are, for instance, land mines, blinding
lasers, booby traps, and explosives.18 The reason is that the control of certainweapons
is governed by these protocols. The nineteen arms control treaties dealt with in this
chapter can be roughly divided into two groups. First, there are those treaties spec-
ifying the terms of peaceful use of certain resources and areas.19 Second, there are
treaties prohibiting the development, trade, stockpiling and use of specificweapons.20
A country’s legal origin is measured by its respective tradition using dummy
variables. This classification is based on the differences between the highest legal
source of law, because this predominantly defines the main characteristics of legal
systems. Initially, the legal origin of a country is either classified as common or
civil law. The highest source of law for common law is case law, while for civil
law this is codified standards. Within the civil-law tradition, we are able to identify
three particular branches, the French code (or Napoleonic code, that dates back
18 Brender 2018.
19 Specifically, these are the Antarctic Treaty, signed in 1959, guaranteeing that only peaceful,
scientific missions will be conducted in the Antarctic; the Partial Test Ban Treaty from the year
1963,which restricts nuclear testing to the underground; theOuter Space Treaty from1967, securing
the peaceful use of outer space and celestial bodies and which prohibits the placement of weapons
of mass destruction in the orbit and on celestial bodies; the Seabed Treaty, signed in 1971, which
provides that no weapons of mass destruction should be placed on the seabed beyond territorial
waters; the Moon Treaty signed in 1979, concerning the jurisdiction of the moon; and lastly the
Open Skies Treaty from 1992, which allows for regular overflight of national territories on certain
routes for verification purposes.
20 The Geneva Protocol being the first international agreement to prohibit the use of biological and
chemical weapons in war and therefore the first treaty which prohibits the use of a weapon type.
It is followed by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968; the Biological
Weapons Convention in 1972; which bans not only the use, but also the production and stock-
piling of biological weapons; the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques in 1977; the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons in 1981 with Protocols I-V restricting the use of weapons with non-detectable fragments
(Protocol I), landmines and booby traps (Protocol II), incendiary weapons (Protocol III), blinding
laser weapons (Protocol IV) and Protocol V which governs the clearance of explosive remnants
of war; the Chemical Weapons convention in 1993; the Anti-Personnel Mines Ban Convention in
1997 and the Convention on Cluster Munition in 2003.
164 J. Klomp and R. Beeres
Table 9.1 Distribution of the
legal origin
Common law 32%




Source Klomp and Beeres 2021
to the 1800s), the German code (enacted by Bismarck in the late 1800s) and the
Scandinavian code (that dates back to the 1700s). The data is collected from La
Porta, Lopez-de Silanes and Schleifer and Mitchell and Powell.21 In Table 9.1, we
report the distribution of the different legal systems across our global panel.
As a preliminary statistical test,we compute the number of arms control treaties for
civil-law and common-law countries. On average, a common-law state has ratified
about 6.3 treaties, while a civil-law state has ratified approximately 7.1 treaties.
This difference is statistically significant at the ninety percent significance level.
This finding implies that civil-law countries are associated with more arms control
treaty ratification. However, this nonparametric test is only suggestive, as unobserved
country heterogeneity, as well as other confounding variables, are not taken into
account.
9.3.2 Empirical Model
To find out whether legal origin influences the ratification of arms control treaties,
we employ an ordered logit model using a panel dataset including 171 countries over
the period 1975–2016. Ordered logit estimation is appropriate when the dependent
variable data is in an ordinal ordering. In this analysis, a higher number of treaties
ratified correspond to a higher level of commitment intention than fewer treaties
ratified.22 However, one drawback of this approach is that we assume that all treaties
are equally important for arms trade control. The model is given as follows.
treatyit = αi + βk xkit−m + γ legali + εi t (9.1)
The dependent variable treatyit is the cumulative number of treaties a country i
has ratified at the end of year t. The vector xk contains k control variables, while
the variable legali captures the legal origin of a country using a series of dummies
indicating whether a nation has a common-law or civil-law origin and the various
subdivisions. The parameter αi is a country-specific intercept, while εit is an error
term.
21 La Porta et al. 2008; Mitchell and Powell 2011.
22 Brender 2018; Neumayer 2002.
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Table 9.2 Data used
Variable Description Source
Real GDP per capita Real GDP per capita in constant
US dollars of 2005 (in logarithm)
World Bank (2018)
Growth rate of real GDP Growth rate of the real GDP per
capita
World Bank (2018)
Military officer Dummy variable taking the value
one when the incumbent leader
or Minister of Defence has a
military rank, zero otherwise
Scartascini et al. 2018
Civil rights Freedom House sub score on
civil rights
Freedom House 2018
Democratic accountability Polity IV score Marshall et al. 2019
Foreign aid Official Development Assistance
as a share of GDP
World Bank (2018)
Trade openness Sum of import and export as a
share of total GDP
World Bank (2018)
Military trade Total values in constant US
dollars of the exports plus
imports of military goods and
services (taken in logarithms)
World Bank (2018)
Size of the armed forces Total size of the military staff
and personnel as a share of the
adult population
World Bank (2018)
UNSC member Dummy variable that is one if a
country is a temporarily or
permanent member of the United




Total population Total number of inhabitants
within a country (in logarithm)
World Bank (2018)
Number of veto players Political constraint index: the
number of veto players in the
political system
Henisz 2017
Source Klomp and Beeres 2021
The vector of control variables is based on earlier literature on the ratification and
implementations of international treaties in general and arms control treaties more
specific.23 These variables are required to avoid an omitted variable bias. The decision
of whether or not to ratify a particular arms control treaty is generally based on
different considerations including economic, political and security concerns. Table
9.2 provides an overview of all control variables, their definition as well as their
23 Brender 2018; Congleton 2006; DeLeat and Scott 2006; Fredriksson et al. 2007; Fredriksson
and Ujhelyi 2006; Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011; Mansfield et al. 2002; Miller 1984; Milner and
Rosendorff 1997; Neumayer 2002; Rosendorff 2005; Vreeland 2008.
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source. All explanatory variables are lagged to avoid simultaneity and endogeneity
problems. The optimal number of lags m for each control variable is determined by
using the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion.
Before estimating the model, we have to solve two further estimation problems
that are related with the panel setting. First, the maximum number of treaties that
could be ratified by a country differs between the start and the end of our period. To
control this issue, we add a variable taking the value that is equal to the total number
of treaties that are opened for signing and ratification. Second, we have to choose
between a fixed-effects model and a random-effects model when estimating the
model. However, since our primary variable of interest—the indicator for the legal
origin—is time-invariant at country level, we are constrained to use the random-
effects estimator. Our model cannot be estimated using fixed-effects because the
legal origin dummy would be collinear with the country-specific dummies.
9.4 Results
Table 9.3 presents the baseline results of the ordered logit model. To obtain robust
standard errors, we apply the bootstrap estimator with 1,000 replicators and cluster
them on country levels. Since it is difficult to directly interpret the standard coeffi-
cients of a logit model as they are in log-odds units, we report the marginal effects
in percentage-points.24 Table 9.3, column 1 includes all control variables suggested
in the previous section. To control for the legal origin, we include a dummy vari-
able taking the value one when a state has a civil-law history and zero otherwise.
This means that we use common-law countries as our reference category. The results
suggest that there is no significant difference in ratifying arms control treaties between
civil-law and common-law states.
However, oneproblematic concern is that the used classificationof the legal system
is rather rough, making it less informative. As a result, it reduces variation among
countries and the explanatory power of the legal origin indicator. In particular, there
is no general consensus on how this legal origin division should be made exactly.25
According to the existing literature, there is some significant heterogeneity among
the countries currently classified as civil or common law. According to Mitchell
and Powell some countries that are initially recorded as common-law ones, should
actually be considered as Islamic or Sharia Law (such as Pakistan and Sudan) or
have a mixed law system (such as Israel or South Africa).26 Mixed law also includes
numerous countries ofAfrica as it is partly basedon tribal or customary law.Likewise,
China’s system is largely civil mixed with principles of socialist law and traditional
Confucian values.27 Table 9.3, column 2 uses a broader classification. In more detail,
24 Cameron and Trivedi 2009.
25 David and Brierley 1985; Glenn 2014; Zweigert and Kotz 1998.
26 Mitchell and Powell 2011.
27 Schaffer et al. 2011.
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Islamic law is based on religious writings, while mixed systems combine elements
of two or more different legal systems including customary law.
The findings point out that civil-law countries are more likely to ratify a particular
arms control treaty compared to common-law countries. This difference is statis-
tically significant at the ninety percent confidence level. In turns out that civil-law
countries ratify about nine percent more arms control treaties compared to coun-
tries with a common-law heritage. Additionally, the results also indicate that Islamic
countries are less likely to ratify arms control treaties than common-law or civil-
law countries, while the impact of mixed law is the same compared to common-law
countries as this legal origin variable is statistically insignificant.
Due to reasons of data availability, using all suggested control variables in one
specification reduces our dataset substantially thereby increasing the risk that the
results are driven by a sample selection bias. To balance the omitted variable bias
against a possible sample selection bias, Table 9.3, column 3 presents our set of
control variables by applying the general-to-specific method. This method does not
rely on economic theory, but is a widely-used method in applied econometrics to
decide on the model specification.28 We first estimate a model including all control
variables as outlined in the previous section, but without including our legal origin
dummies. Next, we drop the least significant variable and estimate the model again.
This procedure is repeated until only variables that are significant at the ten percent
level remain. The results in Table 9.3, column 3 are rather identical compared to the
findings in Table 9.3, column 2. This indicates that the results are quite robust to the
econometric specification chosen.
In Table 9.3 (columns 4 and 5), we split the sample of civil-law countries a little
further into countries of German, French and Scandinavian origin. The results indi-
cate that although countries that have a civil-law tradition are more likely to ratify
an arms control treaty than common-law ones, there is any statistically significant
difference within the group of civil-law countries. On a similar note, earlier empir-
ical studies indicate that socialist legal systems should be considered as a separate
category. A socialist system is driven by the administration implying that there is
no role for private law, the country is governed by one dominant communistic party,
the law is predominately used to realize a political agenda and court rulings hardly
settle disputes in private relations and have a limited role in public law. The classifi-
cation used so far does not distinguish the socialist tradition. Instead, former socialist
countries are reclassified as either German or French according to the main histor-
ical influence on their new legal system. For example, Russia is classified as having
French legal origin.Of the 24 former socialist countries in our sample, 11 have French
and 13 have a German origin. In Table 9.3 (columns 6 and 7), we include countries
with a socialist legal origin as a separate category. The results show that socialist
regimes are rather different from the other civil-law countries as they ratify fewer
arms control treaties. In particular, they even ratify fewer treaties than common-law
countries as the coefficient is significantly negative at common confidence levels.
Furthermore, in the econometric specification in Table 9.3 column 8, we include the
28 Hendry 1993.
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number of treaties ratified in the previous year as an additional covariate. Although
the magnitude and significance both drop slightly of the variables of interest, adding
the dependent variable with a one-year lag does not dramatically affect our main
conclusions as civil-law countries still ratify more arms control treaties compared to
other systems.
Finally, leaders of democratic states face constraints autocrats do not have to take
into account when making ratification decisions. According to the existing litera-
ture, regime differences play an essential role in treaty ratification.29 One crucial
assumption we made so far is that there is no difference between the de jure and
de facto of the applied legal system in a country. The classification of legal systems
is based on the source of law that is the highest in hierarchy including legal docu-
ments or written procedures. As a result, our indicator is not directly related with
the execution or actual practice of law and legislation. For instance, in autocratic
regimes laws and institutions are primarily built and shaped to promote the personal
interests of the ruling elite, making the legal origin less important. This could for
instance explain the negative effect found on socialist and Islamic legal origin as
many countries with these legal systems can be classified as autocratic or at least
democratic transition countries. Generally, autocratic regimes have ratified about six
treaties, whereas democracies have ratified about ten treaties. To explore this issue
some further, we split our data into democratic and autocratic countries based on the
Polity IV score. Each country-year with a Polity IV score larger or equal to seven are
recorded as democratic. As expected, the final columns of Table 9.2 indicate that the
gap between common-law and civil-law countries is larger in democracies as in these
countries the difference between de jure and de facto is less compared to autocratic
states. This gap between common law and civil law is only weakly significant in
autocratic countries as the legal origin is of less importance in these countries. Laws
and policies are more shaped by the self-interest of the ruling elite than by the legal
tradition.
9.5 Conclusion
The objective of this chapter is to explore whether the legal origin of a country
influences the number of arms control treaties that are ratified. Given civil law’s
affinity for binding agreements and common law’s aversion to them,wewould expect
a higher likelihood of ratification of international arms control treaties among civil-
law countries. After testing for the robustness of the results, we can draw a number
of conclusions based on the findings reported throughout this chapter. First, civil-law
countries ratify more arms control treaties than common-law countries. In particular,
civil-law countries ratify about nine percent more treaties. In practice, this comes
down to about two arms control treaties. Second, within the broad civil-law category,
we find no significant difference between countries with a French, German or Nordic
29 Congleton 2006; Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011; Mansfield et al. 2002; Neumayer 2002.
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legal heritage. Third, Islamic and socialist law countries ratify fewer arms control
treaties compared to other legal traditions. Finally, the ratification gap between civil-
law and common-law countries is larger for democracies than for autocracies. This
can be explained by the fact that laws and policies in autocracies are shaped more
by the self-interest of the ruling elite than by the legal tradition of a country.
These results imply that when drafting an international arms control treaty, politi-
cians should take into account the legal tradition of a country. One way to make
treaties more effective is by giving countries the opportunity to partly modify or
disregard provisions on less important issues that are incompatible with domestic
laws and policies.
Two major limitations regarding our study are, first, that we assume that all arms
control treaties are equally important. This is not necessarily the case. Some treaties
have a broader scope or are more stringent than others. So their implications differ
as well as their importance differ. Second, we have only explored the incentives of
ratifying an arms control treaty and have not looked at the implementation in the
national law. Treaties often come with enforcement problems, raising considerable
concerns about the actual implementation of treaty provisions. The existing literature
has already shown there are serious concerns about arms control implementation and
compliance.
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Abstract NATO’s goals require close cooperation of Member States on operational
readiness, interoperability of their systems, material supplies, transfer of technology
and joint R&D projects. A common approach on the application and implementa-
tion of arms export controls, however, is largely lacking. This chapter questions the
absence of application and implementation of arms export controls in the context
of the material logistical support and services provided by the NATO Support and
Procurement Agency (NSPA). Three root causes of deviant behaviour of theMember
States with the arms export controls are identified and analysed: (1) fragmentation
of the arms export control laws and regulations; (2) a lack of leadership commit-
ment and organisational culture of compliance; and (3) a combination of external
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and internal pressures leads to a forced prioritization of operational readiness above
compliance. Next, a response is formulated to effectively counter deviant behaviour
such as non-compliance with arms export controls by implementing a mixture of soft
and hard controls. We advise the NSPA to create a culture of compliance within the
NATO Partnership Program’s community based on ethical values and virtues. This
requires social consensus, leadership commitment and a common agreement on and
formalization of the basic rules of export control.
Keywords Arms export controls · operational readiness · NATO ·
(non-)compliance · deviant behaviour · cooperation
10.1 Introduction
NATO is a political and military alliance whose principal task is to safeguard the
freedom and security of all its 30 Member States by political and military means.
Collective defence is at the heart of the Alliance and creates a spirit of solidarity and
cohesion among its members. Today, the security environment is more complex and
demanding than at any time since the end of the Cold War. NATO faces challenges
and threats that originate from the east and the south, state and non-state actors,
and military forces and terrorists.1 Therefore, it is imperative for the survival of the
Alliance to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture by bolstering its readiness,
responsiveness and reinforcement to respond swiftly and firmly to the full spectrum
of current and future challenges and threats from any direction, simultaneously. The
goals set by the Alliance to enhance its deterrence and defence posture require close
cooperation of Allied Member States on operational readiness, interoperability of
their systems, material supplies, transfer of technology and joint research and devel-
opment projects. At the same time, close cooperation among the Member States
necessitates a common approach by the Alliance on the application and implementa-
tion of arms controls, more specifically arms export controls, to prevent illicit trade
and the proliferation of conventional arms, weapons of mass destruction or arms
technology to hostile nations or non-state actors such as terrorist organisations.
To this end, the Alliance declared to pursue an active policy in harmonising
defence and arms control policies and objectiveswithinNATO.As one of the harmon-
ising policies, the Alliance stated to be ready to support the implementation of the
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) which establishes common international standards for the
import, export and transfer of conventional arms.2 However, various NATO civilian
and military organisations and agencies that are assigned to assist, coordinate and
support theMember States in the realisation of the Alliance’s deterrence and defence
goals such as theDefence InvestmentDivision (DIV),NATOScience andTechnology
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not have a common arms export controls policy, an integrated program, regulations
to assist and support the Member States to cooperate on operational readiness and
training, i.e. transfer of controlled material supplies, services and technology among
them and/or with commercial parties responsibly and arms export control compliant
under the NATO umbrella.
In this chapter, we will question the absence of application and implementa-
tion of arms export controls in the context of the material logistical support and
services provided by the NSPA. As NATO’s appointed primary enabler, the NSPA’s
mission under the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Charter is to provide “cradle to
grave” support and services to the Allied Member States in logistics, infrastructure,
operations and systems.4 To do so, the Agency procures supplies, repairs and main-
tenance services, demilitarization equipment, security items, repair materials and
engineering/technical support from more than 10.000 companies across the world
registered in the NSPA source file. These companies and the Member States are
actively doing business with each other via the NATO Logistics Stock Exchange
(NLSE) program, a secure and web-based e-Business application linking Armed
Forces and Suppliers via a single electronic marketplace.5 Yet in the from “cradle to
grave” process no attention is paid to the arms export controls.6
Based on the Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) framework,7 our chapter provides
an in-depth examination of the Member States’ deviant behaviour of not applying or
of circumventing arms export controls in the context of the NLSE program under the
NSPA’s coordination and support, while the Alliance clearly stated as an objective to
actively pursue a policy of effective arms controls in the light of collective defence.
First, we will identify the deviant behaviour in a (hypothetical) case. Next, we will
provide a root cause analysis of the deviant behaviour and formulate responses on
macro-, meso- and micro-level to prevent the re-occurrence of the deviant behaviour.
Finally, we will reflect on the analysis and the effectiveness of the responses, and
assess the lessons learned for the future.
10.2 Scanning
As one of the NATO countries, a fictitious European NATOMember State (hereafter
EUMS) is heavily dependent on the United States (US) government weapon systems
and technology, which are in most cases acquired through the Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) Program under the Arms Export Control Act. The arms export control regime
of the US is mainly based on foreign policy and national security concerns which
are subject to constant changes depending on the geopolitical environment of that
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Cyprus, Albania and Turkey are under US scrutiny and subject to the US sanctions.
If the EUMS violates the US arms export control regulations, the EUMS will be
excluded from the US weapons program or receive systems based on lower US
technology. Therefore, the EUMS has a firm US export control laws and regulations
oriented Arms Export Control Compliance Organization (AECCO) and an advanced
Internal Compliance Program (ICP) in place. Every re-export or transfer is registered
in the internal Export Control Database and scrutinized by the AECCO accordingly
the export control procedures and processes in the ICP,whether a re-export or transfer
request of a defence article, service or technology to a third party can be authorized
or not. Additionally, all third parties are checked on the US and EU sanction lists
before the re-export or transfer requests are approved.
Yet during the NATO defence exercises, when parties are expected to share spare
parts through the NLSE program with the participating Member States to maintain
the availability of weapon systems, the EUMS material logistics personnel do not
register the re-export or transfer requests in the internal Export Control Database.
This is because the pressure to cooperate with the Member States and to act quickly
on the NLSE requests to safeguard the readiness of the weapon systems for the
NATO exercises gain the upper hand over the complexity of the arms export controls
systems. Especially since the EUMS is one of the few Member States to imple-
ment and apply the related export control laws and regulations and has advanced
procedures/processes in place, whereas most other Member States are not familiar
or have a poor understanding of arms export controls and do not have the required
procedures, processes and or qualified personnel in place.
So the complexity of the unilateral application and enforcement of arms export
controls by the EUMS presents it with a dilemma. Either the EUMS clashes with
the other Member States accusing EUMS of distrusting its Allies and not acting in
good faith, thereby running the risk of being excluded from the NATO Programs or
exercises, or the EUMS gives in to the pressure to act as a reliable and cooperative
member by setting its own arms export controls aside and hence committing export
control violations. Moreover, the NSPA as the primary assisting and supporting
NATO agency to the Partnership Programs officially states that Member States them-
selves are responsible and accountable for whether they apply or implement the arms
export controls.
Based on this, in the next section, we will identify a possible root cause for
the deviant behaviour of the Member States such as the EUMS under the NATO
Partnership Programs on the macro-, the meso- and the micro-level.8
8 Elias 2013, p. 39.
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10.3 Analysis
10.3.1 Macro-level: Fragmentation of the Arms Export
Control Laws and Regulations
Arms export control laws and regulations are based on national, regional and interna-
tional laws and therefore differ for each Member State. As sovereign entities, States
are free to decidewhether or not to adopt laws to regulate and limit the exports of arms,
dual-use goods and technologies for national security purposes and/or foreign policy
objectives. However, at the same time, as participants of the international system,
most states are bound by International Treaties and/or the United Nation Security
Council Resolutions which regulate arms Export or even impose arms embargoes on
some States. For example, the ATT andUnited Nations Security Council Resolutions
1540 and 2420.9
Additionally, there are severalMultilateral Export Control Regimes (MECR) such
as theWassenaarArrangement (WA), and theAustraliaGroup.Although not binding,
theseMECRs promote transparency and greater responsibility in the transfer of arms,
dual-use goods and technology among its members.10 The WA as one of the most
influential regimes, produced two Control Lists: (1) the Munitions List and (2) the
List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, to prevent unauthorized exports and re-
exports of those items and technologies.11 All NATOMember States, except Iceland,
Montenegro, Albania and North Macedonia, are members of the WA and agreed to
commit themselves to the two Controlled Lists.
On the regional level, the European Union (EU) has its own laws and regulations
on arms export controls, although harmonized with international treaties, MECR and
theUNResolutions. TheDual-UseRegulation 428/2009,Annex I and IV (compatible
with the WA) are directly applicable to all EU Member States. While allowing the
Member States to export and re-export freely between them, the regulation imposes
controls such as licensing for exports and re-exports to third parties outside the
EU. Licensing and the enforcement of the regulation is delegated to each Member
State to implement. Based on its shared competence on the matters of the Union’s
Common Security and Foreign Policy, the EU also introduces a Common Military
List (again compatible with theWA) and several directives to harmonize the national
arms export control regimes of its Member States.12 Additionally, the EU has its
own sanction regime alongside the United Nations and the US. The complexity of
the EU’s institutional framework and its related competencies to regulate or partially
regulate export controls adds up to the already highly complex web of arms export
control regimes.
9 Aubin and Idiart 2016, p. 24.
10 Aubin and Idiart 2016, p. 28.
11 Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat 2020.
12 Aubin and Idiart 2016, p. 124.
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As outlined above, it is very challenging for the Member States to understand
and interpret the vague provisions of these layered and complex treaties, regulations,
agreements and arrangements on arms export controls on their own, and to identify
and implement those provisions properly into their national laws and apply uniformly
among them. As argued by Tukamuhabwa,13 knowledge of the law improves compli-
ance while a lack of familiarity with the rules results in poor compliance levels. Yet,
rules must also be clear. Lack of clarity of rules equally increases the possibility for
unintentional and deliberate non-compliance.14
Based on this, we conclude that NATO Member States’ poor knowledge and
understanding of arms export controls due to the complexity and fragmentation of
the laws and regulations, and the discrepancy in the implementation and enforcement,
highly contribute to the deviant, non-compliant behaviour of the Member States.
10.3.2 Meso-level: No Institutionalised Compliance Culture
Within the NATO
As mentioned earlier, the Alliance declares to remain committed to arms controls,
disarmament and non-proliferation, and to pursue an active policy in harmonising
defence and arms control policies and objectives within NATO. Yet, in practice,
NATO’s effort on arms control and non-proliferation remains limited to a general
political declaration of its adherence to the International Treaties such as the ATT
and a couple of small projects on disarmament of Small Arms and Light Weapons
(SAWL) in the Balkans conducted under the supervision of the NSPA.15
Pursuing an active policy on arms controls and non-proliferationwould require the
highest level of the organisation, such as the NAC, to come up with an official state-
ment and a clear working program tasking the NATO’s organisations and agencies
such as the NSPA as the primary enabler, support and service provider, to implement
arms controls in practice within in the context of the NATO Partnership Programs.
When top management initiates and supports compliance, it would spread in the
entire organisation. The main goal is to have a NATO organisation with a culture
of compliance that will motivate all stakeholders to comply with the rules. Studies
have proven that culture plays a central role in the compliance process and associated
outcomes if the culture is characterised by specific values such as openness, trust
and honesty.16 Moral obligation and social influence affect compliance. However,
the NSPA’s current approach to the implementation of the arms export controls is
dismissive, declaring that each Member State is responsible and accountable for its
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Even the standardization agreement (STANAG) 2034 on Standard Procedures
For Mutual Logistic Assistance does not include any provisions or moral obligation
referring to the arms export controls or any procedures or checks to act in compliance
with arms export controls, e.g. embedded in the ATT. Furthermore, the organisation
is not clear or transparent about its own procurement processes. The NSPA has more
than 60.000 companies and partners registered in its source file, more than 10.000
of them already do business within the context of the NLSE Program.17 Yet, no
NSPA procedures or processes, internal or external are in place to make sure that
these registered companies are checked and vetted against the arms export control
regimes and/or sanctions and/or doing business in compliance with arms export
control regimes.
Violations have consequences such as blacklisting, banning from the programs,
blocking of further cooperation involvingUS technology and/or severe fines.Because
of the ambiguous approach of the NATO to arms export controls and the Member
States’ reluctance towards arms export controls, the US pursues a very stringent
export control policy concerning the NATO Partnership Programs. Each Member
State is held responsible to request licenses or third-party approvals for every intended
re-export or transfer of arms, dual-use goods or technologies. Member States such as
the EUMS, which are highly dependent on US arms and technology, may encounter
US restrictions when taking part in the NATO Partnership Programs, such as the
NLSE.
We conclude that, as long as the NATO will not genuinely commit to the imple-
mentation of arms export controls at the highest level such as the NAC, and as long
as the NSPA does not take the stage as an organisation imposing a culture of compli-
ance, Member States will continue their deviant behaviour, hence noncompliance,
or Member States will eventually abandon the NATO Programs because of the high
pressure imposed by the US and its stringent export control policy.
10.3.3 Micro-level: Operational Readiness Versus
Compliance
According to Tukamuhabwa,18 cognitive dissonance is the feeling of uncomfortable
tension that comes from holding two conflicting thoughts in the mind at the same
time. When persons are forced to do something they do not want to do, dissonance
is created between their cognition and their behaviour.
The material logistics personnel of the EUMS are under constant pressure from
their counterparts to act as a reliable and faithful partner in the achievement of the
common goal to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture and form their
own organisation to make sure that the readiness of the weapon system is achieved
as soon as possible. At the same time, the personnel is very aware of the applicable
17 NATO 2020e.
18 Tukamuhabwa 2012.
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arms export control laws and regulations and procedures that must be followed to
get approval from the AECCO. Yet, combined, the external pressure and internal
pressure incentivize the personnel to circumvent the export controls by not registering
the items in the database and denying the AECCO. Moreover, there is no monitoring
system in place to bring violations to the AECCO’s attention.
In sum, high psychological pressure, externally and internally induced on the
material logistic personnel of the EUMS to act as a faithful ally in pursuit of the
common purpose, pushes the personnel over the edge to circumvent the arms export
controls, and commit violations. The absence of a monitoring system or a whistle
blow line makes it possible to commit violations without any consequences.
10.4 Response
In this section, we propose effective responses to the identified root causes of the
non-compliant behaviour concerning the arms export controls at the organisational
level in the context of NATO Partnership Programs. Our target for intervention is the
NSPA. The responses are a mix of hard controls and soft controls with short- and
long-term effects.
10.4.1 Leadership Commitment to the Implementation
of the Arms Export Controls
As discussed in the previous sections, NATO declares to be committed to an active
policy in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation within NATO and refers
to several international treaties and agreements on arms controls. However, although
made at the NAC level, this declaration is more of a general political statement than a
true commitment to the implementation of arms controls, hence arms export controls.
The NAC’s genuine commitment to arms control should firstly be demonstrated by
a strong and clear institutional support to promote a culture of compliance,19 and
secondly by making available adequate resources to the NATO Agency delegated
with sufficient authority and autonomy to deploy policies and procedures on arms
export controls and to fully integrate into the day-to-day operations of the NATO.
The NSPA as the primary enabler of the NATO and support and service provider
of the NATO Member States should therefore be the appointed Agency with the
delegated powers to effectively implement arms export controls. Additionally, the
Agency possesses the necessary experience, knowledge and expertise and is already
tasked with overseeing arms control and disarmament projects within the NATO.
19 Tukamuhabwa 2012.
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10.4.2 The NSPA as the Leading NATO Agency to Create
a Culture of Compliance
According to Tukamuhabwa,20 an organisation with a genuine commitment to
compliance is evidenced by top leaderships’ dedication to ethical behaviour. Ethical
leadership promotes ethical conduct at various levels, not only directly influ-
ences immediate followers but also indirectly influences the ethical cognitions and
behaviours of the followers at the lower levels by replication of ethical behaviours of
the leaders and embedding of shared understanding that represents ethical culture.21
The NSPA’s mission statement, supported by the NAC, should promote the values
the Alliance stands for by aligning itself with the commitment to the arms controls
in the light of the collective security. An example of such a statement could be as
follows:As the primary enabler, the NSPA provides support and services to the NATO
Nations in the light of strengthening deterrence and defence posture of the Alliance
in order to be able to counter current and future threats, meanwhile being committed
to the arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.
To create a culture of compliancewithin theNATO and among theMember States,
it is imperative for the NAC and the NSPA to act as ethical leaders and promote:
(1) clarity (e.g., adopt a normative framework such as a Code of Conduct which
makes clear what is expected concerning arms export controls); (2) transparency
(e.g., be transparent about acquisition processes and the suppliers by publishing its
vetting and decision-making procedures; publish annual reports on arms exports per
member state and commercial parties involved; encourageMember States to provide
information, data and records of their annual transactions); (3) supportability (e.g.,
use social influence on compliance, and build social consensus among the community
to be compliant; skilled personnel to assist the Member States to implement arms
export controls and mediate between them where necessary); (4) discussability (e.g.,
create a forum to discuss openly the issues encountered with the complexity of
the arms export controls); (5) accountability and sanctionability (e.g., implement a
reward and punishment system to encourage compliant behaviour and discourage
dismissive, deviant behaviour among the Member States).22
10.4.3 Common Agreement on the Basic Rules of Arms
Export Controls
The fragmentation and the complexity of the arms export control laws and regulation
are identified as root causes for deviant behaviour and discussed in the Analysis
Phase. TheNSPAshould take the lead to reach a commonagreement on the basic arms
20 Tukamuhabwa 2012.
21 Schaubroeck et al. 2012.
22 Bogers 2018, p. 48.
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export control rules to be applied among the Member States within the framework
of NATO Partnership Programs.23
10.4.4 Formalization of the Implementation of Arms Export
Control via STANAGs
Formalization of the commonly agreed arms export control rules should be incor-
porated in NATO STANAGs, specifically STANAG 2034 on Standard Procedures
For Mutual Logistic Assistance, in order to be able to hold all Participating Nations
formally accountable and responsible in case of non-compliance. As Tukamuhabwa
states, sustained enforcement action instils a culture of compliance and has a direct
effect on compliant behaviour.24
10.4.5 Periodic Arms Export Controls Training to Member
States’ Personnel
The NSPA should provide training on arms export controls to the Member States
to increase awareness and to train Member States’ personnel on how to apply arms
export controls in their day-to-day practice without leading to any operational imped-
iment. Via training, it is important to remove the presumed contradiction between
operational readiness and compliance which eventually results in deviant behaviour.
Training could also be a vehicle to bring the personnel (e.g., material logistics) of the
Member States directly or indirectly involved in the Partnership Programs together to
discuss their personal experiences and the dilemmas they facewhen they are put under
pressure to prioritize operational readiness above arms export controls. Through this
training, the arms export control procedures and processes of the Member States can
be harmonized and aligned, which in the long term will have a positive effect on
compliance.
10.5 Assessment
We have used the POP-framework to identify and analyse the root causes of deviant
behaviour/non-compliance of theMember States with the arms export controls in the
context of the NATO Partnership Program. Based on our analysis, we have proposed
responses to target the root causes of deviant behaviour by Member States. Three
root causes have been identified: (1) fragmentation of the arms export control laws
23 Aubin and Idiart 2016, p. 10.
24 Tukamuhabwa 2012.
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and regulations; (2) a lack of leadership commitment and organisational culture
of compliance; and (3) a combination of external and internal pressures leads to
deviant behaviour by the individuals, such as the material logistics personnel of
EUMS, forced to prioritize operational readiness above its own arms export control
laws and regulations. We have formulated a response to effectively counter deviant
behaviour and prevent the reoccurrence of non-compliance with arms export controls
by implementing a mixture of soft and hard controls.
Yet our main focus has been the role of the NSPA, as the organisation appointed
and delegated by the NAC to create a culture of compliance within the NATO Part-
nership Program’s community based on ethical values and virtues. Because a shared
understanding of values means that members recognize a particular feeling, expe-
rience or activity as normal. In such cases, they are expected to be more cognizant
of ethical issues, to avoid unethical conduct and discourage unethical conduct in
others. Furthermore, social consensus is formed in such a way that the unit penalizes
unethical behaviour, rewards virtuous behaviour and maintains strong ethical norms.
However, strong and clear leadership commitment is required by theNAC towards
arms export controls, supported by adequate resources to effectuate a culture of
compliance. Meanwhile, a common agreement on the basic rules of arms export
control and its formalization through STANAGs will positively contribute to the
compliant behaviour and enable the NSPA and Member States to keep each other
accountable in case of a violation.
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Abstract The sovereignty of states is reflected in the notion of jurisdiction, empow-
ering them to enact and enforce laws and regulations, and to adjudicate disputes
in court. The jurisdiction of states and the exercise thereof is primarily territorial,
limiting the exercise of state authority to their respective national territories except in
specific situations. However, in an increasingly globalized and interconnected world,
it would be hard to maintain that a state should be denied the right to exercise its
sovereign powers beyond national borders when there are reasonable grounds for
doing so. Consequently, the exercise of extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction has
become more accepted, although it is limited to particular situations and circum-
stances. These have to do with the exercise of jurisdiction over nationals, vessels and
aircraft registered in or pertaining to the legislating state, as well as certain activities
aimed at undermining the state’s security or solvency or which constitute crimes
under international law. However, in principle it is not allowed to regulate activities
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of foreign nationals or entities operating wholly outside the legislating state’s terri-
tory. One area where this has become increasingly prevalent is through the exercise
of export controls over foreign nationals and legal persons. The United States (US)
has long been engaged in the exercise of this type of extraterritorial jurisdiction and
is, without doubt, the state that is most proactive in doing so. This chapter considers
US extraterritorial claims with respect to its export control and sanctions legislation
and explores the limits of this practice under public international law.
Keywords International law · export control · sovereignty · extraterritorial
jurisdiction · sanctions · principles of jurisdiction · European Union · United
States · Blocking Regulation
11.1 Introduction
On1 January 2021, theUSSenate, over President Trump’s veto, passed the Protecting
Europe’s Energy Security Clarification Act (PEESCA) as part of the William M.
(Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2021.1
PEESCA adds additional sanctions on Russian energy export pipeline projects, in
particular, the Nord Stream 2 Project and the TurkStream Project.2 US sanctions had
already targeted both projects under the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and
Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA)3 and the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act
of 2019 (PEESA).4 The latter directs the US President to impose sanctions5 on any
foreign person that knowingly provides pipe-laying vessels for the construction of
Russian underwater pipelines, without coordination with allies of the US.6 The mere
threat of US sanctions led the Dutch-Swiss offshore company Allseas to suspend all
its activities related to the Nord Stream 2 project almost overnight,7 not much later
followed by Norway’s quality assurance firm DNV GL.8 The examples show that
1 President Trump vetoed the bill on 23 December 2020. The House of Representative voted to
override the veto on 28 December 2020, followed by the Senate on 1 January 2021.
2 TheNord Stream 2 Project is the nearly completed underwater natural gas pipeline betweenRussia
and Germany. The TurkStream Project consists of two underwater pipelines between Russia and
Turkey, one of which is already completed while the other is still under construction.
3 Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of August 2, 2017, Pub. L. 115-44,
title II, 131 Stat. 898 (22 U.S.C. 9501 et seq.); part of Countering America’s Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA) of August 2, 2017, Pub. L. 115-44, 131 Stat. 886 (22 U.S.C. 9401).
4 Pub. L. 116-92. part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2020.
5 Travel bans and blocking of assets.
6 CRIEEA stipulates that the President may impose sanctions “in coordination with allies of the
US”, thus somewhatmitigating the extraterritorial impact of the statute (Section 232(a)). This phrase
does not return in other secondary sanctions legislation.
7 https://allseas.com/news/allseas-suspends-nord-stream-2-pipelay-activities/. Accessed 20
February 2021.
8 Norway’s DNV GL suspends Nord Stream 2 work over U.S. sanctions fear | Article [AMP] |
Reuters Accessed 20 February 2021.
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even the possibility of being the target of foreign sanction may deter a company from
engaging in otherwise legitimate business.9
This type of sanctions is referred to as extraterritorial or secondary sanctions, as
they are not aimed at the target state (as primary sanctions are) but instead subject
foreign nationals and business entities to US legislative actions without a clear nexus
with the US affecting the relations between third states and the target state. The US
government has enacted secondary sanctions legislation repeatedly over the past few
decades. The extraterritorial reach of US law is not restricted to sanctions, however.10
US extraterritorial practice goes back to the 1940swhenUS courts exercised jurisdic-
tion over foreign persons in antitrust cases. Also, legislation regulating the controls
on the re-export of US origin military and dual-use goods and technology, introduced
in the same period, included extraterritorial elements that are still part of US export
control law. However, secondary sanctions go a good deal further than antitrust and
export control legislation in that the actions of the foreign nationals or entities need
not have any link with the US territory or legal order as is normally the case when
exercising jurisdiction over foreign actions which originate outside a state’s territory
but are aimed at or have a significant effect on the legislating state’s territory or legal
order.
Although the extraterritorial application of domestic law has become an accepted
practice in our increasingly interconnected and complex contemporary society, it is
still a long-established principle of public international law that the jurisdiction of
a state is primarily territorial in nature. Indeed, the unlimited exercise of a state’s
national jurisdiction beyond its national borders except where this is clearly accepted
under international law may come into conflict with the sovereign equality of states,
creating international tension and burdening foreign persons and business with regu-
lations and penalties for engaging in activities which are often perfectly legal under
the laws of their own state. Consequently, the extraterritorial US claims have been a
recurring source of disputes between the US and its trading partners, notably the EU.
As the French minister of Economy and Finance stated, “The European Union must
be free to trade legitimately with the entities and countries it wishes, without extrater-
ritorial provisions impeding its economic operators. It is a question of European
sovereignty.”11
The present chapter focuses on the extraterritorial aspects of US export control
and sanctions legislation and explores the limits under customary international law of
jurisdiction to lawfully impose obligations on foreign natural persons or corporations
outside the US. By way of introduction, the chapter starts with an analysis of the
9 Sometimes referred to as the chilling effect of secondary sanctions; Gordon 2016.
10 Other fields of law not discussed in this chapter: that extraterritorial rules include securities
law and foreign corrupt practices, in particular the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub.
L. 95-213, title I, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified in: 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.).
11 “L’Union Européenne doit pouvoir être libre de commercer légitimement avec les entités et
avec les pays qu’elle souhaite, sans que des dispositions extraterritoriales ne viennent entraver ses
opérateurs économiques. C’est une question de souveraineté européenne”, cited in: Court of Appeal
of Paris, International Commercial Chamber, 3 June 2020, Judgement in SA T v Société N, No. RG
19/07261—No. Portalis 35L7-V-B7D-B7VDG, Section 66.
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concept of jurisdiction as a corollary of the principle of State sovereignty. Also, it
establishes to what extent states are allowed under international law to exert their
jurisdictional powers beyond national borders. Next, extraterritorial aspects of US
legislation on the control of the export of goods and services as well as on sanctions
are analyzed. As these claims have sparked a number of disputes with other states
and especially the EU over the past few decades, the international responses to
US legislation with an extraterritorial effect are examined next. Building on the
reasons for these responses and the arguments brought forward the legitimacy of
extraterritorial US legislation is analyzed in more depth. Finally, this chapter offers
a synthesis and conclusion.
11.2 Jurisdiction of a State
Sovereignty is the supreme authority of states which entails that states are equal and
independent.12 From a legal point of view, this implies that there is no hierarchical
order between them and, therefore, no state can exercise power over another state.
Stemming from the notion of sovereignty are the principles of territorial integrity
and non-intervention, obliging states to refrain from any action that breaches the
sovereignty of another state, including acts that interfere with the internal affairs or
international relations of that state.
Within a state, the principle of sovereignty reflects the unique power and authority
to make laws, subject people and property to legal processes based on these laws
and to compel compliance with the rules where necessary.13 These three powers
are referred to as the legislative, enforcement, and adjudicative jurisdiction of a
state, which, together with the exercise thereof, are an essential characteristic of a
state. Legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction is “the authority of a state to make law
applicable to persons, property, or conduct” whether by legislation, by executive
act, or by determination of a court.14 Enforcement or executive jurisdiction allows
a state “to exercise its power to compel compliance with the law”.15 Adjudicative
or judicial jurisdiction expresses the authority to, “apply law to persons or things,
in particular through the processes of its courts or administrative tribunal”.16 In the
12 Permanent Court of Arbitration, 4 April 1928, The Island of Palmas case (or Miangas), United
States v the Netherlands, Award of the Tribunal, p. 8. www.pca-cpa.org. Accessed 20 February
2021.
13 Voetelink 2015, p. 116.
14 Restatement of the law fourth 2018, Section 401(a) and Introductory Note. ‘Determination of a
court’ is in particular relevant in common law systems where courts can make generally applicable
common law; cf. Restatement of the law fourth 2018, Part IV Introductory Note.
15 Ibid., Section 401(c).
16 Ibid., Section 401(b).
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literature, the latter type of jurisdiction is not always recognized as a separate form
of jurisdiction.17
With a few exceptions, a state has full legislative, enforcement, and adjudicative
jurisdiction within its territorial borders.18 The exercise of jurisdiction can be limited
by international agreement to which the state concerned is a party or by a rule of
customary international law. An example is the concept of immunity which prohibits
a state from exercising its adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction over natural and
legal persons, or their goods, enjoying immunity in that State.
11.2.1 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The other side of the jurisdictional coin is that the extraterritorial reach of a state’s
jurisdiction is regulated and to a considerable extent restrictedunder international law.
Any attempt by a state to exercise its legal authority beyond national borders finds its
limits in “the sovereign territorial rights of other states”19 as, in principle, jurisdiction
and the exercise thereof is territorial in nature.20 However, strict adherence to the terri-
toriality rule can potentially hamper international relations as the interdependency
of economies has become enormous today. Moreover, ongoing globalization entails
that the scope of national interests transcends national borders and can include inter-
national elements. Therefore, it would be impossible to completely separate national
jurisdictions from one another.
A distinction must be made between the various forms of jurisdiction. As the
extraterritorial application of a state’s enforcement jurisdiction (including adjudica-
tory jurisdiction) can have a significant impact on another state’s sovereign rights, it
is generally territorial. Without the consent of the other state, a state cannot exercise
its enforcement jurisdiction in the other state’s territory.21 With respect to legislative
jurisdiction, states are allowed to extend the scope of their laws to extraterritorial
activities with the other state’s “consent, invitation or acquiescence” or under a
permissive rule of international law as set out in more detail in the next sections.22
17 Mann 1964. Bianchi, for example, regards adjudicative jurisdiction as an element of the enforce-
ment jurisdiction, Bianchi 1992, pp. 372 and 373. Crawford views adjudicative jurisdiction as the
actualization of legislation while the carrying out of a judgement or sentence is an expression of
enforcement; Crawford 2019, p. 441, fn. 4. As adjudicative jurisdiction does not play a promi-
nent role in the extraterritorial application of export control law, the present chapter will focus on
legislative and enforcement jurisdiction.
18 US Supreme Court, Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
19 ECHR, 12 December 2001, Banković and others v. Belgium and 16 others, App no 52207/99,
Section 59.
20 PCIJ 7 September 1927, The case of the S.S. Lotus, Series A. No. 10, pp. 18–19.
21 Restatement of the law fourth 2018 Part IV Introductory Note and Section 432.
22 Banković and others v. Belgium and 16 others, App no 52207/99, Section 60.
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11.2.2 Principles of Jurisdiction
Under customary international law, a state is allowed to exercise legislative jurisdic-
tion extraterritorially when a genuine connection exists between the state seeking to
regulate and the persons, property, or conduct being regulated.23 That connection is
reflected in a number of recognized grounds or principles of jurisdiction that provide
for exceptions to the general rule that jurisdiction is territorial in character. These
include the nationality principle allowing states to regulate the actions of persons
and entities possessing its nationality, including vessels and aircraft registered in
that state. Another recognized basis for exercising extraterritorial legislative juris-
diction is the right to criminalize actions aimed at undermining state security or the
integrity of its currency and official documents. Finally, certain acts have become
recognized as crimes under international law giving all states a right to criminalize
them under its national law. The next sub-sections discuss these principles as well
as the territoriality principle in more detail. Beyond these recognized situations the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is widely considered to be impermissible in
the absence of a territorial connection.
11.2.2.1 Territoriality
As state sovereignty and territory are inextricably linked, the principle of territori-
ality is the central element in the contemporary jurisdictional framework.24 It reflects
first and foremost the right of a state to enact laws applicable within its territory.25
However, the principle is also relevant to cross-border events that partially take place
outside the legislating state’s border. Under the generally accepted principle of objec-
tive territoriality, the state where an essential element of an action that commenced
abroad was completed, can assert its legislative jurisdiction over the event.26 The
classic example is the firing of a firearm in the territory of one state killing a person
on the other side of the border.
Derived from this notion of objective territoriality, is the so-called ‘effects
doctrine’, developed by US courts in antitrust cases.27 This doctrine allows the
assertion of legislative jurisdiction over acts committed abroad by foreign persons
or companies that are in accordance with foreign laws but produce a substantial and
23 Restatement of the law fourth 2018, Section 407, comment.
24 Ryngaert 2015, p. 36.
25 AState’s territory encompasses its land territory, internalwaters, the territorial sea and the airspace
over these areas; see Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation; Chicago,
7 December 1944 (Vol. 15 UNTS 1948, No. 102) and Articles 2(2) and (3) of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea; Montego-Bay, 10 December 1982 (Vol. 1833 UNTS 1994, No.
31363).
26 Crawford 2019, p. 442.
27 The ‘effects doctrine’ has been accepted as early as 1945 in the Alcoa case: United States v.
Aluminum Corp. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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intended economic effect on the regulating State’s commerce. Today, the ‘effects
doctrine’ remains in respects controversial28 although it appears to have gained
considerablymore acceptance thanwhen it was first asserted, in particular in antitrust
law.29
11.2.2.2 Nationality
Historically, jurisdiction was primarily based on personality rather than territori-
ality.30 Today, the nationality principle continues to play an important role in the juris-
dictional framework. Generally, a distinction is made between the nationality prin-
ciple (or active personality principle) and passive personality principle. The former
is linked with the nationality of the person or entity performing an act abroad that
need not have any direct relation with the territory of the legislating state. According
to the principle, a state can assert legislative jurisdiction over its nationals outside
its territory.31 An example is Article 18(c) of the EU sanctions regulation on cyber-
attacks that states that the Regulation shall apply “to any natural person inside or
outside the territory of the Union who is a national of a Member State”.32
The nationality principle is also applicable to the international activities of compa-
nies. Article 18(d) of the same EU Regulation holds that the Regulation also applies,
“to any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the territory of the Union,
which is incorporated or constituted under the law of a Member State”. This partic-
ular provision makes clear that the nationality of a corporation for application of the
Regulation depends on the state where it was established.
Application of the active personality principle is well-accepted as opposed to
the application of the passive nationality principle that focuses on the nationality
of the victim of an act performed abroad. Under this principle, a state can apply
its legislative jurisdiction to certain acts performed outside its territory harming its
nationals. Although the passive personality principle is still controversial, its use
has become more accepted with respect to certain crimes, especially terrorist-related
crimes.33 For instance,Article 6(2)(a) of the Terrorist BombingsConvention instructs
28 Crawford 2019, p. 447.
29 Cohen-Tanugi 2015, p. 11. See for instance the Gencor case in which the Court of First Instance
of the EU holds that application of a particular EURegulation “is justified under public international
lawwhen it is foreseeable that a proposed concentrationwill have an immediate and substantial effect
in the Community”. ECJ 25 May 1999, Gencor Ltd v Commission of the European Communities,
Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber, extended composition); European Court
Reports 1999 II-00753, Case T-102/96, ECLI:EU:T:1999:65, at paras 89–92).
30 Ryngaert 2015, p. 49ff.
31 Ryngaert 2015, p. 104.
32 Council Regulation (EU) 2019/796 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against
cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States (OJ L 129 I, 17/5/2019, p. 1/12).
33 Crawford 2019, p. 445.
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state parties to establish jurisdiction over acts set forth in the Convention when “the
offence is committed against a national of the State.34
11.2.2.3 Protective and Universality Principles
The protective principle, also referred to as the security principle,35 is an old andwell-
accepted foundation for legislation with extraterritorial effect.36 It is not based on
the status of the person over whom a state asserts jurisdiction, but instead on conduct
in another state irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator jeopardizing37 the
national security or solvency of the legislating state. The notion of national security
is defined rather narrowly. Consequently, a state can only assert legislative jurisdic-
tion based on this principle when key state interests are at stake. Examples include
violence aimed at overthrowing its government or against key state officials and activ-
ities, espionage or the counterfeiting of its currency or national documents. As such
an act does not necessarily affect the interests of the State where the act was initiated
and, therefore, may not be subject to that state’s laws, extraterritorial application of
the legislative state’s laws seems warranted.38
Universal jurisdiction is concerned with legislation criminalizing recognized
crimes under international law, such as piracy, slavery, war crimes, genocide, crimes
against humanity, and certain acts of terrorism.The jurisdictional principles discussed
above either have a direct or an indirect link between an act and the state asserting
jurisdiction. This is not necessarily the case with the principle of universality. This
principle is based on the idea that the nature of the crimes, or of the circumstances
under which they take place, are deemed to be offensive to the global community at
large warranting action by any state, although in practice, most states require some
link with the act or actor. The classical example of an act that allows the assertion
of universal jurisdiction is piracy on the high seas. Following World War II, states
have concluded various international agreements obliging all states parties to extend
their jurisdiction over the international crimes included in these agreements, such as
genocide and grave violations of the laws of war.39
34 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, New York, 15 December
1997 (Vol. 2149 UNTS 2003, No. 37517), entered into force 23 May 2001.
35 Crawford 2019, p. 446.
36 Ryngaert 2015, p. 114.
37 No actual harm needs to have resulted from the act covered by the extraterritorial legislation;
Ryngaert 2015, p. 114.
38 Ryngaert 2015, p. 114.
39 Articles 49 and 50 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of theWounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field; Geneva, 12 August 1949 (Vol. 970 UNTS 1950, No. 970). Similar
provisions are included in the other three Geneva Conventions and the Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I); Bern, 12 December 1977 (Vol. 1125 UNTS 1979, No. 17512) and
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime and Genocide; 9 December 1948 (Vol.
78 UNTS 1951, No. 1021).
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Later, other crimes were made subject to universal jurisdiction as well, such as
attacks on civil airliners, aerial hijacking and attacks on international officials. These
acts are subject to multiple bases of jurisdiction and states have agreed either to
prosecute or extradite suspects of such offences. As these acts are not of a universal
character in the traditional sense, jurisdiction over the acts is referred to as quasi-
universal jurisdiction.
11.3 United States Export Control Legislation
TheUShas long applied its laws extraterritorially, for example, in the field of antitrust
law and securities law. The extraterritorial reach of US law is also felt in the field
of export control law (see Chap. 5). Starting in the 1940s, the US has enacted laws
controlling the export of commodities and services, partly having an extraterritorial
effect in order to prevent goods from reaching destinations denied by US law. These
provisions have been amended and extended over time and are still in force today,
regularly leading to discussions about the legality of their reach. Evenmore questions
were raised when the US included in its sanctions programs so-called secondary
sanctions that as well as impacting the targeted foreign state or non-state entity, also
subjects foreign nationals and business entities to US legislative actions without a
clear nexus with the US affecting the relations between third states and the target
state.
Extraterritorial legislation would be unwarranted when allied trading partners
share exactly the same concerns and interests and are prepared to fully align domestic
legislation in the field of export control and sanctions. However, even in the ColdWar
period, it proved to be impossible to fully align US security and foreign policy goals
with the interests and economic defense policies of other Western states. Therefore,
the US may have felt extraterritorial legislation to be a more viable option to manage
national export concerns.40 This section looks into these specific US rules, which
can be roughly divided into four interconnected strands of legislation41 of which the
first three will be discussed below.
The first controls the export, re-export, and in-country transfer of most US
origin commercial, dual-use, and less-sensitive military goods and technology. The
second strand is concerned with the export, re-export, and retransfer of, as well as
brokering in, military goods, services, and technology.42 The third strand encom-
passes economic sanctions. Finally, the export of nuclear material, equipment and
technology is subject to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA).43 Because of its
40 Schaap and Ryngaert 2015, p. 10.
41 Restatement of the law fourth 2018, Section 812, Reporters’ Notes 2 and 4.
42 In terms of the Arms Export Control Act and implementing regulations: defense articles (items,
software and technical data) and defense services.
43 Formerly the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et
seq.).
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limited extraterritorial reach, this specific strand of legislation is not addressed in
this chapter.
11.3.1 Dual-Use Export Controls
Traditionally, the US had put controls on exports in times of armed conflict or in
special emergency situations only.44 Consequently, at the onset of World War II,
before it had actually entered the war, the US had enacted legislation to authorize
the control of exports of munitions and other goods essential to the national defense
effort,45 extending the export controls to all commodities in 1942.46 After the war
had come to an end, the US continued to control these exports.47 Today the Export
Controls Act of 201848 (ECA) is the statutory authority for these controls providing
the President with the authority to implement the export control on commercial, dual-
use goods, and less-sensitive military goods and technology. The ECA is adminis-
tered by the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and
implemented by the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which includes the
Commerce Control List (CCL) listing all EAR-controlled items (Part 774).49
From the start, US export controls included extraterritorial elements. For example,
the Export Control Act of 1949 and its implementing regulations were in part appli-
cable “to “any person” within or without the United States”.50 In addition, the trans-
shipment of US exports from one country to another as well as the release of technical
data of US origin by persons and companies situated abroad were restricted by the
Act.51 These provisions were no dead letters and actually led to administrative action
taken against foreign persons and companies for acts committed outside the US.52
44 Joint Resolution of April 22, 1898, No. 25 (30 Stat. 739) authorizing the President to “to prohibit
the export of coal or other material used in war from any seaport of the United States until otherwise
ordered by the President or by Congress”; enacted by Congress three days prior to the declaration
of war against Spain. Berman and Garson 1967, p. 791.
45 Act to Expedite the Strengthening of theNational Defense, Act of July 2, 1940, ch. 508, Section 6,
54 Stat. 714. Silverstone 1959, p. 331.
46 Act of June 30, 1942, ch. 461, 56 Stat. 463. As the statutes were intended to be temporary, they
had to be extended every year.
47 Initially, the controls were based on the Export Control Act of 1949. This statute was replaced by
the Export AdministrationAct of 1969, which, in turn, was superseded by the Export Administration
Act of 1979.
48 Export Controls Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-232, div. A, title XVII, subtitle B, part I (Sec. 1751–
1768), 132 Stat. 2209 (50 U.S.C. 4811 et seq.). Part of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018,
Pub. L. 115-232, div. A, title XVII, subtitle B (Sec. 1741–1781), Aug. 13, 2018, 132 Stat. 2208 (50
U.S.C. 4801 et seq.)
49 15 C.F.R Section 730 et seq.
50 Berman and Garson 1967, p. 866.
51 Berman and Garson 1967, p. 867.
52 Although criminal proceedings under export control legislation are possible as well, Berham
and Garson note that up until 1967 no foreign nationals were held criminally liable for a violation
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An example is the 1953 case against a Dutch trade company and its partners. They
were charged with having violated the Export Control Act of 1949 by unlawfully
diverting and transhipping antibiotics and insecticides.53 As a result, the US authori-
ties revoked their licenses and denied them further trade activities with the US (denial
of export privileges).
Additional ruleswith extraterritorial effectwere introduced as export control legis-
lation developed. A far-reaching step was made in 1982, after Polish military leaders
had declared martial law on 12 December 1981 and suspended the operations of the
free labor union ‘Solidarity’. In response, theUSunilaterally imposed a stringof sanc-
tions onPoland aswell as theSovietUnion for its support of the repression inPoland54
including the June 1982 sanctions targeting the construction of the Soviet Union’s
natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe (the Soviet Pipeline Regula-
tions).55 The latter sanctions had an unprecedented extraterritorial reach. Foreign
subsidiaries of US firms were restricted from exporting wholly foreign-origin equip-
ment and technology. Furthermore, foreign companies with no US connection were
prohibited from exporting foreign-made products that were manufactured with tech-
nology acquired through licensing agreements with US companies, whether or not
the technology had been subject to US controls at the time of export.56
When European companies pressed by their governments continued to export
controlled pipeline equipment, honoring existing contracts, the US Department of
Commerce issued temporary denial orders suspending the privileges of the compa-
nies involved to conduct business with the US in the future.57 Industry was hit
hard. Consequently, the European Community, member States, and Japan vehe-
mently opposed the sanctions (see Sect. 11.4.1). Five months later, on 13 November
1982, international protest and subsequent negotiations led to the lifting of all export
measures and the termination of administrative and court proceedings.58
The ECA of 2018, currently in force, does not specify its jurisdictional reach.
There is no doubt though that certain parts of the Act and the EAR apply extrater-
ritorially. Section 4812(a)(1) ECA authorizes the President to control “the export,
committed abroad which is entirely legal in the place where it is committed; Berman and Garson
1967, p. 866.
53 6 November 1953, Order of the Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Case No.
166, Johannes M.A. Klaasen; 18 Fed. Reg. 7179 (November 11, 1953). Silverstone 1959, p. 339.
54 E.g. Moyer and Mabry 1983, p. 60ff. These measures were implemented in regulations issued
pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1978 (47 Fed. Reg. 141, 144 (1982)).
55 The Soviet Pipeline Regulations amending the Export Administration Regulations, 47 Fed Reg
27250; Moyer and Mabry 1983, p. 69ff.
56 Moyer and Mabry 1983, p. 70.
57 Abbot 1984, p. 89. International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, Orders to U.S.
Foreign Subsidiaries in France, Italy, United Kingdom Concerning the Denial of Export Privileges
for Soviet Gas Pipeline Equipment,” International Legal Materials 21, no. 5 (September 1982):
1098–1105.
58 30 December 1982, Moyer and Mabry 1983, pp. 83–84.
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re-export,59 and in-country transfer of items subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States,whether byUnited States persons or by foreign persons”.As the term re-export
includes activities abroad, this provisionmakes clear that export controls can apply to
foreign nationals outsideUS territory.Moreover, the phrase ‘items subject to the juris-
diction of the US’ further extends the reach of the provision as US origin controlled
commodities, technology, and services retain US nationality. Section 734.3(a) EAR
lists the items that are subject to the EAR, which include, inter alia, “(2) All US
origin60 items wherever located; (3) Foreign-made commodities that incorporate
controlled US-origin commodities, foreign-made commodities that are ‘bundled’
with controlled US-origin software, foreign-made software that is commingled with
controlledUS-origin software, and foreign-made technology that is commingledwith
controlled US-origin technology;61 … (4) Certain foreign-made direct products of
US origin technology or software, as described in Section 736.2(b)(3) of the EAR”.
In other words, “US export controls ‘follow the part’”, meaning that a foreign
national handling US origin EAR controlled goods abroad is subject to US export
control legislation.62
Consequently, foreign nationals involved in re-export activities are subject to the
EAR, in particular Section 736.2(b)which prohibits “the re-export of controlled items
to countries for which a license would be required or to countries which are subject a
general prohibition or embargo by the US”.63 Also, ECA and EARwill be applicable
to foreign-made commodities if it contains a de minimis level of commercial or
dual-use US origin components as set out in Section 734.4. EAR.
Provisions of ECA and EAR can be enforced. Section 4819 ECA makes it in
general unlawful for ‘a person’ to violate ECA and EAR while ‘no person’ may
engage in specific unlawful acts. Clearly, this provision does not exclude foreign
nationals abroad. Section 764.2 EAR on violations uses similar language. As in the
past, US authorities have enforced these rules against foreign persons. An example is
the renewal of an order temporarily denying export privileges of a number of foreign
companies64 in the matter that involved the reexport of US-origin aircraft and aircraft
parts.65
59 “The term “re-export” includes—(A) the shipment or transmission of the item from a foreign
country to another foreign country, including the sending or taking of the item from the foreign
country to the other foreign country, in any manner; and (B) the release or transfer of tech-
nology or source code relating to the item to a foreign person outside the United States” (50
USC Section 4801(9)).
60 US origin is not defined in ECA and EAR.
61 This subsection is subject to the de minimis level of U.S. content as set out in Section 734.4.
EAR.
62 Little et al. 2015, p. 1 and p. 4.
63 Little et al. 2015, p. 8.
64 The original denial order was signed in 2008 and was regularly renewed.
65 29 May 2020, Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Order Renewing Order
Temporarily Denying Export Privileges, 85 Fed. Reg. 34405 (June 4, 2020).
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11.3.2 Military Export Controls
The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA)66 governs the export of defense
articles and services. It is implemented by the International Traffic in Arms Regula-
tions (ITAR),67 which includes the United States Munitions List (USML) of ITAR-
controlled items, and is administered by the Department of State Directorate of
Defense Trade Controls (DDTC). The AECA also contains the statutory authority
for the ForeignMilitary Sales (FMS) program. This program enables eligible foreign
governments and international organizations to purchase defense articles and services
directly from theUSgovernment instead of from a private contractor (the latter proce-
dure is referred to as Direct Commercial Sales, DCS). FMS-sales are not subject to
the ITARbut controlled by the Security AssistanceManagementManual (SAMM).68
This manual is an internal Department of Defense instrument supplemented by
internal security assistance manuals of the various service branches covering details
unique to their organizations.
Although the AECA, like the ECA, does not specify its jurisdictional reach, some
of its provisions have a clear extraterritorial element. For instance, Section 2778(c)
AECA penalizes any person who violates certain provisions of the Act or the ITAR.
The term ‘any person’ allows prosecution of foreign nationals before US courts.
Furthermore, some parts of the ITAR are applicable to foreign persons or to both
US and foreign persons.69 An example is Section 123.9(a) ITAR that, inter alia,
deals with re-exports70 and retransfers.71 This provision does not refer to either a US
person or a foreign person. As re-exports and retransfers by definition can take place
abroad, the provision also affects foreign persons abroad.
ITAR includes various provisions on re-export that are applicable to foreign
persons abroad and affect their control over ITAR controlled goods.72 For instance,
Section 123.10(a) ITAR holds that in order to get a license for the export of specific
66 Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320 (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).
67 22 C.F.R Section 120–130.
68 The electronic version, ESAMM. https://www.samm.dsca.mil/listing/chapters. Accessed 20
February 2021.
69 22 C.F.R. Section 120.14 states: “If a provision in this subchapter does not refer exclusively to a
foreign person (Section 120.16) or U.S. person (Section 120.15), then it refers to both”.
70 22 C.F.R. Section 120.19 Re-export means: (1) An actual shipment or transmission of a defense
article from one foreign country to another foreign country, (2) Releasing or otherwise transferring
technical data to a foreign person who is a citizen or permanent resident of a country other than the
foreign country where the release or transfer takes place (a “deemed re-export”); or (3) Transferring
registration, control, or ownership of any aircraft, vessel, or satellite subject to the ITAR between
foreign persons. (b) Any release outside the United States of technical data to a foreign person is
deemed to be a re-export to all countries in which the foreign person has held or holds citizenship
or holds permanent residency.
71 22 C.F.R. Section 120.51 Retransfer means: (1) A change in end use or end user, or a temporary
transfer to a third party, of a defense article within the same foreign country; or (2) A release of
technical data to a foreign person who is a citizen or permanent resident of the country where the
release or transfer takes place.
72 Little et al. 2015, p. 6.
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defense articles73 a Non-transfer and use certificate (Form DSP-83) is required, to be
executed by the foreign consignee, foreign end-user, and the applicant. The certifi-
cate stipulates that “the foreign consignee and foreign end-user will not re-export,
resell or otherwise dispose of the significant military equipment enumerated in the
application outside the country named as the location of the foreign end-use or to
any other person unless authorized”. Moreover, the notion that US export control
legislation ‘follows the parts’ also applies to defense articles and services. Although
not specified in either AECA or ITAR, DDTC applies the so-called ‘see-through’
rule.74 This rule entails that if an ITAR controlled defense article is integrated into
a larger system or end-item, the controls do not disappear and continue to apply to
the defense article,75 even if it has become part of a foreign commercial system or
product.76 So, as an example, an aircraft or missile designed, developed, and built
outside the US containing one or more defense articles is not subject to ITAR itself,
but the ITAR controlled parts are. As a result, the US can block or delay the sale of
that foreign-built aircraft or missile.77 In a study on the impact of US export control
on the Joint Strike Fighter Project the reach of the ITAR was called “excessive” and
frustrating international business.78 Therefore, it may not come as a surprise that
foreign governments sometimes seek to purchase military equipment that does not
contain ITAR-control parts79 and that foreign producers of military equipment seek
to develop new products without US controlled parts;80 the ‘ITAR-free’ movement.81
Approval for the export of the defense services as mentioned in Section 120.9(a)
ITAR is subject to the conclusion of specific agreements, generally characterized as:
Manufacturing License Agreements, Technical Assistance Agreements, Distribution
73 I.e., “significant military equipment and classified articles, including classified technical data”.
74 Fergusson and Kerr 2020, p. 16. Some support for this rule can be found in AECA and ITAR,
Little et al. 2015, p. 9.
75 From 2013 on, some parts, including items like fasteners (e.g., screws, bolts, nuts) washers,
spacers, etc. are excluded from the rule when they are not ‘specially designed’; cf. Fergusson and
Kerr 2020, p. 16.
76 An example of the application of this rule can be found in the 2006 Consent Agree-
ment between DDTC and The Boeing Company, ‘Designation of Defense Articles’, p. 3
file:///G:/printen%20of%20overzetten/Boeing_ConsentAgreement_06.pdf. Accessed 20 February
2021.
77 In 2018 the U.S. initially blocked the sale of the French Scalp cruise missile
to Egypt. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/03/09/missile-sale-from-france-to-
egypt-depends-on-us-permission-dassault-head-says/ Accessed 20 February 2021.
78 Moore et al. 2011, pp. 35–36. One interviewee stated, ITAR is like “one drop of cyanide in a
bucket of water. Once you’ve put the smallest drop in, everything becomes contaminated”.
79 A tender for a new assault rifle for the German Bundeswehr included an ITAR-free exclu-
sion criterion. https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article213002794/Ruestungsindustrie-Europa-will-
sich-von-den-Vereinigten-Staaten-emanzipieren.html Accessed 20 February 2021.
80 The solar-powered Skydweller drone built by Italian Defense company Leonardo; https://www.
defensenews.com/unmanned/2019/11/12/leonardo-invests-in-fully-electric-skydweller-drone/.
81 The coming EAR-free era. WorldECR 11 March 2020. https://www.worldecr.com/archive/the-
coming-ear-free-era/ Accessed 20 February 2021. Also: Rüstungsindustrie: Europa will sich von
den Vereinigten Staaten emanzipieren—WELT Accessed 20 February 2021.
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Agreements, or Off-shore Procurement Agreements (Section 124.1(a) ITAR). By
signing the agreement, the contracting parties, including foreign licensees, agree to
comply with all applicable sections of the ITAR.
Like theECA, theAECAand the ITARhave been enforced against foreign persons
abroad. In the 1987 Evans-case82 the US District Court for the Southern District of
New York in 1987 upheld the validity of the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
under the AECA. Also, in several other cases, the DDTC has taken administrative
action against foreign persons. For example, in 2020 Airbus SE, a company orga-
nized under the laws of the Netherlands, was charged with, inter alia, unlawfully
reexporting and retransferring ITAR controlled articles.83
11.3.3 US Economic Sanctions
In the US the immediate decision to impose a sanction is almost always laid down
in Executive Orders issued by the President. Such Orders are based on one or more
statutes. Traditionally, the Trading with the Enemy Act of 191784 (TWEA) was the
principal statutory basis for US sanctions. After the enactment of the International
Economic Powers Act of 197785 (IEEPA), this statute has taken over that role. Other
statutes, such as CRIEEA, PEESA, and PEESCA mentioned in the Introduction,
can provide an additional legal basis to impose sanctions.86 Also, the Presidential
Executive Orders can authorize the heads of departments, in particular the Secretary
of the Treasury, to issue any regulation that may be necessary to implement the
sanctions measures. Finally, the export control regulations discussed above, such
as the EAR and ITAR, include requirements that overlap with OFAC’s sanctions
programs.87
US sanctions are organized into sanctions programs that are primarily adminis-
tered and enforced by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC). As part of its enforcement efforts, OFAC maintains a number
82 United States v. Evans, 667 F. Supp. 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/
district-courts/FSupp/667/974/2158497/ Accessed 20 February 2021.
83 Proposed Charging Letter Airbus SE, sys_attachment.do (state.gov). Accessed 20 February 2021.
84 Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (50 U.S.C. 4301 et
seq.).
85 International Economic Powers Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-223, title II, Dec. 28, 1977, 91 Stat.
1626 (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). IEEPA is the statutory basis for most sanctions.
86 Gordon et al. 2019, p. 109ff.
87 EAR: 15 C.F.R. Section 744.10 and Section 744.21, and Section 746 (Embargoes and other
special controls). ITAR: 22 C.F.R. Section 126.1 (Prohibited exports, imports, and sales to or from
certain countries).
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of sanctions list, including the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list88 of
individuals and companies whose assets have been frozen or ‘blocked’.89
Over the past decades, the US has established an intricate web of sanctions
programs.90 The majority are primary sanctions that target other States, individ-
uals,91 groups,92 and economic sectors by prohibiting US persons from engaging
in sanctionable activities with them. Typically, a US person is defined to include:
any US citizen or permanent resident alien, wherever located; entity organized under
US law; or any person in the United States. However, US persons are sometimes
defined much broader, pulling foreign companies within reach of US law, as will be
explained below.
Moreover, primary sanctions and the rules that specifically apply to US persons
can also affect foreign nationals and companies when they get involved in sanctioned
transactions where there is a US nexus.93 Such a situation can occur where such as a
transaction in breach of a sanctions program involves US persons or US origin goods,
services or technology, or is processed through the US financial system.94 Thus, the
foreign person violates US sanctions laws and can be held liable by OFAC.95 The
consequences can be quite severe as, for example, INGBankNVexperienced in 2012.
The bank, incorporated in the Netherlands, agreed to a settlement of $619 million in
forfeitures and fines with OFAC for illegally processing dollar transactions through
88 Available at: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx,
Accessed 20 February 2021. Other lists include the Non-SDN Menu Based Sanctions (NS-MBS)
List; Correspondent Account or Payable-ThroughAccount Sanctions (CAPTA) List; Sectoral Sanc-
tions Identifications (SSI) List; and the Foreign Sanctions Evaders (FSE) List. The Consolidated
List includes the parties on the SDN List as well as some of the other lists.
89 “List of individuals and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf
of, targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such as terrorists
and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are not country-specific. Collec-
tively, such individuals and companies are called “Specially Designated Nationals” or
“SDNs.”: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/specially-designated-nation
als-and-blocked-persons-list-sdn-human-readable-lists Accessed 20 February 2021. As a result,
these assets may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn or otherwise dealt in. McVey 2019,
p. 2.
90 For an overview of US sanctions programs, see: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sancti
ons/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx. Accessed 20 February 2021.
91 Such as supporters of terrorism, narcotic traffickers, and even associates of the International
Criminal Court; Casey et al. 2020, p. 22.
92 Including: political parties, corporations, and terrorist organization; Casey et al. 2020, p. 22.
93 Sultoon and Walker 2019, p. 4.
94 Gordon 2019, p. 14; McVey 2019, pp. 4–5.
95 Note that a violation can be prosecuted under criminal law as well which is the responsibility of
the Department of Justice. Both procedures can take place simultaneously.
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financial institutions located in the US.96 In 2014, the Paris-based BNP Paribas Bank
reached a settlement of no less than $8.97 billion.97
Non-US persons outside the US can also violate US rules by ‘causing’ others
to violate US sanctions as the sanctions programs generally prohibit transactions
“...that evade or avoid, have the purpose of evading or avoiding, cause a violation of,
or attempt to violate prohibitions imposed by OFAC under various sanctions author-
ities”.98 Further, non-US persons can violate US primary sanctions by providing
material assistance and support or knowingly facilitating significant transaction to
sanctioned parties, or act for or on behalf of a designated actor.99 Also prohibited are
transactions with parties listed on the SDN List. Primary sanctions can, therefore,
have an extensive reach and may even have an extraterritorial effect. Some US sanc-
tions, however, explicitly apply to US persons as well as foreign nationals outside
the US but may not necessarily have a clear US nexus. This section will further focus
on these so-called secondary sanctions.
The Foreign Assets Control Regulations of 1950100 were the first of the US
secondary sanctions. Based on the TWEA, the Regulations sanctioned trade with
some Communist States101 by any person within or subject to the jurisdiction of the
US.102 The term ‘subject to the jurisdiction of the US’ extended the meaning of US
person to include foreign companies ‘owned or controlled’ by persons subject to
US jurisdiction.103 Other secondary sanctions specifically targeting Cuba followed,
such as the Cuban Assets Control Regulation of 1963 (CACR),104 the 1992 Cuban
Democracy Act,105 and the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act
96 See: https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/06122012_ing_agreement.pdf Accessed 20
February 2021. ING Bank had violated: the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), 31 C.F.R.
part 515, the Iranian Transactions Regulations (ITR), 31 C.F.R. part 560; the Burmese Sanctions
Regulations (BSR), 31 C.F.R. part 537; the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations (SSR), 31 C.F.R.
part 538 (now-repealed), and the Libyan Sanctions Regulations (LSR), 31 C.F.R. part 550 (now
repealed).
97 See Press release Dept. of Justice, 30 June 2014. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bnp-paribas-
agrees-plead-guilty-and-pay-89-billion-illegally-processing-financial Accessed 20 February 2021.
Emmenegger 2016, p. 632.
98 Gonzalez and Fiorill 2019, p. 153. Based on the penalties provision of 50 U.S.C. IEEPA
Section 1705(a). Rathbone et al. 2013, p. 1111, see International Economic Powers Enhancement
Act, Pub.L. No. 110-96, Section 2(a), 121 Stat. 1011 (2007), amending 50 U.S.C. Section 1705(a).
99 Rathbone et al. 2013, p. 1059, 1102–1103, 1111–1112; McVey 2019, pp. 9–10; and Sultoon and
Walker 2019, p. 4.
100 31 C.F.R. part. 500 (1981).
101 Such as China, North Korea and communist-controlled parts of Vietnam.
102 Marcuss and Richard 1981, p. 462.
103 Berman and Garson 1967, pp. 867–868.
104 31 CFR Part 515; replacing the 1962 Cuban Import Regulations (Berman and Garson 1967, fn
8).
105 Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-484, div. A, title XVII, Oct. 23, 1992, 106 Stat.
2575 (22 U.S.C. 6001 et seq.); also known as the Torricelli Act.
204 J. Voetelink
(LIBERTAD). The latter, better known as the Helms-Burton Act,106 provoked the
fiercest reaction from US trading partners. The statute included several extraterri-
torial measures. Most significantly, Title III permitted US nationals to bring suit
against domestic as well as foreign companies found to be ‘trafficking’ in property
confiscated by the Cuban government after the revolution and claimed by US citi-
zens.107 Additionally, foreign persons were prohibited from selling goods in the US
containing any parts originating in Cuba.
Another series of US sanctions targets Iran. The Iranian Assets Control Regula-
tions of 1981108 was the first of the secondary sanctions, followed by the Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA),109 the Accountability, and Divestment Act of
2010 (CISADA),110 the Iran Freedom and Counter- Proliferation Act of 2012,111
the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012,112 and the Iranian
Transactions and Sanctions Regulations.113 Initially, the extraterritorial applications
of the US sanctions legislation did not lead to any conflicts with US trading part-
ners as Iran became subject to almost identical UN and EU sanctions anyway.114
In 2015, most nuclear-related sanctions were waived or lifted after Iran signed the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),115 limiting its nuclear capabilities. In
2018, however, the US unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and subsequently re-
imposed all sanctions.116 Non-US companies that had initiated or resumed business
with Iran after the secondary sanctions had been lifted, suddenly found themselves
in the position that transactions allowed under domestic law could become subject
to US sanctions.
106 Cuban Liberty andDemocratic Solidarity Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (22U.S.C.
6021 et seq.).
107 Wrongful trafficking activities include: participating in the purchase, sale, transfer of confiscated
property, aswell asmanaging, leasing, possessing, using, or entering into a commercial arrangement
using or otherwise benefitting from confiscated property 22 U.S.C. Section 6091(b)(2)(1996).
108 31 CFR pt. 535 (1981).
109 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, Section 1, 110 Stat. 1541, 1541
(1996). Later renamed: Iran Sanctions Act of 1996. The act imposed, inter alia, sanctions on
any foreign person or entity that invested more than $20 million in Iran or Libya to support the
development of petroleum resources.
110 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-195,
124 Stat. 1312 (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.).
111 Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-239, div. A, title XII, subtitle
D (Section 1241 et seq.), 126 Stat. 2004 (22 U.S.C. 8801 et seq.).
112 Iran Threat Reduction and SyriaHumanRightsAct of 2012, Pub. L. 112-158, Aug. 10, 2012, 126
Stat. 1214 (22 U.S.C. 8701 et seq.).
113 31 C.F.R Sections 560.101–904 (2013).
114 Harvard Law Review 2011, p. 1251.
115 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; Vienna, 18 October 2015; came into effect 16 January
2016; Annexed to UNDoc S/RES/2231 (2015). Signatories: Iran, China, France, Russia, UK, U.S.,
Germany and the EU.
116 Executive Order 13846 of 6 August 2018, Reimposing Certain Sanctions with respect to Iran
(83 Fed Reg 38939 7 August 2018).
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Various States and the EU have vigorously opposed the secondary sanctions on
Cuba and Iran, as will be discussed in the next section. International criticism has
not, however, stopped the US from continuing its extraterritorial practice as recent
secondary sanctions show, such as the sanctions targeting the Russian energy export
pipelines to Europe, as referred to in Sect. 11.1.117
11.4 Analysis
This section will examine the legality of the broad territorial reach of US export
control and sanctions legislation on the basis of the principles of jurisdiction. As
discussed in Sect. 11.2.2, the principles reflect a genuine connection between the
regulating State and the persons, property, or conduct being regulated.118 In other
words, US extraterritorial rules must demonstrate a clear link between the foreign
person or corporation that is regulated and the US in order to be compatible with
public international law.
The previous sectionmay have given the impression thatUS legislation is predom-
inantly extraterritorial. The opposite is true though as a canon of statutory construc-
tion called ‘the presumption against extraterritoriality’ limits the exercise of legisla-
tive jurisdiction.119 The US Supreme Court reaffirmed this presumption in Aramco-
case”,120 stating that, “It is a longstanding principle of American law that legislation
of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of theUnited States”. InMorrison v. National Australia Bank121 the
Court referred to this case and concluded, “When a statute gives no clear indication
of an extraterritorial application, it has none.” As established above, there is no doubt
about the legislator’s intent about the extraterritorial reach of US export control and
sanctions legislation. Consequently, its extraterritorial application is lawful under US
law. Another question is whether public international law, in particular, the principles
of jurisdiction allow the broad extraterritorial reach of the US laws.
117 Another example are secondary sanctions on Hong Kong; Hong Kong Autonomy Act of 2020,
Pub. L. 116-149, 134 Stat. 663 (22 U.S.C. 5701).
118 Restatement of the law fourth 2018, Section 407, comment.
119 Dodge 2020, para 15ff; Restatement of the law fourth 2018, Section 04.
120 US Supreme Court 16 January 1991, EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 US 244 (1991),
248. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/499/244/ Accessed 20 February 2021.
121 US Supreme Court 24 June 2010, Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247
(2010). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/561/247/ Accessed 20 February 2021.
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11.4.1 Export Controls
The extraterritorial application of the export controls as set out in theECA, theAECA,
the EAR and the ITAR seem hard to reconcile with any of the principles of jurisdic-
tion. For an important part, the relevant provisions are based on the US origin of the
controlled items. The idea is that items that have left US territory keep the US nation-
ality. However, the principles of jurisdiction that are based on personality or nation-
ality refer to natural persons and business entities incorporated under domestic law.
An item does not possess a personality and consequently, extraterritorial jurisdiction
cannot be based on the nationality principle.
Some controls may be justified under the protective principle. After all, export
control law deals with the export of military and sensitive items that could impact
national security. However, export can also be controlled for other reasons than
national security (e.g., protection of human rights, economy, or foreign policy).
Moreover, the reach of US export control law is quite broad, especially of the ECA
and EAR. They cover numerous items the export of which would not jeopardize
US national security. Enforcing foreign policy preferences through sanctions does
not fall within the recognized ambit of national security. Therefore, the protective
principle does not provide sufficient ground to justify the majority of the export
control rules.
Yet, the extraterritorial provisions of the ECA, the AECA, and their implementing
regulations do not seem to trouble allied trading partners too much and, in general,
are not a source of conflict.122 Perhaps the best explanation is that the US does
not rely on the direct application of export control laws vis-à-vis foreign trading
partners. Instead, it can be argued that the extraterritorial rules apply to a foreign
buyer or user because he has voluntarily consented to the application of the rules by
submitting forms such as end-use(r) certificates or signing a contract in which the
relevant extraterritorial provisions are incorporated.123 Some rules would not even
apply without the voluntary consent of a foreign person. The ‘see through rule’, for
example, that the DDTC applies with respect to articles containing ITAR-controlled
items, is policy based and not laid down formally. In my opinion, such a policy ‘rule’,
cannot be regarded as exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a State.
The ‘submission clauses’ or ‘Export Control Clauses’ can be very specific and
cannot bemodified.124 For instance, service agreements concluded under the ITAR125
contain a provision stating that the parties will comply with all applicable sections
122 There are exceptions, such as the protest following the enactment of the Soviet pipeline
regulations.
123 It must be admitted that accepting the US terms and conditions can be a forced choice as foreign
customers are often highly dependent on the US defense industry.
124 Rosanelli 2014, p. 5. Lebedoff and Raievski 1983, p. 487, fn 27 provides an older example of
such a clause.
125 As Manufacturing License Agreements and Technical Assistance Agreements do not require a
prior license, no submission by a foreign person is possible as part of the license application process.
Instead, the submission is sought in the contractual documents.
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of the ITAR. In addition, several ITAR-clauses are verbatim included in the agree-
ment.126 Thus, it can be said that the foreign person is directly bound by the terms
of the contract or form he signed; through the provisions of these instruments, he is
only indirectly subject to the extraterritorial rules.
Although the literature is sometimes critical about these ‘submission clauses’,127
it must be noted that foreign governments are often also engaged in the process
and sign these clauses on a regular basis. This is especially true for arms sales to
foreign governments or international organizations under the FMS-program. The
statutory basis of the program is the AECA, which is not implemented by federal
regulations but a Department of Defense manual, the SAMM. In my opinion, this
type of document cannot have extraterritorial effect, legally binding foreign persons,
not to mention foreign States.
The design of the program clearly shows that this is not intended either. Foreign
buyers and theUS government have to conclude a unique government-to-government
contract referred to as the Letter of Order and Acceptance (LOA).128 The standard
terms and conditions, which are an integral part of every LOA, stipulate that the
foreign purchaser agrees not to transfer title or possession of the purchased items
without the prior consent of the US government (Section 2.4). Also, the purchaser
agrees to permit the US government to conduct end-use monitoring verification with
respect to the use, transfer, and security of the articles and services transferred under
the LOA (Section 2.7). These provisions merely restate the obligation under the
AECA, the LOA itself, however, is the legal instrument that binds the parties.
That is not to say that US extraterritorial practice has not met any opposition at
all.129 Lowe, for instance, refers to formal objections to US legislation with extrater-
ritorial effect that the UK and eleven other States raised in 1961.130 In the UK,
extraterritorial application of US antitrust laws, in particular with respect to the ship-
ping industry, led to the enactment of the Shipping Contracts and Commercial Docu-
ments Act of 1964, which was superseded by the Protection of Trading Interests Act
(PTIA) in 1980.131 In general terms, the latter act enables the UK to prohibit compli-
ance with orders of foreign authorities; mandates the non-enforcement of certain
foreign judgements by British courts; and allows British nationals and companies
recovery of the ‘penal’ part of multiple damage132 awarded against them in foreign
126 As required by Section 124.8 ITAR ‘Clauses required both in manufacturing license agreements
and technical assistance agreements’ and Section 124.9 ITAR ‘Additional clauses required only in
manufacturing license agreements’
127 Bianchi 1992, p. 394 and Michigan Law Review 1983, p. 1326.
128 Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2020, https://www.dsca.mil/resources/publications
Accessed 20 February 2021.
129 On occasion, US export controls were challenged in foreign court cases; e.g. Polier 1970, early
cases include: The American Presidents Line case (Hong Kong 1951), Moens v. Ahlers, North
German Lloyd (Belgium 1964), and Fruehauf Corp. V. Massardy (France 1965).
130 Lowe 1980, p. 260.
131 Other States, e.g., Australia, Canada, and France, also enacted statutes rejecting another State’s
extraterritorial legislation; Coughlan et al. 2006, p. 59.
132 So-called ‘treble damages’.
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courts (‘claw back clause’).133 The PTIA thus aims to protect British citizens and
companies from the extraterritorial reach of foreign laws134 and raises the risks for
private extraterritorial lawsuits for multiple damages. Although US antitrust laws
prompted the passage of the PTIA, the Act has also been invoked in the field of
export control and sanctions, e.g., in response to the Soviet Pipeline Regulations.135
Because of the unprecedented extraterritorial reach of these specific regulations,
the European Community (EC), its member States, and Japan vigorously opposed
the export controls. The EC concluded that the measures were unlawful “since they
cannot be validly based on any of the generally accepted bases of jurisdiction in
international law”.136 In particular the EC found the control theory, used to assert
jurisdiction over foreign companies under control of US persons, not consistent with
the Barcelona Traction case.137 Consequently, the nationality principle could not
serve as a basis of jurisdiction over these companies. Neither could this principle
be invoked to assert jurisdiction over US goods and technology as it was generally
accepted that they have no nationality.138 The protective principle could not be appli-
cable either as the extraterritorial provisions of the Regulations were adopted for the
purpose of foreign policy instead of national security.139 Finally, the EC considered
the contractual submission clauses a misuse of the freedom of contracts in order to
circumvent the jurisdictional principles.140
In the only recorded court case on the application of the Soviet Pipeline Regu-
lations (Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V.) the
court also came to the conclusion that US extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction
"would not appear to be justified by the nationality principle". Consequently, the court
ordered Sensor, a Dutch subsidiary of a US company, to comply with its contractual
obligations notwithstanding the Soviet Pipeline Regulations.141
In general, the literature was rather critical about the extraterritorial reach of
the Regulations as well and also concluded that generally accepted principles of
jurisdiction impose limits on the exercise of jurisdiction to regulate conduct outside
the regulating State’s territory.142
The dispute over these extraterritorial Soviet Pipeline Regulations was settled
by diplomatic means and led to the lifting of the measures that hurt the foreign
133 Lowe 1980, p. 273.
134 The PTIA is not directed at the US, but is on almost all occasions invoked against U.S.
extraterritorial laws.
135 Kuyper 1984, p. 73.
136 On 12 August 1982 the EC presented a Note to the U.S. Department of State together with
the legal “European Communities: Comments on the U.S. Regulations concerning trade with the
U.S.S.R.”; European Communities 1982, para 30.
137 European Communities 1982, para 7.
138 European Communities 1982, para 8.
139 European Communities 1982, para 13.
140 European Communities 1982, para 11.
141 District Court the Hague, 17 September 1982, Judgment in Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles
S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V.; International Legal Materials 22, no. 1 (January 1983), pp. 66–74.
142 Lowenfeld 2003.
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trading partners most. Although this action eased international tensions, it could not
take away all European concerns,143 as US export control legislation continued to
include the extraterritorial elements that were already part of the system before the
enactment of the Soviet Pipeline Regulations. Nevertheless, the extraterritorial reach
of US export control did not lead to further major disputes.
11.4.2 Sanctions
Attention shifted to the increasing extraterritorial reach of US sanctions. It must be
noted, however, that the US is not under all circumstances a proponent of secondary
sanctions. When the Arab League implemented a boycott of the newly established
State of Israel in 1948, the US opposed this secondary boycott144 and since 1977,
prohibits US companies from complying with any (non-US approved) boycott.145
This policy has, however, not stopped the US from progressively expanding its
extraterritorial sanctions which resulted in several disputes with its allied trading
partners,146 notably the EU. The first of the disputes arose over the extraterritorial
reach of the ILSA and especially the Helms-Burton Act. After expressing its
concern about the latter statute and its intent to defend EU’s legitimate interests147
the EU filed a complaint with the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade
Organization (WTO).148 Moreover, the EU adopted the ‘Blocking Regulation’ or
‘Blocking Statute’149 to provide EU economic operators “protection against and to
counteract the effects of the extra-territorial application of the laws specified in the
Annex” such as the Helms-Burton Act and the ILSA (Article 1).150 The Regulation
includes the requirement to report activities that are affected by extraterritorial
143 Kuyper 1984, p. 76. Text delivered by Sir Roy Denman, Head of Mission, Delegation of the
European Commission and Peter Hermes, Ambassador, Federal Republic of Germany; 28 April
1983 Aide-Mémoire. http://aei.pitt.edu/5477/1/5477.pdf Accessed 20 February 2021.
144 Weiss 2017.
145 15 C.F.R Section 760.
146 The UK invoked the PTIA again; Davidson 1998, p. 1425.
147 Demarche, Delegation of the European Commission, International Legal Materials 35, no. 2
(March 1996): 398–400.
148 The EU argued that the extraterritorial application of the Helms-Burton Act was inconsistent
with the U.S. obligations under the 1994 GATT and GATS; Annex 1A, General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Annex 1B, General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) of
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization; Marrakesh, 15 April 1994
entered into force 1 January 1995 (Vol. 1867 UNTS 1995, No. 31874).
149 Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the
extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or
resulting therefrom, OJ L 309, 29/11/1996, pp. 1–6.
150 Canada and Mexico passed similar legislation to counter the U.S. extraterritorial sanctions; e.g.,
Rathbone et al. 2013, p. 1073. Recently, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce adopted MOFCON
Order No. 1, “Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legis-




sanctions (Article 2) and provides for a non-recognition and non-execution of foreign
judgements or orders giving effect to the sanctions (Article 4). More important, it
prohibits compliance with the extraterritorial sanctions (Article 5)151 and establishes
a ‘clawback’ procedure (Article 6).
The WTO suit never went forward, however, as the US and the EU settled the
dispute in April 1997 by Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).152 Under the
MOU, the US accepted to waive Title III of Helms-Burton Act. Furthermore, the US
and the EU concluded the Transatlantic Partnership on Political Cooperation in May
1998 in which they agreed ‘to resist’ the passage of new extraterritorial sanctions.153
Because of these arrangements, the Blocking Regulation, which remained in effect,
did not have to be invoked.154
Things changed dramatically when the US withdrew from the JCPOA and subse-
quently re-imposed its sanctions on Iran which partially have extraterritorial reach.
In reaction, the EU updated the Blocking Regulation by including in its Annex
the re-imposed US extraterritorial sanctions.155 Shortly thereafter, President Trump
decided not to renew the waiver with respect to Title III of the Helms-Burton Act,
fully activating the statute on 2 May 2019156 much to the dismay of the EU.157 A
151 See also Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1101 of 3 August 2018 laying down
the criteria for the application of the second paragraph of Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC)
No 2271/96 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted
by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom (OJ L 199 I, 7/8/2018 L 199,
pp. 7–10).
152 Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the U.S. Helms-Burton Act and the U.S. Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act, 36 International Legal Materials 36 (1997) 529–530.
153 US/EU Joint Statement on Transatlantic Partnership on Political Cooperation May 18, 1998; in
Clinton 1998. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1998, 804–806.
154 As U.S. secondary sanctions remained in place the EU continued to protest them. Harvard Law
Review 2011, p. 1249.
155 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/1100 of 6 June 2018 amending the Annex to
Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 protecting against the effects of extraterritorial application of
legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom (OJ L 199
I, 7/8/2018, pp. 1–6. See also: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1101 of 3 August
2018 laying down the criteria for the application of the second paragraph of Article 5 of Council
Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of
legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom (OJ L 199
I, 7/8/2018, pp. 7–10).
156 President Donald J. Trump Is Taking A Stand For Democracy and Human Rights In theWestern
Hemisphere | The White House. Accessed 20 February 2021.Consequently, the waiver came into
effect again 2 May 2019.
157 Council of the EU, ‘Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the full
activation of the Helms-Burton (LIBERTAD) Act by the United States’ (2 May 2019). www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/05/02/declaration-by-the-high-representative-
on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-full-activation-of-the-helms-burton-libertad-act-by-the-unitedstates/
Accessed 20 February 2021; EU External Action Service, ‘Joint Statement by Federica Mogherini
and Cecilia Malmström on the decision of the United States to further activate Title III of the
Helm Burton (Libertad) Act’ (17 April 2019). https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/61183/joint-statement-federica-mogherini-and-ecilia-malmstr%C3%B6m-decision-uni
ted-statesfurther_en Accessed 20 February 2021.
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new dispute is looming with the extraterritorial legislation impacting the European
participation in the Nord Stream 2 Project. However, as the views of the EUMember
States on the project differ widely, the EU has not yet been able to reach consensus
on broadening the reach of the Blocking Regulation by including in its Annex the
PEESA and PEESCA.
The EU and its member States have continuously stressed their position that the
US extraterritorial sanctions are contrary to international law. In the words of the
French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs: “the increasing use by the US of
extraterritorial provisions… is unjustified, unjustifiable and contrary to international
law”.158 Also, every year, the UN General Assembly calls upon States to “refrain
from promulgating and applying laws and measures such as the Helms-Burton Act
… the extraterritorial effects of which affect the sovereignty of other States, the
legitimate interests of entities or persons under their jurisdiction and the freedom of
trade and navigation”.159
Indeed, themajority of the extraterritorial sanctions provisions do not have a suffi-
cient nexus with the US to be consistent with the international law of jurisdiction.
More specifically, the principles of jurisdiction, notably the territoriality, nation-
ality, and protective principle, do not provide a sufficient basis to justify the broad
extraterritorial reach of the sanctions.
ING, BNP Paribas, and many other banks were fined because they processed
dollar transactions through the US financial system. The US asserted jurisdiction
over the transactions because payments in US currency imply that the transactions
pass through its territory because US correspondent bank accounts were used.160 In
addition, processing illegal transactions within the US caused the US correspondent
banks to violate US laws. Both arguments rely on the territoriality principle. In the
literature, such a broad interpretation of this principle has met with much criticism
as the clearing of an amount of money through a US based bank on its way between
two foreign accounts cannot be regarded as a sufficient jurisdictional nexus.161
A considerable number of secondary sanctions regulations extend the meaning of
‘US person’ to include companies incorporated abroad but ‘owned and controlled’
by a US person (the control theory). Such a claim is based on the nationality prin-
ciple. As discussed above, under public international law, the nationality of a corpo-
ration is separate from its shareholders and is determined by its place of incor-
poration.162 Therefore, the US cannot rely on the nationality principle to assert
jurisdiction over foreign-incorporated companies ‘owned and controlled’ by a US
158 “le recours croissant, par les États-Unis, à des dispositions extraterritoriales … est injustifié,
injustifiable et contraire au droit international”, cited in: Court of Appeal of Paris, International
Commercial Chamber, 3 June 2020, Judgement in SA T v Société N, No. RG 19/07261—No.
Portalis 35L7-V-B7D-B7VDG, Section 64.
159 UNDoc A/RES/74/7 of 12 November 2019: Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and
financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba. Preamble and para.2.
160 Emmenegger 2016, p. 654.
161 Emmenegger 2016, p. 655; Ruys and Ryngaert 2020, p. 20ff.
162 As the ICJ established in the Barcelona Traction case.
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person.163 International critique notwithstanding the US continues to rely on the
control theory.164
Nationality also comes into play with respect to sanctions provisions that prohibit
the reexport from a third country by non-US persons of US origin goods, technology,
or services that are subject to US export controls. As mentioned earlier, under public
international law, only natural and legal persons possess nationality. Therefore, the
US cannot establish a jurisdictional linkwith aUS origin item that has left country.165
Of course, a foreign person involved in the reexport of a US controlled item may be
bound by US rules through a submission clause in a contract or license form.
Nowadays, the principal statutory basis for US sanctions is the IEEPA. In order
to impose sanctions under this statute the President first has to declare the existence
of an “unusual and extraordinary threat ... to the national security, foreign policy,
or economy of the United States”.166 Extraterritorial sanctions legislation based on
the existence of a national security threat may be justified pursuant to the protective
principle. This principle only applies, however, where the threat is quite severe jeop-
ardizing key State interests (see Sect. 11.2.2.3). Most US sanctions imposed with
reference to the national security threat do not meet this relatively high threshold.167
Furthermore, the US employs sanctions for a variety of other reasons than the protec-
tion of national security, for instance, to achieve foreign policy or quasi-military
objectives, for economic and commercial reasons, or to fight the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction or terrorism.168 Therefore, a reference to the protective
principle to justify US extraterritorial sanctions is not convincing in most situations.
In establishing the legality of US extraterritorial sanctions, some authors also take
into account the consequences for non-US persons of violating these sanctions while
abroad. They argue that absent a treaty provision to the contrary, it iswithin the discre-
tion of the US to deny a foreign person access to its economic or financial system.
There is no rule of international law requiring a State to grant a foreign corporation
the right to conduct business within its territory (see Chap. 5, Sect. 5.3.3.2). Thus,
the denial of privileges of doing business within the US in response to a violation
163 Court d’Appel, Paris, 22 May 1965, Fruehauf Corp v. Massardy; in Marcuss and Richard 1981,
p. 466; District Court the Hague, 17 September 1982, Judgment in Compagnie Europeenne des
Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B.V.; International Legal Materials 22, no. 1 (January 1983):
66–74.
164 Ruys and Ryngaert 2020, p. 19.
165 Ruys and Ryngaert 2020, p. 20. Already in 1953 the Supreme Court of Hong Kong had held
that goods imported from the U.S. and stored on Hong Kong soil were no longer ‘subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States’ as defined in the U.S. Foreign Assets Regulations. To hold
otherwise, the court said, ‘would be to create an incursion into the sovereign rights of Hong Kong
which … could never have been the intention of the draftsman’. American President Lines, Ltd.
v. China Mutual Trading Co., Ltd. and the Hong Kong & Kowloon Wharf and Godown Co., Ltd.
(19531 A.M.C. 1510.l), cited in: Marcuss and Richard 1981, pp. 466–467.
166 50 U.S.C. Section 1701(a).
167 Ruys and Ryngaert 2020, p. 27 with respect to US sanctions on Cuba and Iran.
168 Rathbone et al. 2013, pp. 1066–1067.
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of extraterritorial US sanctions is a legitimate exercise of territorial sovereignty.169
However, more far-reaching punitive measures such as civil and criminal penalties,
are only allowed under international law where the sanctions have a sufficiently
strong connection with the US170 These arguments are certainly not without merit. It
must be noted, however, that denial of privileges may have a punitive character as it
can have a far more significant impact on a foreign company than a severe monetary
penalty because of the scope of the US market and the dominance of its financial
system. Moreover, the sanctions can still affect the sovereign rights of third states.
11.5 Synthesis and Conclusion
The sovereignty of states is reflected in the concept of jurisdictionwhich encompasses
the powers of a state tomake laws applicable to persons, property, or conduct (legisla-
tive jurisdiction), to exercise its powers to compel compliance with the law (enforce-
ment jurisdiction), and to apply laws to persons or thing through the processes of
its courts or administrative tribunals (adjudicative jurisdiction). Jurisdiction and the
exercise thereof is in principle territorial as the extension of the reach of domestic
laws beyond national borders may impact the sovereignty of other states. However,
the ongoing globalization, including the increasing interdependency of national
economies, make it impossible to keep national jurisdictions fully separated. Conse-
quently, states can exercise their legislative powers extraterritorially based on the
principles of jurisdiction, which express a genuine link between the legislating state
and the subject of the legislation. The main principles of jurisdiction are based on
nationality, vital state interests, and the universal character of certain acts.
US export control and sanctions legislation has long had extraterritorial effect,
resulting in a number of conflicts with its foreign trading partners. The extraterritorial
parts of the AECA, the ECA and their implementing regulations, notably the EAR
and the ITAR, focus on the re-export and transfer of US origin items abroad by non-
US persons. One of the key concepts is the notion that US export controls ‘follow
the part’ extending the jurisdiction over such an item when it has left US territory,
even when it has been incorporated in a new foreign-built object. As goods do not
possess a nationality, the extraterritorial reach of these provisions cannot be based
on the national principle or any other principle of jurisdiction. Still, these provisions
have not given rise to coordinated foreign protests in general. The lack of foreign
response may be explained by the perception that the extraterritorial effect of the
rules is negated by the submission of foreign persons involved in the handling of US
origin items abroad to the US rules through export control clauses in contracts and
export permits and forms.
Much more controversial is the increasing use by the US legislator of a variety of
extraterritorial sanctions provisions that extend the reach of certain statutes to foreign
169 Ruys and Ryngaert 2020, p. 11ff.
170 Ruys and Ryngaert 2020, p. 16ff.
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persons and corporations abroad. In many situations, there is no, or at best a tenuous
nexuswith theUS. Consequently, allied trading partners, notably the EU, vehemently
oppose these extraterritorial rules. The EU strongly believes that the extraterritorial
sanctions are contrary to international law, and EU officials have time and time again
stressed this point. The primary legal weapon shoring up EU’s opposition to the US
sanctions is the Blocking Regulation which had been enacted in response to the 1996
Helms-Burton Act and updated after the US re-imposed its extraterritorial sanctions
on Iran in 2018.171 To date, theBlockingRegulation has not proved as effective aswas
hoped for and has only been applied occasionally.172 Therefore, the EU is exploring
ways to make better use of the Regulation as well as creating new tools, such as
intervening in foreign proceeding in support of EU companies and individuals.173
The imposition of US foreign policy objectives on its foreign trading part-
ners through secondary sanctions shows that “law cannot be divorced from poli-
tics or power” as the International Court of Justice once concluded.174 However,
one single state cannot change international law singlehandedly. Therefore, the EU
must continue to resist US extraterritorial claims in close cooperation with like-
minded states and international organizations.175 Past experiences have shown that
the concerted diplomatic efforts to reverse (the effects of) secondary sanctions can
be successful.176 However, the need for the US to enact extraterritorial sanctions
legislation will only be taken away when the US and its allied trading partner are
prepared to better coordinate their foreign policy objective.
Acknowledgements The authorwishes to express his thanks to TerryGill, BenKlappe, ErikWijers
and Esmée de Bruin for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. All remaining
errors are my responsibility.
171 The UK has retained the Blocking Regulation and the Commission Implementing Regulation
(EU)2018/1101of 3August 2018 layingdown the criteria for the applicationof the secondparagraph
of Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 protecting against the effects of the extra-
territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting
therefrom (OJ L 199 I, 7/8/2018, pp. 7–10). Together with its domestic implementing legislation
(inter alia, the Protection of Trading Interests Order), as amended (Protecting against the Effects of
the Extraterritorial Application of Third Country Legislation (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations
2020), it forms the UK’s ‘Protection of Trading Interests Legislation’.
172 Jennison 2020, p. 174; Ruys and Ryngaert 2020, p. 82.
173 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions,
COM(2021) 32 final of 19 January 2021 The European economic and financial system: fostering
openness, strength and resilience, p. 18.
174 ICJ 20 February 1969, North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp. 42–43.
175 For an overview of (possible) EU responses, see Study European Parliament 2020.
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Abstract International cooperation in the American-led F-35 program inherently
triggers national security concerns. Consequently, the multiple exports in the supply
chain are subject to intricate licensing and export controls. Drawing on insights
from governance and contract theory we introduce a theoretical lens that high-
lights some important trade compliance challenges in supply chain networks. In
this chapter, contract-boundary-spanning governance mechanisms are defined as
increasingly sophisticated hard or soft governance mechanisms in the private law
T. De Schryver (B)




Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates, PO Box 854, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
Safe Trade Corridors, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
G. Demmink
e-mail: gert.demmink@safetradecorridors.com
© The Author(s) 2022
R. Beeres et al. (eds.), NL ARMS Netherlands Annual Review
of Military Studies 2021, NL ARMS,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-471-6_12
219
220 T. De Schryver and G. Demmink
sphere that can be deployed by any public or private stakeholder to govern interna-
tional supply chains. We find contract-boundary-spanning governance initiatives by
state and private stakeholders in the defense supply chain of the F-35 program. At the
same time, we argue that while serious efforts have been made by various state actors
and legislators to reduce the burden in trade compliance requirements in the F-35
program, the industry is still facing a considerable number of compliance challenges.
We argue that more contract-boundary-spanning initiatives by the private parties in
defense supply chain network are needed if these challenges are to be successfully
overcome.
Keywords Global value chains · governance mechanism · contract theory ·
boundary spanning · duty of care ·Memorandum of Understanding · security
cooperation · technology transfer · export controls · F-35 · JSF
12.1 Introduction
The export of technology that is earmarked as being sensitive by the United States
(US), is subject to intricate licensing and export controls. It concerns, for one,
traditional exports in which controlled technology crosses a land border. Due to
the extra territoriality feature of the American export controls, different national
export controlsmay simultaneously applywhen this technology crosses a land border
outside of the US. It also involves deemed exports in which American knowledge
is being transferred to a foreigner or a dual-nationality citizen. Deemed exports can
take place without the technology having to cross a land border. All these types of
exports are subject to strong and complex regulations. Failure to correctly observe
these regulations can have serious business and legal consequences.
All these kinds of exports occur frequently in the F-35 program, in which national
Departments of Defense (DOD) and defense companies from several friendly states
participate.1 Since the original aim in the nineties of the F-35 programwas to achieve
significant advances in the military capability, the program contains a lot of highly
sensitive technology.2 There has also been constant political pressure to develop
this high-tech platform at affordable costs. Due to the extreme degree of product
differentiation and technological complexity in the F-35 program, it was felt that no
single company could manage this program successfully. Instead, the best resources
had to be bundled across companies and across national borders.
In 2001, the contract for the development and the production of the F-35 has been
awarded to the Lockheed Martin/Pratt & Whitney consortium. As Lockheed Martin
is the ultimate system integrator in the F-35 program, it has outsourced certain areas
of design and manufacture and has bought in many services, assemblies, compo-
nents and parts. It has resulted in a complex US-led international operation, with
1 Chapman 2019; Gertler 2020; Vucetic 2013; Vucetic and Nossal 2013.
2 Gertler 2020.
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approximately 2,000 partners involved over ten countries.3 Clearly, the regulation of
(re-)exports of goods, services and technology in the F-35 program is an important
point of attention. These (re-)exports are addressed in a Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU) framework between friendly states.4 While this MOU framework
allows the export of US-controlled technology in the F-35 program as efficiently
as possible and in accordance with all international export laws and regulations,
irregularities or compliance issues have regularly occurred in the past.
A real-life example, in which the names of the companies involved have been
anonymized, illustrates the complex export control challenges in the F-35 program.A
Dutch company has sent at a certain moment in time, a metallurgical component that
needed to be produced according to very precise specifications, to a renowned labo-
ratory in the Netherlands for calibration tests. The problem was that this Dutch labo-
ratory was not known by the American system integrator. When the Dutch company
subsequently sent the component and the calibration report that it had received from
the laboratory to the US, the system integrator observed that an export control viola-
tion had occurred and reported it to the US authorities. This report has stress-tested
the relationship between the American integrator and the Dutch counterpart. The
system integrator has reacted by imposing a cordon sanitaire on the Dutch company
until it was able to demonstrate the proper functioning of its internal compliance
program.
In sum, the international cooperation in the F-35 program is fraught with multiple
forms of complexity. Firstly, from a management and technology perspective, it is
an enormous challenge to co-create the F-35s.5 Secondly, there are national security
concerns in all participating countries that make international cooperation even more
demanding.6 Conflicts of interest between business interest and national security
concerns can create tensions in the value chain of the F-35 program. We will inves-
tigate in this contribution how the export control laws and regulations are embedded
in the governance structure of the F-35 program.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the next sectionwe introduce themost
relevant theoretical insights for analyzing global supply chain governance. There-
after, the theoretical framework is applied to the F-35 context. To this end, we will
make use of interview data collected byMoore et al. about the collaboration between
UK and US partners in the F-35 program.7 We will also analyze one of the phase
MOUs in the F-35 program. The chapter ends with conclusions and implications for
future research.
3 Service Logistics Forum 2020.
4 Vucetic and Nossal 2013.
5 Gertler 2020.
6 Moore et al. 2011.
7 Moore et al. 2011.
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12.2 Theory
The innovative international cooperation in the F-35 program has led to new gover-
nance issues that we will map on contemporary business models and contract liter-
ature. More specifically, we draw on the taxonomy of Gereffi et al. to describe
the governance practices at the level of transactions between network parties in
a value chain.8 This taxonomy will offer us a useful business perspective on
micro governance practices in global value chains. We also draw on the concept
of contract-boundary-spanning governance mechanisms, by which the imbalance
between opportunities of international chain cooperation and threats of limited legal
liability of the entire value chain can be addressed.9 Whereas the business lens
focuses on the transactions in a value chain, the legal lens will focus on the supply
chain level. These two theoretical insights are first introduced and then combined
into a theoretical framework.
12.2.1 Transaction Level: Governance as Bilateral Linking
There are different ways to regulate business transactions between network part-
ners in a global value chain. Gereffi et al. have developed a taxonomy that orders the
governance practices in global value chains along a dimension that reflects the power
asymmetry between suppliers and system integrators. They argue that the choice for
a governance type ought to depend on three contingencies. Firstly, it depends on
the complexity of the technological information that is involved in a transaction
between partners. Secondly, it depends on the extent to which this technology infor-
mation can be codified in a transaction between parties. Thirdly, it depends on the
importance of the required capabilities of any suppliers in the design or production
of components. These three contingencies determine the power relations between
network partners and the governance type. When there are extreme power asymme-
tries between suppliers and system integrator, the system integrator will dictate who
gets involved or it can determine unilaterally which information is being shared in
the network. The higher the power asymmetries the more likely that a captive gover-
nance mechanism applies. When the power is evenly distributed, like in a relational
governance type, each party brings in unique and important competences. Therefore,
suppliers and system integrator engage in a close dialogue.10
Although their model is intuitively appealing, we have to bear in mind that many
different transactions are needed to design, build and deliver a technological complex
product. While it is possible that certain types of governance mechanism are more
frequently present in a particular value chain, we have to acknowledge the possibility
that there will be different kinds of governance practices between network partners
8 Gereffi et al. 2005.
9 Salminen 2016.
10 Gereffi et al. 2005.
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in a global value chain. As such the typology of Gereffi et al. is a particular useful
lens to be used at the level of the transaction; but it can be become theoretically
challenging to apply the taxonomy at the level of the global value chain.11 Since we
need to acknowledge that different kinds of governance types can coexist at the same
time in a global value chain, we will assume that a global value chains consists of
a series of transactions with business partners that are governed in different ways.
This chain of interrelated business transaction is an attempt to orchestrate resources
in a complex program.12
12.2.2 Chain Level: Contract-Boundary-Spanning
Governance Mechanisms
Modeling a global value chain as a series of linked bilateral contracts is consistent
with Salminen’s approach. Salminen notes that “supply chain actors have subscribed
their individual contracts to the logic of the supply chain as a whole”.13 From this
perspective, we can infer that some degree of rapport between network parties can
be implied. To a certain extent, network partners will thus take into account the
stakes of the companying network partners. Yet, it can also elicit defensive, boundary
enforcing behavior.14 Put differently, it cannot be assumed that a good working
governance mechanism at the chain level, that automatically activates a duty of care
in the chain, is present. Hence, the risk exists that not all network partners feel liable
for any negative externality that may arise. As such these compliance risks cannot
be quickly contained. So, whereas resource orchestration and governance theories
focus on the most positive scenario of collaboration, we need a different perspective
for analyzing (latent) problems in chain collaboration.
Salminen has researched solutions aimed at tackling the weak liability in clothing,
automotive and nuclear plant construction supply chains.15 He has selected these
value chains because there exist initiatives in which network parties commit them-
selves to reduce the impact of compliance risksmore quickly.He calls these initiatives
Contract-Boundary-Spanning GovernanceMechanisms (CBSGM) and defines them
as “increasingly sophisticated mechanisms that are used by private actors to govern
chains or networks of contracts”.16 Two dimensions are central to this new concept.
Firstly, it concerns initiatives that are initiated in the private-law sphere. Secondly, it
concerns initiatives that go beyond the bilateral contracts between contract partners
and are thus “increasingly sophisticated”.
11 Ponte and Sturgeon 2014.
12 Gong et al. 2018.
13 Salminen 2016, p. 737.
14 Faraj and Yan 2009; Kwan 2019.
15 Salminen 2016; 2018.
16 Salminen 2016, p. 710.
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Fig. 12.1 Theoretical framework. Source De Schryver and Demmink 2021
Salminen has found two forms of CBSGMs. The first form consists of a dedicated
governance contract signed by all private actors on top of the underlying chain of
contracts. As such, the extra contract connects directly the two ends of a supply chain.
The first form of CBSGM is based on the power of hard controls, because the extra
contract can trigger for example audits and even court cases against network partners.
The second form of CBSGM “blends in” the chain of contractual relations.17 The
second form of CBSGM focusses more on awareness-raising. Network partners are
mainly approached in a positive way to assume their own responsibility. A high
degree of trust and transparency and a lot of multilateral consultation between the
parties are assumed in this blended form. We therefore argue that the second form
relies more on the power of soft controls.
CBSGMs are no panacea. The effectiveness of the hard form of CBSGM depends
on whether there is a willingness to take joint responsibility. Even though an overar-
ching contractual layer exists, the risk of blurring liabilities remains due to a conflict
of contracts. Network partners in the value chain might be tempted to take advantage
of the confusion between the two layers of contracts to disclaim responsibility. The
danger of the blended form of CBSGM is that it results in noncommittal diplomacy.
CBSGMs should therefore be seen as a sensitizing concept; and not yet as a fixed
concept with clearly defined antecedents and outcomes.
12.2.3 Theoretical Framework
We combine the insights of Gereffi et al. and Salminen into a theoretical framework
(see Fig. 12.1). Because our unit of analysis is the complete value chain level, we
limit the description of the value chain to a sequence of linked transactions arranged
through bilateral contracts between different network parties. Given the fact that this
is already a simplified representation of a value chain, we sort these bilateral contracts
according to the distance to the end customer. We label it contractual distance.
The framework starts with an end customer signing a contract with a system
integrator for the production of a technologically complex product; (1) in Fig. 12.1
17 Salminen 2018, p. 425.
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represents this transaction. There is no contractual distance between the two parties.
The system integrator also maintains various bilateral contacts with Tier 1 partners
for the execution of the initial contract. These transactions are represented by (2) in
Fig. 12.1. There is a small contractual distance between the Tier 1 partner and the end
customer because the Tier 1 partner has no direct contractual relationship with the
end customer. If there would be any direct communication between the Tier 1 partner
and the end customer, the contract with the system integrator will always be taken
into account. It can further be assumed that these Tier 1 partners themselves must
also start new contractual relationships with other partners; e.g. extra employment
relationships or new investment relationships. When these partners enter the value
chain, we refer to them as Tier 2 partners because of the increased distance to the
end customer. They have no direct bilateral relationship with neither the system
integrator nor the end customer. They are involved in the project by the grace of
the Tier 1 partner. We represent these transactions by (3) in Fig. 12.1. In practice,
this process can repeat itself indefinitely and give rise to many more ramifications.
For conceptual clarity of the theoretical framework, we limit the representation in
Fig. 12.1 to three Tier partners with four layers of transactions. The Tier 3 partners
therefore maintain a contractual relationship with the Tier 2 partners; (4) in Fig. 12.1.
There is contractual distance with the end customer, the system integrator and the
Tier 1 partner.
All horizontal lines—(1) till (4)—in Fig. 12.1 represent the bilateral contracts
that have been signed in order to deliver the high-tech product. There is rarely a
central oversight of all contract relationships without central governance. And if
there were, the oversight becomes more difficult for the system integrator and the
end customer to maintain as the contractual distance increases. This was clearly
the case in the example presented earlier. The laboratory was involved in the value
processwithout the involvement of the system integrator.Hence therewas contractual
distance. Although initially the Dutch supplier benefited from signing a contractual
relationshipwith the laboratory to get the calibration report, this contract, represented
by (3) in Fig. 12.2, has raised trade compliance issues in the value chain. The US
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administration and system integrator were not aware about the involvement of the
laboratory and observed a security risk. It is clear from Fig. 12.2 that the distance
from the laboratory to the system integrator and the end customer could have been
shortened. Since there is a need for a better overview, CBSGM can be introduced.
This is shown in Figs. 12.1 and 12.2 by adding an extra layer on top of the linked
bilateral contracts.We represent these CBSGMs by the vertical (V) lines in Figs. 12.1
and 12.2.
Salminen has introduced CBSGMs because the different partners in the value
chain are only loosely coupled. Loose coupling does not usually cause any problems
if everything goes well in win-win situations; but is extremely fragile in case of
problems or zero-sum games. Again, the practical example outlined in Sect. 12.1 of
this chapter serves as a useful illustration. After they became aware of the compli-
ance issue, the bilateral relationship between the Dutch supplier and the US system
integrator came under pressure. The relationship was even temporarily frozen until
the Dutch company had demonstrated to be in control again. Such breaches in the
bilateral contracts are expressions of market power that provide local solutions at
the transaction level. They are not to be considered as good system solutions for all
stakeholders involved. There is a risk that in the event of negative externalities, each
party will want to limit its own liability and abstain its responsibility. However, the
damage from negative externality has occurred and may persist.
In the next section, we apply this theoretical framework to the F-35 program.
In contrast to the previous research of Salminen where it was clear from the onset
that CBSGM were present, the contract-boundary-spanning governance in the F-
35 program has yet to be identified. Because there is a linked chain of bilateral
contracts, we consider it likely that CBSGMs are to be identified. More specifically,
we investigate which ones are (or should be) present in the F-35 program.
12.3 Methodology
Our analysis consists of two parts. Firstly, we have analyzed the perceptions of some
suppliers in the F-35 program. Secondly, we conducted a text analysis of the phase
MOUs.
In order to get a better understanding of the governance mechanisms in the F-35
program by means of the theoretical framework, we draw on Moore et al. who have
provided us with a unique insight on the working relationships between international
network partners in the F-35 program. Nine semi-structured interviews with UK
industry representatives and seven interviews with UK government representatives
on various topics related to working relationships between suppliers and the system
integrator were held by the researchers. Moore et al. have intensively used quotes in
their reporting of the findings as a respondent validation technique. These quotes are
interesting because they often entail concrete examples of certain business transac-
tions and metaphors about the context of these transactions. Even though the quotes
are not verbatim due to anonymity editing, we decided to reinterpret these quotes in
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the light of the theoretical framework of this chapter. In particular, we retained 26
quotes—based on perceived relevance—of the 16 interviewees. Three quotes from
the UK government representatives were retained; the 23 other quotes are from the
UK industry representatives. It is unfortunately not possible to give more details
about the authorship of the quote since Moore et al. have disclosed only whether an
industry representative or government representative is being cited.18
For the reinterpretation of the data, we applied deductive coding techniques. To
each quotewe assignedmultiple codes in different pre-existing theoretical categories.
We assigned codes when there was evidence of interlinked contracts, complexity of
transactions, codification of transactions, supplier capabilities, market power, and
hard or blended CBSGMs. We also created a unique identifier for each quote. The
identifier combines the page number in Moore et al. with a code whether it was a
government or industry representative. This combination is both unique and mean-
ingful for each quote. Once each quote has been coded, we have made data matrices
that link the quotes to the theoretical constructs of our model. Out of these data
matrices, excerpts have been included in this chapter that according to us best high-
light the extent to which the quote can be matched with the theoretical constructs.
Since we are primarily geared towards understanding the case, our main focus is
how these quotes manifest themselves to the theoretical framework. Therefore, we
summarize by giving our interpretation about the patterns found in the columns of
the data matrices.
12.4 Results
12.4.1 Perceived Supply Chain Governance
Salminen introduced CBSGM because there are governance weaknesses in the chain
of interlinked contracts of global value chains.19 We therefore first describe whether
the UK representatives also frame the context of their working relations in the F-35
as a chain of interlinked contracts. As indicated from three different excerpts in Table
12.1, this is the case. The UK representatives clearly frame the supply network as a
chain of interlinked contracts. The excerpts also show that their context is perceived
as ‘a complication’ or a difficult situation.
As the first contingency in the Gereffi et al. taxonomy is the complexity of trans-
actions, the next step was to assess the extent to which information and knowl-
edge transfer is needed in order to contribute to the design and production of a
part of the F-35.20 The four excerpts in Table 12.2 illustrate that the interviewees
perceive the transactions to be technologically complex. They need very precise
18 Moore et al. 2011.
19 Salminen 2016.
20 Gereffi et al. 2005.
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Table 12.1 Evidence of the chain of interlinked contracts
Identifiera Excerpt
I.5p1.p18 The added complication is that the UK firm has to make the request to Washington
through the US firm with which it is working on the JSF. So the UK firm is hindered
in numerous ways from getting the best suppliers
I.11p28 When the UK firm works through a US firm and has a novel proposal which
necessitates some sharing of information, the US firm is responsible for getting that
approval from Washington
G.26p69 Within JSFb, it is important to ask what Lockheed Martin as the prime contractor
actually has done with any ITAR requests from UK firms. What exactly will
Lockheed have proposed to the US government for approval?
aLegend: I = UK industry representative, G = UK Government representative; bJSF stands for
Joint Strike Fighter, and is the previous name of the F-35
Source Moore et al. 2011
Table 12.2 Evidence of HIGHLY PERCEIVED complexity of transactions
Identifiera Excerpt
I.9p27 However, it is not possible to design a component in isolation, and it is necessary to
obtain large amounts of relevant data. ITAR made it impossible to obtain this data,
such as on operating margins and operating temperatures, so it was not possible to
design the component in the most efficient way possible
I.10p27 Ultimately, the UK firm had to design around the US modified part, without
knowing all the details. This generated difficulties with regard to testing the
complete unit as well as how the entire system would operate, particularly with
regard to certain performance scenarios. As a result, the solution was to send the
whole system from the UK to the US for testing, and then return it to the UK. The
interviewee’s comment was that getting to 100% of the specified requirement was
possible, but it took more time and effort, with additional design work necessary due
to the barriers imposed by ITAR
I.12p28 While there were contractual provisions which addressed sharing of information,
there were instances in which there were misinterpretations and errors which
blocked exchanges of information
I.21p45 The firm has worked on JSFb under an arrangement that assumes it will not get
source code access. This certainly generates difficulties resulting in the UK firm
having to find complicated “workarounds” or simply having US firms do the work
aLegend: I = UK industry representative, G = UK Government representative; bJSF stands for
Joint Strike Fighter, and is the previous name of the F-35
Source Moore et al. 2011
product specifications in order to fulfill the demands. The industry representatives
argue that intense information exchange about product specifications is a necessary
condition for successful business transactions between network partners. Hence, we
can infer that it involves complex transactions from an engineering and management
perspective. The excerpts also show that the necessary technology information is not
easily shared; which complicates the working relations. This is to us an indication of
institutional complexity due to competing logics: network partners have to balance
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Table 12.3 Evidence of MODERATE possibilities of codification in a transaction
Identifiera Excerpt
I.9p27 ITAR made it impossible to obtain this data, such as on operating margins and
operating temperatures […] this was not a restriction of information due to
intellectual property rights (IPR), but restrictions imposed by ITAR
I.10p27 the UK firm was not authorized to know about any additions or modifications
undertaken by a US firm to a particular JSFb component
I.12p28 There were instances in which there were misinterpretations and errors which
blocked exchanges of information. However, there also were numerous instances
where exchanges were completely blocked due to US requirements
I.22p45 The UK firm was never allowed near anything associated with the software, which
has not helped the UK firm in understanding how the systems work
I.25p49 And sometimes the US puts in provisos that the company did not expect, or at times
does not even know about. Much depends on the license, and a well-drafted broad
scope in the license gives the firm the required flexibility. On issues such as
hardware or technical data, the license may be silent, so the company has to work to
find a solution
aLegend: I = UK industry representative, G = UK Government representative; bJSF stands for
Joint Strike Fighter, and is the previous name of the F-35
Source Moore et al. 2011
between information hoarding due to security concerns and information sharing due
to resource orchestration. This balancing act leads to extra process steps complicating
any transaction. Therefore, we argue that the complexity of the transactions is high.
The excerpts in Table 12.3 complement the previous analysis. It is not straight-
forward to meet contractual obligations without a minimal degree of information
exchange between network partners. The excerpts in Table 12.3 highlight some of
the attributions by the interviewees why codified information is not always shared. In
particular, the excerpts illustrate their awareness of regulatory constraints to codify
information. Hence while it is feasible from a practical point of view to codify and
exchange technology information between network partners, the codification efforts
of the technology owners are not leading to information exchange due to regulatory
constraints. As a result, we conclude that the ability to codify necessary technology
information in a transaction is only moderate.
Next, Table 12.4 clearly shows that both in and out the F-35 program capable
suppliers can be identified by the interviewees who can contribute to the production
and design of parts for the F-35. From these excerpts, we infer that not every supplier
has the same set of unique competences. Instead, they have competences that are rare,
valuable and difficult to replicate. The high level of supplier capabilities is perhaps
best illustrated in the excerpts by their concerns over the protectionof their intellectual
property rights. Also, the apparent playfulness to redesign components without full
technological information is according to us a clear indication that the capabilities of
the network partners are high. The excerpts in Table 12.4 again show that technical
competence is not a sufficient condition to be included in the F-35 program.
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Table 12.4 Evidence of HIGH capabilities of suppliers
Identifiera Excerpt
I.8p.25 The UK firm believed that a company from another European country was capable
of filling a particular role on JSFb. Unfortunately, it took a significant amount of
time and effort to get US approval to bring in that company
I.10p.27-28 The UK firm was not authorized to know about any additions or modifications
undertaken by a US firm to a particular JSF component. The UK firm then had to
produce items in which that component was used. Ultimately, the UK firm had to
design around the US modified part, without knowing all the details. This generated
difficulties with regard to testing the complete unit, as well as how the entire
system would operate, particularly with regard to certain performance scenarios.
As a result, the solution was to send the whole system from the UK to the US for
testing, and then return it to the UK. The interviewee’s comment was that getting
to 100% of the specified requirement was possible, but it took more time and
effort, with additional design work necessary due to the barriers imposed by ITAR
G.15p.33 While firms want to work on a major project like JSF, they are concerned about
protecting their IPR
G.18p.36 The UK feels that UK technology is being “stolen” by the US under ITAR. Two
examples are LED screen technology and night-vision goggles. If there is
co-development and technology sharing with the US, the US then slaps on ITAR
restrictions, and the UK cannot freely use the technology. However, added the
interviewee, it is not clear if this is a result of a deliberate US policy or the lack of
joined-up government in the US regarding ITAR
aLegend: I = UK industry representative, G = UK Government representative; bJSF stands for
Joint Strike Fighter, and is the previous name of the F-35
Source Moore et al. 2011
Based on the analysis of three contingencies, it is already possible to rule out the
two classical governance types. It is clear that not every supplier in the institutional
field is eligible towork on the F-35 program. There are other selection criteria besides
price information. Hence the market typology of governance does not apply here.
Nor does the hierarchical governance type apply to the F-35 program as the system
integrator does not have all competences in place. Instead, the three contingency
factors seem to suggest that a relational governance type, due to the highly perceived
technological complexity, to the high capability base of the supplier’s network and
to the innate high possibilities to codify the information between network partners,
could fit.21 But we still need to take the power element in our analysis into account.
Since both network partners involved in a transaction have their own sources
of power, we have presented the power sources by the suppliers and by the US
system integrator in two different tables. Table 12.5 summons the perceived power
sources of the UK industry. Table 12.6 lists the perceived power sources of the US
system integrator. As the excerpts in Tables 12.5 and 12.6 illustrate, there are many
forms of market power leading to substantial barriers to mobility. Regulation is an
acknowledged barrier tomobility in strategicmanagement literature.22 TheAmerican
21 Gereffi et al. 2005.
22 Caves and Porter 1977.
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Table 12.5 Evidence of LOW perceived market power by UK suppliers
Identifiera Excerpt
I.4p17 Bearings for a component of the JSFb are made by one US firm. They could be
acquired from a European firm at a lower cost and with a more secure supply chain.
However, ITAR makes it easier to stay with the existing supply chain and deters any
effort to drive down costs and obtain greater security
I.5 p1.p18 the UK firm is hindered in numerous ways from getting the best suppliers. As a
result, the firm simply falls back on using old, approved suppliers, as it is difficult to
conduct competitive tendering […] A fire at one of its suppliers made it impossible
to get supplies, but the firm determined it was better to wait for the company to
rebuild the facility, rather than seek clearance for a new supplier from the US
G.15p33 These concerns have led to difficulties with regard to integrating technology onto the
JSF, as European partners have been reluctant to share information on METEOR or
ASRAAM with the US
I.17p36 ITAR is like “one drop of cyanide in a bucket of water. Once you’ve put the smallest
drop in, everything becomes contaminated.” It makes it hard for the UK company
because it may want to find other uses for its products. To cite one example, the
individual noted that a civilian product that goes to the US and has something added
that is ITAR-related (like special paint) becomes an ITAR-controlled item. A firm
wants to avoid having to produce two lines of items, so the company would not go to
the US and risk ITAR “contamination” for the whole product line. These are
illogical decisions, and have no consistency on what is military and non-military. If
a product is developed and applied on a civil project, there would be no problems
whatsoever. But as soon as it is put on a military project, it becomes ITAR controlled
aLegend: I = UK industry representative, G = UK Government representative; bJSF stands for
Joint Strike Fighter, and is the previous name of the F-35
Source Moore et al. 2011
export regulation makes it hard for UK partners to get into the F-35 program; as it
is hard to get out of the program. This is not as comfortable as it may seem for the
UK partners, because the excerpts highlight that they perceive high market power
asymmetry between them and the US system integrator. While UK network partners
seem to have the power to rise prices and to determine their level of involvement—as
for instance indicated in their efforts to protect some of their intellectual assets—
there is no evidence from the interviews that the suppliers are aiming to scale up or to
integrate forward. Hence, much of the incidences of power of UK network partners
are a defensive tactical response to other more dominant forces. The bargaining
power of the UK network partners is therefore relatively low.
It is clear from the excerpts in Table 12.6 that strongest power imbalance is in favor
of the US side. According to the interviews, the system integrator might have used its
US citizenship to create information asymmetries and to rationalize certain business
decisions. As such they are able to control any potential switching costs. While the
capabilities of the UK suppliers are high, their competences are substitutable and the
system integrator has market power because there are enough suppliers worldwide
to choose from. Hence, we conclude that market power asymmetry is high.
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Table 12.6 Evidence of HIGHLY perceived market power by the US system integrator
Identifiera Excerpt
I.11p.28 When the UK firm works through a US firm and has a novel proposal which
necessitates some sharing of information, the US firm is responsible for getting
that approval from Washington. The immediate response on the US side often is
to simply reject the UK initiative, rather than undertake that onerous process
I.18p.36 If there is co-development and technology sharing with the US, the US then
slaps on ITAR restrictions, and the UK cannot freely use the technology
I.19p.37 the US company it is working with on JSFb used the ITAR as an excuse to
defend a particular decision. The example involved software developed for use
in the JSF. The UK firm was informed by the US company that it was excluded
from this work on the basis of security concerns, but never received a clear
response from the US government or the US company. It was offered work on
other systems, which it accepted, but the perception in the UK firm was that the
US company appeared to have used ITAR to cover a business decision, and the
UK firm could not challenge the outcome
I.20p.37-p.38 The US company eventually responded that the US government would not give
access to the UK firm to work in those areas. However, it again was not clear
about the rationale behind that US government decision, merely stating that for
“reasons of affordability,” it would be handled as a responsibility of the US
company. The interviewee stated that, as there was no transparency in the
process, it is not clear if that outcome was genuinely due to a decision by
Washington, or if the US company was looking for an excuse to capture work in
a strategic area and to change an informal agreement that the UK firm would
have that line of work
I.21p.45 The firm has worked on JSF under an arrangement that assumes it will not get
source code access
G.26p.69 Within JSF, it is important to ask what Lockheed Martin as the prime contractor
actually has done with any ITAR requests from UK firms. What exactly will
Lockheed have proposed to the US government for approval?
aLegend: I = UK industry representative, G = UK Government representative; bJSF stands for
Joint Strike Fighter, and is the previous name of the F-35
Source Moore et al. 2011
The perception ofmarket power asymmetry is an important indicator in theGereffi
et al. model.23 The higher the power asymmetries the more likely that a captive
governance mechanism applies. The more even power is distributed, the more likely
a relational governance type is suitable. Thus, while the analysis from the three
contingencies suggests that a relational governance type would be the most appro-
priate governance form in the F-35 program, the extreme degree of power asymmetry
seems to indicate that a captive governance type is—based on the interviews—abetter
classification of the actual governance type in the F-35 program.
The discrepancy between the desired and the actual governance type stresses the
theoretical importance of CBSGM. In order to repair some of the misfit, namely a
23 Gereffi et al. 2005.
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Table 12.7 Evidence of blended contract-boundary-spanning governance activity
Identifiera Excerpt
I.6p22 Compliance with US regulations is the third most important factor for the firm
regarding JSFb participation (after production rate and affordability of the aircraft).
That is indicated in the extensive training process undertaken in the firm for
employees working on JSF
I.23p49 He has regular contact with US government officials on JSF, and there have been no
major problems. […] The firm’s personnel in the US have a good relationship with
US counterparts. Certainly there are restrictions on UK personnel, but as they have
been in the US for a long time, the arrangement works well. The working
environment has developed over a lengthy period of time and, certainly in the JSF
development phase, US regulations have not been an insurmountable impediment.
[…] Basically, US behavior is geared to helping the UK firm despite US regulations.
But the UK will need to push the US for more dialogue
I.24p49 While agreeing that resolution of problems comes down to personal relationships,
stated that when the firm works directly with Washington, things can get difficult. To
a degree, the firm has reasonable relationships with US officials, and generally those
individuals have been knowledgeable. The firm works with the JSF project office to
resolve problems and issues
aLegend: I = UK industry representative, G = UK Government representative; bJSF stands for
Joint Strike Fighter, and is the previous name of the F-35
Source Moore et al. 2011
lack of communication, we expect to find some additional blended forms of contract-
boundary-spanning governance initiatives.
The excerpts in Table 12.7 give clear manifestations of blended forms of contract-
boundary-spanning activity. The UK representatives clearly engage in communica-
tion with the US administration (I.23p49; I.24p49) in an effort to comply to export
regulations. The contract-boundary-spanning activities are also evident from their
efforts to comply with the ITAR by means of training and tone at the top (I.6p22).
These excerpts illustrate that the blended form of CBSGMs is present in the F-35
program.
We also suspect that UK and US network partners adjust their working relations
because of fear the risk of (civil) penalties.While there is contract-boundary-spanning
governance activity, it is not the result of a hard CBSGM as there is no contract that
enforces them to do. Instead, the ITAR-frame of the UK representatives substitutes
the contractual form of hard CSGGM. The fear arises from the fact that the US
administration might impose sanctions.
These findings have potentially important implications for the theoretical frame-
work of Salminen. Firstly, it suggests that hard contract-boundary-spanning activity
do not have to be formalized in a contract between private network partners. In
the next section, we will explain that contractual agreements that imply CBSGM
exist at another level. Secondly, the analysis of the quotes indicates that not all
network partners participate equally in the contract-boundary-spanning governance
activities. From the excerpts in Tables 12.7 and 12.8, it seems that the system inte-
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Table 12.8 Evidence of hard contract-boundary-spanning governance activity
Identifiera Excerpt
I.13p30 At some JSFb meetings, non-US citizens were told to leave at certain points. In one
instance, that meant that the firm had one US national remaining in the room while
the rest of the UK team was asked to leave
I.24p49 In the early stages, however, the firm got little instruction on the regulations, and the
US response was “just go read the ITAR.”
aLegend: I = UK industry representative, G = UK Government representative; bJSF stands for
Joint Strike Fighter, and is the previous name of the F-35
Source Moore et al. 2011
grator has been sidestepped in some of these contract-boundary-spanning gover-
nance initiatives. UK representatives invest directly in good relationships with the
US governments. Much of the attributions by the interviewees, refer to regula-
tory contract-boundary-spanning governance efforts. Thirdly, it shows that contract-
boundary-spanning governance activities do not always have positive effects. Due
to the deterrence effect of export regulations, communication problems can para-
doxically increase. One can also observe that the US administration and UK firms
try to solve these problems once certain thresholds of mutual trust and familiarity
have been reached. As a result, the US administration, with their outreach activities
play a proactive role in promoting blended contract-boundary-spanning governance
activity in defense supply chains.
12.4.2 An Interpretation of the Memoranda
of Understanding
While the reinterpretation of the interview data at Moore et al. did only reveal
implicit framing of contract-boundary-spanning governance initiatives, we argue
that CBSGMs do exist in other areas of the F-35 program. In international law, it is
common to use a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) framework to set out the
details of the development, testing, production, and delivery phase. A phase MOU
expresses a convergence of will towards an intended line of action in each phase of
the F-35 program. Since MOUs do not have the same legal status as international
treaties, they can be put into effect without time-consuming legislative approval by
national bodies. As such anMOU can be framed as a contractual agreement between
state actors in a complex regulatory context. We will argue in this section that these
phase MOUs contain features of CBSGMs.
In the context of export control and trade compliance, a raft of enforceable export
regulations applies.24 Security cooperation between states is regulated by amultitude
of international agreements, treaties, national laws, regulations, and policies. Most
24 Aubin and Idiart 2016.
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governments, bound by these international treaties, also impose stringent security
requirements on defense companies operating under their jurisdiction. In this highly
regulated context, the ministries of defense of all the partner countries in the F-
35 program have signed different phase MOUs to support the F-35 program.25 For
example, the DODs of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway,
Turkey, the UK and the US have signed a Production, Sustainment, and Follow-on
DevelopmentMOU (PSFDMOU) concerning their intent to produce, and sustain the
F-35 at Washington, Oslo, and Copenhagen between November 2006 and February
2007.26 This MOU has entered into force on 31 December 2006 and is at the time of
writing still in effect. In this PSFD MOU, these state actors express their desire to
cooperate in the design, production and acquisition of the F-35 seeking to capitalize
on the lessons learned from their previous experience in the previous phases of the
F-35 program.
While themain aimof for signing a phaseMOUs is to coordinate efforts to develop
mutual defense capabilities of the state actors through international industrial collab-
oration, some articles in the phase MOUs also take into account national security
concerns. We argue that in particular the articles in the phase MOUs that directly try
to monitor any business transaction of private network partners in the defense supply
chain could be considered as a CBSGM, even though the phase MOUs are signed
by state actors. In order to support our argument, we need to revisit the two central
dimensions in the definition of a CBSGM, namely the fact that it is an initiative taken
by private partners and that it is a sophisticated governance mechanism.
12.4.2.1 First Dimension: “Used by Private Actors”
The phase MOUs of the F-35 are essentially contracts signed by the DODs of all
states participating in the program. Since the DODs represent their states, they are
more public actors than private actors. However, due to the fact that the MOUs
qualify more as a soft law than as a legally binding enforceable law, such as the US
International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR) or the EC Directive 2009/43/EC
(implemented in the Netherlands through the Besluit Strategische Goederen), we
argue that state actors also make use of private contracts to govern supply chains.
12.4.2.2 Second Dimension: “Increasingly Sophisticated Mechanisms”
To show that the phase MOUs entail an increasingly degree of sophistication in the
governance of value chains, we have included the most relevant articles of the PSFD
MOU in an appendix (Sect. 12.6). While we restrict the analysis here on the most
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recent phase MOU in the F-35 program, it equally applies to previous phase MOUs
as well.
According to Section 6.8 of the PSFDMOU, state actors agree to take a pioneering
role in the governance of compliance risks in the value chain. This is not restricted to
their own responsibility. They also engage to sway network partners into compliance
efforts. This is evident from the advisory and disciplining roles that state actors
are expected to take towards private network partners in the F-35 program. It is
important to emphasize that the MOU are not signed by these private partners. Nor
does a MOU substitute the national laws and international regulations regarding
export control, which obviously remain in effect to all parties concerned. Hence the
MOU supplements both the existing regulatory framework and the chain of bilateral
contracts; and, as such, is already indicative of a certain degree of sophistication.
In order to fulfill their contractual obligations, state actors resort to both types
of CBSGMs. Articles 6.10 and 6.11 in the PSFD MOU are manifestations of hard
CBSGMs that state actors are expected to implement. State actors are urged to use
their existing legal and licensing power to make sure that the required technology
information for business transactions is restricted to its intended end-use and regis-
tered end-user and otherwise kept confidential. These articles reveal a reason why
some of the extreme knowledge hoarding activities have been observed between UK
and US network partners in the Moore et al. study. On the contrary, in Article 7:5 we
clearly find the spirit of blended CBSGM. By means of this article, state actors are
encouraged to raise compliance awareness among network parties. This awareness-
raising informationmay relate to information regarding generally accepted standards
for the design of internal trade compliance programs.
All the articles in in the PSFD MOU indicate that it concerns a best-efforts obli-
gation, not a results obligation for the state actors. How the states act upon these
articles, is left to the individual states. In practice, the effort obligation has resulted
in numerous initiatives to promote compliance in the value chain. For one, it has
resulted in what the program participants have come to know as the ‘contractual
flow-down’ in an attempt of participants to call upon the network partners to show
proactive behavior. It has also resulted in many outreach activities. For example,
the Nederlandse Industrie voor Defensie en Veiligheid (NIDV) and the Netherlands
Aerospace Group (NAG) have organized seminars and workshops since 2007. This
was done on the basis of an industry-led need for more information. Topics like
industrial espionage, intellectual property, export controls, contracting and security
have been covered in these workshops. These efforts have led to greater levels of
awareness within the Dutch defense industry regarding the aforementioned themes.
This required actively seeking out those parties and this was supported by NIDV
and NAG with courses, presentations with invitations also being sent to US govern-
ment officials, from the Commerce Department/BIS. NIDV also has representation
(larger companies by Thales and smaller companies by an NIDV representative) on
the export control committee of the Brussels-based ASD (European Aeronautics,
Space, Defence and Security Industries), to which US government officers were also
regularly invited. Feedback with respect to all this information—likewise between
the ASD participants themselves—was shared with the Dutch defence industry.
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In sum, by signingMOUs state partners commit themselves to takemultiple initia-
tives towards achieving trade compliance in the supply chain. Instead of using laws,
state actors resort to contracts to regulate trade compliance in the value chain. As a
result, our analysis suggests a new dimension to CBSGMs. Not only private stake-
holders or parties who are not directly involved with the development and production
process can take on contract-boundary-spanning governance initiatives. State actors
also make use of the two forms identified by Salminen. First, state actors can force
private partners in the value chain to take on their trade compliance responsibility
through contractual obligations and hard controls. They also can make use of soft
controls via outreach activities. Therefore, in our opinion, the definition of CBGSM
should be adapted to increasingly sophisticated hard or soft governance mechanisms
in the private law sphere that can be deployed by any public or private stakeholder
to govern value chains or networks of contracts.
The extension of the definition of CBSGM to public stakeholders is meaningful
because state actors should be better able to set aside business interests and deal with
themanagement of negative externalities.27 It is therefore important to recognize that
the initiative to regulate the duty of care does not have to lie in the chain itself. Instead,
state actors can use their private instruments to govern value chains. At the same time,
it raises questions about the contexts in which governments consider it appropriate
to work with legislation instead of CBSGMs, and vice versa. In particular, it would
be interesting to further investigate the enforcement effects of these CBSGMs.
In this chapter, we have only focused on the signing of the MOUs but we have
not dealt with the actions of state actors when a business partner is falling short
of expectations. The initial example in this chapter has indicated that the system
integrator has taken corrective actions towards the Dutch supplier; but it is unclear
whether theDutch state has also been informed and, if so,what actions has been taken.
Nor do the interviews in Moore el al. contain attributions for contract-boundary-
spanning governance initiatives that are geared towards the phaseMOUs. The focus is
on the ITAR instead.While these attributionsmake sense from a business perspective
because the phase MOUs do not address enforceable rules to companies, it remains
to be seen how state actors will monitor whether the MOUs will be followed up in
practice. Earlier on in this chapter, we already raised concerns about the effectiveness
of CBSGMs. It is appropriate to repeat these concerns in this context, as state actors
are only sporadically involved in the primary production processes of value chains.
12.5 Conclusions and Discussion
In this section we highlight the theoretical and practical contributions. In order to
explain trade compliance governance in global value chains of the defense industry,
we have combined governance theories with private contract theories. The fairly new
theoretical concept of CBSGM, which indicates the extra efforts of private partners
27 Heidenkamp et al. 2013.
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in value chains to activate the duty of care across contract boundaries, was given the
floor.28 Based on our analysis, we have tweaked the definition of this new concept
to: increasingly sophisticated hard or soft governance mechanisms in the private
law sphere that can be deployed by any public or private stakeholder to govern
value chains or networks of contracts. We have applied these theoretical insights
to the F-35 program where, under strong regulatory pressure, network parties in
the value chain commit to combatting inappropriate technology transfer. Moreover,
from the analysis of the phase MOUs we have observed that also public parties
engage in CBSGMs in order to pay more attention to compliance issues in the supply
chain. Notwithstanding these contract-boundary-spanning governance initiatives, we
argue that the F-35 program and by extension the defense industry is still facing a
considerable number of compliance challenges. We argue that coordination by the
private parties in the supply chain network itself is needed in order to successfully
overcome these trade compliance challenges.
This chapter is only a start. More theoretical and empirical research needs to
be performed on the impact of CBSGM in defense supply chains. This analysis,
based on existing sources, should be seen as a first step. There are a number of
limitations that are related to the use of secondary data. We had no control over how
the interview data inMoore et al. was collected, nor can we engage in any respondent
validation of our findings. Moreover, the interviews of Moore et al. served other
purposes than ours. Since Moore et al. were mainly interested in the UK perceptions
on the working relationships with the US in the F-35 program, no systematic data
from the own compliance efforts by UK companies were collected. There was only
sporadic evidence in the interviews of certain elements of an internal compliance
programs in the UK firms, mostly related to compliance training and tone at the top.
Although the research questions are different from ours, we share a common interest
in explaining barriers in international collaboration. Also, the perspective in Moore
et al. is restricted to the UK and is confined to the early stages of collaboration. Hence
the datamay not be indicative for the perceptions of all stakeholders involved, nor can
it be assumed that the UK perceptions have remained the same over time. Finally, it is
not clear fromMoore et al. how the sample of industry and government interviewees
were selected. Given that there aremore than 1900 suppliers in 10 different countries,
we cannot easily generalize findings from the interview data.
Despite these methodological limitations and even possible issues with the trust-
worthiness, the main findings of Moore et al. are consistent with other reports that
have tackled the issue of production delays and cost overruns in the F-35 program (see
for example various US GAO reports monitoring the progress in the F-35 program.29
Hence, the data is a good start for an analysis. An advantage of our approach is that
our source data, namely the quotes in Moore et al., are open-access. It allows anyone
to replicate our analysis. Obviously, we clearly promote future research that includes
a more diverse set of secondary sources and encourage collecting own data to test or
apply the theoretical framework more rigorously.
28 Salminen 2016.
29 United States Government Accountability Office 2014, 2019, 2020.
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Research on boundary spanning governance is clearly an emerging field.30 The
theoretical contribution of this chapter is that the new concept of CBSGM is applied
to a new and relevant setting. If we compare the defense supply chain with the
cases from Salminen, the F-35 supply chain combines features of the automotive
and nuclear value chain. It has in common with the automotive value chain that in
both cases chains were striving for efficiency gains through performance contracts.
The value chain of the F-35 has in common with that of the nuclear plant that the
government puts very strong regulatory pressure on the production processes and
that the product is a specially designed, complex product.
It has also become clear thatmore theory development aroundCBSGMneeds to be
done. An interesting option is to combine the two forms of CBSGMswith the contin-
gency factors from the Gereffi et al. model. For example, if the value chain is already
familiar with codifying transactions, such as in a modular or captive governance
structure, then it probably takes little effort to implement the hard form of CBSGM.
On the other hand, if the value chain cannot simply codify transactions without
consultation, such as in a relational or hierarchical governance structure, then the
blended form of CBSGMwill probably fit. A larger pool of network partners should
be invited for exchanging experiences and engaging into discussions. According to
this logic, fit is achieved when the CBSGM matches the existing governance struc-
tures. Although it can be easy to add an extra layer of governance in this way, this
approach raises questions about the effectiveness of CBSGMs. It is unclear whether
having more of the same is also better.
An alternative reasoning is to look for complementarity between the CBSGM and
the primary governance mechanisms. Although it will be more difficult to achieve,
themissing link in captive andmodular governancemechanisms is the lack of consul-
tation between network partners. After all, quite a lot has already been contractually
determined and codified in such a context. The value chain needs multilateral consul-
tation. Conversely, a hard CBSGM in a relational supply chain could be the perfect
carrot-and-stick approach. In other words, in this line of research it would be appro-
priate to look at the combination of primary and more sophisticated governance
mechanisms together in order to achieve more balance. Inspired by the levers of
control framework,31 it seems necessary to conduct research about these configura-
tions in times of crisis situations in which negative externalities actually occur; and
in calm periods of going concern, because the degree to which various governance
mechanisms reinforce each other is significantly different in these two situations.
30 van Meerkerk and Edelenbos 2018.
31 Simons 1994.
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12.6 Appendix: Export-Related Articles from the PSFD
MOU
6.8 “Contracting Officers will insert into prospective Contracts (and require its
Contractors to insert in subcontracts) provisions to satisfy the requirements of
this MOU, including Section VII (Industrial Participation), Section IX (Disclo-
sure and Use of Project Information), Section X (Controlled Unclassified Infor-
mation), Section XII (Security), Section XIII (Third Party Sales and Transfers), and
Section XIX (Amendment, Withdrawal, Termination, Entry into Effect, and Dura-
tion), including the export control provisions in accordance with thisMOU, in partic-
ular paras 6.10 and 6.11 of this Section. During the Contracting process, Contracting
Officers will advise Prospective Contractors of their responsibility to immediately
notify the Contracting Agency, before Contract award, if they are subject to any
license or agreement that will restrict their freedom to disclose Information or permit
its use. Contracting Officers will also advise Prospective Contractors to employ their
best efforts not to enter into any new agreement or arrangement that will result in
restrictions.”
6.10 “Each Participant will legally bind its Contractors to a requirement that
the Contractor will not retransfer or otherwise use export-controlled Information
furnished by another Participant for any purpose other than the purposes authorized
under this MOU. The Contractor will also be legally bound not to retransfer the
export-controlled Information to another Contractor or subcontractor unless that
Contractor or subcontractor has been legally bound to limit use of the Information to
the purposes authorized under this MOU. Information furnished by one Participant
under this MOU may only be retransferred by another Participant to its Contractors
if the legal arrangements required by this paragraph have been established.”
6.11 “Each Participant will legally bind its Prospective Contractors to a require-
ment that the Prospective Contractor will not retransfer or otherwise use export-
controlled Information furnished by another Participant for any purpose other than
responding to a solicitation issued in furtherance of the purposes authorized under
this MOU. Prospective Contractors will not be authorized use for any other purpose
if they are not awarded a Contract. The Prospective Contractors will also be legally
bound not to retransfer the export-controlled Information to a prospective subcon-
tractor unless that prospective subcontractor has been legally bound to limit use of
the export-controlled Information for the purpose of responding to the solicitation.
Export-controlled Information furnished by one Participant under this MOU may
only be retransferred by another Participant to its Prospective Contractors if the
legal arrangements required by this paragraph have been established. Upon request
by the furnishing Participant, the receiving Participant will identify its Prospec-
tive Contractors and prospective subcontractors receiving such export-controlled
Information.”
7.5 “In order to ensure that industrial opportunities are open to industry in all of
the Participants’ nations, the Participants will use their best efforts and encourage
their Contractors to use their best efforts, to address export control issues in a timely
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manner that promotes the maximum degree of industrial cooperation among the
Participants’ nations, consistent with their national laws and regulations.”32
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13.1 Introduction
Arms embargoes can be imposed for different reasons and by various bodies, such as
international organizations (e.g., the United Nations (UN)), or, collectively by states
(e.g., the European Union (EU)) and even by an individual state. From literature, it
appears, “arms embargoes are one of the most frequently used types of economic
sanctions but they are perceived as one of the least effective”.1 Moreover, according
toMoore, nearly “every international arms embargo has been systematically violated
by arms exporting states”.2 So why bother with another analysis of its effectiveness?
Grounded in the belief that arms embargoes ultimately strive for behavioral change
of the target (i.e., the receiver of the embargo), this chapter argues that another anal-
ysis of effectiveness may indeed be valuable.3 Building on literature, for measuring
success,4 a dashboard is constructed to assess the effectiveness of arms embargoes.5
To illustrate the dashboard’s usewe reflect on the arms embargo against SaudiArabia,
imposed in 2018 by numerous EU member states sanctioning this nation’s actions
in the civil war raging throughout Yemen from 2014 onwards.
In Yemen, a conflict between Houthi rebels, supported by Iran, and Abd Rabbu
Mansour Hadi’s Yemenite government, supported by a military coalition from the
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Sudan, Egypt and Morocco, commanded by Saudi
Arabia is tearing the country apart, causing massive suffering and societal disrup-
tion. It has become clear, major arms industries supplying the Saudi-led coalition,
predominantly stem from the United States (US) and the European Union (EU).
Human Rights Watch has documented dozens of Saudi and Emirati-led coalition
attacks in Yemen in violation of martial law and amounting to war crimes. Scores of
indiscriminate and disproportionate airstrikes have killed and wounded thousands of
civilians, including children, hitting civilian areas, such as, markets, homes, schools
and hospitals.
The above provides ample motives for European countries to impose an arms
embargo against Saudi Arabia. For, EU member states are to comply with an EU
Common Position, adopted in 2008, holding there should be no arms exports if
there is a “clear risk” that such weapons will be used to commit “serious violations
of international humanitarian law”. As to United Nations (UN) members, also, the
above-mentioned violations and near-war crimes would provide grounds to decide
to impose an arms embargo, as, a decision about arms sales to Saudi Arabia should
be compliant with the UN/Arms trade treaty. This treaty stipulates that a state shall
not authorize any transfer of arms if it has knowledge at the time of authorization
that the arms would be used in attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians.
1 Erickson 2013, p. 159; also Brzoska 2009a, pp. 2–3.
2 Moore 2010, p. 593.
3 Baldwin 1999/2000, p. 87; Brzoska 2009a, p. 21.
4 Brzoska 2009a, pp. 19–20; Giumelli 2011, p. 1.
5 Baldwin 1999/2000; Brzoska 2009a; Brzoska 2009b; Brzoska and Lopez 2009; Giumelli 2011;
Lopez 2012.
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Finally, on 25 October 2018, after two earlier attempts by the European Parlia-
ment, some European countries do indeed impose an arms embargo on Saudi Arabia.
This decision has been directly prompted by allegations regarding the Saudi govern-
ment’s involvement in- and accountability for the murder of the Saudi journalist
Jamal Khashoggi. However, neither the UK, nor France or the US, counting, next to
Germany, as main arms suppliers to Saudi Arabia, join the embargo. Moreover, in
March 2019, Germany succumbs to the European arms industry pressure allowing
German spare parts to be sold to Saudi Arabia.
Against this background, this chapter aims to contribute in two ways. First, based
on our dashboard covering the period 2015–2019, we offer an analysis of the effec-
tiveness of an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia. Second, we elaborate on the
question as to how political, security and economic motives have impacted the
(un)willingness of major arms selling states to join the arms embargo against Saudi
Arabia?
The remaining part of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 13.2 introduces
our dashboard for measuring the effectiveness of arms embargoes. Section 13.3
proceeds to operationalize the dashboard. Next, in Sect. 13.4, the results are
presented, and Sect. 13.5 offers a conclusion and a discussion.
13.2 A Dashboard for Analyzing the Effectiveness of Arms
Embargoes
The dashboard to assess the effectiveness of the arms embargo against Saudi Arabia
is derived from the framework developed by Brzoska.6 Brzoska’s framework to
assess the effectiveness of arms embargoes consists of three levels of effectiveness.
Both Level-1 and Level-2 effectiveness are noticed in the domain of the embargo
receiver, whereas Level-3 effectiveness takes place in the domain of the sender.
Level-1 effectiveness is attained when the targeted state (i.e., the receiver of the
arms embargo) changes its policy. Level-2 effectiveness is understood as “the degree
to which deliveries of weapons to the target are stopped”. According to Brzoska,
Level-3 can be measured by “the expressed satisfaction of sender government with
the operation of an arms embargo”. In our opinion, within Level-3 states indicating
they support the embargo as a “symbolic gesture of disapproval” can be distinguished
from states actually imposing and implementing the embargo.
Grounded in Brzoska’s work, we have proceeded as follows to construct the dash-
board. The highest manifestation of effectiveness is related to the core objective of
arms embargoes: influencing the behavior of target. The attainment of this goal is
called Level-1 effectiveness. Level-1 is to be measured within the domain of the
receiver of the embargo. Level-2 effectiveness is measured by the degree in which
deliveries of weapons to the target are stopped. Level-3 effectiveness is measured
6 Brzoska and Lopez 2009.
246 M. Bogers et al.
from the perspective of states delivering arms to the receiver of the embargo. When-
ever most arms traders actually implement the embargo and stop their arms supplies
to the target, Level-3 effectiveness has been reached. Finally, Level-4 effectiveness
is attained in those cases when states supplying arms to the target, indicate they are
joining the arms embargo.
An arms embargo is considered non-effective under the condition that none of the
governments of arms-supplying states indicate their intention to join the embargo.
At Level-4, an embargo will become more effective, if and when, at least one,
some or all arms-supplying states communicate they intend to join the embargo.
At Level-3, the embargo’s effectiveness increases even more, if and when, at least
one, some or all arms-supplying states put an end to their arms deliveries. Level-3 and
Level-4 effectiveness apply to the domain of the embargo-senders. At Level-2, the
arms embargo gains effectiveness the longer a targeted state (the embargo-receiver)
is able to import less weaponry. Last, Level-1 effectiveness is reached when the
targeted state actually changes its behavior, which is then attributed explicitly to
the arms embargo. Both Level-1 and Level-2 effectiveness are to be reached in the
domain of the embargo-receiver. The following section proceeds to operationalize
the dashboard.
13.3 Research Methods
The findings presented in this chapter are the result of an exploratory study. Encour-
aged by Brzoska, we analyze the effectiveness of the arms embargo against Saudi
Arabia on four levels.7 To obtain insights into the attainment of Level-1 effectiveness,
we investigated whether Saudi Arabia actually changed its behavior due to the arms
embargo. To this end, we have selected proxies analyzing the shift in the number
of attacks carried out by the Saudi-led coalition on civilian gatherings, educational
facilities andmedical facilities and the number of civilian casualties during the period
2015-2019. This is not to say that these particular measures are the only one worth
considering. On the contrary, we acknowledge that these measures are meant to illus-
trate how Level-1 effectiveness can be measured. Level-2 effectiveness concerns the
extent towhich deliveries ofweapons to SaudiArabia have been stopped.Wemeasure
this from the perspective of the importing country, analyzing the shift in volume of
arms imports by Saudi Arabia from 2015 until 2019. Level-2 effectiveness is obvi-
ously influenced by the behavior of the supplying states, as, arms suppliers have to
cooperate to achieve Level-2 effectiveness. However, although a state can assure no
arms are exported from its own country to SaudiArabia, it can only partially influence
other arms exporting states’ export policies. For this reason, Level-3 effectiveness
measures the volume of the arms exports to Saudi Arabia per supplying country. Due
to the availability of data our research on Level-2 and Level-3 effectiveness only
captures the reported legal arms trade. Last, Level-4 effectiveness analyzes states
7 Brzoska 2009a.
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Table 13.1 Summary of parameters
Effectiveness level Parameters Figure/Table Source
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Source Yemen Data Project 2020; SIPRI 2020a
motivated to implement an arms embargo, at once, versus those that needed addi-
tional convincing, by arguments, compensations, or other means. In doing so, we
also consider states maintaining- or prematurely lifting the arms embargo as well as
political statements expressing more or less political interest in achieving Level-1
effectiveness.
Table 13.1 summarizes the parameters selected to assess the effectiveness levels 1
to 4. Levels 1 to 3 are measured quantitatively. As, from early 2015, some European
states (Austria, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland) started to ban exports of (heavy)
weaponry to Saudi Arabia, this study’s time horizon is fixed between January 2015
and December 2019. Level-4 effectiveness is examined by means of a qualitative
interpretation of political statements, news articles and research reports.
13.4 Results
13.4.1 Level-1 Effectiveness: Influencing the Behavior
of Saudi Arabia
From January 2015, this section presents data on the number of air raids conducted
by the military coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arabian Emirates on
civilian gatherings, including data on the numbers of civilian casualties due to the
attacks. Figure 13.1 shows fluctuations between 2015 and 2019. The number of
civilian casualties due to attacks on civilian gatherings shows a decrease. Resulting
from attacks on civilian gatherings, in 2015, 4,255 civilians died, whereas in 2019
the number of casualties was reduced to 515.
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Fig. 13.1 Attacks on civilian gatherings and civilian casualties. Source Yemen Data Project 2020
From Fig. 13.2, there appears a decrease in the number of attacks on educational
facilities from 2015 until 2019 and the number of casualties decreases accordingly
until 2019. InAugust 2019, the attack on a community college in Dhamar City causes
the number of civilian casualties to soar to 206.
From Fig. 13.3, it transpires that although, from 2015 to 2019, the number of
attacks on medical facilities fluctuates, in 2019 it drops to zero. The same applies to
the number of civilian casualties due to attacks on medical facilities.
Based on the data presented above, from 2015 until 2019 the numbers of attacks
on civilian gatherings, educational- andmedical facilities and civilian casualties have
Fig. 13.2 Attacks on educational facilities and civilian casualties. SourceYemenData Project 2020
13 Effectiveness of Arms Control: The Case of Saudi Arabia 249
Fig. 13.3 Attacks on Medical Facilities and Civilian Casualties. Source Yemen Data Project 2020
decreased, excepting the 206 people killed as a result of the attack on a community
college in Dhamar in August 2019. However, according to us, the numbers of attacks
on civilian gatherings remain high and, moreover, it is questionable whether these
decreases have indeed resulted directly from the arms embargo. In February 2016,
the European Parliament already started to call on the European Union to impose an
arms embargo against Saudi Arabia, however, most European governments adopted
restrictions on their arms export to Saudi Arabia not earlier than 2018. According to
the Trump administration, US involvement inYemen andUS support to the Saudi-led
coalition, amongst other reasons, aims to prevent more civilian casualties,8 and, so,
supporting Saudi Arabia with intelligence and advanced weapons could be supposed
to actually help lessening the numbers of civilian casualties. However, the UNGroup
of Eminent International and Regional Experts in Yemen (GEE), in their research
report, concludes that a series of airstrikes conducted from June 2019 to June 2020,
appear to have been undertaken without proper regard to principles of distinction,
proportionality and precaution, necessary to protect the Yemen population.9 Based
on this report and the fact that the number of attacks on civilian gatherings, in 2019,
remains high, we find the arms embargo at Level-1 is not effective.
13.4.2 Level-2 Effectiveness: The Volume of Weapon Imports
into Saudi Arabia
Level-2 effectiveness examines how the volume of weapon imports of Saudi Arabia
fluctuates from 2015 until 2019. Figure 11.4 shows Saudi Arabian weapon imports
8 The Guardian 2019a.
9 UN 2020.
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Fig. 13.4 Volume weapon imports to Saudi Arabia. Source SIPRI 2020a
have increased. According to SIPRI, during this period, Saudi Arabia counted as the
world’s largest arms importer, its imports of major arms accounting for 12 per cent
of global arms imports in 2015–2019.10 Despite wide-ranging concerns of the EU
Parliament and US Congress about both the Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in
Yemen and the ensuing humanitarian situation, Saudi Arabia apparently succeeded
in increasing its weapon imports.11 Although US Congress considered and passed
proposals to reject some US arms sales and to end US military involvement in oper-
ations related to the anti-Houthi campaign, no one voted to overrule presidential
vetoes of related legislation.12 The same applies to the EU. Despite various calls of
Members of the European Parliament (EP) to find a political solution for the conflict
in Yemen and to impose an EU arms embargo against Saudi Arabia, the largest arms
exporting countries, France and the UK decided not to follow suit. However, a court
ruling in June 2019 forced the UK government to suspend new arms sales to Saudi
Arabia until its decision making process was reconsidered and lawful.13 Figure 13.4
presents an increasing trend of Saudi Arabianweapon imports, and, thus, we consider
the arms embargo—at the second level of analysis, as not effective.
13.4.3 Level-3 Effectiveness: The Volume of Arms Exports
to Saudi Arabia per Country
Table 13.2 sheds light on the arms export volumes to Saudi Arabia per country from
2013-2019. We have decided to add 2013 and 2014 to Table 11.2 to find potential
10 SIPRI 2020b.
11 EU 2020; CRS 2020.
12 CRS 2020.
13 Court of Appeal 2019a; 2019b.
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Table 13.2 The volume of arms exports to Saudi Arabia (2013–2019)
Country 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2015–2019 Rank
Austria 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 8 17
Belgium 21 10 0 0 0 0 38 38 11
Bulgaria 0 0 8 1 15 0 0 24 13
Canada 34 45 111 11 10 46 107 285 5
China 0 0 35 15 35 40 40 165 9
Finland 4 7 7 0 0 0 0 7 18
France 53 169 161 76 115 197 209 758 3
Georgia 0 0 0 6 7 0 0 13 16
Germany 80 63 2 16 121 140 0 279 6
Italy 0 0 89 89 48 0 0 226 7
Netherlands 25 25 25 0 0 0 0 25 12
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 19
Serbia 0 0 4 11 2 0 0 17 14
Slovakia 1 0 3 3 0 0 0 6 20
South Africa 0 1 5 4 6 0 0 15 15
South Korea 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 21
Spain 0 98 208 0 15 70 0 293 4
Sweden 0 160 0 1 0 0 0 1 22
Switzerland 0 83 142 44 0 0 0 186 8
Turkey 44 39 52 39 13 0 0 104 10
UK 746 615 751 858 425 61 135 2230 2
US 607 1426 1774 1769 3121 3202 3138 13004 1
Source SIPRI 2020a
differences in arms exports of supplying states, comparing the two years before the
start of coalition attacks in 2015 to the period from 2015 until 2019.
Between 2015 and 2019, the US, the UK, France, Spain and Canada were the
five largest arms exporting countries to Saudi Arabia. Together, these five countries
accounted for 94 per cent of the arms exports. The US, counting as the main arms
contributor, contributed over 5 times more than the second largest arms exporting
country, the UK. From 2017, the US almost doubled their arms exports to Saudi
Arabia. This increase is, amongst others, the result of the May 2017 arms deal,
worth $110 billion, by which the US commits to supply military equipment to Saudi
Arabia.14 Starting from 2017, UK arms exports figures decrease, partly because of
a court ruling in June 2019, forcing the British government to reconsider and adjust
its decision-making processes before approving new weapon sales to Saudi Arabia
14 US Department of State 2017, 2021.
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Table 13.3 Volume of arms exports to Saudi Arabia as a percentage of total arms exports per
country (2013–2019)
Country 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Volume (TIV)
2013–2019
Austria 0 0 40 25 0 0 0 7
Belgium 38 100 0 0 0 0 90 68
Bulgaria 0 0 11 2 50 0 0 24
Canada 18 22 32 9 14 41 57 365
China 0 0 2 1 3 4 3 165
Finland 5 8 35 0 0 0 0 18
France 4 10 8 4 5 11 6 979
Georgia 0 0 0 100 100 0 0 13
Germany 10 4 0 1 6 13 0 422
Italy 0 0 13 14 6 0 0 226
Netherlands 7 4 5 0 0 0 0 75
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
Serbia 0 0 11 48 100 0 0 17
Slovakia 100 0 100 17 0 0 0 6
South Africa 0 2 9 5 8 0 0 16
South Korea 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3
Spain 0 9 18 0 2 7 0 391
Sweden 0 48 0 0 0 0 0 161
Switzerland 0 25 30 21 0 0 0 270
Turkey 28 24 21 17 8 0 0 187
UK 46 37 64 62 35 9 14 3,590
US 8 15 18 18 26 31 29 15,037
Source SIPRI 2020a
as well as to reconsider already existing arms deals.15 As to France, the third main
supplier of arms to Saudi Arabia, from 2017, reaching its apex in 2019, French arms
exports increase. Canada ranks fourth, caused by major supplies in 2015 and 2019.
The bulk of these exports were light-armored vehicles, large caliber artillery and
heavy machine guns. Spain comes in as the fifth largest arms exporting country as, in
2015, Spain delivered two Airbus A330-200 MRTT in-flight refueling jets to Saudi
Arabia. In the same year they sold the Saudis two Transport aircrafts and two MP
aircrafts, whereas, from 2017 to 2018, 100 Alakran 120 mm were delivered.16
Table 13.3 presents the volume of weapon exports to Saudi Arabia as a percentage
of a country’s total weapon export and offers additional insights into the size and the
financial importance of the arms sales of arms exporting countries. As Saudi Arabia
15 Court of Appeal 2019a; 2019b.
16 SIPRI 2020c.
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Table 13.4 Overview of national decisions regarding the arms embargo
Early adopters (action taken
in 2015)
Countries officially imposing an
arms embargo or suspended
(future) approvals of military
equipment.











Source Bogers et al. 2021
counts as one of their largest buyers, Belgium, Canada, Georgia, Serbia, the UK
and the US may be expected to be less willing to impose an arms embargo. For, as
compared to other countries, a discontinuity of arms sales will impact their domestic
arms industries heavier. Unfortunately, we have no information on foregone revenues
of countries that did put their arms sales on hold.
Based on the data in Table 13.3, we consider the arms embargo—at the third level
of analysis, as -partly-effective. In 2015, seventeen countries exported arms to Saudi
Arabia. Since then, the number of arms supplying countries has decreased. In 2019,
only seven countries were still supplying weapons. However, it should be noted that,
over recent years, arms exports from the US, France and Canada have expanded
substantially.
13.4.4 Level-4 Effectiveness: The Political Will to Implement
an Arms Embargo
At this fourth level of effectiveness, the analysis takes stock of the countries that offi-
cially imposed an arms embargo or suspended future approvals ofmilitary equipment
to Saudi Arabia. Next, the analysis reflects on which countries have been directly
motivated to take actions against Saudi Arabia in 2015, the ones that needed further
prodding, by arguments, compensations, or other means. Last, the analysis at Level-
4 considers the countries that either maintained the arms embargo or prematurely
lifted the arms embargo as well as any political statements expressing more or less
political interest in achieving Level-1 effectiveness.
As early as in 2015, some European countries decided to end their arms supplies
to Saudi Arabia (see Table 13.4). According to Austria’s Foreign Minister Kneissl,
Austria already stopped sending military equipment to Saudi Arabia in 2015.17
In January 2015, Germany decided not to sell Leopard tanks to Saudi Arabia.18
17 Reuters 2018a.
18 The Japan Times 2015.
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Sweden decided not to extend a military cooperation agreement.19 Also, Switzer-
land imposed strict export restrictions for all countries involved in the YemenWar.20
Next, Belgium,21 Denmark,22 Germany,23 Finland,24 Italy,25 Norway,26 the Nether-
lands,27 South Africa,28 Sweden,29 Switzerland,30 and the UK31 officially imposed
an arms embargo or suspended (future) approvals of military equipment (see Table
13.4).
Germany is numbered among the main arms exporting countries imposing an
arms embargo. In March 2018, Germany’s political parties CDU/CSU agreed in
their coalition contract to ban arms exports. On account of German national history,
Chancellor Angela Merkel saw good reasons to adhere to strict arms export guide-
lines, “Germany should not compromise for the sake of profits and dissatisfaction
of its defense community.”32 Although the country initially pursued a total arms
export ban, later Germany eased restrictions to enable the supply of components and
spare parts for completed contracts.33 Under pressure from France andUK, Germany
allowed for more leeway regarding systems developed jointly with other European
countries. It appeared that, as Germany was heavily involved in the production of
components exported by others, the German arms ban on Saudi Arabia held disas-
trous consequences for lucrative European projects. According to Merkel, “we have
just as good reasons in our defense community to stand together in a joint defense
policy. And if we want to develop joint fighter planes, joint tanks, then there’s no
other way but to move step by step towards common export controls guidelines.”34
Despite the country’s initial total arms export ban, in the end Germany was left with
an agreement containing numerous exceptions and even allowing some exports of
German weapons to the Gulf State.
Table 13.5 provides an overview of countries, that although initially agreeing to
impose an arms embargo, at a later stage reverted to newexport orders to avoid hurting
their defense industry’s commercial reputation or, even, European defense industry
19 The Local 2015.
20 Swissinfo 2015.
21 Iran Press 2018; MPNnews 2016; ParsToday 2018.
22 Reuters 2018b.
23 The Japan Times (2015); Financial Times (2018); The Defense Post (2019).
24 Middle East Monitor 2018a.
25 Politico 2018.
26 The Defense Post 2018.
27 Independent 2016; Middle East Monitor 2018b.
28 Middle East Eye 2019, Reuters 2019a.
29 The Local 2015.
30 Swissinfo 2015.
31 BBC 2019; Castle 2020, Sandle and Faulconbridge 2019, Brooke-Holland and Smith 2021; Court
of Appeal 2019a; 2019b.
32 Human Rights Watch 2019.
33 Defense Security Monitor 2020.
34 The Guardian 2019b.
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Table 13.5 Countries that imposed an arms embargo and allowed new export orders to Saudi
Arabia
Country New orders 2015–2019 Description Year Comments
Germany 2 IPV-60 OPV 2015 Delivery suspended as part
of temporarily German halt
on arms deliveries in 2019
23 EC145 Light helicopter 2016 EUR500m deal; ordered via
France
4 TRS-4D Radar 2017 For 4 MMSC frigates from
the US
24 OM-366 Diesel engine 2018 For 24 CAESAR
self-propelled guns from
France
Sweden 71 MD5 Diesel engine 2015 For Bastion APC from
France
Switzerland 5 GDM-008 35mm CIWS 2018 For 5 Avante-2200 frigates
from Spain
Source SIPRI 2020c
goals. Despite several resolutions of the EP to impose an embargo on military arms
export to Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, Italy and the UK refrained from
following suit until June 2019. Italy had economic reasons to not impose an arms
embargo, as appears for instance, from the situation of RWMItalia, an arms producer,
counting Saudi Arabia as its main client. RWM Italia is owned for 100 percent by
Rheinmetall, Germany’s largest arms firm. Due to Germany’s arms ban, Rheinmetall
was not allowed to deliver weapons to Saudi Arabia, but, as a company registered
in Italy, RWM Italia was not restricted by the German arms regulations.35 Come
June 2019, on account of a campaign instigated by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), the Italian Parliament eventually agreed to change their arms exporting
policies to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Consequentially, RWM Italia
suffered substantial financial losses and staff unemployment.
Table 13.3 shows that from2015until 2019, arms exports toSaudiArabia represent
on average 41 per cent of the UK’s total arms export, providing the country clear
economic reasons to abstain from any arms embargo. Moreover, security, is also
mentioned as a reason to continue the arms trades with Saudi Arabia.36 The phrase
“Gulf security is our security” is repeatedly mentioned by the UK government, for
instance, for countering Iranian actions in the region.37 The slogan “Global Britain”
emphasizes the UK’s foreign and trade policy to re-establish and strengthen bilat-
eral relations.38 However, there are also opponents of the UK arms exports to Saudi
Arabia. During 2015–2019, the UK government resisted pressure from opposition
35 Politico 2018.
36 Van Rij and Wilkinson 2018.
37 Arab News 2016; Devanny and Berry 2021; Ministry of Defence 2019; Reuters 2016.
38 Van Rij and Wilkinson 2018.
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parties and campaign groups to suspend arms sales. The campaign group Campaign
Against Arms Trade, which opposes arms exports to Saudi Arabia, took the UK
government to court. Although the High Court rejected their claim in 2017, in June
2019 the Court of Appeal concluded the government must reconsider the decision-
making-process for approving export licenses and reconsider existing licenses. Until
then the UK was not allowed to grant new arms export licenses to Saudi Arabia.
In 2020, the UK government resumed granting licenses after reconsidering and
adjusting its process and concluded there was no clear risk British arms exports to SA
might be used in the commission of a serious violation of International Humanitarian
Law. Security, economics and the UK’s trade-/foreign policy seem the main reasons
for the UK to continue their arms sales to Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia is one of the main buyers of Canadian arms (see Table 13.3). Over
the years 2018-2019, Canada delivered 250 Light Armored Vehicles (LAV-700) to
Saudi Arabia, a $14 billion deal contracted in 2014.39 After media reports on the
involvement of the Saudi government in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi,
in October 2018 the Trudeau administration promised to suspend approvals of new
arms export permits during the review of the LAV-700 arms deal. However, this
decision did not affect the delivery scheme. In 2020, Canadian Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, François-Philippe Champagne and of Finance, Bill Morneau explained why
the government did not cancel the arms deal. “The cancellation of the $14 billion
contract -or even the mere disclosure of any of its terms- could have resulted in
billions of dollars in damages to the Government of Canada, with potential damages
amounting to the full value of the contract. This would have put the jobs of thou-
sands of Canadians at risk, not only in Southwestern Ontario but also across the
entire defence industry supply chain, which includes hundreds of small and medium
enterprises.” To ensure that, in future, the Canadian government will be able to
uphold high standards with regarding Human Rights, the government has improved
the agreement. “We have ensured that Canadian’s exposure to financial risk will be
eliminated where future export permits are delayed or denied if there is an infringe-
ment of the permit’s end use assurances—which ensure that the vehicles are used
only for the stated purpose”.40
Other main arms exporters to Saudi Arabia—such as the US, France and Spain—
did not implement the restrictions (see Table 13.4). In 2016, France sold, amongst
others, three patrol vessels (Combattante FS-56) to Saudi Arabia, a e250 million
deal.41 As the Saudi-led coalition is known to have used boats for a naval blockade
of ports, thereby aggravating an already existing humanitarian crisis, this arms sale
has been debated intensely. Asked about the continuing arms sales, PresidentMacron
stated, “Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are allies of France and allies in
the fight against terrorism. We accept responsibility for that.” Security appears the
main reason for France to continue their arms sales (see Table 13.3). According to
the FrenchMinister of Defence, Florence Parly, “Tomy knowledge, French weapons
39 SIPRI 2020c.
40 Global Affairs Canada 2020.
41 SIPRI 2020c.
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are not being used in any offensive in the war in Yemen. I do not have any evidence
that would lead me to believe that French arms are behind the origins of civilian
victims in Yemen”.42
Since 2015, the US has provided limited military support to the Saudi-led coali-
tion, including intelligence sharing, logistics support and, until 2019, in-flight refu-
eling of non-US aircraft. As a result of the civil casualties inYemen, President Obama
decided to halt some arms sales at the end of his term, but these wereminor in relation
to the total arms exports to Saudi Arabia.43 During the Trump administration, rela-
tions with Saudi Arabia have been tightened. In 2017, Saudi Arabia agreed to spend
and invest $450 billion in the US of which $110 billion were to be spent on military
equipment. In 2019, President Trump vetoed several resolutions of the Senate to
withdraw troops and limit weapon exports to Saudi Arabia. According to President
Trump the US would be foolish to cancel these contracts because Russia and China
would be the enormous beneficiaries.44 He also stated that the US is not engaged in
hostilities in or affecting Yemen. Main arguments not to impose an embargo or to
limit weapons exports are to protect Americans in the region from rebels, to main-
tain good bilateral relations, to prevent civilian casualties by limited support, prevent
the spread of terrorism, to discourage the malign activities of Iran in the region and
several economic reasons e.g., to maintain the competitive position of the US.45 The
economy and the balance of power in the region seem the main reasons for the US
to continue their arms sales.
Based on Table 13.4, we consider the arms embargo—on the fourth level of
analysis—partially effective. Most Western States used the arms export restrictions
to send out a clear signal condemning the offensive actions of Saudi Arabia in Yemen
and their alleged involvement in the killing of Khashoggi. However, dissociation of
the Western world would be more credible if the largest arms exporting countries,
France, the US and Spain, were also willing to implement arms export restrictions
andwhen stateswould have directly imposed an arms ban putting human rights above
economic stakes.
13.5 Conclusions
Literature offers no comprehensive nor accepted definition of what constitutes an
effective arms embargo. However, we find an arms embargo can score differently on
four levels of effectiveness. Since the restrictions did not impact Saudi behavior, and
neither resulted in reducing arms flows, we consider the arms embargo ineffective on
Level-1 and Level-2. Level-3 and Level-4 effectiveness are not about influencing the
behavior of the targeted state and measures the political decisiveness of governing
42 Reuters 2019b.
43 Stewart and Strobel 2016; Hudson 2016.
44 The Observer 2018.
45 Landler and Baker 2019.
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parties. The analysis allows for better understandingnational reasons to followcertain
strategies regarding arms export to Saudi Arabia. As the number of states, imposing
an arms embargo or suspending (future) approvals of military equipment surpasses
the number of states opposing the arms embargo, at Level-3 and Level-4, we find the
arms embargo partially effective.
According to us, the chosen parameters in combination with the qualitative inter-
pretation provide an interesting view on the effectiveness of the arms embargo and the
behavior of the various states concerned. The quantitative analysis allows for better
understanding why nations adhere to specific strategies regarding the export of arms
to Saudi Arabia. The qualitative interpretation provides an interesting perspective on
the behavior of arms exporting countries in the complex labyrinth of political and
economic stakes.AsSaudiArabia has becomeamajor armsbuyer and is seen by some
nations as a bulwark against Iranian influence in theMiddle East, understandably the
political and economic stakes are of great significance.
Some states seem to struggle to effectively act upon Saudi Arabia’s airstrikes in
Yemen. Most nations consider these actions as serious violations of international
humanitarian law. However, economic interests seemingly keep them in a strangle
hold. Some nations continued weapon supplies, because a cancellation of contract
would have resulted in enormous losses. Other nations put a hold on their arms
supplies, but, facing pressure of their European allies, needed to end their strict arms
export ban to avoid hurting their defense industry’s reputation and undermining their
ambition to develop a common European Defense industry.
This study suggests that if the core objective of the arms embargo is to achieve
Level-1 and Level-2 effectiveness, a collective approach of the international commu-
nity is of paramount importance. There will be little chance of success at either level
unless the embargoes are imposed collectively. The effect of states’ actions that did
impose the embargo has remained limited, due to the unwillingness of some major
arms exporting countries, opposing the arms embargo. As Level-3 and Level-4 effec-
tiveness take place in the domain of the embargo senders, success at these levels will
be easier to achieve. Although the core objective of the arms embargo—influencing
the behavior of Saudi Arabia- has not been reached, this has not seemed to deter
most governments to invoke an arms embargo or suspend future arms sales. Govern-
mental decisions are linked to internal politics and domestic pressure. Opposing an
arms embargo may cause political damage to some governing parties.
One limitation in regard to our investigation is that we were only able to study the
period 2015–2019. Most European governments adopted restrictions on their arms
export to Saudi Arabia not earlier than 2018. Due to a lag effect the effectiveness
of the arms embargo may become apparent after 2019 which makes our results
preliminary. Further research is needed.
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14.1 Introduction
This chapter describes and analyses a situation of non-compliance in relation to the
US export control regulations, more specific the International Arms Trade Regu-
lations (ITAR). We consider an unauthorized transfer of a so-called Dronebuster
from the Army to a National Research Institution (NRI) for research purposes in a
fictitious, non-existent European NATO member state (hereafter named EUMS).
Someyears ago, theMinistry ofDefence (MoD) of theEUMSpurchased a number
of Dronebusters to serve in missions against drone threats. In the slipstream of an
investigation on drone threats and a range of counter measures by Dronebusters
taking place in the vicinity of EUMS airports, it was deemed necessary to investigate
the impact of Dronebusters on other electrical and electro-magnetic systems present.
Without much ado, the Army proceeded to submit one Dronebuster for closer testing
by the NRI, specifically with regard to the Dronebuster’s electro-magnetic impact
on other systems.
By the time the MoD’s Export Control Compliance Team (ECCT) became aware
of the Dronebuster’s transfer to NRI, the item had already been tested and returned to
the Army. However, as the Dronebuster, an export controlled item under the Interna-
tionalTraffic inArmsRegulations (ITAR)hadbeenpurchased in theUSby theMoD’s
Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), handing it over to NRI—outside the MoD—would
have required prior authorization by the US. As it turned out, the Army was neither
aware of the Dronebuster being an export-controlled item nor that prior authorization
for the transfer should have been mandated.
Based on the Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) framework, our case-study serves
as an investigation into the underlying causes and conditions of this unauthorized
transfer.1 We ask what causes and conditions have resulted in the unauthorized
transfer of the Dronebuster. Section 14.2 introduces non-compliant behaviour in this
(hypothetical) case study. Section 14.3 analyses the causes at the macro-, meso- and
micro-levels. Derived from information gathered in the third section, in Sect. 14.4
we develop an appropriate response. In the final section, Sect. 14.5, we discuss our
findings.
14.2 Scanning
A Dronebuster is an efficient tool for preventing drones to approach secured areas
or own troops. A Dronebuster operator can jam the drone command link causing it
to hover or return home. Also, the signal can be jammed to the extent a drone will
crash or land. The operator only needs to pull and hold the trigger of the Dronebuster.
Dronebuster Block 3 is an export controlled itemunderUS export control regulations,
specifically, ITAR. Furthermore, Dronebusters have been classified as Significant
Military Equipment.
1 Braga 2008.
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EUMS MoD acquired Dronebusters to serve in missions, either domestic or
abroad, against drone threats. When it became necessary to investigate the impact of
Dronebusters on other electrical and electro-magnetic systems at airports, the Army
offered oneDronebuster toNRI for testing.Additionally,NRI requested to be allowed
to open the systems for further investigations. However, this request was denied by
the MoD, on the grounds that, re-transfer of a Dronebuster, its data, software etc.
to parties outside the EUMS MoD is not allowed without prior authorization by the
US government. At the time the Army’s Export Control officer was notified of the
transfer to NRI the item had already been tested and returned.
Previous investigations into this case have clarified that officers and staff involved
in thisDronebuster transfer toNRIwere unaware of the requested prior authorization,
both in case of transferring as well as testing export controlled items. The main issue
here appears a lack of awareness among all involved personnel.
This raises several questions for further analysis. First, as export control was
already relatively well known within the EUMS MoD why were these officers and
staff not informed on the export control implications of a Dronebuster transfer to
NRI? Second, information on the export control classification is available and visible
whenever employees attempt to transfer export control items outside the MoD. Why
did the personnel involved fail to react to this information?Why were they not aware
of the implications of the export control references? Why did the internal control
system not operate as expected?
14.3 Analysis
14.3.1 Macro-level: Export Control Laws and Regulations
for the MoD
Export control laws and regulations; international as well as national have been in
place for a substantial period of time, starting with treaties on weapons of mass
destruction after World War II. In modern warfare, export control frameworks have
become more comprehensive and influential. For many years the EUMS MoD did
not fully appreciate their relevance for daily business and operations, although a
fair number of EUMS’ weapon systems and equipment were acquired in the United
States, and, consequentially, remained under US export control regulations.
In 2011, both an investigation into the relevance of export control regulations
regarding the EUMS MoD, as well as the (non-)compliance situation, at the time,
made clear export control still was not very high on the agenda. This all changed,
as it transpired that some serious violations of export control regulations had taken
place within the EUMS Airforce. Voluntary disclosures were brought to the atten-
tion of the US government, thereby turning into a sensitive political issue for the
EUMS government and parliament. As at the macro-level the political and regu-
latory consequences became increasingly clear and explicit, at the meso-level, the
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organizational level of the MoD, actions were required. As a result, commands and
instructions started cascading down the Operational Commands (Navy, Army, Air
Force) requesting commanders to implement export control regulations and to install
and execute internal compliance programs.
14.3.2 Meso-level: The EUMS Army
From 2014, the Army started implementing export control regulations. At the time,
theArmy’s sloganwas theywere using ‘a raincoat and a sharp pocket knife’ instead of
any technologically advanced equipment. At all Army levels, knowledge on Export
Control was limited, and personnel largely remained unaware of any legal, moral or
ethical issues involved.
In 2016, it became clear that something had to be done about this awareness and
knowledge gap as the Army increasingly acquired advanced equipment and specific
technology from the US and therefore subject to ITAR. The Commander of the Army
started their internal compliance program in 2016. At unit levels, serious handling of
export control regulations did start from 2016 by describing an internal compliance
program and by introducing a dedicated organizational unit within the organization.
By the end of 2018, this organizational unit has turned into a standing unit (i.e., the
Export Control Compliance Team).
Amongst others, internal compliance programs (ICPs) are to raise organizational
awareness on the relevance and importance of export control laws and regula-
tions. And this is where the Dronebuster case went askew, for, as it turned out,
involved personnel were completely unaware of export control implications of their
actions. Looking back, it seems obvious that, when starting with the construction and
implementation of an ICP, awareness will not be raised throughout the organization
immediately.
However, four years later, in the EUMS Army, the Export Control Compliance
Team is still on the road, regularly spreading the export control news. A lot has been
invested in these roadshows on behalf of commanding officers and relevant staff
in security and logistics, as well as the organization of training and publishing on
intranet. Education and training is one of the Key Performance Drivers for a Defence
Organization. Export Control was a relatively new feature within the EUMS MoD,
and lacking appropriate training/education has led -and sometimes still does- to non-
compliant actions. Familiarity with Export Control regulations increases compliance
(e.g., by training and information sessions) and will contribute in Export Control
compliance in general.2
Communication and training have undoubtedly contributed to an increased aware-
ness at the organizational level. However, as the Army is a large, multi-layered orga-
nization, awareness levels are expected to vary across the organization and its various
units. As it is possible, bureaucratic rules and regulations can facilitate non-compliant
2 Gelderman et al. 2006.
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activities, transparency and accountability at all organizational levels should be aimed
for. Obviously, the MoD’s export control organization is still ‘under construction’,
progressing towards maturity.
14.3.3 Micro-level: Awareness of Individuals
At the micro-level, the level of the individual employee (commander, staff, soldier),
actions taken at the macro- and meso-level appear to induce increasing levels of
awareness. Personnel directly involved in security and logistics, in general, are both
knowledgeable when it comes to export control as well as experienced in using ICT
systems and in cooperation with export control support teams. Nevertheless, as the
non-compliant behaviour regarding the Dronebuster has made clear, there is still
work to be done in this respect.
At the micro-level, one important characteristic of the EUMS MoD is vital
when planning to increase employee awareness. This regards the fact that military
staff rotates every three years, and sometimes even faster. Consequentially, raising
knowledge and awareness knowledge and awareness within the various units of the
organization has to be undertaken as a continuous endeavour, deserving constant
attention.
It is clear that introducing measures (e.g., ICP) at an organizational (meso-)level
does not automatically imply compliance at a (micro-)individual level. Because all
three organizational levels are intertwined, a problem and a solution at one level will
always need additional analyses at the other levels. Therefore, serious investments
in staff and personnel will be required, also considering other specific characteristics
of military personnel (e.g., can-do mentality).
In the Dronebuster case, export control regulations were not lived up to because
employees were unaware of export control implications of their actions. On top of
this, however, it appeared the implications of this neglect were underestimated and
evendisregarded.Oneof theEUMSArmy’s paramount guidelines is themissionmust
be fulfilled, no matter what. ‘Make it happen, no matter what’ may be considered
an Army maxim professing a positive organizational culture, although it comes with
a serious downside, regarding its potential to instigate non-compliant behaviour in
the workspace.3 At the micro-level, such maxims can result in employees believing
that, in order to fulfil the mission, laws and regulations may be avoided or even
circumvented.Although such behaviourmaybe considered adequate duringmissions
and other operational situations, in peace situations, concerning export control
regulations, this will thwart and even obstruct the effectiveness of new rules or
reforms.4
As it turned out, employees rationalized their unawareness and breaking of rele-
vant export control regulations by pointing at the organization, that did not ‘educate’
3 Griffin 2013.
4 Interligi 2010.
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them sufficiently in this respect. The fact that the system of internal control was
not fully functional may have added to this feeling. Furthermore, Army employees,
mandated to execute actionswithin their ownwork field in combinationwith not fully
operational internal controls (e.g., an ICT system not blocking transactions when
proper authorizations are lacking) opens the possibility to violate, either knowingly
or unknowingly, export control regulations. A process which excludes all possible
mistakes or deviance seems unfeasible (opportunities continue to exist for those who
want to be deviant/non-compliant). According to cognitive dissonance theory forced
ExportControl compliance can culminate into cognitive dissonanceor non-compliant
behaviour.5 Therefore, constant control and monitoring remain necessary.6
14.4 Response
According to the definition of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners,7 the
EUMS Dronebuster case can be defined in terms of fraudulent reporting or fraud on
behalf of the organization, aiming to make the organization look better than it is. This
sounds somewhat harsh, and one may argue whether this constitutes actual ‘fraud’.
In almost all Defence cases bearing resemblance to this one, there is no motive for
personal gain (nothing is taken away), instead, the main driver for non-compliant
behaviour appears to be to create an image of an organization functioning properly.
Employees, not considering the appropriate regulation, appear to want to fix an issue.
Thus, instead of fraud, we refer to this kind of behaviour as non-compliant or deviant
behaviour.
Building on Braga’s8 problem-oriented policing and crime prevention, and to
induce potential novel ways for proper behaviour, we have applied amodel presented
by Cornish and Clarke.9 The authors use the idea of situational crime prevention as a
starting point, and, from here, have developed a related list of techniques and specific
programs. To us, thismodel has been useful because it urged us to thinkmore in-depth
instead of aiming for short term success.
In a reflection on Cornish and Clarke, we suggest the following responses. First,
introduce controls to complicate deviant behaviour (i.e., clear procedures; working
internal controls in IT systems; no manoeuvre or escape possibilities; and access
authorizations in accordance with one’s role). Second, increase the risk of exposure
of deviant behaviour (i.e., extend action responsibility from one officer to two or
more officers; separate duties, roles, and responsibilities; four eyes principle; peer
reviews and audits focussed on export control). Third, reduce rewards for deviant
5 Festinger 1962.
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behaviour (i.e., clearly communicate rewards for correct export compliant behaviour
as well as disciplinary actions following from non-compliance).
Fourth, clarify stressful situations and procedures. Often, employees experience
a sense of operational urgency when handling items with export control regula-
tions. The lack of an optimized controlled process induces uncertainty and anxiety,
causing them stress. Clear procedures and training as well as adequate support
by an export control compliance team, would take away stress and frustrations.
Internal controls by ICT systems would support this. Fifth, prevent any excuses
for deviant behaviour. Neither procedures nor the system should allow for deviant
behaviour. So the parts/items should be identified, and applicable sets of regula-
tions should be implemented in the systems. An Internal Control System should
be implemented and periodically audited. HRM involvement could improve recruit-
ment, initial screening/selections and background screening, which in their turn may
improve the quality of new personnel intakes. Training allows employees to acquire
new skills, improve on existing ones, perform better, increase productivity and to
become better leaders. As an organization is made up of the sum total of what its
employees achieve individually, organizations should do everything in their power
to ensure that employees perform at their peak.
14.5 Assessment
In this chapter we have used Braga’s POP-guide as a lens to look at an export
control problem. We have analysed the occurrence of non-compliant behaviour in a
fictitious case, entailing an unauthorized transfer of a Dronebuster from the Army
to a National Research Institution (NRI) for research purposes within a fictitious
European NATO member state, EUMS. Based on our analysis, we have suggested a
number of responses. In sum, these responses add up to a coordinated mix of hard-
and soft controls. As a short-term response, soft controls (e.g., training, education,
development and communication) have to be priorities. In the long run the internal
control system (including a proper audit plan) should be in place and development,
training and communication on export control is to be secured in the organization.
The internal control system should minimize the possibility of deviant actions (e.g.,
registration and obligated process flows with blockages).
During the analysis of theEUMSDronebuster case, itwas interesting to investigate
both actual deviant behaviour as well as possible solutions. A question that remains
to be answered is why the NRI did not react on reception of the items. For NRI also
should have been aware of export control implications as well as of the fact there
was no US authorization of the item received for investigation. We would like to
recommend this question for further study.
270 W. Nieboer and D. van Manen
References
Braga AA (2008) Problem-Oriented Policing and Crime Prevention, 2nd edn. Willow Tree Press,
New York
Clarke RV (1995) Situational crime prevention. Crime and Justice 19:91–150
Festinger L (1962) Cognitive dissonance. Scientific American 207:93–06
Gelderman CJ, Paul WT, Brugman MJ (2006) Public procurement and EU tendering directives–
explaining non-compliance. International Journal of Public Sector Management 19:702-714
Griffin RW (2013) Organizational Behavior. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Huberts LW, Maesschalck J, Jurkiewicz CL (eds) (2008) Ethics and integrity of governance:
Perspectives across frontiers. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham
Interligi L (2010) Compliance culture: A conceptual framework. Journal of Management and
Organization 16:235–249
Murdock H (2019) Auditor Essentials: 100 Concepts, Tips, Tools, and Techniques for Success.
CRC Press, New York
Wim Nieboer is a major with the Netherlands Army with a technical background. Currently is
he employed as the Netherlands Liaison Officer with the NATO Support and procurement agency
in Luxemburg. His research interests include ethics and compliance of export controls and related
EU NATO possibilities, and impossibilities.
Dik van Manen is head of the Export Control Compliance Team (ECCT) with the Netherlands
Army.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Chapter 15
Developing an Adequate Internal
Compliance Program for the Royal
Netherlands Air Force Command
Robert Bertrand and Hans van Riet
Contents
15.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
15.2 Setting the Scene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
15.2.1 Historical Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
15.2.2 PESTL Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
15.3 The Development of an Internal Compliance Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
15.3.1 The Need for an Internal Compliance Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
15.3.2 Legal Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
15.3.3 Internal Compliance Program Frameworks and Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
15.3.4 The Internal Compliance Program of the Royal Netherlands Air Force
Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
15.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
15.4.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
15.4.2 Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
Abstract This chapter examines how an adequate Internal Compliance Program
(ICP) for the Royal Netherlands Airforce (RNLAF) was developed. In order to
create an adequate ICP, it is essential to determine which legal and other aspects
should be incorporated in the ICP framework. To deduct these relevant aspects of the
environment the RNLAF operates in, a Political, Economic, Social, Technological
and Legal (PESTL) analysis is used. Furthermore, the different ICP frameworks are
compared in order to make a combination of them to create the most adequate ICP
for the RNLAF. We conclude that this should be a combination of mainly US ICP
Frameworks as of the fact that the RNLAF ismostlyUS orientated. TheCOSOmodel
as an internationally widely used best practice framework is the core. The combi-
nation of the PESTL analysis, the legal framework and the chosen ICP frameworks
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together result in an 11 pillars ICP, which we consider is the most adequate ICP for
the RNLAF. Leading principle in combining all the aforementioned elements, is that
the ICP has to be tailored to its organizations’ characteristics (e.g. nature of items,
size of the organization, national, regional and global footprint). We understand that
there is no one-size-fits-all approach, but one needs to design an ICP that specifically
fits the given organizational structure, its size and daily operations.
Keywords COSO Model · export control · Internal Compliance Program · control
frameworks · trade compliance · Royal Netherlands Airforce
15.1 Introduction
This is a chapter on the business case of the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF)
Command involving the handling of military and dual use items, technical data,
technology, software and defense services. More specifically, this chapter examines
how an adequate Internal Compliance Program (ICP) for the RNLAFwas developed.
This is relevant for RNLAF in particular, but also for other organizations that have
need of an ICP or might be involved in developing one.
In order to understand the importance of this research, both the historical back-
ground for the need of an adequate ICP and the environment the RNLAF operates in
will be described. These topics will be handled in Sect. 15.2. Next, the legal aspects
with regard to an adequate ICP for the RNLAF will be elaborated on in Sect. 15.3.
Furthermore, the concept of an ICP will also be presented in this section. Thus, the
third section focuses on the main legal regimes the RNLAF has to comply with in
its operations. When one understands and implements these legal aspects, one is
able to put an adequate ICP for the RNLAF in place as it covers all operational
activities. Only then can the RNLAF conduct its operations in an export control
compliant matter. Of course, it is obviously not solely a matter of legal aspects when
designing an ICP. However, when the goal is to adequately achieve compliance, legal
aspects are core. This is inherent to our topic: compliance. Generally, compliance
means adhering to a rule, such as a policy, standard, specification, or law. Regulatory
compliance defines the goals companies want to achieve to ensure that they under-
stand and take the necessary steps to comply with policies, laws, and regulations.
We will, when relevant, also discuss other aspects of compliance, however. Finally,
a conclusion is presented in the final section, Sect. 15.4, of the chapter.
15.2 Setting the Scene
In order to provide the reader with a historical context and to understand the types
of relevant environmental influences affecting compliance on export control of the
RNLAF, we present a brief historical analysis of the RNLAF with regard to the
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importance of developing an adequate ICP, as well as a Political, Economic, Social,
Technological and Legal (PESTL) analysis.
15.2.1 Historical Context
With a so-called Voluntary Disclosure1 the RNLAF, in June 2015, started a path to
improve on the compliance on export control laws and regulations. The Voluntary
Disclosurewas answered in January 2017 by theUSgovernment and theRNLAFwas
strongly advised to become in control. And although the it concerned one specific
regulatory regime, the activities in the compliance domain thereafter covered all
export control activities that the RNLAF is conducting. The ratio behind this is
simple; throughout the world there is a great variety of export control laws and regu-
lations and the RNLAF, an organization that operates internationally (e.g., contrac-
tual, on mission, training), is confronted with all these types of legal constraints.
Therefore, the ICP must cover all these compliance aspects.
Becoming and remaining compliant with all these export control laws and regu-
lations can only be achieved by setting up an adequate ICP that embeds control
measures in the RNLAF daily business. Therefore, the RNLAF tasked itself to build
an ICP. On 24 December 2019, the first version of the RNLAF’s ICP was posted on
the intranet of the RNLAF.2 It seems a little bit late for the RNLAF to finish its ICP.
However, from the start of the Voluntary Disclosure, the RNLAF took all corrective
actions to resolve all the past violations, but also took measures to prevent future
violations. Thus, on an operational level, both corrective and preventive actions were
taken, such as conducting risk assessments on the numerous Air Bases the RNLAF
operates, building an export control database, creating management commitment
(which resulted in embedding a Unit Export Control Compliance in the RNLAF’s
organization structure), starting a licensing process and writing policies and proce-
dures. In fact, the RNLAF already started with designing the pillars of an ICP at an
early stage, although it was not written in a formal document.
At the start of the operational process, the RNLAF swiftly had to make personnel
available to start doing the export control tasks. However, very logically there was
a lack of personnel with knowledge about these specific laws and regulations. Until
August 2019, the operational course of action took place. The positive effect thereof
that was realized: while conducting three years of operational export control compli-
ance corrective and preventive actions, the RNLAF to a certain degree became an
export control compliant organization. Now, it was time however to become export
1 A Voluntary Disclosure is a notification to a US federal agency that an export control laws and
regulations violation may have or has occurred. If it is found that an export violation did occur, the
Voluntary Disclosure will be seen as a mitigating factor (in most cases) when determining penalties
and/or sanctions.
2 Royal Netherlands Airforce 2019.
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control compliant on a strategic level. Only by designing an adequate ICP and main-
taining it with dedicated capacity, the RNLAF would become fully aware how all
relevant export control laws and regulations affect its operations and enable it to
implement measures to make sure that it remains export control compliant, this time
on a strategic level.
15.2.2 PESTL Analysis
As stated before, it is important to understand the RNLAF’s relevant environmental
influences affecting compliance in general. Every single day, the RNLAF sends all
kinds of military and dual use items and technical data and delivers services to
external parties (e.g., Northrop Grumman International Trading Inc., Meggitt Inc.
and Teledyne Defense Electronics LLC) for testing, repair and maintenance, and
overhaul. These items are most of the time classified on either the United States
Commerce Control List (US CCL)3 or the United States Munitions List (USML).4
However, sometimes the items do not have a US classification, but are classified on
European or national control lists. The fact, however, that they are classified, means
that compliance aspects are at stake. The type of classification determines the level
and type of export controls that apply.
US defense companies have two main avenues for selling on the international
market: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). Under
FMS, theUSgovernment procures defense articles and serviceswith defense industry
on behalf of the foreign customers. DCS allowsUS defense companies (in possession
of a commercial export license) to negotiate directly with foreign customers. Most
of the RNLAF’s items have been acquired from the US through several FMS cases
(i.e., F-16, AH-64 Apache, MQ-9 Reaper), some through DCS (i.e., C-130, NH-
90) and some through a combination thereof (i.e., CH-47 Chinook). Therefore, in
order to effectuate the envisaged re-exports, the RNLAF needs prior US Department
of State, Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers (RSAT) authorization or
authorization of other offices (US, EU or other). Understanding the importance of
strict adherence to US export controls and other regulatory regimes, the RNLAF
all the time requests authorizations for these envisaged re-exports. Furthermore, the
RNLAF urges the regulating offices of these re-exports to swiftly process these
requests on their part, as it is crucial for maintaining the operational readiness of the
RNLAF.
In order to fulfill all export control compliance conditions (legal, regulatory or
other), the RNLAF needs to have an adequate ICP. Only then, the RNLAF is able to
strictly adhere to US export controls and other regulatory regimes, while requesting
for authorizations for these envisaged re-exports. The ICP is the core instrument to
be in control and compliant.
3 US Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security 2020.
4 Electronic Code of Federal Regulations 2020.
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The RNLAF is a military organization, and therefore has specific requirements
and needs, to stay in control and compliant. These specific requirements and needs
are highly dependent on trade laws and regulations that affect its re-exports of the
items, services and technologies. In this business case, an ICP Framework was build,
based on the existing ICP Frameworks, that fulfills all the needs of the RNLAF in
its daily business (see Sect. 15.3).
The PESTL analysis considers five dimensions that should be taken in consider-
ation in the business case: the Political, Economic, Social, Technological and Legal
dimension. Below, we will elaborate on how these dimensions affect the RNLAF,
and more specifically an ICP.
15.2.2.1 Political and Legal Environment Analysis
The reason we describe the political and legal environment together is because they
are highly intertwined. Politics to a large extent shapes the legal environment, since
politics in most Western countries have the authority under constitution to make
laws and to alter or repeal them. Most of the weapon systems the RNLAF has, are
bought through FMS cases or DCS contracts from the US. Only a small percentage
of all the RNLAF weaponry is bought from the EU market. Therefore, the RNLAF
has to comply with various US laws and regulations (see Chap. 11 of this volume),
but also sometimes with EU or the various national laws and regulations. Further-
more, because of the fact that most weaponry is bought from the US Department of
Defense and the US defense industry, the RNLAF is highly dependent on the US
defense industry complex as a whole: US government, Army, Air Force and industry.
Therefore, the scope in building an adequate ICP should consider all US political and
legal aspects (which are subject to frequent change). Nonetheless, EU and various
national politics and legal aspects should likewise be taken into account. And these
aspects affect not only the domain of export controls. As national and supranational
political fora tend to intervene in more and more areas of procurement, trade, labor
market, environment, and so on, compliance becomes a chief priority for doing and
staying in business. The impact of the legal aspects, as can be expected, is large
and affects the daily business of the RNLAF. Its importance reflects in the legal
framework of an ICP (see Sect. 15.3).
15.2.2.2 Economic Environment Analysis
The RNLAF is a defense organization and therefore depends on the economic envi-
ronment, national as well as international. The RNLAF is doing its business in an
environment of mostly government to government deals (FMS Cases) and industry
to government deals (DCS and other commercial contracts). Its funding is provided
by taxpayers’ money. The RNLAF is a governmental organization, which makes it
an economically atypical organization, compared with the defense industry. On the
other hand, theRNLAF is highly dependent on the economicalmaturity of the various
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defense industries it deals with (e.g., Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems, Raytheon).
Furthermore, theRNLAF is highly dependent on the relationship between the defense
industry and its governments abroad. In short, the economic environment can at best
be described as imperfect markets of goods and services. Investment selection in
these markets cannot be made under competitive conditions (e.g., by public tender)
because there are only one or a few suppliers (monopolies or near monopolies) for
specific products or services. In addition, the number of buyers in these markets
is often limited, especially in cases of government procurement.5 All this makes
contractual relations of the utmost importance. All these considerations should be
envisaged when designing an adequate ICP for the RNLAF.
15.2.2.3 Social Environment Analysis
Monitoring the public opinion, both nationally and abroad is essential for the RNLAF
for maintaining the operational readiness. Especially a change of the public opinion
in the US concerning the defense industry or spending can harm its operations, but
also enable the RNLAF to import new weaponry and re-export it. Again, most of the
RNLAF’s weaponry is bought and repaired in the US, thus, an adequate ICP should
consider the most relevant actual and future social factors in the US as well as its
national and EU social changes. Of special interest is also the effect of public opinion
on topics as accountability and corporate governance.
15.2.2.4 Technological Factors
The RNLAF is highly dependent on US military and dual use items, technical data,
technology, software and defense services. If the RNLAF complies with all US
export control laws and regulations and does not commit violations like re-exporting
items or technology to 126.1 International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)6
embargoed countries, there will be no reason to negatively affect the RNLAF in, for
instance, receiving less than the state-of-the-art technology.With this technology, the
RNLAF is able to maintain its older weaponry (e.g., repair, overhaul), but also able to
constantly improve newly bought weaponry such as the MQ-9 Reaper and the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter to US Standards of Technology. Not surprisingly, specifically for
the project F-35 a complete ICP Framework was built in order to entirely comply
with all relevant US Laws and regulations.7 Therefore, the focus of an adequate ICP
for the RNLAF should be on building walls around US technology; thus: prohibiting
re-exports to embargoed countries. Screening of RNLAF personnel and embedded
contractors and physical and IT security should be considered to prevent the leaking
of technology to unauthorized persons/countries. In short, technology is of the utmost
5 Bertrand 2016, pp. 7–8.
6 US Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls 2020b.
7 US Department of State 2002.
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importance for the RNLAF and everything must be done in the field of compliance,
to secure its future use.
15.3 The Development of an Internal Compliance Program
In this section we examine how an adequate ICP for the RNLAF was developed.
After a short introduction (Sect. 15.3.1) of the method used, we first describe the
legal framework. This contains the main legal regimes the RNLAF has to comply
with in its operations. With this legal framework (Sect. 15.3.2), by using relevant
ICP guidelines, frameworks and standards (Sect. 15.3.3), an adequate ICP for the
RNLAF is put in place (as described in Sect. 15.3.4).
15.3.1 The Need for an Internal Compliance Program
According to Tamada andAchilleas, export control regimes are developed and imple-
mented by a method combining an international approach and a national approach.8
The development and implementation of an export control regime consists of a two
step-method. This comprises the establishment of a legal framework on the basis of
national law and applicable international law. Thereafter the other elements of the
regime are defined and modified to the organizational needs.
The above-mentioned concept for developing and implementing export control
regimes, can apply to designing an ICP for any organization, thus also for theRNLAF.
In fact, the first step the RNLAF should take to become export control compliant is
to understand the export control laws and regulations that affect its daily operations.
Thus, the first question the RNLAF has to answer is: With which parties from which
countries do we do business with?
Thereafter comes the question: What kind of ICP Framework or combination of
ICP frameworks available do we need to apply for building our own ICP Frame-
work? Over the years, many ICP Frameworks were developed by different organi-
zations. One should examine which ICP Frameworks are the most relevant for the
RNLAF’s operational environment. By comparing, combining and applying these
ICP Frameworks, the RNLAF is able to design a tailor-made and adequate ICP.
8 Tamada and Achilleas 2017, p. 11.
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15.3.2 Legal Framework
Since the RNLAF is mostly US-orientated, the RNLAF should gain a thorough
understanding of at least the US ITAR,9 the Export Administrations Regulations
(EAR)10 and the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)11 (for the FMS
cases the RNLAF is party to). The most important section of the latter document is
SAMM,C8.7, third party transfers, as it describes the licensing process for third party
transfers. Since the RNLAF is involved in many FMS cases, every time re-exports
take place, the RNLAF has to apply for a third-party transfer authorization before
the re-exports actually happen. Therefore, the ICP of the RNLAF should incorporate
these US laws and regulations.
Furthermore, the RNLAF is part of the Kingdom of The Netherlands, which is
member of the United Nations, the European Union, and the RNLAF also does
business with several EU member states. Therefore, the UN, EU and the Dutch
export controls, and other import, anti-bribery and anti-corruption laws and regu-
lations should be incorporated in the ICP. In fact, it is to be expected that all these
export control laws and regulations be applied in the daily operations of the RNLAF.
Finally we mention sanctions law, as the RNLAF needs to secure that every time
re-exports take place they comply with sanctions law, for example by checking that
no companies are involved that violated UN, EU and US sanctions law earlier.
Further, an interesting aspect one should understand is that the EUExport Controls
and the Dutch Laws and regulations are civil law systems, which means that these
regulatory regimes are driven by codified standards. Wernaart defines a civil law
system as, “The idea behind a civil law system is that a society can be organized in
a coherent way by adopting written codified standards”.12 However, as mentioned
before, the RNLAF is mostly involved in deals with the US government or the US
defense industry. US Laws and regulations are based on a common-law system,
which is a case law driven system. With regard to the essence of a common-law
system, Wernaart describes it as, “A common law system is case law driven. The
law is therefore predominantly developed by judges, rather than a legislator or
academics”.13
The impact of the difference between the civil and common law-based origins is
however not as big as one would expect at first sight, because U.S. Export Controls
are codified in federal laws and regulations (such as ITAR and EAR). The majority
of the changes in the US thus find its origins in changes of these laws and regulations
and not so much in new jurisprudence. In general however, one can observe that U.S.
Export Controls, take the ITAR for example, tend to change more frequently than
the EU and Dutch Export Controls, which is important to keep in mind.
9 US Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls 2020b.
10 US Department of State Bureau of Industry and Security 2020.
11 US Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2020.
12 Wernaart 2017, p. 58.
13 Wernaart 2017, p. 58.
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Also, between the EU and Dutch regimes, a specific relation must be mentioned.
One has to understand that the laws of the EU have a supranational character, which
means that to become in force, these laws need to become part of the national legal
system of the EU Member States.14 Another legal aspect that needs to be addressed
is that some export control regimes have an extraterritorial character. This is the
case with the US export control regime. In practice, this means that the US Laws
and regulations follow the goods. Thus when, for example, the RNLAF buys F-16
aircraft through FMS-cases, every time the RNLAFwants to re-export, re-transfer or
import these defense articles, US Laws and regulations need to be applied on these
transactions, which results in the application for authorizations (such as a third-party
transfer) with the US Department of State. Thus, in order to design an adequate
ICP for the RNLAF not only all the above-mentioned laws and regulations must be
incorporated into the different pillars of the ICP, but also the relationships between
them must be embedded.
15.3.3 Internal Compliance Program Frameworks
and Guidelines
As has been said, there are many models available for designing ICPs. However,
for US oriented businesses and organizations, such as the RNLAF, the most applied
models are the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commis-
sion Internal Control—Integrated Framework (COSOModel),15 the US Department
of Commerce/Bureau of Industry and Security Compliance Program Guidelines
(BIS Guidelines)16 and the US Department of State/Directorate of Defense Trade
Controls,ComplianceProgramGuidelines (DDTCGuidelines).17 Furthermore, there
are lots of additional frameworks and guidelines for developing an adequate ICP: the
Coalition for Excellence in Export Compliance Best Practices for Export Controls
(CEEC Best Practices),18 the Common Industry Standards for European Aerospace
and Defense (CIS Standards),19 the Framework for IT Governance and Control
(COBIT Framework)20 and many more. In addition, the EU recently presented a
recommendation on ICPs21 as did the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.22
All the aforementioned ICP guidelines, frameworks and standards (hereinafter
together summarized as ‘ICP frameworks’) consist of a combination of pillars that
14 Craig and De Burca 2003, pp. 3–4.
15 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 2013.
16 US Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security 2012.
17 US Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls 2020a.
18 Coalition for Excellence in Export Compliance 2011.
19 Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe 2012.
20 IT Governance Institute 2007.
21 European Union 2018; 2019.
22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019.
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need to be elaborated on in the ‘perfect ICP’. Furthermore, most ICP Frameworks
take the five COSO Model components as a starting point: (1) control environment;
(2) risk assessment; (3) control activities; (4) information and communication; and
(5) monitoring. The COSOModel is a very flexible ICP framework that can be used
for businesses as government organizations and non-governmental organizations. In
fact, the COSOModel is just a starting point and not a ready to use ICP. It is literally
a framework that should be supplemented with other pillars specially designed for
an organization such as the RNLAF. Since most of the time the RNLAF deals with
DDTC and BIS, it is understandable that their ICP Frameworks will be examined
as a surplus to the COSO Model and an opportunity to achieve best practice. The
guidance on ICPs provided by the EU and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
have not been taken into consideration when developing an ICP for the RNLAF,
first, because the RNLAF focused primarily on ICPs for US-oriented businesses and
organizations, second, because they have only become available recently. They will
be considered in the near future however.
Examining the above-mentioned ICP Frameworks, results in a combination of a
maximum of ten separate components that are considered relevant to be incorporated
in an ICP:
(1) Management commitment (CEEC, BIS, COSO, COBIT, CIS and DDTC);
(2) Compliance organization (CEEC, COSO, CIS and DDTC);
(3) Risk assessment (BIS, COSO and COBIT);
(4) Policies and procedures (CEEC, BIS, COSO, COBIT, CIS and DDTC);
(5) Contract management and authorization applications (CEEC, BIS and
DDTC);
(6) Screening (CEEC, BIS and DDTC);
(7) Training and communication (CEEC, BIS, COSO, CIS and DDTC);
(8) Physical/IT security (BIS, COSO, COBIT and DDTC);
(9) Compliance reviews/audits (BIS, COSO, COBIT, CIS and DDTC);
(10) Handling violations and voluntary (self-) disclosures (CEEC, BIS and
DDTC).
The DDTC and BIS Frameworks both combine 9 pillars together, which make
them the most detailed and complete ICP Frameworks. The difference between them
is that DDTC includes the pillar Compliance Organization and lacks the pillar Risk
Assessment, while for BIS the opposite counts.
The COSO Model defines internal control as a process effected by an entity’s
board of directors, management and other personnel designed to provide reasonable
assurance of the achievement of objectives in the following categories: (1) opera-
tional effectiveness and efficiency; (2) financial reporting Reliability; and (3) appli-
cable laws and regulations compliance. Obviously, the last category is most relevant
when designing an ICP. Bearing in mind the original five COSOModel components,
we consider the longlist of 10 separate components a natural refinement logically
following the needs of the specific application in export control compliance. And
although in different organizations the names and number of ICP components might
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be slightly different, in general they will not be essentially different from our ten
components’ longlist.
15.3.4 The Internal Compliance Program of the Royal
Netherlands Air Force Command
Now that the ICP frameworks that are most relevant, as well as the laws and regu-
lations the RNLAF is obliged to comply with, have been elaborated on, these
elements are combined in order to design the most adequate ICP for the RNLAF.
The RNLAF’s ICP consists of 11 pillars, which are distilled from the COSO-, BIS-,
and DDTC-frameworks:
(1) Introduction and management commitment;
(2) Legal and regulating framework;
(3) Compliance organization;
(4) Policies and procedures;
(5) Contract management and authorizations and authorization applications;
(6) Screening;
(7) Training and communication;
(8) Physical and IT security;
(9) Recordkeeping;
(10) Compliance audits;
(11) Violations and voluntary (self-)disclosures.
Most ICP frameworks contain a maximum of nine pillars. The RNLAF added
two extra pillars (i.e., (2) legal and regulating framework and (9) recordkeeping).
Also, we see that risk assessment is not a pillar, as conducting risk assessments is
considered inherent to evaluating all pillars of the ICP and is a continuous process.
Below, we will shortly explain the relevance and content of each pillar.
15.3.4.1 Introduction and Management Commitment
The most essential pillar that provides the fundament of an ICP is that the senior
management of the RNLAF commits itself to all the other pillars of the ICP. There-
fore, a management commitment letter from the Commander of the RNLAF is
included. This letter contains a strong and durable commitment to exercise control
compliance for the RNLAF, and all its approximately 6000 employees. In the COSO
Model commitment is an essential part of the control environment, which is defined
as “set of standards, processes and structures that provide the basis for carrying out
internal control across the organization”.23 This component comprises the tone at the
top, communication about ethical behavior and internal control within all levels of
23 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 2013.
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staff, and the overall integrity and values of the organization. These elements provide
the overall basis for a successful system of internal control. Not directly in the ICP,
but in the control environment as a whole, resources to develop and implement the
ICP are provided and assigned.
15.3.4.2 Legal and Regulating Framework
As important as the first pillar is the component of all the export control laws and
regulations the RNLAF has to comply with while conducting its operations. This
pillar incorporates the legal framework. The primary focus in this pillar is on the US
laws and regulations (ITAR and EAR, as well as the SAMM for FMSCases). The EU
export control regime and the Dutch strategic goods regulation,24 and other import,
anti-bribery and anti-corruption laws and regulations are also included. Furthermore,
the difference between the legal essence and implications of FMS and DCS bought
articles is explained. This pillar affects all other pillars of the ICP, as it constitutes
the core of compliance. Therefore, the RNLAF explicitly chose to include the legal
framework as the second chapter of the ICP.
15.3.4.3 Compliance Organization
In this pillar the compliance function is set up and the staff is assigned to the compli-
ance function to ensure there is capacity, so the ICP can do its work to achieve
the organization’s strategic goal of compliance. Furthermore, the staff compliance
officers and the compliance officers at the Air Bases are cited. Thus, all the RNLAF
personnel is able to reach out to their specific point of contact, when they have export
control compliance questions. As such, the senior management of the RNLAF has
ensured that there is a sufficient number of personnel dedicated to the export control
compliance functions. Furthermore, back-up personnel is assigned that can maintain
the compliance function in the absence of the key compliance officers.
15.3.4.4 Policies and Procedures
Policies and procedures are the operational elements of an adequate ICP. In fact,
the policies and procedures of the RNLAF translate the strategic ICP goals into
operational control measures. Here, the policies go into processes, which relate to
procedures on such a detailed level that work instructions are touched upon, that
contain the specific internal controls. These work instructions are vital considering
the fact that the 6,000 employees of the RNLAF need to understand and apply these
work instructions in their daily business.
24 Government of the Netherlands 2020.
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15.3.4.5 Contract Management and Authorizations and Authorization
Applications
Contract management deals with the processes and requirements applicable when the
RNLAF deals with external parties. For being (and staying) export control compliant,
it is essential to incorporate the applicable laws and regulations into all contracts in
the whole supply chain. Furthermore, this pillar contains all the agreements the
RNLAF is involved in with external parties, such as the Technical Assistance Agree-
ment (TAA), the Warehouse Distribution Agreement (WDA) and the Manufacturing
License Agreement (MLA) and the implications thereof.25 Moreover, this pillar
covers the licensing processes for the application for third party transfers and general
correspondences. Because of the complexity of these export control contracts, agree-
ments and authorizations, guidance by the Unit Export Control Compliance is given
to the RNLAF personnel on all the above-mentioned procedures.
15.3.4.6 Screening
The RNLAF personnel, suppliers, customers and embedded contractors the RNLAF
does businesswithmust be screened on the proper security level, tomake sure they are
of proper conduct and good standing. In this pillar, all the RNLAF’s requirements for
an adequate screening are elaborated on, to make it a sufficiently preventive control.
15.3.4.7 Training and Communication
Without proper communication and training on export control compliance, the
RNLAF’s ICP would be ineffective. Therefore, to ensure that the RNLAF personnel
complies with all the export control laws and regulations in its daily business, the
RNLAF developed communication strategies and several training programs, such as
e-learning modules export control compliance designed to create awareness at all
levels of the RNLAF, as well as export control training provided to focal points, who
are appointed to answer export control related questions of the RNLAF personnel
on the ground. These strategies and programs are elaborated on under this pillar.
15.3.4.8 Physical and IT Security
The RNLAF took measures to ensure that export control compliance is incorpo-
rated in the security environment. It covers for example controlled access to certain
RNLAF locations (physical security) and IT procedures that need to be applied (IT
controls incorporated), such as the (semi-)automated SEC database that controls all
re-exports of items and technical data. The SEC database is continuously developed
25 US Department of State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls 2020b, part 124.
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and upgraded according to the latest export control regulations. Without an approval
of the requested re-exports of transfers in the SEC database, the items cannot be
shipped or technical data not transferred to third parties. Regarding the latter, the
focus is laid on the re-exports of technical data.
15.3.4.9 Recordkeeping
A properly functioning documentation and recordkeeping system is essential for an
adequate ICP. In case of, for example, an external audit by DDTC, the RNLAF must
be able to show the records of the past transactions, to establish an audit trail. The
RNLAF has different systems for recordkeeping, such as the X-Post system. The
different legal requirements for periods of recordkeeping are also covered in this
pillar.
15.3.4.10 Compliance Audits
An inclusive audit system is an indispensable element for the RNLAF’s ICP. In fact,
this audit system allows the RNLAF to evaluate if its ICP is designed properly,
is actually implemented and is working effectively to achieve its strategic goal.
Therefore, operational and compliance audits need to be performed. These audits
help the RNLAF to improve its ICP when gaps are found. This pillar focuses on
internal and external audits and the audit tools the RNLAF uses as part of the Three
Lines of Defense model.26
15.3.4.11 Violations and Voluntary (Self-)disclosures
All companies and organizations, including the RNLAF, sometimes commit viola-
tions. The US authorities consider a clear procedure of how to handle viola-
tions—a procedure in which is explained how the RNLAF handles voluntary
(self-)disclosures—a mitigating factor. Therefore, a clear procedure of the handling
of violations and voluntary (self-)disclosures is designed and presented. Further-
more, examples of non-conformities and violations are elaborated on, this in order
to instruct and educate the RNLAF personnel.
26 In the Three Lines of Defense model, management control is the first line of defense in risk
management, the various risk control and compliance oversight functions established by manage-
ment are the second line of defense, and independent assurance is the third. Each of these three
“lines” plays a distinct role within the organization’s wider governance framework.
15 Developing an Adequate Internal Compliance Program … 285
15.4 Conclusion
This section summarizes our research and sets out some further topics for consider-
ation.
15.4.1 Summary
In this chapter we examined how an adequate ICP for the RNLAFwas developed.We
described the historical context that triggered the need for an adequate ICP. In order
to create an adequate ICP, we then examined the PESTL environment the RNLAF
operates in. This is essential for the determination which environmental aspects
should be incorporated in the ICP framework. Thereafter, the legal framework was
established. This is based on scrutinizing the RNLAF’s daily business (with which
countries and continents does the RNLAF conduct business) and thus which laws
and regulations need to be compliedwith. Furthermore, the different ICP frameworks
were compared in order to make a combination of them to create the most adequate
ICP for the RNLAF. We concluded that this should be a combination of mainly
US ICP Frameworks as the RNLAF is mostly US orientated. The COSO Model as
an internationally widely used best practice framework is the core which was built
upon. The combination of the PESTL analysis, the legal framework and the chosen
ICP Frameworks together resulted in an 11 pillars ICP, which we conclude is the
most suitable ICP for the RNLAF. The steps taken and elements included in the ICP
of the RNLAF and the development process in general, can be of use to any other
organization that has need of an ICP and/or might be involved in developing one.
15.4.2 Consideration
For an ICP to be adequate and truly state-of-the-art, it has to be tailored to the situation
(e.g., nature of items, size of the organization, national, regional and global footprint).
We have seen that there is no one-size-fits-all approach, because there are no ICP
(frameworks) that are ready to use instantly. Because of its flexibility, the COSO
model has been used as a framework starting point for the RNLAF. Besides, other
ICP Frameworks were combined with the COSO model, which enabled to design an
ICP that specifically fits the organizational structure of the RNLAF, its size and daily
operations. For a good development (process) of an adequate ICP it requires time
(years), in depth knowledge, effort and experience as we can learn from the RNLAF.
And the job is never finished, the ICP is a living program. When changes occur in
laws and regulations, structure of the organization, or personnel the ICP is updated
in real-time and communicated throughout the organization.
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Another topic of consideration is the following: the native tongue of the RNLAF
personnel is Dutch. Although on average they have a fair knowledge of English, for
an adequate implementation of the ICP, the RNLAF chose to document the original
version of the RNLAF ICP in Dutch. Its availability in the personnel’s native tongue
is a requirement for the ICP to be embraced at all levels, so that the procedures and
working instructions can be understood and applied. It is also imperative for the
RNLAF to establish a culture of compliance within the RNLAF. Therefore, training
is provided throughout the organization to create awareness, working procedures in
chart are published on the intranet, rules and regulations elaborated for their proper
application and focal points are created on all levels for questions and support.
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Abstract The Dutch Republic underwent a process of state formation, accelerated
economic growth and military reforms during the Eighty Years War. In particular
between 1585 and 1621, Dutch merchant-entrepreneurs built up a burgeoning arms
industry and sector of arms exports. These exports required a system of passports,
still an under-researched theme in current literature, organized by the States-General
and admiralties in order to support exports to neutral and allied states, but to forestall
these did not fall into enemy hands. In particular, the system of passports shows
how merchants, acting as intermediaries between allies and the States-General and
the admiralties, could meet the volatile demand of war materials. As a result, the
supply side of the export market was oligopolistic, but the composition of the group
of oligopolists varied depending on the region and the prevailing market conditions
in question. From this study it can be concluded that the system of export control had
only a limited effectiveness regarding the creative arms exports to Spanish Habsburg
destinations, due to divergent central and local interests. However, the major part
of the Dutch arms exports flowed to allies such as France, Venice, Sweden and the
German protestant states. Dutch merchants provided them with batches of strategic
materials and total package-deals of armaments for entire army and navy units. From
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1621, the States-General supported these transactions by supplying war materials
from the state arsenals fostering timely and largescale deliveries, meeting volatile
demand conditions.
Keywords Arms · export · control · Dutch Republic · Eighty Years War · The
Netherlands
16.1 Introduction
The current post-Cold War world and Early Modern Europe share two geopolitical
and -military conditions: multipolarity among major powers and the significant role
of entrepreneurs in the supply and service of their armed forces. Onewill also observe
that the majority of the current European states, including The Netherlands, were
founded in Early Modern Europe. After the start of the Dutch Revolt a burgeoning
arms industry and trade sector was built up in a young Dutch Republic in the middle
of interrelated processes of economic growth, military reforms and state formation
between 1585 and 1621. Although this arms industry and trade managed to serve
a domestic market on which the Dutch state army, the admiralties, and the Dutch
East India Company formed important factors of demand, the arms export rapidly
developed too. The arms exports of the Dutch Republic underwent an enormous
growth supportedby the import, processing and transit of rawmaterials, semi-finished
and finished products and the building of the domestic industry. Parallel to the growth
of this sector, the state authorities of the young Republic, in particular the States-
General and the admiralties, tried to control it by means of a system of passports and
sureties in order to regulate the flows of export.
Starting out from this context, this chapter aims to determine the origins and effects
of the Dutch state policy to control arms exports in relation to the development of
the Dutch arms market between 1585 and 1621. Firstly, this chapter explains how
this system worked and what goals the States-General and the admiralties aimed to
achieve. Secondly, the significance of arms exports for allies, neutrals and opponents
of the Republic is discussed. From a broader strategic perspective, armaments and a
number of goods for dual use, civil and military use, were also a matter of concern
for the Dutch authorities, in particular regarding the army and naval campaigns of the
Spanish Habsburg Empire and their allies around the Republic. The States-General
not only perceived Habsburg threats in the campaign theatre of the Netherlands, but
also within European and overseas theatres, and took threats towards their allies into
account too. The first two topics lead to a third one: to what extent was the Dutch state
policy for arms export control effective? In order to assess its effectiveness, the arms
exports on France, the biggest ally, and those on the Spanish-Habsburg territories,
the enemy of the Dutch Republic, are discussed. These examples illustrate how far
government regulations on arms exports extended and influenced these. The divergent
interests of the States-General and the admiralties also had important implications
for these government regulations and thus for the development of the Dutch arms
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exports. Finally, this chapter aims to determine the effects of the development of
the Dutch arms exports and system of export control on the market organization
of entrepreneurs on the supply-side. In doing so, this chapter determines whether
opportunities occurred for monopolies and oligopolies on the supply side and which
significance the arms export and the state authorities attempts to regulate it, had on
the development of the Dutch arms industry.
16.2 Regulation of Arms Exports
The government of the Dutch Republic set the boundaries within which the Dutch
arms exports developed. The States-General decided quite early on to control and
regulate the export of arms. After the establishment of the admiralties in 1586, these
councils and the States-General gradually created a system for the issue of passports
by resolution for the export of armaments, shipbuilding materials and victuals.1
Kernkamp was the first historian to write about these exports and this licensing
system in his study of the contraband trade between the Republic and the Southern
Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. However, he focused on the trade in victuals and
shipbuilding materials, but not specifically on the arms trade. In more recent contri-
butions Vogel has provided more insight in the Dutch arms exports and government
regulations during the Eighty Years War.2
How did the arms export passport system work? The granting of passports was
linked to the payment of export duties on enemy (license fees) andneutral destinations
(convoy fees). Depending on the port of departure, merchants of arms had to submit
requests to one of the admiralty colleges.3 In 1597 five admiralties each controlled a
district of seaports and rivers in order to tax the riverine and seaborne trade for the
equip a part of the state fleet and to protect convoys of merchant vessels en route to
European ports. Consent or permission was then granted on such a petition by the
Councils of Admiralty, after which the specified goods could be exported. Clauses
were added to the consents that were intended to regulate legal arms exports.
As example I take the petition ofPierre de Jourdaen, aMiddelburgmerchant.On21
July 1590, he requested to export three dozen muskets and arquebuses, and armour
and forks to Caen. The Admiralty of Zeeland granted him permission, provided
that he would pay the convoy duties on these arms and a deposit for their market
value. Within two months he had to rejoin the Admiralty College in Zeeland, with
1 The admiralties and the States-General were the most important institutions that issued passports.
To a lesser extent the Council of State and the Stadholder held the right to issue passports. Before
1586 also the States of Holland and the States of Zeeland issued passports for the exports of war
materials. For example: ZA ASZ 469: Resoluties Staten van Zeeland (Res.SZ) 08.08.1584, f.110v,
18.09.1585, f.127.
2 Kernkamp 1931–1934; Vogel 1997, pp. 197–210; Vogel 1993, pp. 13–21. A very insightful study
of the Dutch trade of shipbuilding materials from Northern Europe to Spain offers the recent
dissertation of Jiménez Montes 2020.
3 Merchants also had to request passports for the export of shipbuilding materials and victuals.
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a certificate of delivery of the weaponry, signed by the governor or city council of
Caen. He would lose his deposit if he did not comply with these rules. The limited
shipping time aligned with the estimated maximum duration of the return trip to
Caen. These timeslots varied according to the destinations: six weeks for a return
journey to London, and three months for one to La Rochelle or Bordeaux.4 In view
of the high deposits, sometimes amounting to the double market value, it can be
assumed that the consents led to actual arms exports.
On the basis of such passports, I have investigated the Dutch export of
arms, semi-finished products for arms, and raw materials for gun founding and
gunpowder production, in particular from the Zeeland and Amsterdam admiralties,
that accounted for the biggest export flows. The issued passports of the States-General
in their resolutions provide for back up information for a few years in which no
admiralty records were available.
From 1600 onwards merchants were obliged, based on resolution, to first request
a passport for the export of arms at the States-General before applying for a similar
passport at a Council of the Admiralty. At times the admiralties issued large numbers
of passports when the demand for arms abruptly increased to certain destinations.
Not infrequently they issued passports without prior consents of the States-General.5
The opportunity to collect additional revenues were simply too tempting and several
admiralties sometimes acted explicitly against the prevailing regulations of theStates-
General.
Whereas the admiralties were led by financial interests, for every request the
States-General took the national strategic interest into account. The deliberations
leading to their decisions, often short, sometimes more elaborate accounts, were
inserted in their resolutions. They prohibited the export of war materials to enemy
destinations. In the case of a neutral destination, as shown in the example above,
clauses of a limited shipping time, a deposit and proof of delivery to the specified
destination had to prevent that war materials ended up in Spanish-Habsburg territory.
Arms exports served the foreign policy of the Dutch Republic if the foreign buyer
pursued an objective that was in line with the interests of the States-General. With
these interests in mind, the States-General made it compulsory from 1600 onwards
that passports and consents had to be applied for first from them and only secondly
from the admiralty under whose district the port of export resorted.
Whether or not a request for arms export was consented upon depended on the
export bans of the States-General. These bans were made public through placards
and forwarded by letter to the admiralties. Sometimes the admiralty asked for advice
at the States-General, if these prohibitive regulations could not provide clarity over
a certain request. In case of uncertainty, arms could be exported without consent, or,
in other words, as disguised illicit trade.
4 NA AA 2448: Res.Adm. Zeeland 06.08.1590, 01.04.1591, 30.12.1591, 11.09.1592, 21.09.1592.
5 Vogel 1993, p. 16. NA AA 2447, 2448: Res.Adm. Zeeland 13.06.1584–31.12.1595. Examples
are the exports to France in the years 1590–1598 and to England in the years 1639–1648. De Boer
1941. A thorough insight in the activities of the various state institutions of the Dutch Republic
offers: Groenveld 1984. About the Dutch arms export to England: Edwards 2000.
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The divergent interests of the admiralties and the States-General illustrate the
difficulty of developing and delimiting the power and competences of the central state
institutions in relation to the regional institutions in the Dutch Republic. There was a
certain imperfection in the formation of theDutch state, because local authorities took
limited notice of higher authorities and local interests prevailed. However, the States-
General tried to improve their control on arms exports, and to curtail the admiralties’
interests. This shows the dynamics of action and reaction in the state-building process
of the Dutch Republic.
16.3 Extent of Exports
The series of admiralties’ consents only indicate the minimum scale of the arms
exports. First of all, due to more focus on other matters, not all requests and consents
were recorded in an admiralty’s resolutions. Secondly, only fragmented or summarily
updated resolutions exist for the admiralties of the Noorderkwartier, Friesland and
Rotterdam. Most of the flows of armaments, however, were exported from ports
under the jurisdiction of the admiralties of Zeeland and Amsterdam and fortunately
their resolutions cover most years of the Eighty YearsWar. The requests and consents
recorded in the resolutions of these two admiralty boards therefore clearly reflect the
main trend in the Dutch arms exports.
Table 16.1 shows the estimated value of arms exports via both admiralties. The
quantities stated in the requests and consents were combined with the serially avail-
able price data of deliveries to the Zeeland arsenals for the State army and the
admiralty of Zeeland. These data reflect the prices for arms on the Zeeland and
Amsterdam markets in the period under scrutiny.6 After 1600 only a small flow
of armaments was exported via Zeeland and almost all exports originate from the
district of the Amsterdam admiralty. This trend reflects the relocation of merchants’
activities after the fall of Antwerp from Vlissingen and Middelburg to Amsterdam
and the diminished economic significance of Zeeland at the end of the sixteenth
century.
The arms exports peaked between 1590 and 1595, 1604 and 1612, and 1616 and
1621, and reflect the increased and steep demands in certain European areas due to
wars. Table 16.2 differentiates the export flows of arms via the Amsterdam admiralty
per area.
During the first export boom arms exports mainly went through Zeeland waters
to both territories of the French king Henry IV and of the rebellious League. Various
French companies, regiments and admiralties continued to be important buyers of
Dutch gunpowder, sulphur, saltpetre, firearms, bladed weapons and guns.7 Although
difficult to calculate, Dutch merchants ran an important transit trade to the Spanish
6 ZA ARC 10–360: Rek.ontv.gen. te lande 1573–1621. ZA ARC 614–640: Rek.ontv.gen. te water
1586–1621.
7 Vogel 1993, pp. 16–17. NA AA 2447, 2448: Res.Adm. Zeeland 13.06.1584–31.12.1595.
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Table 16.1 Arms exports of the Dutch Republic via the admiralties of Amsterdam and Zeeland,
1585–1621 (in carolus guilders)
Year Zeeland admiralty Amsterdam
admiralty
Year Zeeland admiralty Amsterdam
admiralty
1586 – – 1604 1392 5112
1587 – – 1605 0 87623
1588 5666 3316 1606 0 227909
1589 21762 2252 1607 1061 143799
1590 16511 7775 1608 679 155737
1591 48781 2548 1609 1080 20076
1592 25509 7077 1610 0 125038
1593 23037 13313 1611 0 111528
1594 17712 19562 1612 1046 23899
1595 8189 – 1613 2 32783
1596 – – 1614 519 38888
1597 – – 1615 70 19929
1598 – – 1616 0 8065
1599 – 8351 1617 8250 74212
1600 – 21345 1618 0 69993
1601 – 7041 1619 900 110
1602 260 20136 1620 – 71000
1603 675 7404 1621 – 57172
Note No figures available for the open years
Source NA AA 2447–2454: Resolutions Admiralty of Zeeland 13.06.1584–30.12.1621; NA AA
1334–1367: Resolutions Admiralty of Amsterdam 04.02.1586–21.12.1621
Southern Netherlands and the Iberian Peninsula via North-French ports such as
Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais; Rouen and Le Havre east of the Seine estuary; and ports
in Southwest-France such as Bayonne, La Rochelle, Bordeaux.
The Italian territories developed into a second important market for war materials
mainly due to the great orders of the Republic of Venice in the years 1606–1608 and
1616–1619. In those years, Venice fought defensive campaigns against the Habsburg
and Ottoman forces in Europe and thus became an attractive ally for the Republic in
the Eastern Mediterranean. In an imminent conflict between 1606 and 1608 with the
Papal States,Venice purchasedweapons for the first time on a large scale, in particular
saltpetre, sulphur and gunpowder. The war of Venice against the Austrian Habsburg
Empire and the privateers supported by Vienna, the Uskoken, again resulted in large
orders from 1616 onwards for gunpowder and saltpetre and the equipment for rented
and bought warships. After Venice, Livorno, the free port of the Duke of Tuscany,
and Genoa followed as important arms export destinations.8
8 Geyl 1913; Vogel 1993, p. 19; Engels 1997, p. 87.
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A third sales market formed the North German ports of Emden, Bremen and
Hamburg. Dozens of muskets and arquebuses were sold to their local bourgeoisie.
Many Amsterdam merchants supplied the local merchant navy in Emden with arms,
in particular iron cast guns. Bremen and Hamburg served as destinations for war
materials for Brunswick-Lunenburg and Brandenburg, allies of the Dutch Republic
during the War of the Jülich Succession (1610–1614) and the Thirty Years’ War
(1618–1648). However, the Hanseatic ports of Bremen and Hamburg also fulfilled
an important transhipping function to enemy ports such as Bilbao, Santander, La
Coruna, Seville, Lisbon and Malaga.
After the top three of export markets Sweden andDanzig, Konigsberg and Lübeck
followed. Within these Hanseatic ports the merchant navy were in demand for iron
and bronze cast guns, and the local bourgeoisie imported firearms and side arms.
From 1592 onwards Duke Charles of Sweden, even as France, bought complete
packages of firearms, bladed weapons, powder and ammunition for the equipment
of regiments and companies.9 The Swedish demand for war materials increased
during the Kalmar War against Denmark (1611–1613). However, in 1612 the States-
General temporarily prohibited exports to Sweden, but a year later these exports
rose steeply again. When the Danish king also tried to import weapons and troops
raised in Northern Germany via Frisian ports, the States-General prohibited this in
1612.10 After 1613 arms exports to Denmark via Amsterdam resumed, but these
exports only grew substantially during the Danish intervention in the Thirty Years’
War (1620–1625).11
Between1585 and1621 the demandon theEnglishmarket concentrated on armour
parts, sword blades and rapier hilts, which were transported to London for their
assembly into full-fledged weapons. Iron cast guns were not in demand, as English
gun founders provided these relatively cheaply. After the peace with Spain in 1604,
the English demand for weapons from the Republic decreased.
Among the more irregular, yet at times large, clients were Malta, Moscow and
Barbary.Mainly consignments of sulphur and themuskets for the gunpowder industry
and the Moscow bourgeoisie were exported to Muscovy. Malta, the privateer base
9 An example is the export delivery of 65 muskets, 280 arquebuses, 1.000 helmets, 140 harnesses,
300 pikes, 150 rapiers and cutlasses and 330 pounds of matches in: NA AA 1338: Res.Adm.
Amsterdam 27.06.1592. An example of another package-deal to Sweden: 2.000 muskets, 1.000
harnesses, 2.000 rapiers, 500 cavalry arms, 10.000 pounds of gunpowder and 100.000 pounds of
matches: NA AA 1363: Res.Adm. Amsterdam, 09.06.1617. For the French export see for example:
NA AA 1335–1338, 1340, 1343: Res.Adm. Amsterdam 06.06.1589, 10.07.1589, 11.09.1590,
12.05.1592, 08.04.1593, 20.07.1593, 12.07.1594, 11.11.1597.
10 NA AA 2452: Res.Adm. Zeeland, 26.03.1612 A request to the admiralties via a letter of the
States-General of 17.03.1612, whereupon in accordance with a resolution of the king of Denmark
the States-General decided to forbid the trade to Sweden. NA AA 1358: Res.Adm. Amsterdam,
28.08.1612 A request to the admiralties via a letter of the States-General of 09.08.1612, whereupon
in accordance with a resolution of the king of Sweden the States-General decided to forbid the trade
to Denmark. NAAA1358: Res.Adm.Amsterdam, 27.04.1612 Copy of a letter of the States-General
of 10.04.1612 whereby the ‘toevoer van krijgsvolk en commoditeiten van oorlog’ was banned to
both states. See also: NA AA 1358: Res.Adm. Amsterdam 24.03.1612.
11 NA AA 1357, 1360: Res.Adm. Amsterdam 28.09.1611, 20.12.1611, 30.10.1613, 17.10.1614.
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of the Johannite Order, was not only a major buyer of shipbuilding materials, but
also of cannon balls and gunpowder.12 However, Dutch merchants also supplied
Malta’s archenemies, theBarbary corsairs andMorocco,withwar supplies as part of a
Mediterranean triangular trade. Holland andZeeland ships transportedwarmaterials,
including Italian sulphur andprovisions, to privateer bases such as Safi,Algiers, Tunis
and Tripoli, shipped captured batches of sugar and brazil wood to Livorno, Tuscany’s
free port, and closed the triangle by shipping Levant goods such as silk and raisins
to Western European ports.13
The export peaks correlate with the volatile war conditions for France, Venice, the
GermanProtestant states,Denmark andSweden. From1590, the friendly relationship
of the States-General with France developed into an alliance in which the Dutch
Republic, in addition to subsidies and troops, exported and supplied war materials
to the French king. From the Twelve Years’ Truce (1609–1621) onwards, the Dutch
Republic developed or continued allianceswithVenice, theGerman Protestant states,
Bohemia,England, Sweden and at timeswithDenmark.14 Dutch arms exports to these
states were, as Vogel concludes, closely related to the Dutch raison d’état.15 This
phenomenon was part of the intensification of the Republic’s diplomatic relations
with other European powers and the gradual maturing of this young state. This
process ran parallel to what Barbour calls the intensification and expansion of Dutch
trade, including the arms trade.16 Those merchants who specialized in the support of
these allies could continue their contacts in the arms trade and became more regular
suppliers.
16.4 Products
One of the comparative advantages of the Dutch Republic as an arms market was
the availability of a versatile range of armaments on the supply side. In particular
the package deals for companies, regiments or fleet units of European allies were a
12 The data on the export markets presented here are based on the requests and consents in:
NA AA 2447–2454: Res.Adm. Zeeland 13.06.1584–30.12.1621. NA AA 1334–1367: Res.Adm.
Amsterdam 04.02.1586–21.12.1621. NA AA 1334–1367: Res.Adm. Amsterdam 04.02.1586–
21.12.1621. For Malta see: NA AA 1352, 1354, 1360–1362: Res.Adm. Amsterdam 03.04.1606,
09.05.1606, 20.11.1608, 13.05.1614, 31.03.1615, 19.10.1616.
13 Zeeland with its deep coastal waters and an important transit function in the arms trade formed an
attractive base towards the SouthernAtlantic andMediterranean. Thus,we encounter early examples
of requests and consents to Barbary. On 28 September 1592, Eustaes Trevasche, a Londonmerchant,
successfully asked permission to export 8000 pounds of sulphur to Barbary on the condition he did
not visit any Spanish fortresses in Northern Africa. NA AA 2448: Res.Adm. Zeeland 28.09.1592;
Heeringa 1910, pp. 1108–1110; De Jong 1998, pp. 46–47.
14 De Jong 2005, Chap. 9.
15 Vogel 1997, p. 199.
16 Barbour 1963.
16 Arms Exports and Export Control of the Dutch Republic 1585–1621 299
very attractive selling point.17 These involved enormous amounts in order to equip
complete units. An early example is a delivery in 1592 to a Swedish regiment of
1,500men for the war againstMuscovy. It consisted of 200muskets, 800 arquebuses,
1,000 helmets, 350 complete harnesses (with thigh and arm pieces), 1,000 pikes, 500
rapiers and cutlasses, and 30 drums.18 In the Republic, foreign powers equipped their
recruited troops with gunpowder, fuses, bullets, firearms, bladed weapons, helmets
and armour. These successful packages stimulated theDutch arms industry to coordi-
nate the production and unite the supply of its various components. Starting out from
the customer’s wishes these package-deals were created in close interaction between
supply and demand. The rise of these deals and its component partswere undoubtedly
an incentive for standardization of troops and their equipment in European armies.
How were the package deals obtained? These were produced in the industrial
centres inHolland, Zeeland andUtrecht. The organization of production alignedwith
the supply via the import of raw materials, auxiliary materials and fuels, and semi-
finished products. Merchant entrepreneurs organized trade with the supply areas,
the domestic industry and the export markets. Musket, sword and armour makers
were active in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, Delft, Dordrecht and The Hague.
They assembled parts of firearms from Liège, Brunswick and Suhl with locally
produced stocks into muskets, arquebuses and pistols. Sword makers and armour
makers processed sword blades and hilts, and armour parts from Liège and Solingen
into finished products.19 Bullets were crafted by blacksmiths using English, Swedish
and Spanish iron or imported directly fromSweden, Poland andBrunswick. InGouda
and Utrecht, matches were spun from local hemp or imported Baltic hemp.
Various merchants were able to organize these packages of arms, based on
imported, assembled and finished materials, such as Ghijsbrecht Cornelisz. van
Culenberch from Utrecht and Wouter Buys fromMiddelburg did in the same way as
their deliveries of armour, helmets, pikes, muskets and arquebuses for theDutch State
army.20 Standardization of the armament of the Dutch state army played an impor-
tant role in the delivery of packages and this development became known to foreign
buyers and suppliers at an early stage. In 1604, the German Emperor was permitted
by the States-General to buy 3,000 arquebuses, "made in the Dutch way” and Liège
musket makers were familiar with muskets according to the Dutch model.21
The largest sums in arms exports, however, comprised warships and stocks of
strategic materials. For example, Caspar van Ceulen exported 600,000 pounds of
17 Vogel 1993, p. 14.
18 Vogel 1997, p. 200.
19 Kist et al. 1974; Gaier 1976.
20 De Jong 2005, Chap. 1.
21 Vogel 1993, p. 18; Yernaux 1939, p. 279.
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gunpowder, 100,000 pounds of sulphur and 100,000 pounds of matches to the Vene-
tian Republic in 1606–1608 for its war against the Papal States and, through consul-
tancy of the States-General, free of convoys, licenses and tolls.22 Strategic commodi-
ties such as sulphur and saltpetre were transited from respectively Italy and Sweden,
and from Lorraine, Poland and, after 1622, India. Amsterdam merchants with shares
in the gunpowder industry dominated this transit trade of sulphur, saltpetre and
gunpowder.
The equipment of themerchant navy abroad formeda third category and concerned
the transit of English andGerman iron cast guns.23 Finally, there existed amore small-
scale export of dozens of firearms and bladed weapons to clients from La Rochelle
to Archangel.
16.5 Government Arsenals
Not only its versatile range, but also its relatively short supply lines and subsequent
timely deliveries made the Dutch arms market attractive for foreign demand. Agents,
trade factors and ambassadors supported deliveries with letters of recommendation
in order to obtain the necessary passports. With the consent of the States-General,
these export batches were sometimes supplemented or even delivered entirely from
the provincial and admiralty arsenals of the Dutch Republic.24 The advantages for
arms merchants were huge: they did not have to keep stocks, they could deliver
quickly and on a regular basis, and put together versatile total packages for complete
army and naval units. Therefore, these total packages were also created through an
intensive and flexible interaction between private individuals and the public sector.
The interests of the Dutch Republic were also served: the arms trade served to
support anti-Habsburg allies, generated revenues from import and export duties, and
old stocks were timely sold in accordance with reduced numbers of army companies
and warships during the Twelve Years’ Truce.
From 1600 onwards, a comparison between the passports of the admiralties with
those of the States-General on the same arms transfers is possible. The requests and
consents of the admiralties almost always mention the merchants and arms involved
and sometimes the ambassador’s recommendations. The related first passports from
the States-General only occasionally mention the merchants, but do include per
arms batch partly or complete sales from the state arsenals and the ambassador’s
recommendations. It appears that deliveries from state arsenals for arms exports,
however, only started to play a significant role after 1621. Before 1621 such deliveries
only occurred sporadically. It means that the exports rose independently during the
22 NA AA 1352–1354, Res.Adm. Amsterdam 04.09.1606, 07.08.1607, 23.07.1608. In comparison:
Abraham Verbeeck exported 5000 pounds of matches and 2000 pounds of gunpowder to Venice:
NA AA 1354: Res.Adm. Amsterdam 21.11.1608.
23 The German iron cast guns were also called ‘Suyrlandse’, or of Sauerland origin.
24 Vogel 1993, pp. 14–16.
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Twelve Years’ Truce. Together with the demand from the Dutch merchant navy and
Dutch East India Company, the three sectors compensated to a certain extent for the
falling orders for army and fleet. This prevented adverse effects on employment and
continuity of the arms industry.
16.6 Trade with the Enemy
Tradewith the enemywas awell-knownphenomenonduring theEightyYears’War.25
What was its importance for the Dutch arms exports? As stated earlier, arms exports
to Spain headed for ports in Northern Spain and Southwest France, while those to
the Spanish Southern Netherlands and the Spanish territories in the East-Netherlands
ran via ports in Northern France and the North-German territories. Another detour
was possible to Hamburg and Bremen, from where a transit route, with papers from
the Hanseatic League, or in Hanseatic ships, headed for Spain and Portugal too.
Around 1585, the Dutch opportunities to export arms to Spanish territories were
influenced by turbulent, international trading conditions. After the signing of the
Treaty of Nonsuch on 10 August 1585, Queen Elizabeth had sent English troops
commanded by Sir Robert Dudley, the Earl of Leicester, to the relief of the Dutch
provinces. English garrisons heldBrielle, Flushing andRammekens as sureties for the
Dutch repayments of these troops. Moreover, the Earl of Leicester became governor-
general and supervisor of the collective war effort of the Dutch provinces in 1586,
which enabled him to control the youngDutch admiralties and thus all flows of Dutch
export trade.26
Since 4 August 1586 the Earl of Leicester had banned all trade on Spanish territo-
ries, the French ports east of the Seine estuary and all German ports west of Bremen.
Nevertheless, the Zeeland admiralty continued to permit the export to Spain of bronze
and copper for the founding of bronze guns. After repeated English protests and
complaints from the States-General, the Zeeland admiralty banned this arms trade in
1590. Yet, several merchants continued their now illicit exports, declaring false desti-
nations such as La Rochelle, Bordeaux and Bayonne in their requests.27 In addition,
bronze, copper and gunpowder were transited over Bayonne via sea or land routes
to Bayona, Laredo and San Lucar in Spain. Frequently Zeeland merchants partici-
pated in the transit of these war materials to Bilbao and San Sebastian.28 False Dutch
passports or foreign passports were also used to sail on to Spanish ports.29 Another
method was to hide the war materials under different, preferably heavy, cargo and
25 Kernkamp 1931–1934.
26 Israel 1995, pp. 219–228.
27 NA AA 2447: Res.Adm. Zeeland 28.11.1586.
28 Wernham 1969, pp. 224, 390.
29 Wernham 1969, pp. 439–440.
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to export it under a different name, which seriously hampered visitations at sea of
Dutch or English admiralty ships.30
In addition to these tricks, good trade contacts and provision of information were
indispensable for arms exports to the Spanish market. Regular correspondence with
consortia and trade agents in the Spanish ports informed the Zeeland and Dutch
merchants of precise data. For example, Hans Vlack, a merchant from Goes, asked
his son, being his agent in San Sebastian, to write regularly what types of weapons
and ship equipment were most in demand and to specify their measures and weights
in order to ensure quick delivery.31 Vlack also corresponded on arms and ammunition
with Jan Verhagen and Jan van der Bogaarde in Bilbao, who supplied directly to the
provedor, the ammunition master of the Spanish navy! Apparently, such consortia
accounted for a substantial part of the deliveries to the Spanish armed forces.32
Weapons were exported to the Southern Netherlands too. However, offices of the
Zeeland admiralty and state fortresses, the blockade fleet of the admiralties of the
Flemish coast and Dunkirk privateers prevented access to Antwerp and Flanders.
However, Abbeville, Boulogne, Calais and Dieppe in Northern France provided a
good alternative in times of peace between France and Spain, from here good country
roads led into the Southern Netherlands. No wonder merchants regularly applied for
passports at the Zeeland Admiralty to export weapons to these specific ports.33
However, the significance of the arms trade in the Southern Netherlands should
not be overestimated due to the near location of the large arms industry of neutral
Liège. The phenomenon observed by Israel that the trade in victuals on the enemy
via Northern French ports increased or decreased respectively with increasing or
decreasing license fees on the trade flows via the Meuse and Rhine, or closing and
opening these rivers, probably did not apply for the arms trade to the Southern
Netherlands.34
At the start of the Twelve Years’ Truce, the conditions for arms trade to Spain and
the Southern Netherlands seemed more favourable. In 1610 and 1612 Amsterdam
merchants promptly applied to the admiralty of Amsterdam for the export of salt-
petre and sulphur to Spanish destinations. Yet, the States-General and theAmsterdam
admiralty turned down similar requests for gunpowder export, after gathering intelli-
gence that these were intended for a fleet in Havana and a naval squadron in Lisbon,
because the hostilities with the Habsburg Empire continued overseas.35
30 Wernham 1969, p. 223.
31 Wernham 1969, p. 224.
32 Wernham 1969, p. 390.
33 In the period between 1604 and 1621 no request for Dover in England were found. The arms
trade via Dover to Flanders would after 1621, and interrupted through the English-Spanish War of
1625–1630, increase enormously. Kepler 1972, p. 279, 282; Taylor 1972, pp. 236–260.
34 Israel 1980, pp. 462–463, 489–491.
35 NA AA 1356, 1358: Res.Adm. Amsterdam 15.03.1610, 14.02.1612.
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16.7 Exports to France
A major part of the arms exports opted for France. Only France regularly purchased
large quantities of war materials for their army and navy in the Republic. The civil
war between the Catholic League and the Protestant king Henry IV made France an
attractive exportmarket. TheStates-General regardedFrance, that is to say the Protes-
tant camp of Henry IV, as their main ally and sent substantial subsidies to the royal
French forces between 1593 and 1598. After the peace of Vervins between France
and Spain (1598) and the Triple Alliance between England, France and the Republic,
French subsidies between 1600 and 1609 played a major role in the payment of, in
particular the French regiment of, the States army.36
The French purchases on the Dutch market took place in a decentralized
and centralized manner. French governors, captains and superiors purchased war
materials themselves from French and Dutch merchants. The French ambassador
supported all their requests for arms export from the States-General and the admiral-
tieswith letters of recommendation.Moreover, theFrenchkingordered large amounts
of arms centrally from the Dutch Republic. This resulted in a regular export of a wide
range of raw materials and semi-finished and finished products, including thousands
of pounds of gunpowder, sulphur, saltpetre, lead, bullets, iron and bronze cast guns,
hundreds of pieces of armour, bladed weapons and firearms. Carlo Cipolla attributes
their extensive French purchases on the Dutch market to the destructive impact of
the Wars of Religion. He assumes that during the war experienced craftsmen fled
France en masse leading to severe losses of production capacity of the French arms
industry.37 However, the import of gunpowder, saltpetre and sulphur to ports such
as Dieppe, Caen, La Rochelle and Bordeaux indicates the existence of local powder
mills. Although semi-finished products such as sword blades, blades of rapiers and
armour plates were sometimes exported as well, mainly complete bladed weapons
and firearms predominated in export to France between 1590 and 1621. This proves
Cipolla’s point: the French industry could still supply gunpowder to the French army
and naval forces, but lacked producers of swords, arquebuses and muskets.
From 1588 a major part of the arms to France were exported via Zeeland waters
to Caen, Grandville and Dieppe in Normandy, St. Malo and Rosco in Brittany, Calais
and Boulogne in the North and Southwestern ports such as La Rochelle, Bordeaux
and Bayonne. Consequently, this trade was mainly a Zeeland-French affair in which
merchants from Middelburg, Vlissingen, Caen and Dieppe participated. As was
common practice, the arms trade followed in the wake of other trades of existing
merchant networks. The Rotterdam banker and merchant Johan van der Veecken
remitted money to Paris and sent weapons for the Protestant troops to Dieppe during
1595–1598 through his brother-in-law Nicolaas Quingetti in Paris. Earlier, before
1595, he paid his brother-in-law the salary of the agent of the States-General in
36 Vogel 1993, pp. 16–17.
37 Cipolla 1996, pp. 66–67.
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France by exchange. Likewise, Wouter Buys of Middelburg relied on his brother in
La Rochelle for the arms sales to the royal French army.38
The armed forces of the League formed an attractive sales market too for English,
Dutch, Zeeland and Hanseatic merchants. After Leicester’s political failure in 1588
and the foundation of the Dutch Republic, the English authorities remained keen to
stop the illegal arms export to the League. In Zeeland, a network of spies informed
the English governor of Flushing, Sir Philip Sidney, on this smuggling trade of
mainly Zeeland ships to the League and Spanish territories. In turn he regularly
informed the Lord High Admiral and the Lord Treasurer. The Lord High Admiral
sent English warships in order to intercept these ships, and agents of the Zeeland
traders in Dover, the States of Zeeland and the Dutch Republic often contacted the
Lord Treasurer to represent the interests of Zeeland merchants whose war materials
had been intercepted.39 These correspondence channels show how the trade to the
League was organized.
Thus, a considerable number of French destinations, mentioned in the merchants’
requests for export to France at the Zeeland admiralty, can be seriously questioned. In
1589 three ships from Middelburg and Flushing unloaded supplies and ammunition
in Le Havre, a League port opposite the royal port of Caen. A year later three ships
of Cornelis Meunicxs of Middelburg unloaded their cargoes of ammunition, instead
of Bordeaux, in the League ports of St. Malo and Nantes.40 The timeslot in the
clause of the passports provided for sufficient time, and attestations to be submitted
with the request could be falsified. In practice, the Zeeland Admiralty tolerated
arms smuggling and Meunicxs ship went unpunished after its return in Zeeland. The
admiralty’s ships even escorted seventeen ships, including ones of Zeeland, to Le
Havre, instead of Caen.
After French and English complaints, the States-General banned these trade flows
in several edicts. License fees were levied on the export to all French destina-
tions, instead of the convoy fee for royalist destinations. And from 1591, arms
merchants needed to supplement their requests with letters of recommendation.
Nevertheless, the Zeeland admiralty did not care to enforce these measures. Joos
Nevejans of Middelburg lacked a letter of recommendation, but was permitted to
export 4,000 pounds of gunpowder, 200 arquebuses, 60 dozen gunpowder bottles
to Caen. Consignments of weapons, bronze and copper were also granted without
further ado for League ports in Brittany. Other examples show that also the States
of Zeeland and the city council of Middelburg protected the interests of the Zeeland
arms dealers.41 The regional interests prevailed, even where they clashed with those
of the States-General, and this shows that the aspect of state formation was still
incomplete.
The French king also had financial motives for his objections to arms exports to
the League. In 1591 he tried to concentrate this arms trade in the royalist ports of
38 NA AA 2447: Res.Adm. Zeeland 22.08.1588.
39 Wernham 1969, pp. 125, 178, 224, 229, 289.
40 Wernham 1969, pp. 125, 178, 224, 229, 289.
41 NA AA 2448: Res.Adm. Zeeland 21.01.1591, 23.03.1591. Wernham 1969, pp. 125, 223–224.
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Caen and Dieppe in order to collect an impost, similar to the license fees, on all
arms and victuals trade between his subjects and the League rebels. Its revenues
were to finance his army. The French king asked England, Hamburg, Saxony and
the Republic, and especially the magistrates of Vlissingen and Middelburg, to stop
their exports to the League and help to organize a blockade of the two main enemy
ports of Rouen and Le Havre. The measures of the States-General mentioned above
fitted in this context, but admiralties abstained from enforcement.42 All this shows
how inadequate the organization of the state and the scope of the central government
still were in the midst of all kinds of conflicts of interest.
With the peace of Vervins between France and Spain and the breakup of the
League in 1598, the arms trade to France had passed its provisional peak. However,
France remained an important export market for Dutch war materials. After 1621, in
particular after the start of the start of French war against the Spanish (1635–1659)
and the Austrian Habsburg Empire (1635–1648), arms exports to France increased
enormously.43 This shows the volatility in the exports for arms merchants to an
important ally. Only in 1621 after the restart of the subsidies from France and the
support policy of the States-General from the state arsenals the Frenchmarket offered
sufficient guarantees to large arms dealers.
16.8 Entrepreneurs
In contrast to the domestic market of the State army, admiralties, and Dutch East
India Company, no ubiquitous arms dealers were active in the Dutch arms exports.
Several dozen merchants were engaged in arms exports, but each accounted for only
a few percent of the annual exports. Via Zeeland dozens of merchants from Zeeland,
Holland, France, Liège, the German areas and England exported semi-finished and
finished products from industrial centres in the hinterland such asDordrecht, Utrecht,
Solingen and Liège. Exports via Amsterdamwere dominated by dozens ofmerchants
from that city.
Several merchants temporarily gained a prominent position in a niche export
market. The volume of Dutch arms exports was volatile due to the peaks in demand
that depended on country-specificwar conditions, and ofwhich those exports to Spain
and France testify. Van der Kooy has pointed out the importance of regional special-
izations in the Amsterdam staple market.44 Merchants with specialized knowledge
and an extensive network within a specific region or state were able to respond well
and supply the erratic regional demand thanks to their position within the regional
economy. This offered them temporary advantages, becausewith the end of hostilities
the demand for war materials stopped as well.
42 Wernham 1969, pp. 223, 229, 289.
43 Vogel 1993, pp. 16–17; Beks 1993, pp. 36–41.
44 Van der Kooy 1931.
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Merchants as representatives or commercial agents of foreign authorities that
maintained a highly branched interregional network were particularly well placed
to operate on the volatile international arms market. Paul de Willem, Thomas
l’Hermitage, and Jacob and Abraham Symonsz acted as agents of the kings of
Denmark, England and the duke of Brunswick-Lunenburg respectively. They were
the forerunners of the later more famous largescale arms dealers such as Louis de
Geer for Sweden and Gabriel Marselis for Denmark andMuscovy. A sound network,
experience and a specific orientation on certain regional salesmarkets played a crucial
role. In a sense, in particular those suppliers to major states that became involved in
the Thirty Years’ War managed to rapidly expand their arms exports.
Entrepreneurs with major interests in the gunpowder industry may also be
counted among themore prominent and wealthy arms dealers in exports. Gunpowder
producers such as Abraham Verbeeck and Jacques Emmerix of Amsterdam between
1600 and 1608 exported tens of thousands of pounds of gunpowder, sulphur and
matches to England, Venice,Muscovy and France. Jan Raij of Amsterdam controlled
the sulphur trade to France during the Twelve Years’ Truce. Caspar van Ceulen of
Amsterdam supplied Venice with 600,000 pounds of gunpowder, 200,000 pounds
of sulphur and 100,000 pounds of saltpetre, as mentioned earlier, and temporarily
accounted for 61% of the estimated turnover in the Amsterdam arms exports.45 They
all turned out to be merchants who maintained extensive networks in Europe, traded
in other products as well to areas of their arms exports such as Italy and Moscow,
and as a result, were well aware of the dynamic local market situation.
But these merchants also formed stars that only lit up temporarily in the sky. The
supply of different war materials per region was concentrated at a limited number
of suppliers, which meant that there was an oligopolistic market form. The decisive
factor for those few suppliers’ ability to participate was their specialized knowledge
of highly differentiated foreign markets.
16.9 Conclusion
Arms exports from the Republic increased in the dynamic years of 1585–1621. Clear
peaks occurred in those years when foreign demand rose steeply due to wars. Arms
were mainly exported to Dutch allies: France, Venice, the German Protestant states
and Sweden. From 1621 onwards, the States-General occasionally supported arms
exports by supplying war materials from the state arsenals. By means of a system of
passports, they tried to control arms exports, taking into account the national strategic
interests and those of their allies. The States-General banned arms exports to the
Spanish Habsburg Empire. In spite of all these measures, Dutch merchants managed
to exports to enemy ports through the declaration of false destinations on passports,
via transit ports in neutral territory, and via assistance of local consortia and agents
within their networks. In these illegal arms exports, although probably relatively
45 NA AA 1346–1354: Res.Adm. Amsterdam 01.01.1600–29.12.1608.
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small in size compared to the permitted flows of export, the interests of local Dutch
authorities, opposed to the interests of States-General, played amajor role. Themajor
part of the legal exports formed total packages of gunpowder, matches, firearms,
bladed weapons, pikes, armour and helmets for army regiments and companies, and
strategic raw materials such as sulphur and saltpetre.
During this period, a small group of entrepreneurs supplied the domesticmarket of
the state and provincial arsenals, the admiralties and the Dutch East India Company
and held dominant positions for years. This was not the case with arms exports.
There were, however, traders who, on the basis of their specialization and network
by region, temporarily had a significant share in the arms exports. Entrywas therefore
possible, but required specialist knowledge of the local economy. Some merchants
gained a temporary strong position in exports to a nichemarket as a commercial agent
or factor of a European state, usually an ally of the Dutch Republic. Traders with
major interests in the gunpowder industry also temporarily held strong positions in
the export of strategic raw materials to various European markets. But all this never
led to a permanent situation, given the temporary length of European wars in these
decades and the resulting volatile demand for war materials.
To conclude, the arms exports fell into the hands of a limited number of arms
dealers, a group of varying composition. The structure of the export market as a
whole was oligopolistic, but the composition of the group of oligopolists varied
depending on the region and the prevailing market conditions in question.
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